Honble Farooq Hasan, J.—This second appeal having been filed by legal representatives of the defendant-tenant (Chandaram who died pendente suit) arises out of the judgment and decree of the trial court which were affirmed by the first appellate court also. 2. Plaintiffs (namely, Girraj Sharan, Cm Prakash, Pradeep Kumar, Suresh Kumar (sons) and Smt. Resham Kaur (widow) of Shri Bal Krishan Sharma, instituted a civil suit and sought therein a decree of eviction against the defendant-tenants (appellants) on the following assertions : (1) that the tenant had not paid rent of the suit shop for the period from 16.2.1970 to 28.2.1972 and, therefore, the tenant had been defaulter; (2) that, the suit shop is needed reasonably and bonafidely by the landlord so as to carry on business of electrical apparatus etc. by Suresh (plaintiff No. 4), of which he has got good experience; (3) that, the suit shop had been parted with possession by the tenant to Motiram and, therefore, the suit shop has been sublet and seemingly not needed by the tenant, and (4) that the tenaney has come to an end as the tenant in their reply to the notice denied the ownership of the landlord (plaintiffs). 3. The defendants denied the plaintiffs assertions and did also deny the title of the suit shop of the plaintiffs and their stand was that the suit shop was owned by the temple Shri Dauji Baldev Ji Maharaj. As regards default in payment of rent, they pleaded that they bad already deposited the rent upto 15.4.1972 under Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act (for short the Rent Control Act), They also pleaded that they never denied the ownership of the plaintiffs in their reply to the notice. 4. The suit was also got amended in regard to the plea of comparative hardship. 5. 4. The suit was also got amended in regard to the plea of comparative hardship. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed : ^^1- D;k fookfnr nqdku dh Lo;a ds fy, oknh dks jhtuscy o cksukQkbZMyh vko;drk gS\ 2- D;k izfroknh us nqdku fldeh fdjk, ij mBk nh gSa\ 3- vk;k izfroknh fMQkYVj gS\ 4- nknjlh\ 5- vk;k lHkh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa of.kZr en ua- 4 ¼v½ okni= dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, fMØh dks jí djus dh vis{kk mls ikfjr djus esa dfBukbZ vf/kd gks tk;sxh\ 6- vk;k izfroknh us eqrkfcd en ua- 5 ¼Mh½ vthZnkok nknhx.k ds LokfeRo ls bUdkj fd;k gS\ The evidence was led by both the parties in support of their respective case. 6. After hearing both the parties, the learned trial Court under its judgment & decree dated 8th April 1983, decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction against the defendants-tenant deciding issue Nos. 1, 5 and 6 in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the tenant and under issue No. 3 the tenant was held not defaulter. 7. The conclusion drawn on issue Nos. 1, 5 & 6 by the trial Court and the decree of eviction were affirmed by the first appellate court in appeal moved by the tenants. Hence this second appeal. 8. Issue Nos. 1 & 5 relate of the questions of comparative hardship & bonafide and reasonable necessity of the suit shop. Issue No. 6 relates to the question of denial of the title of the landlord. 9. The concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below under issue Nos. 1, 5 & 6 are sought to be challenged in this second appeal and that apart, the impugned decree of eviction is also sought to be assailed raising a question of partial eviction as provided in 2nd para of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Rent Control Act. Undoubtedly, such a question of partial eviction neither before the trial Court nor the first appellate court, has been raised inasmuch as it has also not been raised in memo of second appeal. Undoubtedly, such a question of partial eviction neither before the trial Court nor the first appellate court, has been raised inasmuch as it has also not been raised in memo of second appeal. Only during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the defendants has raised a completely new question by contending that since it has not been considered by the two court-below and there is no findings having been arrived at or recorded as to the partial eviction as contemplated in sub-sec.(2) of sec. 14 of the Act, thereby it has resulted in miscarriage of justice and in violation of the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Much stress has been laid on this point seeking remand of the case to the trial court for being considered the question of partial eviction. 10. As said earlier, admittedly no ground as to the partial eviction has been urged by the appellants either before the trial Court or before the first appellate Court or even in memo of appeal before this Court. Therefore, the courts below could not have rightly recorded any findings as to the partial eviction. That apart, the appellants cannot now be allowed to take a new plea at the stage of second appeal now can be allowed to set up a new case. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case where the subject matter of tenancy is one single shop, partial eviction does not arise. 11. Now let me advert to have a look at the decisions on the question of partial eviction in different circumstances. 12. In Hanuman Das Vs. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case where the subject matter of tenancy is one single shop, partial eviction does not arise. 11. Now let me advert to have a look at the decisions on the question of partial eviction in different circumstances. 12. In Hanuman Das Vs. Sanwal Ram (1), this Court observed as under: "But when the rented premises consist of a single shop or a single room or apartment the question of partial eviction or he could not be evicted therefrom and it is not possible to evict him from a part of the shop or room, when the subject matter of tenancy is one single shop or a single apartment." In Hanuman Dass case, this Court observed that no argument was advanced in either of the two courts below on the question of partial eviction nor any plea was taken on behalf of tie defendants that the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenants from only a part of the premises; and that neither any issue was framed nor any evidence was led on this question by the defendants. As regards the decision of the Apex Court in Rehman Jeo Wangnoo Vs. Ramchand (2), this Court observed that it can only be applicable where there are number of apartments in the rented premises and where the reasonable requirement of the landlord, may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from only some of them. But, in case of rented premises consisting of a single shop or a single room or apartment, this Court observed, the question of partial eviction cannot arise. 13. In the instant case also, the rented premises consist of a single shop. So, the decision in Hanuman Das Vs. Sanwalram (referred to above) is clearly applicable. 14. In M/s Prem Tent House Vs. Praksh Chand Jain. (3) the question of regarding partial eviction was raised first time before the High Court. This Court therein found that such a question of partial eviction was not raised before any of the subordinate courts therefore, no finding was given on the context by the subordinate courts, and in that view of the matter, the prayer made for remand of the case for the purpose of question of partial eviction to the trial court, was rejected. 15. In Raj Kumar Vs. 15. In Raj Kumar Vs. Mehar Chand (4) where suit demise consisted of two rooms, a kitchen, latrine & bathroom, this Court observed that how could one possibly imagine of any possibility of partial eviction and in these circumstances, even non-giving of any finding by the subordinate courts did not affect the decision the things were very apparent that partial eviction was not possible. 16. Similar are the circumstances of the case at hand. Thus, having benefitted by the enlightenments derived from the decisions referred to above, I find no reason to take a different view as against the one taken by this Court in the above referred cases and in this view of the decisions, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has no force and the appeal cannot, therefore, be allowed on this ground, nor the matter of partial eviction can be now agitated and considered by this Court in view of the circumstances, narrated above by me, especially when no such question or any plea in written statement nor any issue was raised before the subordinate courts. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant (defendants) submitted that the courts below erred in holding that the tenants denied the title of the plaintiff-landlord. Shri Grag contended that the tenant has not renounced character of his possession of the suit shop as tenant and the relationship of the tenant and landlord were not denied, and therefore, cannot be a denial of title of the landlord. 18. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the defendants in written statement so also their deposition stated that the plaintiffs are not owner of the shop but it is of the temple of Shri Dauji Baldevji Maharaj. 19. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the findings concurrently arrived at by the two courts below on a proper appreciation of the evidence and pleadings of the parties, and concomitantly upon a look at the provisions contained in sub-clause (f) of Section 13(l)of the Rent Control Act, I am of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is bizre and barren of force. 20. 20. Clause (f) of sub-section 13 reads as under : "(f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the later has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant." A bare look at the afore quoted provision makes it precise that the act of renouncing his character by the tenant, by use of word, or in it, is itself a separate ground, whereas the ground of denial of title of the landlord itself is an alternative one for eviction. No doubt, denial of title means resulting by setting up the tenancy relationship with the third person. A careful reading of the impugned conclusions drawn in the judgment under appeal would show that the decree for eviction has not been passed against the tenant on the ground that the tenant has renounced his character as such, but it has been passed because the tenant has denied landlords title in his written statement and his reply to the notice of the landlord, by setting up the tenancy with Temple of Shri Dauji Baldevji Maharaj. 21. Upon perusal of written statement, I find that the defendants pleaded that plaintiffs are not owner of the suit shop but it is owned by the temple of Shri Dauji Baldevji Maharaj. It has been pleaded so in reply to the contents of para 1 of the plaint. In para I of the plaint, the plaintiffs averred by giving description of the suit shop and claiming himself to be the owner of the property. In fact, in para 1 of the plaint there was no pleading of any tenancy whereas it was only about the title of the plaintiff which was specifically denied by the defendant-appellant, as stated above. 22. Again in his additional pleas at para 9 of the written statement, the tenant specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs have got in their possession, under a sale deed of the suit shop according to which the suit shop had been under proprietary rights of the idol. The present appellants are legal representatives of the tenant (since deceased) after having been substituted. They filed their written statement on 20 3.1976 followed by another statement filed on 20.5.77. The present appellants are legal representatives of the tenant (since deceased) after having been substituted. They filed their written statement on 20 3.1976 followed by another statement filed on 20.5.77. In para 1 of written statement filed on 20.3.1976, the appellants stated that the suit shop is owned by temple of Dauji Baldevji Maharaj and the plaintiffs are only its manager and, in para 11 thereof, they categorically slated that the suit shop was purchased by ancestors of the plaintiffs for the idol of the said temple and the suit shop was dedicated to the idol whereof the plaintiffs arc only the Manager and nothing more. Similar assertions have been reiterated in paras (1) and 9 of their written statement filed on 20.5.1977. 23. The appellants had also filed their amended written statement on 26.7.1988 wherein they also reiterated their assertions made in their earlier written statements, categorically denied the title of the plaintiff. 24. From the very inception, not only the tenant but also his legal representatives (present appellants), all of them denied title of the landlord. The contention of the present appellants that they have not renounced their character as such, and that their case falls in first part of clause (f), is fallacious. As said above, the word, or has been used in between renouncing the character as such by the tenant, and denial of the landlords title, in clause (f). It means that two alternatives have been enacted to avail or to get decree of eviction under clause (f) and they are independent to each others. In the case on hand, the appellants have nowhere shown their character of having possession of the suit shop as tenant qua plaintiff landlord. 25. The contention of the present appellants that if original tenant has committed any sin by denying the title of the landlord, then that sin does not in herit to them upon death of original tenant, does also not help them in view of the pleadings and circumstances appearing in the case on hand. As pointed out the pleadings wringing out from the written statements filed by the original tenant and his legal representatives (present appellants) who were stand still to their plea having taken right from the very inception by reiterating them even in amended written statements, (supra), all of them continued to repeat their sin which furnishes a ground for eviction under clause (f). Thus, the decision cited by present appellants in A. S. Sulcohnnd Vs. C. Dharamalingam (5) does not held them in any manner because, the present case establishes the denial of landlords title by both, the original tenant and his legal representatives, as pointed out above. 26. The decision in D. Satyanarayan Vs. P. Jagdish (6) deals with the interpretation of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, and the words during the continuance of the tenancy have been interpreted to mean during the continuance of the possession that was received under the tenancy in question. In that case rule of estoppel was considered and it has been held that the tenant cannot be estopped from contending that the landlord had no title before the tenancy commenced or that the title of the landlords has since come to an end. The facts in that case totally different than that of the case on hand. There, the plea of estoppel was raised. Hence no aid can be derived to the facts of the present case in favour of the tenant. 27. In Ram Gopal Parikh Vs. Rikhab Chand Surana (7), the pleadings were different than those in the case on hand. In that case, the pleadings established that tenant did not deny title of landlord and he claimed right of permanant tenancy and in these circumstances, the eviction was held to be not justified. But, here in the case on hand, as stated earlier, pleadings show that the tenant has denied title of the landlord. So, no benefit can be derived from the decision in Ramgopal Vs. Rikhab Chand (supra) in favour of the appellants. 28. In Nanduben Dayalji Vs. Bhatia Ranchhod Das (8), the landlord died and the tenant challenged the title of the heir of the landlord on the ground that he was not the heir of the landlord, and according to their Lordships, it did not amount to disclaimer. In the case on hand, the tenant has not challenged the title of the heir of the landlord on the ground that he is not the heir of landlord. They have challenged the title of the landlord denying such on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the landlord but the suit shop is owned by the temple of Dauji Baldevji Maharaj. The decision is patently not applicable to the case before me. 29. In Kundan Mal Vs. They have challenged the title of the landlord denying such on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the landlord but the suit shop is owned by the temple of Dauji Baldevji Maharaj. The decision is patently not applicable to the case before me. 29. In Kundan Mal Vs. Gurudutta (9) the eviction was sought on the ground of disclaimer of title under Section 13(l)(f) of the Raj. Rent Control Act and it was held that the denial has to be clear and inunequivocal terms. In that case, the tenant expressly described the character of his possession as that of a tenant and wherein, there had been dispute in between the plaintiff (landlord) and defendants 3 to 6 whom the tenant has specifically described as co-owners, and the document relied upon was proceeding in a suit of 1973 which was not directed against any of the defendants excepting the Municipality and no relief against the other defendants was prayed for. On this background after having been examined from the entire plaint, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the facts of that case found that the ground of eviction contemplated under Section 13(l)(f) of the Rent Control Act is not made out. But, in the case at hand, background appearing in the plaint is entirely different. The defendant Chandaram in his cross-eximination admitted to have executed rent note (Ex.1) wherein Chandaram treated the plaintiffs as owner of the suit shop. Similarly, Pradeep Kumar & Prem Narain proved by their deposition in favour of the plaintiffs showing/establishing their (plaintiffs) ownership of the suit shop. But the defendants in their reply to the plaintiffs notice denied the title in a clear and unequivocal terms by stating/setting up the tenancy in favour of the temple of Dauji Baldevji Maharaj. Hence the decision relied upon by Shri Garg, in Kundan Mal Vs. Gurudutta (supra) does not assit Shri Garg. 30. In Tej Bhan Vs. II Addl. District Judge (10) dealing with Section 3 (l)(f) of U.P. Rent Control Act which is completely pari-materia to Section 13 (l)(f) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Law, the question was whether there was disclaimer of the landlords title on the part of the appellant-tenant so as to incur forfeiture of the tenancy. The premises in question originally belonged to one Shambhoolal Jain who died leaving behind his wife, two sons and a daughter by the name of Mainawati. The premises in question originally belonged to one Shambhoolal Jain who died leaving behind his wife, two sons and a daughter by the name of Mainawati. The property was sold in execution of a money decree and was purchased by Mainawati in 1956. Mainawati conveyed the property one Gopinath Agrawal and Subhash Chandra (appellant therein) who was in possession as tenant attorned the tenancy in his favour. Subsequently, Gopinath sold the same in favour of Chhaya Gupta (third respondent therein) and both Gopinath and Chhaya Gupta asked the appellant to attorn the tenancy in favour of Chhaya Gupta. Subhash Chand declined to do so and caallenged not only the title of Chhaya Gupta but also the validity of the sale in favour of Gopinath. This led to the filing of the case for his eviction on the ground of disclaimer. 31. There was also a question being raised, whether there could be denial of title of a landlord, without the tenant renouncing of his character as such. It had been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that there could be a denial of the title of his landlord without the tenant renouncing his as such where, for instance, he set up a plea of justertji. 32. No doubt, question whether the grounds under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rent Control Act are established or not, is purely a question of fact. On this issue, it may be recalled, both the courts-below have recorded concurrent findings. And, the question of fact cannot be re-opened in second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. 33. In M/s Sagar Mal Vs. Gauri Shanker (11), the trial court had dismissed the suit for eviction recording the findings in favour of the tenant and the first appellate court has though concurred findings of fact but set aside the decree of the trial Court by decreeing the suit of the plaintiff holding that the tenants defence was liable to be struck off. The tenant preferred second appeal. This court in second appeal did not agree with the decision of the first appellate court on the question of liability of tenants defence to be struck off, yet the High Court sustained the decree of eviction passed by the first appellate court. The tenant went in appeal against the judgment of this Court before the Supreme Court. This court in second appeal did not agree with the decision of the first appellate court on the question of liability of tenants defence to be struck off, yet the High Court sustained the decree of eviction passed by the first appellate court. The tenant went in appeal against the judgment of this Court before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the tenants appeal and observed: "If the second appeal was one preferred under Section 100, C.P.C. the finding of the courts below on that issue did not involve any substantial question of law. Even if the finding was wrong it was only a finding of fact or at best a finding on a mixed question of law and facts and nothing more." There is also concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two courts below on the question of bonafide necessity duly supported by the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. Plaintiff, Suresh, has proved by adducing his own deposition duly corroborated by his witnesses that he was unemployed, having experience to carry on business of electrical articles, its fitting & repairs, and he has no accommodation to do such his profession or business. The courts below rejected the defence of the defendants that Suresh was carrying on business of flouring mill because, according to the courts below, no such pleading was urged in their written statement, inasmuch as from their evidence of Ramlal (Dw 3) the flour mill was admittedly not in his name (Sureshs) Plaintiffs witnesses deposed that Suresh was not employed or carrying on his profession by doing job at Restaurant known as Happy Restaurant owned by Pradip. Such a deposition was corroborated by the witnesses of the defendants viz., Radhey Shyam (Dw 5). Both the courts below eoncurred that the plaintiff proved that his necessity is both genuine and reasonable that the suit shop was required for employing himself and augmenting his income as the income so far received on wages was not sufficient for him to take the two ends meet. Besides there is also a rinding on comparative hardship in favour of the landlord. I do not find any reason to depart from the concurrent view of the courts below that the plaintiff has established his personal necessity and that there will be greater hardship to him if decree of eviction is not passed. Besides there is also a rinding on comparative hardship in favour of the landlord. I do not find any reason to depart from the concurrent view of the courts below that the plaintiff has established his personal necessity and that there will be greater hardship to him if decree of eviction is not passed. I do not think it necessary to deal with the evidence led by the parties in further detail as the question whether the plaintiff has established his personal necessity within the meaning of the Rent Act has been gone into by the trial court and the first appellate court and a concurrent finding was reached in his favour which cannot be interferred with ignoring mandatory provisions of Section 100, C.P.C. The conclusion drawn by the courts below are reasonable and legal besides being conclusions of facts. The findings do not suffer from any error of law. Despite long arguments no question of law could be said to arise out of the orders of courts below what to say of substantial question of law. In recording concurrent findings the two courts below adverted to evidence on record. No material evidence was ignored nor any was misread, nor it is the case of the appellant before me. 34. Next contention on behalf of the appellants is that their application for producing certain documents under O. 41 Rule 7 C.P.C. was disallowed by the first appellate court. Having gone through the conclusions drawn by the subordinate appellate court on this question 1 find that it rightly disallowed the application of the defendants because as lightly found, the documents sought to be produced were not at all relevant as to the just decision of the case rather they did not pertain to the suit shop. The evidence was already there to arrive at a rightful conclusion on the controversy raised. In fact it was sought as a pretext to get the decree further delayed and prolonged. 35. It is a case of rent eviction duly based on rent-note admittedly executed by the defendants in their deposition so also written statement. There was no necessity to produce sale deed of the suit shop. Rent-note was an admitted document wherein the defendants treated the plaintiffs as owners of the suit shop. 35. It is a case of rent eviction duly based on rent-note admittedly executed by the defendants in their deposition so also written statement. There was no necessity to produce sale deed of the suit shop. Rent-note was an admitted document wherein the defendants treated the plaintiffs as owners of the suit shop. Thus the contention on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiffs have not produced sale-deed in their possession of the suit and adverse inference should be drawn against the plaintiff, is again bizarra and barren of force. 36. For the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.