JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This revision is directed against the order of Appellate Authority (II), Solan, in Rent Appeal No 5-NL/14 of 1990/1988, decided on 16-5-1990, whereby the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Nalagarh, m Case No. 6/2 of 1986, decided on 30-9-1988, has been set-aside. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the landlord preferred an application under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereafter shortly the Rent Control Act). The shop owned by him is in Khewat-Khatauni No. Min. 354/498, Khasra No. 734, Ward No. 1, Main Bazar, Nalagarh town, it had been let out to respondent No. 1 on 15-7-1973 against rent of Rs. 140 per mensem, excluding water and electricity charges. Respondent No. 1 was doing the business of soap under the name and style of 4Ashoka Jain Industry. The eviction was sought on number of grounds, namely, that the respondent was in arrears of rent from May, 1986 and that he had made material alterations without the consent of the landlord and had thus materially impaired the value and utility of the property and that the premises had been sublet to ‘Mahavir Gram Udyog’, a co-operative society, and by doing so, the first respondent had parted with the possession and transferred the same to respondent No. 2 without consent Additionally, it has also been stated that the premises were required by him for doing business with the help of his son. 3. The respondent has contested this application. It has been denied that the premises in dispute had been sublet According to the respondent, there is only change in the name of the industry from Ashoka Jain Industry5 to Mahavir Gram Udyog Samhi. Members constituting the same are from the family of the respondent. The memorandum of association had been executed between them and it has been got registered with the Registrar of Societies through registration dated 10-2-1977. There is no change in the nature of business. The landlord had been receiving the rent as member of the said Samiti and was thus estopped from filing the petition for eviction. The allegation of sub-letting has, thus, been denied. 4. The Rent Controller framed the following issues on the pleadings of the parties: 1. Whether the respondents have made material alterations in premises in dispute, as alleged. If so, its effect ? OPP. 2. The allegation of sub-letting has, thus, been denied. 4. The Rent Controller framed the following issues on the pleadings of the parties: 1. Whether the respondents have made material alterations in premises in dispute, as alleged. If so, its effect ? OPP. 2. Whether the respondents are in arrears of rent, as alleged, if so, its effect ? OPP 3. Whether respondent No. 1 has subletted the premises in dispute to respondent No. 2, as alleged. If so, its effect ? OPP 4. Whether the premises are required bona fide as alleged by the petitioner ? OPP 5. Relief. 5. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion on issue No. 3 that the first respondent had sublet the premises in dispute to respondent No. 2 and was liable to be evicted from the premises. Other issues have been decided in favour of respondent No, 1. 6. The eviction order was assailed before the Appellate Authority, which has set-aside the same. Hence this revision petition before this Court. 7. The short question for determination in this case is whether the conclusion on issue No. 1 drawn by the Appellate Authority is in accordance with law and evidence on record. The case file has been examined carefully to appreciate the question. Respondent No. 1 has admitted that the premises were taken on rent in the year 1973 for doing the business of soap under the name and style of Ashoka Jain Industry, Nalagarh. He had taken his son Shri Ashok Kumar as partner He states that in place of ‘Ashoka Jain Industry, Nalagarh,, there is Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti, Nalagarh, which has been registered with the Registrar of Societies and members constituting it belong to his family. In fact, the first respondent wants to submit that toe premises had not been sublet since the Society Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti, Nalagarh’ has been formed in place of Ashoka Jain Industry and is controlled by him. He also says that the landlord had been receiving rent from him which may have been taken out of the accounts of this body. 8. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti, Nalagarh is a body corporate separate than the members constituting it. It has authority to acquire, hold and dispose of the property in any way it likes. 8. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti, Nalagarh is a body corporate separate than the members constituting it. It has authority to acquire, hold and dispose of the property in any way it likes. It can sue and be sued in its name and is thus independent of its members. Ashoka Jain Industry, Nalagarh is completely replaced by this body and the possession of the premises has also passed on to it and the memorandum of association discloses that respondent No. 1 is one of the share-holders. The body can admit more members and respondent No. 1 individually has no control over its functioning and the occupation of the premises by the body. 9. According to the Appellate Authority, by the constitution of Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti, Nalagarh’, respondent No. 1 has not handed over the legal possession of the premises to it. He retains legal control over it. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that this case does not attract the Supreme Court decision in Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia, AIR 1989 SC 1416, for the reason that the respondents continued to retain the control and legal possession of the premises at all material times and cannot be said to have sublet or transferred his rights under the lease by constituting ‘Mahavir Gram Udyog Samiti, Nalagarh’ in place of Ashoka Jain Industry, Nalagarh’. It was on the basis of evidence that the apex Court came to the conclusion in Roop Chands case (supra), that the tenant had allowed the premises to be used by a social club, registered as a limited Company under the Companies Act, 1956, and had not at any time exercised his right to exclusive possession and kept the premises locked and denied the members of the club entry to the premises. As a matter of fact, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the Sakhar-kheda Education Society, Sakharkheda, through the Secretary and others v. The State of Maharashtra through Secretary Education Department and others, AIR 1968 Bom. 91, to assert that a Society registered under the Act is not a Corporation but is merely an association of persons, though for certain purposes, it is recognised as an entity. 91, to assert that a Society registered under the Act is not a Corporation but is merely an association of persons, though for certain purposes, it is recognised as an entity. The Society can sue through its President in view of the provisions of the Act and the suit must be regarded as being on behalf of members who constitute the Society. It is not every association of persons who do business or carry on trade that can be regarded as a Corporation (See also 1985 (2) RCJ 531, Princes Nalini Rajya Lakshmi Devi v. Mahesh Chander Walia and others). 11. It has been found by the Appellate Authority that respondent No. 1 was the original tenant of the premises in dispute. In order to serve the villagers by promoting village industries, he constituted the ‘Mahabir Gram Udyog Samitis Nalagarh’ of which he himself is a member of the governing body. Other members of the body are his family members. Even if this body has been registered under the Societies Act, that does not mean that respondent No. 1 has lost control over its functioning. Rather, he is the President of this body while other members of his family are members of it. It is, in fact, a substitution for Ashoka Jain Industry Nalagarh’ (See AIR 1975 Del. 117, Vishwa Nath and another v. Chaman Lal Khanna and another). 12. On the question whether respondent No. 1 has parted with the possession of the premises in favour of the Society, the answer is in the negative. In order to prove sub-letting, the landlord has to establish that the tenant has parted with the legal possession of the premises in favour of the sub-tenant. This has been held in large number of decisions. I can refer to cases like. Inder Mohan Khanna and others v. Jai Prakash and another, (1978 (2) RCJ 99); K. C. Thomas v. R. L Gadeock and another, (AIR 1970 Patna 163); Mis. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West) v Inder Singh and others, (AIR 1986 SC 1564; Smt Shanti Devi v. Puran Chand and others, (1975 PLR 654) and Vijay Kumar Goel v Vishwa Nath Sud and another, (1985 SLJ 678). 13. Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West) v Inder Singh and others, (AIR 1986 SC 1564; Smt Shanti Devi v. Puran Chand and others, (1975 PLR 654) and Vijay Kumar Goel v Vishwa Nath Sud and another, (1985 SLJ 678). 13. The aforesaid discussion, therefore, demonstrates that respondent No. 1 has not parted with the legal possession of the premises of which he is the tenant of the landlord The view taken by the Appellate Authority is in accordance with law and evidence on record There is no Justification to vary the same The petition, thus, fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed. -