JUDGMENT 1. - All these writ petitions are more or less identical and common questions of law are involved in them, as such, they can conveniently be disposed of by common order.In all these cases, the petitioners were admitted to Senior Secondary classes in 10 plus 2 scheme in various schools in Rajasthan, which are recognised and affiliated to the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Ajmer (in short, 'the Board'). They passed their Secondary School Examinations either from the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, or other Boards/Universities outside Rajasthan. After admission in the schools, they continued their studies but were refused to take Examination.However, they were allowed to appear in the examination of the year 1992 by various orders of this Court, but their results have not been declared so far under the orders of the Court. 2. Brief facts of each case may, be summarised as under in order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioners:- The petitioners in writ petition Nos. 2333/92, 2334/92, 2336/92, 2414/92, 2493/92, 2565/92, 2613/92 and 2621/92 have passed Secondary School Examination from the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to in short, 'C.B.S.E.'). As per the Examination By-Laws of C.B.S.E., the pass criteria of Secondary School Examination was as follows: "(i) A candidate will be eligible to get the Pass Certificate of the Board, if he gets a grade higher than E in all subjects of internal assessment unless he is exempted. Failing this, the result of the external examination will be withheld but not for a period of more than one year. (ii) In order to be declared as having passed the examination, a candidate shall obtain a grade higher than E in any four out of five subjects of external assessment. (iii) .......... (iv) ........... (v) ........... (vi) No overall division/distinction/aggregate will be awarded." All these petitioners had secured less than 33% marks in one subject. After passing Secondary School Examination, they were admitted to XIth class in 10 plus 2 scheme in various schools affiliated to the respondent Board, where they passed XIth class as regular students and then were admitted to XIIth class. They continued their studies as regular students throughout. They also deposited all the fees in time and filled up examination forms for Senior Higher Secondary School Examination of 1992, through their respective schools. They continued their studies as regular students throughout. They also deposited all the fees in time and filled up examination forms for Senior Higher Secondary School Examination of 1992, through their respective schools. Some of them have also taken their practical tests and were allotted roll numbers of the examination by the respondent-Board. However, they were declined to take their examination on the ground that in one subject of Secondary School Examination, they had secured less than 33% marks as required for admission in XIth class of the schools affiliated to the respondent-Board. In Writ petition Nos. 1953/92, 2266/92 and 2650/92, the petitioners had passed Secondary School Examination from C.B.S.E., New Delhi as regular students of the schools affiliated to the said Board. Then, they took admission in Xlth class in the schools which are affiliated to C.B.S.E. and passed the examination, But, on account of the transfer of their father, they took admission in Xllth class in the schools in Rajasthan which are affiliated to the respondent-Board. They continued their studies in these schools as regular students after paying the fees. They also filled up the examination forms of Senior Higher Secondary Examination, 1992 of the Board through their schools. However, they were denied to appear in the examination on the ground that in one subject of Secondary School Examination, they had secured less than 33% marks.In writ petition No. 2422/92, the petitioner passed Secondary Examination, 1990 of Council for the Indian School Certificate Examination, New Delhi, as a regular student of Maharani Gayatri Devi Girls Public School, Jaipur, which is affiliated to it. In the said Examination, she passed 5 subjects with more than 35% marks. Thereafter, she took admission in XIth class in the same school, but, left the school in July, 1990 and took admission in Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School, Jaipur, which is affiliated to the respondent-Board. There she studied in XIth class and passed the examination. Then, she was admitted to XIIth class where she undertook her studies for whole of the year as a regular student. She filled-up the Examination Form in time and was allotted Roll No.002109 by the respondent-Board. Her practical examinations were taken on 10th, 11th and 14th March, 1992. There she studied in XIth class and passed the examination. Then, she was admitted to XIIth class where she undertook her studies for whole of the year as a regular student. She filled-up the Examination Form in time and was allotted Roll No.002109 by the respondent-Board. Her practical examinations were taken on 10th, 11th and 14th March, 1992. On March 17, 1992, her father received a letter from the Principal of the School intimating him that the petitioner would not be allowed to appear in Senior Higher Secondary Examination, 1992 of the respondent-Board, as she had not secured prescribed 33% marks in the one subject of History, Civics and Geography.In writ petition No. 2521 /92, the petitioner passed High School Examination in the year 1989 of the Board of Secondary Education, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, as a regular student of Kamla Nehru Girls Higher Secondary School, Indore. Thereafter, she took admission in Xlth class in Govt. Central Girls Senior Higher Secondary School, Ajmer in July, 1989 and passed XIth class in the year 1990. Then, she was admitted in XIIth class in the same school where she continued her studies in the academic session of 1991- 92. The Examination Form of Senior Higher Secondary Examination, 1992 of the respondent-Board was filled-up by her in time through the above school. But, the Assistant Director (Examinations) of the respondent-Board intimated to the Head Master of the School vide his communication dated 5.3.92 to cancel admission of the petitioner in XIth or XIIth class, as she did not secure prescribed 33% marks in the subject of Mathematics in the High School Examination.In writ petition No. 2660/92, the petitioner passed her High School Examination from the Board of Secondary Education, Assam, Gauhati in the year 1990, as a regular student of Sarupattiar Girls High School, Sarupattiar. Then, she came in Rajasthan and took admission in XIth class in the Govt. Radha Krishna Maru Girls Senior Higher Secondary School, Sikar, in the year 1991. There she passed XIth class and continued her studies in XIIth class in the same school. She filled up the Examination Form for Senior Higher Secondary School Examination, 1992 of the respondent-Board, wherein, she was allotted Roll No.250551. Radha Krishna Maru Girls Senior Higher Secondary School, Sikar, in the year 1991. There she passed XIth class and continued her studies in XIIth class in the same school. She filled up the Examination Form for Senior Higher Secondary School Examination, 1992 of the respondent-Board, wherein, she was allotted Roll No.250551. Subsequently, vide communication dated 19.2.92, the respondent-Board intimated to the Principal of the School that she was not eligible to appear in the examination as she had secured less than 33% marks in English subject in the Secondary School Examination.In writ petition No. 775/92, the petitioner passed Secondary School Examination, 1991 from C.B.S.E., New Delhi. Thereafter, he was admitted in class XI (Science-Biology) by the Principal, Govt. Upper Middle School, Bharatpur. This school is affiliated to the respondent-Board. On 13.12.1991, respondent No.3 gave a letter to the petitioner, canceling his admission in XIth class. This order of respondent No.3 has been challenged in the present writ petition, which was filed on 17.1.92. The writ petition was admitted on 24.1.92 and the petitioner was allowed to attend the class; and, vide order dated 19.3.92, he was also allowed to appear in the examination of XIth class. 3. In all these petitions, the petitioners have prayed to issue a writ of mandamus to respondent-Board; to allow them to appear in the Senior Higher Secondary Examination, 1992 and to quash its communications by which they were held to be ineligible to appear in the examination. They have also challenged the order cancelling their admission in XIth or XIIth class as the case may be. 4. The action of the respondents has been challenged by the petitioners on various grounds. The first and foremost challenge is that all the petitioners have passed Secondary School Examination or High School Examination from legally established Boards or Universities, as such, they were/are eligible and entitled to get admission in XIth class under 10 plus 2 scheme. And, any Regulation or Rule of the respondent-Board prescribing minimum 33% marks in all the subjects, including English subject, in the qualifying examination of Secondary School Examination/ High School Examination for admission to XIth class is beyond the competence of the respondent-Board and the same is also ultra vires being arbitrary and irrational. And, any Regulation or Rule of the respondent-Board prescribing minimum 33% marks in all the subjects, including English subject, in the qualifying examination of Secondary School Examination/ High School Examination for admission to XIth class is beyond the competence of the respondent-Board and the same is also ultra vires being arbitrary and irrational. Another ground of attack is that the petitioners made no false statement and suppressed no relevant fact before anybody at the time of their admission in the various schools affiliated to the respondent-Board, and after admission, they were allowed to continue their studies as regular students for two years and in some cases for one year. As such, the respondents are estopped by their action and conduct to deny them to appear in the Examination on the ground that they were wrongly given admission by the various schools for having not obtained prescribed 33% marks in Higher Secondary School Examination or High School Examination. The next ground is that the action of the respondent is violative of the principles of natural Justice. Lastly, in some of the writ petitions, there is an additional ground of challenge that the action of the Board in not granting 1% grace mark while considering their case is arbitrary and discriminatory, as the same benefit was provided to other students similarly circumstanced. 5. In all the writ petitions, the respondent-Board has filed the returns. Neither any appearance has been put nor any return has been filed on behalf of the schools, who had given admission to the petitioners.These petitions are being contested by the Board on the ground that the petitioners did not secure minimum 33% marks in one of the subjects or in English subject in Secondary School Examinations/ High School Examinations, as such, they were not eligible to be admitted in Xlth or XIIth class in various schools. It is denied by the Board that it did not possess the competence to make Regulation/Rule prescribing the condition of minimum 33% marks in all the subjects in the last qualifying examination passed by the students for recognition by it and that the said condition is arbitrary or irrational. It is also denied that the principle of estoppel applies against the Board for the action of the various schools granting admission to the petitioners contrary to the directions and Regulations of the Board. It is also denied that the principle of estoppel applies against the Board for the action of the various schools granting admission to the petitioners contrary to the directions and Regulations of the Board. According to it, there cannot be any estoppel against statute. It was also denied that the principle of natural Justice applies in the instant cases. With regard to the contention partaining to grace, marks, the plea of the Board is that as per the Regulations of the Board, the grace marks were admissible to a student if there was provision of grace marks in the scheme from where he/she had passed Secondary School Examination. It was further pleaded that there was no provision to grant grace marks by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, the petitioners were not entitled to get the same. 6. From the pleadings of the parties and the submissions made by their learned counsel, the following questions are formulated for consideration and decision in the writ petitions: (i) Whether the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan was competent under the law to recognise only those certificates of Secondary School Examination issued by Secondary Education Boards or Universities of other States where the students had secured 33% marks in all the subjects, including English paper for the admission in XIth class in a school/college affiliated to the Rajasthan Board ? (ii) whether the Rajasthan Board and the Principal of the School/College are estopped to challenge the eligibility of the petitioners on the ground of not securing qualifying 33% marks in one subject on account of their action, conduct and omissions ? (iii) whether the action of respondents cancelling the admissions of the petitioners in XIth or XIIth class and the order of respondent-Board in refusing to allow them to take their examination, is violative of the principles of natural Justice ? (iv) whether the decision of the Board denying 1% grace marks to the petitioners on the ground that there was no provision of giving grace mark in the scheme from where they had passed the Secondary School Examination is arbitrary and discriminatory, as this benefit has been given to other students coming from outside Rajasthan? (iv) whether the decision of the Board denying 1% grace marks to the petitioners on the ground that there was no provision of giving grace mark in the scheme from where they had passed the Secondary School Examination is arbitrary and discriminatory, as this benefit has been given to other students coming from outside Rajasthan? (v) whether the condition laid down by the Board prescribing 33% marks in all the subjects including the English paper for admission of a student in XIth class in a school affiliated to the Board is arbitrary, irrational and discriminatory ? 7. Question No. (i): "Whether the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan was competent under the law to recognise only those certificates of Secondary School Examination issued by Secondary Education Boards or Universities of other States where the students had secured 33% marks in all the subjects, including the English paper for the admission in XIth lass in a school/college affiliated to the Rajasthan Board ?' (a) The first and the foremost contention of the learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, is that there is no specific provision under the. Act empowering the Board to make any regulation or rule prescribing minimum 33% marks in all subjects, including English paper in the qualifying Secondary School Examination conducted in other States for the admission in 'Class-XI'. Counsel argued, that section 36(2)(h) of the Act, no doubt, empowers the Board to make regulation for 'admission of institutions to the privileges of recognition and the withdrawal of recognition' but, this power does not include a conditional recognition of diplomas /certificates issued by the Boards/ Universities of other States. Elaborating the argument, the learned counsel contended that once the Board recognised the Secondary Examination of Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, or any other Board, no further condition could be laid that only those certificates of Secondary Education will be recognised where the students secured 33% marks in all the subjects including English subject. (b) On the other hand, Mr. Rastogi contended that the respondent-Board is an academic institution having autonomous character, and it is fully competent to make regulation/rule for recognition of diplomas and certificates in respect of different examinations conducted in other States and this power includes to prescribe minimum marks in any or all subjects for recognition. (b) On the other hand, Mr. Rastogi contended that the respondent-Board is an academic institution having autonomous character, and it is fully competent to make regulation/rule for recognition of diplomas and certificates in respect of different examinations conducted in other States and this power includes to prescribe minimum marks in any or all subjects for recognition. It was also contended that this Court cannot, and should not enter into the question as to why equivalence is accepted or refused by the Board. In other words, the argument of Mr. Rastogi is that the questions of eligibility of the students for admission are matters which are entirely in the domain of the concerned educational Board or University. (c) I have given my careful consideration to the above submissions. The Board of Secondary Education for Rajasthan (respondent) was establised/constituted under section 3 of the Rajasthan Secondary Education Act, 1957 (hereinafter, to be referred to as 'the Act'). The preamble indicates that the Act was made to provide for the establishment of a Board for Secondary Education in Rajasthan with a view 'to developing the system of Secondary Education in the State on modern, scientific and progressive lines' and to reorganise, regulate or supervise such education. The various sections of the Act further make it clear that the Board has been constituted as an autonomous body with all powers in relation to 'Secondary Education'. This power includes to prescribe courses of instructions for secondary education in the State, conduct examinations, publish results of the Examinations of the Board, grant certificates and diplomas to the candidates, recognise institutions for the purposes of its examinations and admitting them to the privileges of the Board and to admit candidates to the examinations of the Board etc. etc. Section 36 of the Act empowers the Board to make regulations for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. Clause (d) of subsection (2) specifically empowers the Board to make regulations for the conditions under which candidates shall be admitted to the examinations of the Board and shall be eligible for diplomas and certificates, and clause (h) empowers to make regulations for the admission of institutions to the privileges of recognition and the withdrawal of recognition. Clause (d) of subsection (2) specifically empowers the Board to make regulations for the conditions under which candidates shall be admitted to the examinations of the Board and shall be eligible for diplomas and certificates, and clause (h) empowers to make regulations for the admission of institutions to the privileges of recognition and the withdrawal of recognition. Thus, in my view, the Board has been entrusted to regulate and supervise the entire work connected with Secondary Education, and it is the only authority to decide the eligibility of the candidates to be admitted to the examinations of the Board. It also has the power of admission of institutions to the privileges of recognition and the withdrawal of recognition. The powers of the Board under clause (d) and (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act and other general powers empower the Board to decide the equivalence and recognise diplomas and certificates of different examinations of other States. While recognising a certificate or diploma of a particular Board or University, the Board can also prescribe the minimum marks in any or all subjects for equivalence or recognition. The matter relating to the decision of equivalence and recognition of a diploma, certificate or degree is of the domain of academicians and experts in education, and it is not a matter of objective assessment or evaluation by the Court. In Rajendra Prasad Mathur & ors. v. Karnataka University & anr., 1986 (Supp) SCC 740 , this question was considered by the Apex Court of the country, and it was observed: "In the first place it may be noted that what the condition of eligibility laid down by the Karnataka University requires is that the students seeking admission should have passed the two-year Pre-University Examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore or an examination held by any other Board or University recognised as equivalent to it. The examination held by any other Board or University which has been passed by the candidates must be recognised by the Karnataka University as equivalent to the two-year Pre-University Examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore. The equivalence has to be decided by the Karnatake University and it is not a matter of objective assessment or evaluation by the Court. The examination held by any other Board or University which has been passed by the candidates must be recognised by the Karnataka University as equivalent to the two-year Pre-University Examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore. The equivalence has to be decided by the Karnatake University and it is not a matter of objective assessment or evaluation by the Court. It is for each University to decide the question of equivalence of an examination held by any other Board or University of the examination which primarily constitutes the basis of eligibility." A Division Bench of this Court in Dharmendra Acharya v. State of Rajasthan & ors., 1992 (1) RLR 335 (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 101 of 1992) decided on April 1, 1992 had an occasion to consider this very question and it was held that a conditional recognition by the Board to recognise only those diplomas and certificates of secondary education where the students have secured 33% marks in all the subjects including English paper is not beyond the powers of the Board. It was also held that the Board can prescribe any standard for bringing them in parity with the diplomas and certificates issued by other institutions. Lastly, it was observed: "We are firmly of the opinion that the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Ajmer is the only competent authority to decide the academic standards for a particular examination and to grant parity with that examination to the simlar examinations held by other Institutions. Thus, we are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Jain and Mr. Purohit, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant that the Board cannot put any condition, while granting recognition to a particular examination held by other Institutions." In view of the above discussions, the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners deserves to be rejected. 8. Question No. (ii): "Whether the Rajasthan Board and the Principal of the School/College are estopped to challenge the eligibility of the petitioners on the ground of not securing qualifying 33% marks in one subject on account of their action, conduct and omissions ?" (a) The next equally important challenge made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that none of the petitioners made any false statement or suppressed any relevant facts before anybody and had submitted their marks-sheets along with the admission forms to the Principals of the respective schools. According to the learned counsel, it was the bounden duty of the Principal of the concerned school, as well as, the Board to have scrutinised the matter thoroughly before permitting them to continue their studies. Learned counsel submitted that if at this juncture their admissions are cancelled, it will cause loss of two precious years/or one year of their career. It was also contended that the petitioners cannot be punished for the negligence of the Principals or the officials of the respondent-Board in not rejecting their admissions at the initial stage. The damage done to the petitioners by the silence or inaction on the part of the respondents is clear that had they been told at the initial stage of admission that they were not going to be admitted, they would have chosen other institutions or continued their studies in the same institutions from where they had passed their Secondary Examination. The inaction of the Board in not informing them at the initial stage and the act of the School authorities in permitting them to remain on the rolls of the school and so continue to function like any other candidate deprived them of any chance seeking admission elsewhere. It was also submitted that the petitioners are young boys/girls of tender age and at no point of time they were intimated by the Principals of the Schools that they were not eligible to get admission on the ground that they did not secure minimum 33% marks in one subject. According to the learned counsel, the Hand-Book titled "ANUDESHIKA" containing instructions of the Board to the Principals of the recognised Schools is not available in the market and it appears that even the Principals, who gave admission to the petitioners, were not aware about the condition of 33% marks in all the subjects, as such, they should not be made to suffer their two valuable years for no fault on their part. Lastly, it was contended that all the petitioners had passed Secondary School Examination which is the basic qualification to get admission in Xlth class in 10 plus 2 course, and they could have continued their studies in Higher Secondary or Senior Higher Secondary class in 10 plus 2 course either in the same institutions or other institutions recognising such certificates without any further condition of 33% marks in all the subjects. Further, after passing their Senior Higher Secondary School Examinations, they are entitled to admission in the University of Rajasthan for higher studies even though they had not secured 33% marks in all the subjects in Secondary School Examination. Thus, according to them, the petitioners are not basically disqualified or ineligible to get higher studies, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel should be invoked in their favour, especially when they have already appeared in the Examination though under the orders of the Court. (b) Mr. Ajay Rastogi, appearing for the respondent-Board, on the other hand, refuted the above submissions and contended that the Board is not bound by the action of the various schools granting admission to the petitioners even though they were ineligible to be admitted. According to Mr. Rastogi, the Board had informed all the recognised schools/colleges about the necessary conditions/instructions for admission of the students in 10 plus 2 course, which were to be respected by them. Mr. Rastogi, contended that there are thousands of candidates seeking admission, and estoppel should not be applied to the Board for the mistake made by the schools admitting students, who lacked eligibility. Mr. Rastogi further contended that there can be no estoppel against the statute and this Court should not give any relief to the students otherwise there will be no sanctity to the regulatory mechanism in the matter of admission in different colleges/ schools. (c) I have given my anxious consideration to the above submissions. It is no doubt true that the questions of eligibility for admission are matters which are pre-eminently fit to be decided by the concerned schools /colleges or Board's officials. Normally, this Court would be reluctant to interfere in these matters, because the academic discipline can be preserved best by them. It is also true that prescription of minimum marks in a subject /subjects for eligibility to get admission in higher class is aimed for better and qualitative standard in education. But, at the same time, this Court cannot be unmindful to the factum of admission vis-a-vis the date and academic session. The approach of a Court in such matters should be, as observed in Charles K. Skaria & ors. v. Dr. But, at the same time, this Court cannot be unmindful to the factum of admission vis-a-vis the date and academic session. The approach of a Court in such matters should be, as observed in Charles K. Skaria & ors. v. Dr. C. Mathew & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1230 :- Whether might be the passion for correct law and provocation on account of governmental indifference, the court, in our view, must use its power to correct error and promote order and not strike down an illegal error without going forward to affirmative action which may minimise injury generally. Indeed, the judicial process, in its creative impulse, must hesitate to scuttle, salvage wherever possible and destroy only when the situation is beyond retrieveal - a life-giving facet forgotten by the High Court when quashing the admissions for the year." The various provisions of the Act and Regulations provide general checks on the institutions and the heads of the institutions recognised by the Board. The Board has been provided with all powers for regulating and supervising secondary education in Rajasthan. This power includes to direct inspection of such institutions and to withdraw recognition of the institutions who violate the provisions of the Act and Regulations or do not honour the directions and instructions of the Board. Chapter XIII of the Rajasthan Secondary Education Regulations, 1957 deals with the provisions for recognition of institutions by the Board. Clause 10 in the Chapter specifically provides that no institution shall be recognised or continue to be recognised unless it completes, amongst others, the following requirements: (i) that it shall be under the inspection of the inspecting officers of the Education Department of the State and shall be open to inspection by such other person or persons as the Board may, for purposes of formal inspection depute independently or associate with such officers; (ii) that all information and returns called for from the institution by the Board shall be duly furnished by the Head of the Institution; (iii) that it follows such rules regarding the admission and migration of scholars as may be laid down by the Board." Therefore, the argument of Mr. Ajay Rastogi, the learned counsel for the Board, is not correct that the Board is a toothless body having no control or supervision over the institutions recognised by it. Ajay Rastogi, the learned counsel for the Board, is not correct that the Board is a toothless body having no control or supervision over the institutions recognised by it. In fact, all the institutions recognised by the Board function under the control and supervision of the Board. They provide admission to the students and impart education in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and Regulations. They are also bound to carry out all instructions given by the Board. In fact, these institutions prepare candidates for the various examinations of the Board under its complete supervision and act as its agents. In the matter of admissions to the migrated students, the Board has issued guidelines which are contained in the Hand-Book "ANUDESHIKA". As per the guidelines, all such admissions to the students are given provisionally by the schools after scrutinising the eligibility of the candidates and they are forwarded to the Board for confirmation within one month from the date of admissions. In case the provisional admissions are found contrary to admission rules, it is specifically provided that the Board shall write to the Director of Education to take action against the defaulting head/heads of the institutions. (d) From the pleadings of the parties and the respective submissions made before me by the counsel appearing for the parties, the following facts are undisputed : (1) All the petitioners had passed the qualifying examinations i.e. Secondary School Examination or High School Examination, basically needed for admission in XIth class in 10 plus 2 course. (2) They made no false statement and suppressed no relevant fact before anybody at any time, and had submitted the mark-sheets at the time of admission. (3) After admission they have studied for two years in most of the cases, and in some cases for one year in the various institutions which are recognised by the Board. They also passed the examination of class XI as regular students and some of them have taken practical tests of Senior Higher Secondary School Examination, 1992 after allotment of Roll Numbers by the respondent-Board. (4) Neither the school authorities nor the respondent-Board ever disputed their eligibility to get admission in XIth class or so. On the contrary, the petitioners were given impression that their respective admissions stood confirmed by the Board when the same were not cancelled within one month. (4) Neither the school authorities nor the respondent-Board ever disputed their eligibility to get admission in XIth class or so. On the contrary, the petitioners were given impression that their respective admissions stood confirmed by the Board when the same were not cancelled within one month. (5) They deposited all the fees and also filled up examinations forms in time, but at the last moment, they were refused to take the examination on the ground that they did not secure the prescribed 33% marks in the qualifying examination i.e. Secondary School Examination or High School Examination. (6) Had the admissions of the petitioners been cancelled at the initial stage or within a reasonable time, they could have continued their higher education in the same institution from where they passed Secondary School Examination or High School Examination or sought admission in other institution having no such condition as laid down by respondent-Board. This has caused great damage and injury to them. (7) If the petitioners had migrated to Rajasthan after passing Senior Higher Secondary Examination, they were/are eligible to get admission for higher studies in Rajasthan inspite of the fact that they had not secured 33% marks in all the subjects in Secondary School Examination or High School Examination. It is against the back ground of these facts, the applicability of 'promissory estoppel' or 'equitable estoppel' has to be examined. (e) The learned counsel for the parties have referred a large number of decisions of this Court and other High Courts as well as of the Supreme Court in support of their contentions. I would like to discuss them to decide the controversy. In Kumari Inderjeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan & ors., 1975 WLN (UC) 328 , this Court had an occasion to examine the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the regulations of the respondent-Board. The facts in this case were that the petitioner Kumari Inderjeet Kaur had passed her examination of Xth class from a school at Gorakhpur in the year 1974. This examination was a home examination and as per the regulations of the respondent-Board, she was not entitled to be admitted to XIth class as she had not passed any Board's examination. Thereafter, she continued pursuing her studies in XIth class. She filled up the examination form which was sent to the Board through the Head Mistress. This examination was a home examination and as per the regulations of the respondent-Board, she was not entitled to be admitted to XIth class as she had not passed any Board's examination. Thereafter, she continued pursuing her studies in XIth class. She filled up the examination form which was sent to the Board through the Head Mistress. She was allotted roll number and was also allowed to take practical examination in Science subjects. Then, the Assistant Secretary of the Respondent-Board informed the Head Mistress that the petitioner's application for admission to the examination has been cancelled. This Court, taking into consideration the provisions in the regulations confirming power to the Chairman of the Board to relax the rigour of any regulation for the purpose of admission of the students coming from a place outside the jurisdiction of the Board and also for appearing in the Higher Secondary Examination, held that the admission of the petitioner was at the best irregular. It was further observed : "It is not disputed that the Board has to deal with large number of cases & allowance has to be made for the inaction of the Board but that too only for a reasonable time. In the case before me after allotting the roll number the Board further allowed the petitioner to take the practical Examination and did not raise objection till 7th of March, 1975. The petitioner was, therefore, put to a great detriment and if it is viewed on practical reality, the petitioner would be put to a great detriment in her future educational career as she will lose years together. The reason is obvious. If the petitioner is now held ineligible for appearing at the Higher Secondary Examination, she will have to sit in Xth class with no culpable fault of her. If the Board would have informed the petitioner earlier she would have gone to other Educational Institution for pursuing her studies which would not lengthen her educational career. In the facts and circumstances of this particular case it will be rather inequitable to the petitioner to deny her right to appear at the Examination, as such denial will bring ruin on her future career and in my opinion the Board, in the circumstances, is precluded from denying the right of the petitioner to appear at the Examination. In the facts and circumstances of this particular case it will be rather inequitable to the petitioner to deny her right to appear at the Examination, as such denial will bring ruin on her future career and in my opinion the Board, in the circumstances, is precluded from denying the right of the petitioner to appear at the Examination. In University of Delhi v. Ashok Kumar Chopra & anr., AIR 1968 Delhi 131 , a Division Bench of Delhi High Court decided the principle of estoppel in similar circumstances in the light of S. 115 of the Evidence Act. It was held as under : "Before discussing the decisions cited at the Bar, we may point out that there are two answers to the argument of Shri Avadh Behari that to these cases, the proposition that there can be no estoppel against a statute, will apply. The first answer is, that as pointed out by the learned Judge, in view of the provisions contained in Ordinance X-A, any admission made contrary to the terms of clause 1 of Ordinance I cannot be considered to be an ultra vires act, and therefore, the proposition has no application. The second answer is that the doctrine will apply only with reference to the pleading of the University that it had not approved the provisional admission made by the Principals. The reason is that once the University had kept quiet and had not sent any intimation to the students concerned that it had not confirmed the provisional admission made by the Principle of the Colleges, that silence and inaction will amount to a representation that the University had approved the admission of the students concerned. The reason is that once the University had kept quiet and had not sent any intimation to the students concerned that it had not confirmed the provisional admission made by the Principle of the Colleges, that silence and inaction will amount to a representation that the University had approved the admission of the students concerned. It is the fact that the University had approved the admission of the students in question that the University is estopped from denying " Then, it was further observed : "Consequently, in these cases, the estoppel operates only to the extent of preventing the University from pleading that, as a matter of fact, it did not approve of the admission of the students concerned, and therefore, at that stage, the application of the student did not arise and hence, the doctrine that there can be no estoppel against a statute can have no operation." Again in paragraph 14, the legal position was further explained as under:- "The position is that if the terms of a statute are absolute and do not admit of any relaxation or exemption, then anything done contrary to the terms of such a statute will be ultra vires and will be void and no person can be estoppel from putting forward the contention that what he did was illegal or void. On the other hand, if a statute having prescribed certain conditions or qualifications for the doing of a certain thing itself provides for exemption therefrom under certain circumstances or authorities somebody to exercise the power of exemption then anything done not in terms of these conditions or qualifications will not be ultra vires and will be said to be merely irregular and to such an act, the proposition that there can be no estoppel against a statute will have no application." Lastly, it was further held that the principle of estoppel contained in S. 115 of the Evidence Act can also be applicable on the basis of inaction or omission. The Bench held : "It is significant that it is not merely a positive or active declaration that can be the basis for a plea of estoppel but also an act or omission can constitute such basis.An estoppel may arise from silence as well as words. The Bench held : "It is significant that it is not merely a positive or active declaration that can be the basis for a plea of estoppel but also an act or omission can constitute such basis.An estoppel may arise from silence as well as words. However, to constitute an "estoppel by silence" or "acquiescence" it must appear that the party to be estopped must be bound in equity and good conscience to speak and that party claiming estoppel relied upon such silence or acquiescence and was misled thereby to change his position to his prejudice. As far as the present cases are concerned, there can be no doubt what ever that the University owed a duty to the students concerned either to approve or to reject the provisional admission made by the Principals of the Colleges within a reasonable time. Though the University has the power of approval or rejection, from the very nature of that power, it must be held that it is a power coupled with a duty. When the applications were taken from the students by the Principals of the College for forwarding the same to the University, the Principals were acting as agents of the University and the University all along knew that on the strength of the provisional admission granted to them by the Principals, the students are continuing their studies in the college and if they are to be told that they were not eligible for admission, they should be told so at an early time. What can be the reasonable time within which the University can reject the provisional admission of the students should be determined after taking into account the fact that they were young students studying in the colleges and for them every year matters in their life and career and the course itself for which they sought admission was of three years' duration." In Miss Sangeeta Srivastava v. Prof. U.N. Singh & ors., AIR 1980 Delhi 27 , a Bench of Delhi High Court again considered the question of equitable estoppel applicable to educational institutions. In this case, the petitioner was admitted to M.A. (Part I) class though she was not eligible as she did not secure minimum prescribed percentage of marks in her B.A. Examination. U.N. Singh & ors., AIR 1980 Delhi 27 , a Bench of Delhi High Court again considered the question of equitable estoppel applicable to educational institutions. In this case, the petitioner was admitted to M.A. (Part I) class though she was not eligible as she did not secure minimum prescribed percentage of marks in her B.A. Examination. After admission, she continued to attend the classes, paid her fees and when the examination was to take, she was denied admission to sit in the examination. It was observed by the Court : "The damage done to the petitioner by the silence or inaction on the part of the respondent is dear from the fact that had the petitioner been told in July, 1978 that she was not going to be admitted she could have chosen either some other career or joined some other university. But the inaction of the University in not informing her and the act of the college in permitting her to remain in the rolls of the college and to continue to function like any other college student deprived her of any chance any seeking admission elsewhere. One academic year will inevitably be lost if the university was now to be permitted to deny her the right to sit in the examination and that for no fault of the petitioner. This is not a case where the petitioner has played any fraud or misrepresented facts or cancealed any material particulars while seeking admission. She had placed full facts before the college and the university." Then, it was further observed : "As we said before if this information was given to the petitioner at the time we do not think that she could have complained of cancellation because admittedly she was not eligible for admission. She had placed full facts before the college and the university." Then, it was further observed : "As we said before if this information was given to the petitioner at the time we do not think that she could have complained of cancellation because admittedly she was not eligible for admission. But she was entitled to believe and assume that as the college was continuing to keep her on its rolls, the university had accepted her application and no objection was being raised to the factum that she had got a little less than 45% marks." The plea raised on behalf of the University that estoppel should not be applied to the university or college making a mistake so as to permit a student who lacks eligibility to continue the studies, was rejected by observing that to accept such a contention will be to encourage and to put a premium on callous indifference on the part of the University officials and to allow them to play havoc with the life and career of thousands of youngmen and women seeking admission into the portals of the University.In K.K. Jacob (Minor) v. The Madurai University and anr., AIR 1978 Madras 315 , a similar question was involved. For the admission to the Pre-University course, the Indian Certificate of Secondary Education Examination (Class Xth) conducted by the Council for the Indian Schools Certificates Examinations, New Delhi was recognised as equivalent to Matriculation by Madurai University, subject to the condition that candidate should obtain 40% of the marks in the subjects of (1) English Language and literature (2) Mathematics or Modern Mathematics (3) Science Physics-Chemistry and Biology and 35% in the other compulsory subjects and passing the whole examination at one sitting. The petitioner had not obtained the qualifying marks in Mathematics i.e. he had obtained only 35% marks in Mathematics as against the minimum of 40% marks required by the University. The admission of the petitioner was cancelled by the Principal on the communication received from the University. The Madras High Court in the above judgment, after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court followed the view of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Kumar Chopra's case (supra) and held that the plea of estoppel was made out against the respondent.In Vijay Ramawat & ors. The Madras High Court in the above judgment, after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court followed the view of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Kumar Chopra's case (supra) and held that the plea of estoppel was made out against the respondent.In Vijay Ramawat & ors. v. State of Rajasthan & anr., 1984 WLN (UC) 534 , after considering the various decisions, it was held that the principle of estoppel can be invoked to a case against an Authority which represents, though under a mistake, that a student has been admitted or that he has passed a particular examination.In Prahlad Kumar v. University of Rajasthan, 1985 RLR 580 , the facts were that the petitioner had secured less than 45% marks in B.Com. Examination as required to be eligible to get admission in L.L.B. 1st year. His examination was cancelled, on this ground. A Division Bench of this Court, set aside the admission of the petitioner observing as under : "It is true that the University had addressed a circular letter to all the Principals of various colleges that admission should not be granted in L.L.B. First Year course unless the candidate has obtained minimum of 45 per cent marks in the aggregate at the qualifying examination. But if the Principal of Government College, Karauli, had given admission to the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be punished to suffer for the negligence of Principal, Government College Karauli. The University may take suitable action against the Principal if it so likes for not complying with the circular and instructions issued to him but a poor student who is not alleged to be guilty of any misrepresentation or malpractice or any fault cannot be made to suffer for the mistake of Principal. The petitioner appellant had studied in College for one year and since the University did not object appearing in the examination by the petitioner in 1982, the University cannot, in 1983, when two valuable years of the petitioner have been wasted in studying L.L.B. Course be permitted to raise the question of eligibility of the petitioner. The University ought to have been vigilent and it is an internal matter between the University and the Principal of various colleges as to how they should see that their instructions regarding admission are strictly observed. The petitioner cannot be punished and his two valuable years cannot be allowed to go waste. The University ought to have been vigilent and it is an internal matter between the University and the Principal of various colleges as to how they should see that their instructions regarding admission are strictly observed. The petitioner cannot be punished and his two valuable years cannot be allowed to go waste. The University as late on September 27, 1983, just ten days before the examination informed for the first time that his admission has been cancelled. The University should have been vigilent and should have informed the petitioner before he took up the L.L.B. First Year Examination, 1982, so that at least second year could have been saved." In Gulab Chand v. University of Jodhpur & ors., 1985 WLN (UC) 8 , this Court held that in cases dealing with the career of the students affecting their valuable and precious years of study, technicalities or legalism should not enter into consideration and humanistic approach should be adopted.In Smt. Reeta Sharma v. University of Rajasthan, 1987(2) RLR 832 = 1987 RLW 757 , the petitioner was provisionally admitted in B.Ed. (Correspondence course), but, subsequently her eligibility was disputed. The Division Bench of this Court found the equities in her favour and directed the University of Rajasthan to declare the results.In Tara Chand Gupta v. The University of Ajmer, 1992(1) WLC(Raj.) 16 , the result of the petitioner was withheld on the ground that he was permitted provisionally to appear at the Third Year TDC Arts Examinations, 1988 subject to the confirmation of his eligibility and that he was not found eligible for appearing in the said examination as per the provisions of Ordinance 241-A of the University. After considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court and of this Court, it was held that it was not open to the University at this stage to say that the petitioner was not eligible in view of Ordinance 241-A.In Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 , the petitioner was allowed to appear in LL.B. Part I Examination though he was not eligible as he had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures. It was held that once he was allowed to take the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowered the University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant had worked itself out and the applicant could not be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear.In Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University & anr., 1986 (Suppl.) SCC 740 , the Apex Court of the country found that the appellants were not eligible for admission to the Engineering Degree Course of the Karnataka University and their admission was contrary to the Ordinance prescribing the condition of eligibility. It was also held by the Court that the action of the Karnataka University in not recognising the Higher Secondary Examination held by the Secondary Education Board, Rajasthan and the Ist Year B.Sc. Examination of the Rajasthan and Udaipur Universities as equivalent to the Pre-University examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore was not arbitrary. Having held so, relief was given on the ground of equities observing as under:- "But the question still remains whether we should allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective engineering colleges in which they were admitted. It was strenuously pressed upon us on behalf of the appellants that under the orders initially of the learned Judge and thereafter of this Court they have been pursuing their course of study in the respective engineering colleges and their admissions should not now be disturbed because if they are now thrown out after a period of almost four years since their admission their whole future will be blighted. Now it is true that the appellants were not eligible for admission to the engineering degree course and they had no legitimate claim to such admission. But it must be noted that the blame for their wrongful admission must he more upon the engineering colleges which granted admission than upon the appellants. It is quite possible that the appellants did not know that neither the Higher Secondary Examination of the Secondary Education Board, Rajasthan nor the first year B.Sc. Examination of the Rajasthan and Udaipur Universities was recognised as equivalent to the Pre-University Examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore. The appellants being young students from Rajasthan might have presumed that since they had passed the first year B.Sc. Examination of the Rajasthan and Udaipur Universities was recognised as equivalent to the Pre-University Examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore. The appellants being young students from Rajasthan might have presumed that since they had passed the first year B.Sc. examination of the Rajasthan or Udaipur University or in any event the Higher Secondary Examination of the Seconcary Education Board, Rajasthan they were eligible for admission. The fault lies with the engineering colleges which admitted the appellants because the Principals of these engineering colleges must have known that the appellants were not eligible for admission and yet for the sake of capitation fees in some of the cases they granted admission to the appellants we do not see why the appellants should suffer for the sins of the managements of these engineering colleges. We would, therefore, notwithstanding the view taken by us in this judgment, allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective engineering colleges in which they were granted admission." In Ashok Kumar Singhvi v. University of Jodhpur & ors., AIR 1989 SC 823 , the appellant was a diploma holder serving as an Administrator/Instructor, he was granted study leave by the Syndicate of the University. Then, he made an application for admission in B.E. Degree Course. On 14.11.87, after the last date for admission for general seat had expired he was given admission by the Vice-Chancellor on the recommendation of the Dean of the Faculty in spite of the fact that he had obtained less than 60% marks in the Diploma examination passed by him. Subsequently, he received a communication that his admission was put in abeyance until further orders. The appellant then filed a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed. Then S.L.P. was preferred before the Supreme Court and the same was allowed observing as under: "It is submitted on behalf of the University that it was through mistake that the appellant was admitted. We are unable to accept the contention. It has been already noticed that both the Dean and the Vice-Chancellor considered the objections raised by the Officer-in-Charge. Admissions, and thereafter direction for admitting the appellant was made. When after considering all facts and circumstances and also the objections by the office to the admission of a candidate, the Vice-Chancellor directs the admission of such a candidate, such admission could not be said to have been made through mistake. Admissions, and thereafter direction for admitting the appellant was made. When after considering all facts and circumstances and also the objections by the office to the admission of a candidate, the Vice-Chancellor directs the admission of such a candidate, such admission could not be said to have been made through mistake. Assuming that the appellant was admitted through mistake, the appellant not being at fault, it is difficult to sustain the order withholding the admission of the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University, 1986(Suppl.) SCC 740 :( AIR 1986 SC 1448 ) . In that case, the appellants were admitted to certain private engineering colleges for the BE. Degree Course although they were not eligible for admission. In that case, this Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the students whose admissions were subsequently cancelled and the order of cancellation was upheld by the High Court. At the same time, this Court took the view that the fault lay with the engineering colleges which admitted the appellants and that there was no reason why the appellants should suffer for the sins of the management of these engineering colleges. Accordingly, this Court allowed the appellants to continue their studies in the respective engineering colleges in which they were granted admission. The same principle which weighed with this Court in that case should also be applied in the instant case. The appellant was not at fault and we do not see why he should suffer for the mistake committed by the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering." In R.K. Khandelwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors., AIR 1989 SC 823 16 (1981)3 SCC 692 , the question arose for consideration whether the appellant Dr. R.K. Khandelwal was entitled to be admitted to M.D. Course in Paediatrics of the Agra University. R.K. Khandelwal was entitled to be admitted to M.D. Course in Paediatrics of the Agra University. Having held that the appellant has failed to make out a case in his favour, the appeal was dismissed, but the following observation was made: "But considering that under interim orders passed by this Court from time to time, the appellant has appeared for the M.D. Examination on the completion of course, we hope that the University and the S.N. Medical College will take a sympathetic view of the appellant's case and having his result declared." In Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University & ors., AIR 1990 Cal 253 , the appellant was admitted and permitted to appear at Part I and Part II of Law Examination, though he-was not eligible having not received the minimum qualifying marks. He was admitted to Final Law Classes but the result for the pre-law and interlaw examinations were not declared. Justice Sharma, (concurring) observed as under : "This is apart from the fad that I find that in the present case the appellant while securing his admission in the Law College had admittedly submitted his marks-sheet along with the application for admission. The Law College had admitted him. He had pursued his studies for two years. The University had also granted him the admission card for the Pre-Law and Intermediate Law Examinations. He was permitted to appear in the said examinations. He was also admitted to the final year of the course. It is only at the stage of the declaration of his results of the Pre-Law and Inter-Law examinations that the University raised the objection to his so-called ineligibility to be admitted to the Law Course. The University is, therefore, dearly estopped from refusing to declare the results of the appellant's examination or from preventing him from pursuing his final year course." In Jaisree Pal & ors. v. State of West Bengal & ors., AIR 1990 Cal. 253 , the students were admitted to Higher Secondary Science Course and were allowed to continue the course for almost one year. On detecting the irregularity in the admission in the Science stream after about eight months of such admission, they were called upon to change the subject as they did not obtain the prescribed marks in the last qualifying examination. On detecting the irregularity in the admission in the Science stream after about eight months of such admission, they were called upon to change the subject as they did not obtain the prescribed marks in the last qualifying examination. After considering the various judgments including that of Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University (supra), it was observed, in para No. 23 of the judgment, as under : "Following determination as made in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University, ( AIR 1986 SC 1448 ) (supra), other decision referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and also following the unreported decision cited by Mr. Chatterjee, I think and hold that the students were admitted though provisionally by the admission committee of the college or the principal of the college i.e. respondent No. 2, even contrary to the instruction and/or regulations prescribed from time to time by the West Bengal Higher Secondary Council, students cannot be held responsible for such omission and commission therefore they cannot be made to suffer for latches and lapses of the respondent No. 2." In Shyamlal Shrungi v. State of M.P., AIR 1990 MP 15 , the petitioners were admitted to B.Ed. Course. In the mid-session, their admissions were cancelled on the ground that they had not passed their graduation with any of the two subjects as required by Rule 1.2(a) of the Rules. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held the cancellation of their admission to be extremely high-handed act and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was attracted.In Kanishka Aggarwal v. University of Delhi & ors., AIR 1992 Delhi 105 , a Division Bench of Delhi High Court again considered the principle of estoppel in the matter of admission of the students. In this case, admissions were given to the candidates in LL.B. Course, who were having less than qualifying marks though nothing was suppressed or mis-stated in the application forms. After getting provisional admission, they started attending classes after paying the fees. Subsequently, their admissions were cancelled by the University. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court considered the law of estoppel as applied in England and Australia. They also referred to decisions of Australia in the following manner: "We may, at this stage, also refer to that great Judge coming from Australia-Dixon, J., and to his two judgments Thompson v. Palmer and Grundt v. Great Builders Pty. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court considered the law of estoppel as applied in England and Australia. They also referred to decisions of Australia in the following manner: "We may, at this stage, also refer to that great Judge coming from Australia-Dixon, J., and to his two judgments Thompson v. Palmer and Grundt v. Great Builders Pty. Gold Mines Ltd. (1937)59 CLR 641 . What is significant for our purposes is that in the latter judgment Dixon, J. took as the starting point for his estoppel in paes, the "assumption" made by the party seeking to set up the estoppel, rather than the conduct of the party sought to be estopped. The forms of "conduct" giving rise to an "estoppel" to which Dixon J. referred to in Thompson v. Palmer (supra) may be summarised as "estoppel by convention" "estoppel by exercise of rights" "estoppel by acquiescence in another mistake", "estoppel by negligence" and "estoppel by representation". The notion of the making of a promise has no place in any of these". The legal position was summarised as under: "The legal position now appears to be as follows :(i) The onus placed on the party raising the plea of estoppel is very light, (ii) There need be no express representation; (iii) Form of representation is not material. The effect is a mere raising of an expectation would suffice (iv) Acquiescence or standing by would be sufficient (Per Lord Kingsdom in Ramsden (1866 LR 1 HL 129), supra); (v) A very minimum of conduct is normally required". After holding that the plea of estoppel was available to the students, the Bench also considered the proposition in case the plea of estoppel had not been available. Lam unable to restrain my temptation to reproduce paragraph Nos. 35, 36 & 37 of the judgment: "35.-Let us assume, the plea of estoppel is not available. Still, should the applicant be allowed to be thrown out ? Should we deprive him of the rainbow of today and make his tomorrows bleak, barren and ominous ? Whom shall we be serving thereby ? As inefficient, if not corrupt, system which has been spreading its fangs year after year ? The Rip Van Winkles who refused to come out of their deep slumber even in the face of the reverberations caused by loud protests of foul play and demand for a CBI enquiry ? Whom shall we be serving thereby ? As inefficient, if not corrupt, system which has been spreading its fangs year after year ? The Rip Van Winkles who refused to come out of their deep slumber even in the face of the reverberations caused by loud protests of foul play and demand for a CBI enquiry ? Those who found it well nigh impossible to even transfer certain clerical staff in spite of pressing demand by the teaching community ? Should we serve them or this innocent student who bought a dream with his time and money ? lie played no fraud. His only fault was his assumption that vistas of knowledge were being opened to him. Must he suffer for this innocence ? Where lies his fault ? How much do we wish, somebody had whispered to the University : Un peu de charite, voyons'." "36.-Yes, Wells is right (Situated Decision making, 63 S Cal. L Rev 1727 (1990) in pointing out that judges remain impartial spectators while hearing the witnesses and going through reports, but at the end of the trial they become agents by interacting not only with those who are involved in the case, but with unknown others also whose cases will be decided in accordance with this case and ultimately they become "situationalists" or "formalists" in spite of their having been trained in the same legal system. John Dewey (Logical Method and Law, in 15th Middle Works 1889-1924, 68 (1983) quotes Justice Holmes as saying, 1 m2.5". "The whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at every point between logic and good sense-the one striving to work fiction out to consistent results, the other restraining and at last overcoming the effort when the results become too manifestly unjust". Though Dewey points out that Homes uses "logic" in a narrow "sylogistic" sense, and himslef advocates "experimental logic" (P.69), let us say, the formalist judge represents logic, while the situationalist judge represents good sense. With respect, it is the situationalist judge we find working in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka Universtiy, 1986 (Supp)SSC 740: ( AIR 1986 SC 1448 ) Thaper Institute of Engineering and Technology Patiala v. Abhinav Taneja , (1990)3 JT 72 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1222 ) and Ashoka Chand Singhvi v. Jodhpur University, AIR 1989 SC 823 . With respect, it is the situationalist judge we find working in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka Universtiy, 1986 (Supp)SSC 740: ( AIR 1986 SC 1448 ) Thaper Institute of Engineering and Technology Patiala v. Abhinav Taneja , (1990)3 JT 72 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1222 ) and Ashoka Chand Singhvi v. Jodhpur University, AIR 1989 SC 823 . For, in all these cases, the Supreme Court protected the interests of the students though found having been initially ineligible for admission. Who would not love to be in such august company? "37.-True, the petitioner has not obtained the requisite percentage of makrs. He is below the expected standard. Let the University polish him into a diamond. In any case, let this "wide heath of Furze and briars" flourish with the Pine and Oak for, who knows, this may lead to the realisation of Keatsian vision of "a grand democracy of Forest Treas". From the above catena of decisions of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court, the legal position may be summarised as under: (i) in matters dealing with the career of the students, technicalities and legalism should not enter into consideration and humanistic approach should be adopted; (ii) the plea of estoppel is also applicable against the educational institutions who permit a student, who lacks eligibility to continue the sutdies; (iii) the inaction or silence on the part of the Board/ University may amount to a representation that the admissions of the students have been approved/confirmed and they are estopped from denying this fact; (iv) it is inequitable to deny the student to appear in the examination after they had studied the course for a considerable period as the denial will bring ruin in their career; (v) even in cases where the admission of a student is contrary to some statutory provision, the Court can still grant relief to him if equity is found in his favour. The present cases are not to be equated with those where the candidates lacked basic qualification of eligibility to get higher education and their admissions are inherently bad. All the petitioners have passed the qualifying examinations from different Boards or University outside Rajasthan, but failed to obtain the prescribed percentage of marks in one subject as required by the Rajasthan Board. All the petitioners have passed the qualifying examinations from different Boards or University outside Rajasthan, but failed to obtain the prescribed percentage of marks in one subject as required by the Rajasthan Board. They were/are eligible to get admission in classes XI or XII in other States or at least at the place from where they passed the qualifying examinations. It is also undisputed that none of the petitioners made any misrepresentation or suppressed any material fact from anybody at any time and they were given to understand that their admissions were confirmed by the Board as they were not cancelled within a month or in a reasonable time. They have studied for two years in most of the cases and also paid fees. They were allowed to take examination of class XI and in some cases, their practical tests of the Board Examination after they were allotted roll numbers. Even their admissions were wrongful, the blame for the same must lie more upon the Principals of Colleges who granted admission and then on the respondent-Board, who could have cancelled the admissions within a month or in reasonable time. The petitioners are young boys/girls of tender age and it is quite possible that they did not know that the qualifying examination passed by them was not sufficient to make them eligible to get admission in the institutions affiliated to the Rajasthan Board. It is also possible that even the concerned Principals of the Colleges were also not aware that the petitioners were not eligible to get admission. There may be bona fide mistakes on their part, but, I do not find any reason why the petitioners should suffer for their mistake or the inaction on the part of the respondent-Board. The equities are in favour of the petitioners and it would be unjust to cancel the admissions at this stage and to deny them to take their respective examinations.I may also consider some unreported judgments of this Court which referred by the learned counsel for the Board in the course of his arguments.In Rajesh Kumar Swari v. Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, Ajmer & ors. D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 707/1987, dated 26-7-88 , the facts of the case were that the petitioner had passed his Secondary School Examination conducted by C.B.S.E., New Delhi and then he took admission to XIth class conducted by the Board of High School and Intermediate Examination, Allahabad (U.P.). He failed in the said examination and thereafter, he took admission at Kotputli in the State of Rajasthan. He filled up five examination form for appearing in the Higher Secondary Examination of 1987 (at the relevant time, this examination was conducted by the Board), but, he was denied to appear in the examination on the ground he did not secure 33% marks in all the subjects. The petitioner was denied the relief in that case as he did not come with clean hands. He misrepresented and misguided the school authorities and also obtained an order of this Court by making wrong reference to the conditions of C.B.S.E. This decision does not help to the respondent-Board at all as the writ petition was dismissed purely on the ground that the petitioner did not come with clean hands and was not entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.Another judgment on which reliance has been placed is Ramveer Singh v. Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, Ajmer, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 984/1991. D/d. 20.9.1991 . It is no doubt true that in that case also, a similar question was involved. Before the learned Judge, a decision of this court ( S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2057/91 Miss Manju Kumari v. Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, Ajmer, & ors.), 1991 (2) RLR 135 , D/d. 8.8.1991 , was referred, in which, also a similar question was considered as the Board had cancelled the admission of the petitioner on the ground of not securing 33% marks in all the subject, but relief was given to him relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University (supra) holding that the recognised schools act on behalf of and as agent of the Board. But, this decision was distinguished by the learned Single Judge on the facts of the case. In this case, the Principal of the school had himself made a reference to the Board and sought confirmation of the Board regarding admission and the Board cancelled the admission. But, this decision was distinguished by the learned Single Judge on the facts of the case. In this case, the Principal of the school had himself made a reference to the Board and sought confirmation of the Board regarding admission and the Board cancelled the admission. In such circumstances, it was held that no question of estoppel can arise against the respondents. Hence, this judgment also cannot give any help to the respondent as the same was decided on the facts and circumstances of the case.The last decision on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent Board is in the case of Dharmendra Acharya v. State of Rajasthan & others (supra). This judgment is in favour of the respondent-Board, in which, it was held that the Board was competent to put any condition while granting recognition to a particular examination held by other institutions.The Bench also declined the relief on equity on the ground that admission was contrary to the prospectus of the Board and he took admission in XIth class knowing this clear position. However, the question of estoppel was not considered in this case. On the question of equity also the various judgments of this Court, other High Courts and Supreme Court were not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judges. Hence on this question also, the decision may be said to be perincuriam. Still, I would have thought proper to refer the matter for consideration by a larger Bench, but for the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka & ors., J.T. 1992(4) S.C. 292 . In this judgment the Apex Court of the country has held as under:- "The "right to education" therefore, is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The State is under a Constitutional mandate to provide educational institutions at all levels for the benefits of citizens. The educational institutions must function to the best advantage of the citizens." (emphasis provided) It has been further held : We hold that every citizen has a 'right to education' under the Constitution, The State is under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its obligation through State owned or State-recognised educational institutions. The State may discharge its obligation through State owned or State-recognised educational institutions. When the State Government grants recognition to the private educational institutions it creates an agency to fulfill its obligation under the Constitution. The students are given admission to the educational institutions whether State owned or State recognised in recognition of their right to education' under the Constitution. (emphasis provided)After this judgment, it can now be safely held that all the recognised schools which granted admissions to the petitioners were acting.as agents on behalf of the respondent Board, as such, the Board is bound by their action. Further, these educational institutions are expected to function to the best advantage of the citizens. In the present matters, there is also no material to show that the petitioners had taken admissions knowing that they were not eligible to get admission. This decision therefore, does not help to the respondent Board to take a different view.The net result of the above discussion is that question No.2 is decided in favour of the petitioners and is is held that the respondents are estopped to challenge the eligibility of the petitioners to get admissions in class XI or XII on the ground that they did not secure 33% marks in one subject in the qualifying examination. It is further held that even if the plea of estoppel is not available, the equity lies that the admissions of the petitioners should not be cancelled and the result of their examination be declared. 9. Question No. (iii): "Whether the action of respondents cancelling the admissions of the petitioners in Class XI or XII and the order of respondent-Board in refusing to allow them to take their examination, is violative of the principles of natural Justice ?" Elaborating their contention, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the action of the respondent-Board cancelling the admissions of the petitioners and refusing them to take their examinations and that too after they had studied for two years or so, is not only a harsh action, but by the said action their rights are seriously jeopardised, as such, they should have been afforded an opportunity to put forward their case, Counsel argued that natural Justice is a concept which has succeeded in keeping the arbitrary action within the limits and preserving the rule of law. On the other hand, the argument of Mr. On the other hand, the argument of Mr. Ajay Rastogi is that in the matters where the admissions were made in violation to the Regulations, opportunity of hearing was not necessary at all. It was submitted that the educational discipline and better standards require no compromise and any violation of it should be visited strictly.It cannot be disputed that audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule device by the court to ensure that an authority should arrive at a just decision and is is calculated to act as healthy check on the use or misuse of the powers. In Union of India & anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 , it was reiterated that the principles of natural Justice are not the creation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 is not a negator to the principles of natural Justice but their constitutional guardian. The principle of natural Justice consists inter alia, of the requirement that no man should be condemned unheard. In the instant cases, the petitioners were given admission by the Principals after scrutinising their cases and the respondent-Board also did not take any action at the initial stage. The concerned schools even did not seek confirmation and the matters were not forwarded for confirmation of the admissions from the Board within one month as required by the guidelines and the petitioners were made to understand that their admissions were confirmed by the Board when the same were not cancelled within one month or in a reasonable time. Cancellation of admissions after two years or so, would surely injure their career. It is true that normally the questions of eligibility for admission are matters within the domain of the educational authorities and the courts are reluctant to interfere in the matters. But, in cases, where serious prejudice to the rights of the students is caused and the admissions are cancelled on the ground that prescribed marks were not obtained in the last qualifying examination, the minimum natural Justice required atleast a notice to them, so that they could have effectively put their case to be considered by the authority. But, in cases, where serious prejudice to the rights of the students is caused and the admissions are cancelled on the ground that prescribed marks were not obtained in the last qualifying examination, the minimum natural Justice required atleast a notice to them, so that they could have effectively put their case to be considered by the authority. In not doing so, the principles of natural Justice are violated.In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. & others v. Kumari Chittra Srivastava & others, AIR 1970 SC 1039 , the Board of High School and Intermediate Examination cancelled the examination of a candidate, who was allowed to appear at the examination, without giving any show cause notice to him. It was held that the action of the Board was vitiated by the violation of the rule of natural Justice. It was also held that the Board in cancelling the examination was exercising quasi judicial functions and it was incumbent upon it to issue a show cause notice to the candidate before inflicting the penalty of cancellation.In Board of Technical Education, U.P. and ors. v. Dhanwantri Kumar and ors., AIR 1991 SC 271 , a similar view was taken by the Apex Court of the country.Applying the above principles in the instant cases, I have no hesitation in holding that in the present matters the action of the respondents in vitiated for violation of the rule of natural Justice. 10. Question No. (iv):- "Whether the decision of the Board denying 1% grace marks to some of the petitioners on the ground that there was no provision of giving grace marks in scheme from where they had passed the Secondary School Examination is arbitrary and discriminatory, as this benefit was given to other students coming from outside Rajasthan." In writ petition No. 2660/92 (Miss Rekha Agrawal), the petitioner had appeared in 7 subjects in High School Examination of Board of Secondary Education, Assam. The total marks in the said examination were 850. In one subject, i.e. General Methematics, she had secured 24 marks out of 100% marks and was declared successful after giving her 6 grace marks. It is noteworthy that as per the Regulations of the Board of Secondary Education, Assam, a candidate is required to secure only 30 marks out of 100 marks to pass in the subject. In one subject, i.e. General Methematics, she had secured 24 marks out of 100% marks and was declared successful after giving her 6 grace marks. It is noteworthy that as per the Regulations of the Board of Secondary Education, Assam, a candidate is required to secure only 30 marks out of 100 marks to pass in the subject. As per the decision/ Regulation of the respondent Board also, she is entitled to get 1% grace marks of the total marks, which comes to 85 marks. By adding 8.5 grace marks in 24 marks, secured by her in General Mathematics, the total marks becomes 32.5 i.e. in round 33 marks and she becomes eligible to get admission. Learned counsel for the respondent-Board is not in a position to controvert the above facts. No reply to this writ petition was filed by the respondent-Board to contest it.In writ petition No.775/92 (Sanjeev Sogarwal), the petitioner had passed Secondary School Examination of C.B.S.E. In the subject of Social Science, he had secured 28 marks out of 100 marks. The total marks of all the external subjects in the examination were 500 marks and if 1% grace marks were given to him, he would have been eligible to be admitted in Class XI as per the Regulations of the Board. However, he was denied the benefit of 1% grace marks on the ground that grace marks are not provided in the scheme of C.B.S.E., New Delhi.Similarly, in writ petition No. 2414/92 (Pankaj Agarwal), the petitioner had passed Secondary School Examination of C.B.S.E. Out of five external subjects of the examination, in Mathematics he secured 28 marks out of 100 marks while in other subjects he had secured more than 33% marks. If 1% grace marks was made available to him, he was eligible to get admission in Class XI as per decision/Regulation of the respondent-Board also inasmuch, as the total marks in the Mathematics would have become 28 Plus 5 i.e. 33 marks out of 100 marks.In writ petition No. 2621/92 (Bhawani Singh Shekhawat), the petitioner out of 5 external subjects, in the subject of English secured less than 33 marks i.e. 29 marks. If he was given 1% grace marks, then, in this subject marks would have been 29+5=34 marks.In writ petition No. 2565/92 (Sujeet Sharma), the petitioner had passed Secondary School Examination of C.B.S.E. In the subject of English, he secured 31% marks. If he was given 1% grace marks, then, in this subject marks would have been 29+5=34 marks.In writ petition No. 2565/92 (Sujeet Sharma), the petitioner had passed Secondary School Examination of C.B.S.E. In the subject of English, he secured 31% marks. If he was allowed 1% grace marks, then, the total marks in this subject would become 31+5 i.e. 36 marks, out of 100 marks.The above petitioners, who passed Secondary School Examinations from C.B.S.E., New Delhi were denied 1% grace marks of the total marks on the ground that there was no provision of giving grace marks in that scheme. The contention of the learned counsel is that there is no nexus or basis for classification to discriminate these petitioners with other students to whom 1% grace marks were given. According to learned counsel, the Regulation of the respondent-Board itself provides to grant 1% grace marks to the students, who passed Secondary School Examination/High School Examination from outside if in the scheme of the said qualifying examination, there is a provision to grant such grace marks, but this benefit is denied to other students like the petitioners in writ petitions No.775/92, 2414/92, 2621/92 and 2565/92, on the ground that there is no provision for providing grace marks in the scheme of case. There should be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object to be achieved, which is wanting in the instant cases. The learned counsel for the Board could not point out the nexus or the basis for this classification. Two candidates migrating from outside to seek admission in the schools which are affiliated to the respondent-Board, are being differently treated in the matter of granting grace marks. The classification is not founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes students migrated to Rajasthan for further studies. In my view, the different treatment given to such students is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is also irrational and the above petitioners were wrongly denied the benefit of grace marks. If this benefit is given to them, they become eligible to get admission in Class-XI. Hence, this question is answered in favour of the petitioners. 11. In my view, the different treatment given to such students is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is also irrational and the above petitioners were wrongly denied the benefit of grace marks. If this benefit is given to them, they become eligible to get admission in Class-XI. Hence, this question is answered in favour of the petitioners. 11. Question No. (v) : "Whether the condition laid down by the respondent-Board prescribing 33% in all the subjects including the English paper for admission of a student in Class-XI in a School affiliated to it, is arbitrary, irrational and discriminatory ?" Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that once the respondent-Board has given recognition to an equivalent examination of C.B.S.E. or Board of Secondary Education of other States, the imposition of the above condition is arbitrary and irrational. As such, the condition is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.Learned counsel argued that 10 plus 2 scheme was introduced in the year 1986 throughout the country in pursuance to the national policy on education. According to them, the concept of national system of education lays the greatest emphasis on elimination of disparities in the educational system and to develop national integration and adherence to certain national values and concerns. In pursuance to the national policy, the Board of Secondary Education in different States have introduced 10 plus 2 scheme. Therefore, if a certificate of pass issued by one Board is not honoured/recognised by another Board by prescribing minimum percentage of marks in the subjects, the same is arbitrary, irrational and against the basic core of national policy on education. They also argued that the boys seeking admission in Class-XI are of tender age and they have to shift from one State to another State along with their parents for several reasons, for example, due to transfer, shifting of business, to seek employment or disturbances, violence, threat of terrorism in some States. I would have considered this aspect more deeply but for the reason that my brother Judge Mr. I would have considered this aspect more deeply but for the reason that my brother Judge Mr. Calla has already considered this argument in ( Bimlesh Agarwal v. Board of Secondary Education, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 644/91, decided on 13.3.1992 , wherein, it has been held as under: "These boys along with the parents have to shift not only for the reason of their employment or otherwise but also because of the situations which are prevailing in different States on account of disturbances, violence and threat of terrorism whether from Punjab, Assam or J & K or may be any other State for that purpose and shifting in such cases has an adverse impact on the career of the students all over the country. While dealing with the cases of this nature the matters cannot be examined bereft of the present context and the atmosphere of uncertainty faced by students. The law cannot be applied in vacuum, it has to be applied in national context and the fact situation obtaining all over the country. In the back-drop of these facts, I am of the considered opinion that the requirement of obtaining 33% marks in each of the subjects is wholly arbitrary; it is unreasonable and irrational, rather it is an oppressive requirement against the students as well as the parents and, therefore, this requirement cannot be sustained in the eye of law whether it has been prescribed in the regulation or otherwise." Once this view stands, the order of the respondent - Board cancelling the admissions of the petitioners on the ground of not securing the prescribed 33% marks in the subject in the qualifying Secondary School Examination and the order denying them to appear in the examinations on that ground is not sustainable. Hence, this question is also answered in favour of the petitioners. 12. The net result of the above discussions is, that the orders passed by the respondent-Board/Principals of the Schools cancelling the admissions of the petitioner in Class XI or XII and denying them to take their respective examinations are liable to be quashed and the same are hereby quashed and set aside. All the petitioners have appeared in their respective examinations under the orders of this Court, as such, the respondents are directed to declare the result forthwith. All the petitioners have appeared in their respective examinations under the orders of this Court, as such, the respondents are directed to declare the result forthwith. The successful petitioners shall be entitled to take admission in the higher course and their case for admission in higher classes shall be considered sympathetically by the concerned authorities even if the last date of admission has expired, as they should not be deprived to get admission simply because the writ petitions are decided a few days after the closure of the admissions. The petitioners shall be entitled to get the cost of this writ petition from the Principals of the respective schools which is quantified Rs. 500/- in each case. 13. Before parting with, I would like to express few works of concern that school going boys/girls, like the petitioners have been subjected to great mental agony and torture on account of serious lapses and omissions on the part of the respondents for deciding the question of admissions after two years or so. The respondent-Board is competent to de-recognise any institution affiliated to it if the head of the institution does not follow its instructions and Regulations properly and in time, so that the fate of the students may not be kept in lurch for a considerable period. The respondent-Board cannot plead alibi stating that it is a toothless body and cannot punish the defaulting institutions or their heads. Under the Act and Regulations, the Board has wide powers including the power to de-recognise the institution. I hope and trust that in future, the Board will come out as an institution with promptitude in its action and decision instead of pleading helplessness.Petition allowed. *******