JUDGMENT 1. - An objection was taken by Mr. Mehta that the petition has been filed after about 18 years of the award and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 2. Mr. B.L. Sharma, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the case has checkered history, inasmuch as the land in question of Nohra No. 5 situated in village Baggad was proposed to be acquired under the Jaipur Land Acquisition Act, 1943 as per Notification dated 15.5.1946 and on the representation of the petitioner and in view of the settlement arrived at between the petitioner and the representatives of Seth Vishwambhar Lal, the proceedings were dropped on 24.3.1947. Thereafter, fresh proceedings were initiated on 20.8.1949 and these proceedings were also in-fructuous & the matter was recommended to be dropped on 23rd June 1952. Thereafter the proceedings were initiated for the 3rd time on 10.2.1956 when the notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 was issued and objections were submitted by the petitioner, who is alleged not to have been heard and thus without complying the provisions of Section 5-A, the notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued, on 29.12.1981. The S.D.O., Jhunjhunu who was acting as Land Acquisition Officer ceased to have the power of Land Acquisition Officer and, therefore, the matter was transferred to the Collector, Jhunjhunu. where also the petitioner submitted objections and the same were again sent to the Sub Divisional Official, Jhunjhunu, who in the absence of the parties have recorded on 19.3.1964 that the entire proceedings are completed any only award is to be given. Ultimately, award was given on 12.4.1964. It is submitted that the petitioner was not aware of the S.D.O. was acting in collusion with Seth Vishambher Dayal. 3. It is submitted that the Assistant Secretary, Education, Government of Rajasthan on 31.7.1966 has issued a letter to the Land Acquisition Officer that since there is no agreement of Vishambher Dayal High School, Bagar, which is a private institution, with the Government as the agreement has not been published in the gazette under Section 42 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 and as such the proceedings of acquisition may not be carried on. Learned councel for the petitioner has submitted that after this letter the Government has not issued any further letter superseding it. Learned councel for the petitioner has submitted that after this letter the Government has not issued any further letter superseding it. On 17.12.1976, another letter was issued by the Government for taking possession of the land and, therefore, the petitioner approached the Education Minister vide his application dated 23.6.77 and stay was granted. This stay order was vacated on 30.1.1978. The Government wanted to examine the relevant record as per order dated 11.5.1978, but the said record was not sent and the forged documents were prepared to. show that the possession of the Nohra has been taken and when the demolition of the boundary wall Nohra was started, there was a roit and an FIR in this regard was also lodged on 7.8.1982. Ultimately. Tehsildar was appointed as received of the disputed property under Section 145 and therefore, the petitioner has not been negligent and the proceedings being illegal, without jurisdiction and without providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and without publishing the agreement in the Gazette, the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of laches. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Prakash Chand Kasliwal v. Union of India 1986 R.L.R. 492 where in it was held that detention under Cofee-posa being abinito void, no proceedings at all can be taken under the Act of 1946 and the objection of delay cannot be sustained. In this case, the documents relied upon and the grounds of detention were not supplied to the petitioner along with the order of detention. This judgment has no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 5. Another judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 (2) SCC 377 wherein the plot was requisitioned for indefinite period and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that reasonableness of the period of time for continuance of the order has to be examined. This was a case where a flat was requisited and allotted to the tenant by the Acquisition Department of the State Government. This case has no relevance with the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. This was a case where a flat was requisited and allotted to the tenant by the Acquisition Department of the State Government. This case has no relevance with the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. Reliance has also been placed on Collector District Magistrate Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, AIR 1985 SC 1622 wherein on account of non publication of notification under Section 4 in the Gazette and publication of notice in the locality or publication in the locality prior to issuance of notification was held fatal to the exercise of power for acquisition of land. In the present case, there is no viol-cation of the provisions of Section 4 as was found is this case and, therefore, this case has also no application. 7. Another judgment of Mohd. Usman v. Union of India, AIR 1984 Raj. 156 has also been relied upon, wherein the petitioner was a contractor who had purchased scrap material sold at railway auction and there were similar other parties. The matter was disputed before the Delhi High Court and the writ petition was allowed by the Delhi High Court. The petitioner submitted that the respondents agreed to give similar benefit as may be given to other contractors, but after disposal of the writ petition by Delhi High Court, the petitioner has made further representation and no action was taken thereon. Auction in this case was held on 31.1.1967. The writ petition was filed in Delhi High Court on 31.1.1972 and they approached the Rajasthan High Court on 14.12.1973 after submitting various representations. The main point in this case was with regard to challenge of one auction for which similar relief was to be given to number of parties & the matter was pending in Delhi High Court and was ultimately decided in their favour and still the petitioners were deprived of similar benefits. The facts of this case are altogether different and hence not applicable. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on I.D. Investment Company (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 1989 LACC 85 , wherein there was a change in the public purpose for acquisition of the land, for which no intimation was given and in those circumstances it was held that the notification under Section 6 was ultra vires. 9. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on I.D. Investment Company (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 1989 LACC 85 , wherein there was a change in the public purpose for acquisition of the land, for which no intimation was given and in those circumstances it was held that the notification under Section 6 was ultra vires. 9. Reliance has also been placed on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 40 wherein the Supreme Court has held that prejudice can be a ground of relief only when it is due to action of another party and not when it resulted from ones' own act. It has also been held in this case that it is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by the court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could to be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon J even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Delhi High Court in Angira Devi v. V.L.A.C., 1987 LACC 623 , wherein in the notification issued under Section 4 the petitioner' land were not covered and hence the proceedings were quashed. The facts of all these cases have no resemblance to the facts of the present case. 10. In Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 it has been held that where the validity of notification has been challenged after 21/2 years, the petition is liable to be dismissed. This Court has also taken the view in Hastimal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 1973 R.L.W. 309 that the ground of delay is not merely a controversy between the parties inter se but is an important factor which regulate the exercise of judicial discretion in the exercise of estra ordinary jurisdiction. The line between two approaches is subtil but it exists. In this case violation of the fundamental right was alleged. The notification under Section 52(2) of the Improvement Act was published on 6.11.1964 and reply was filed on 21.11.1964. The notification was issued under Section 52(1) on 30.6.1965 and the notice for determination of compensation was issued on 26.6.1965 and the notice for determination of compensation was issued on 26.3.1966. In this case violation of the fundamental right was alleged. The notification under Section 52(2) of the Improvement Act was published on 6.11.1964 and reply was filed on 21.11.1964. The notification was issued under Section 52(1) on 30.6.1965 and the notice for determination of compensation was issued on 26.6.1965 and the notice for determination of compensation was issued on 26.3.1966. The petition was filed on 25.7.1965 and it was held that the petitioner is not entiled for any relief on the ground of delay. 11. In Ratni Devi v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, AIR 1975 SC 1699 , the Supreme Court has held that valid notification under Section 4 is siqua-non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of the property. The notification under Section 4 was issued in 1959 followed by notification under Section 6 in July, 1960 and the petitioner allowed the Government to complete acquisition proceedings on the basis of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 and then wanted to attack the notification on the ground which were available to them at the time when the notification was published. It was held that it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. 12. From the various case laws discussed herein-above, it is evident that the notification under Section 4 was issued in 1956 and another notification under Section 6 was issued in 1961. The petitioner had been representing his case through his advocates and was fully aware. Not only this, a notice under Section 9(3) was also issued to the petitioner and the award was passed thereafter. The petitioner had also filed a civil suit through his mother in respect of the property in dispute and has remained unsuccessful. The Gazette which has been issued on 10.2.1956 clearly mentions that the said land is required for public purpose, namely, for construction of science building, hospital etc. of Vishambhar Lal High School. The objections which have been taken were available to the petitioner even when the notification under Sections 4 and 6 were issued and there are number of disputed questions involved also. 13. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he was not aware of the award is not believable. As a matter of fact, steps have been taken by the petitioner from time to time for not implementing the order of acquisition. 13. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he was not aware of the award is not believable. As a matter of fact, steps have been taken by the petitioner from time to time for not implementing the order of acquisition. There should be an end to a litigation and more particularly in a case where the land is acquired for public purpose and as informed that till December, 1987 a sum of Rs. 604025 has already been invested in Science building and about 3 lacs have spent in equipping 3 laboratories. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings were declared void on 21.7.66 is not correct, inasmuch as it was only directed to be deferred and thereafter there had been further progress in the matter when it came to the knowledge of the Government at different stages. The petitioner has also concealed the fact of filing of civil suit in the civil court through his mother. The suit was dismissed and even the appeal has also been dismissed. The challenge to the proceedings initiated in 1956 by issuing notification under Section 4 or in 1961 by issuing notification under Section 6 or by giving award in 1964 would not justifiably be sustained by filing writ petition in 1982. Once the award has become final it cannot be challenged after 18 years and the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 14. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of laches. It is expected that for. such a public cause, the petitioner should be generous rather than continuing litigation which appears to be within any justification.No order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******