JUDGMENT : B.L. Yadav, J. These analogous Appeals and Civil Revision involve similar questions for determination, hence it is convenient to dispose them of by a common judgment. 2. Defendant's First Appeal No. 172 of 1983 arises out of Original suit No. 17 of 1977 (for short first suit). Plaintiff's First Appeal No. 148 of 1983 arises out of Original suit No. 19 of 1982 (for short second suit). This second suit was filed for declaration that Plaintiffs were co-owners of the land in dispute along with Someshwar Nath Bhargava, the Defendant No. 1. First Appeal No. 172 of 1983 would, however, be the leading appeal. 3. Both the appeals have been filed against the common decree dated 3rd January 1983, pissed by the Addl. Civil Judge, Allahabad, decreeing the first suit filed by Smt. Kusum Kumari and dismissing the second suit filed by Parmeshwar Nath. The first suit was filed by Smt. Kusum Kumari against Someshwar Nath Bhargava, for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 24-2-1977 with the allegations that Defendant Appellant agreed to sell western portion of No. 12 (New No. 16) Mayo Road Allahabad, to the Plaintiff Respondent for a consideration of Rs. 99889/- out of which a sum of Rs. 5000/- was paid in cash to the detendant as part payments of sale consideration and balance was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed and the Defendant stated in the agreement that he has purchased the property in question by a sale deed dated 13-11-63 along with Radhakant and Ramendranath Bose and there has been oral partition between Someshwarnath Bhargava and Radhakant Bhargava and that the Defendant in the first suit is in possession of separate portion in respect of which he has agreed to execute the sale deed. As the land was not yielding any income rather lying vacant and the Plaintiff offered the highest price hence he agreed to execute the agreement for sale and later on he would execute sale deed within 2 months from the date the name of the Defendant in the first suit was mutated over the said property. Before that he would satisfy the Plaintiff in the first suit, about his right to transfer. Before that he would satisfy the Plaintiff in the first suit, about his right to transfer. The mutation was effected in the name of the Defendant Appellant in the first suit on 20-11-73 nevertheless he did not inform the Plaintiff about his name being mutated. Immediately after coming to know about the order of mutation in favour of Defendant Appellant in the first suit, notice was sent to the Defendant on 26-11-76 to the effect that Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and the Plaintiff was ready to pay balance of the sale consideration and Defendant was directed to execute the sale deed but after receipt of the said notice the Defendant furnished incorrect information and replied incorrectly Then second notice was given directing the Defendant Appellant to perform his part of the contract. Inspite of service of the second notice the Defendant Appellant did not execute the sale deed, as agreed upon, hence the Plaintiff had no option but to file the suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale. 4. The Defendant Appellant, in the first suit, contested it with the averments that the agreement for sale dated 24-2-72 was obtained by the Plaintiff Respondent by misrepresentation, coersion and perpetuating fraud and the -said transaction was void and not enforceable in law. The property in suit was Joint Hindu Family property acquired out of joint Hindu Family nucleus and his sons had interest in the property in question and the Defendant had informed the Plaintiff about this fact. As other members of the Joint Hindu Family, particularly his sons, Plaintiffs in the second suit, had not entered into agreement nor had signed agreement for sale hence the same was not enforceable in law. The property in suit being Nazul land there could be no agreement for sale without permission of the District Magistrate. The Plaintiff Respondent in the first suit did not aver or prove that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract hence suit was barred by Section 16-C of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The agreement was unfair and illegal and not enforceable. The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. Plaintiffs of second suit The suit was barred by time and was not maintainable in the absence of exemption from ceiling under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976. The agreement was unfair and illegal and not enforceable. The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. Plaintiffs of second suit The suit was barred by time and was not maintainable in the absence of exemption from ceiling under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976. 5. The second suit was filed by the sons of Defendant in the first suit with the allegations that they were members of Joint Hindu family and the property in suit was acquired by the Joint Hindu Family nucleus hence the Defendant of first suit, Someshwarnath Bhargava, father of the Plaintiffs in the second suit, alone did not have any right to enter into agreement for sale nor there was any legal necessity nor the agreement for sale was for the benefit of the estate. The sale considertion was inadequate and the Defendant in the first suit Someshwar Nath Bhargava, father of the Plaintiffs in the second suit had no right to execute any agreement for sale. 6. The second suit was contested by Smt. Kusum Kumari, Defendant in the second suit and Plaintiff in the first suit, on the ground that Some shwarnath Bhargava has got all legal rights to execute agreement for sale. As after execution of the agreement for sale, the prices of the land had gone much high hence the Defendant Appellant in the first suit, and the Plaintiffs in the second suit wanted to back out the agreement for sale and in furtherence of this object second suit was filed. First suit was neither barred by time nor by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act 1963. 7. Trial court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 3-1-83 decreed first suit for specific performance of the contract and dismissed the second suit, with the findings that the permission of the District Magistrate was not necessary before executing the agreement for sale or executing the sale deed as the land in suit was occupancy tenancy and not the Nazul land. In case it was assumed that it was essential to obtain the permission the Defendant of the first suit may be directed to obtain requisite permission of the District Magistrate. The Defendant in the first suit is the sole owner of the land in suit, the sons of Defendant in the first suit and Plaintiffs in the second suit cannot be assumed, to be co-owners. The Defendant in the first suit is the sole owner of the land in suit, the sons of Defendant in the first suit and Plaintiffs in the second suit cannot be assumed, to be co-owners. The transaction was for the benefit of the estate and the agreement for sale was presumed to have been made on behalf of the members of joint Hindu family and was also binding on the Plaintiffs of the second suit. After appreciating oral and documentary evidence it was held that the Defendant in the first suit cannot 'say that he did not make the agreement as Karta of the Joint Hindu family, rather the agreement for sale has been made with the consent of his sons and that suit was not barred by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act and suit was within time and the suit was not barred by estoppel and acquisance. 8. Civil Revision No. 787 of 1990 u/s 115 of CPC (for short the Code) has been filed by the Defendant in the first suit, Someshwarnath Bhargava against Ram Govind Misra (the husband of Smt. Kusum Kumari Plaintiff of first suit) challenging order dated 21-8-1990 passed by Execution court allowing amendment in the execution application by adding relief of possession. 9. Mr. S.K Verma, learned Counsel for the Appellants in both the appeals and applicant in the Revision vehemently urged with all clarity of expression, that first suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 54 of Limitation Act 1963 (for short the Act) as it was filed after 3 years from the date of refusal to perfrom his part of the contract by the Defendant in the first suit. In support of this point reliance was placed on Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni and Others Vs. Balaji Ganesh Kulkarni and Others, AIR 1976 Bom 342 : (1976) MhLj 224, Manick Lal Seal and Another Vs. K.P. Chowdhury, AIR 1976 Cal 115 10. The suit was barred by Sections 14 and 16-C of Specific relief Act 1963 as the Plaintiff in the first suit neither averred nor proved that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. Reliance was placed on Bageshwari Prasad Dwivedi v. Deopati Kuer AIR 1961 Pat 416 , S. Wajid Ali Vs. Mt. Isar Bano Urf Isar Fatma, AIR 1951 All 64 , Mannan Lal Vs. Chhotaka Bibi, (Dead) by Lrs. Reliance was placed on Bageshwari Prasad Dwivedi v. Deopati Kuer AIR 1961 Pat 416 , S. Wajid Ali Vs. Mt. Isar Bano Urf Isar Fatma, AIR 1951 All 64 , Mannan Lal Vs. Chhotaka Bibi, (Dead) by Lrs. B. Sharda Shankar and Others, (1970) 1 SCC 769 , Mahmood Khan v. Ayub Khan AIR 1978 Alld 463, Suraj Singh v. Sohan Lal AIR 1978 All. 330. 11. In the absence of permission of the District Magistrate in respect of land in suit which as Nazul land, execution of the sale deed was not possible and the oral evidence led by the Plaintiff in the first suit was not reliable but the court below erred in relying upon the same. The plaint in the first suit was filed on 17-1-78 with a deficient court fee of Rs. 100/- only, suit was registered on 27-1-1977 when Munsarim reported deficiency in court fee but there was no order of the court for making the deficiency good and making the deficiency good without any order of the court would not enure for the plaintiffs' benefit as Section 149 of the Code is to be interpreted as proviso to Section 6 of the Court Fees Act as amended in its application to the State of U.P. and that the agreement for sale was fraudulent, Someshwar Nath Bhargava. Defendant of the first suit and Plaintiffs of second suit were members of Joint Hindu Family and the agreement for sale was not for the legal necessity or for the benefit of the Estate hence the same would not be binding on all members of coparcenary (Plaintiffs in the second suit) including the Karta (Defendant in the first suit). 12. In civil revision it was urged that the relief for possession could not have been allowed to be added at the time of execution particularly when the same was absent in the original suit. 13. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned Counsel for the Respondent in both the appeals and opposite party in the revision urged that the suit was well within time as it was filed within three years from the date of knowledge of refusal by the Defendant in the first suit to perform her part of the contract. It is to be noticed that no date of refusal was given by the Defendant in the first suit and Plaintiffs in the second suit. It is to be noticed that no date of refusal was given by the Defendant in the first suit and Plaintiffs in the second suit. Last clause of Article 54 of the Act was relevant to be interpreted and the cardinal principles of interpretation pertaining to the counting of the limitation was that it is to be liberally construed so that the cause of action for suit may remain alive unless the word employed indicate otherwise. In any case, in the written statement the Defendant in the first suit, and the Plaintiffs in the second suit, did not plead specific facts necessary to prove that the suit was barred by time. Time was not essence of the contract even if it was mentioned in the agreement for sale. 14. In respect of plea about the fraud, misrepresentation and coersion, the Defendant in the first suit did not give particulars and details as required by order 6 Rule 4 of the Code. It was urged that the suit was not barred by Sections 14 and 16-C of Specific Relief Act in as much as Plaintiff in the first suit specifically stated in para 10 of the plaint that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract but Defendant in the first suit has just denied in para 10 of the written statement and only this much was stated that the Plaintiff had failed to perform her part of the contract and is not entitled to any relief. It is to be noticed that the readiness and willingness of the Plaintiff as envisaged by Section 16-C of Specific Relief Act was not denied in the written statement hence it would be deemed to have been admitted in view of Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code, specially when second notice was also sent, by the Plaintiff of the first suit, to the Defendant of the first suit consistent with the CPC Form No. 47 and 48. 15. 15. The suit was not barred by Section 14 of Specific Relief Act in as much as Section 14 deals with the contracts not specifically enforceable, and a contract for non performance of which compensation in terms of money was adequate relief, that cannot be specially enforced, but in the present case contract for transfer of immovable property was involved and in view of Explanation 1 of Section 10 breach of contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately compensated in terms of money hence Section 14 would not operate as bar. Further there was no evidence led by the Defendant of the first suit in support of this plea. As the land in dispute was occupancy tenancy and not Nazul Land hence permission of the District Magistrate was not necessary. In any case, it was for the Defendant of the first suit to obtain permission if any. Further refusal to execute sale deed for want of permission would not amount to refusal. It just shows inability of the Defendant till 28-1-75 to execute the sale deed. 16. The land in dispute was self acquired property of Someshwarnath Bhargava and it was not acquired with the nucleus of joint Hindu family. The land in suit was purchased by Someshwarnath Bhargava along with Radhakant on 18-11-63 and in that sale deed it was not stated that Someshwarnath Bhargava was purchasing it from the Joint Hindu Family nucleus nor in the agreement for sale dated 24-2-72 it was stated that land in suit was acquired with the Joint Hindu Family nucleus 17. The land in suit was purchased by Someshwarnath Bhargava along with Radhakant on 18-11-63 and in that sale deed it was not stated that Someshwarnath Bhargava was purchasing it from the Joint Hindu Family nucleus nor in the agreement for sale dated 24-2-72 it was stated that land in suit was acquired with the Joint Hindu Family nucleus 17. The plaint was filed on 17-1-78 (vide page 38 of the paper book) and deficiency in the court fee was made good on 20-1-78 on the report of Munsarim even before the order of the court and the suit was treated to have been filed on 17-1-78 u/s 149 of the Code even if the court fee was not paid within time the court in its discretion, at any stage allow the Plaintiff to make the deficiency good in the court fee either in whole or in part and upon such payment it would date back to the date of presentation and such plaint would have same force and effect as if the court fee has been paid in the first instance, hence this section could not be said to be a proviso to Section 6 of the Court fees Act and even if there was some deficiency in court fee the same could have been made good by the order of the Court u/s 149 of the Code. Oral evidence has correctly been considered and even if two views were possible, the appellate court would have no justification to reappreciate the oral evidence as the trial court has occasion to see the demeanour of the witnesses. 18. In revision it was urged that in a suit for specific performance of the contract as the suit was decreed, the sale deed was to be executed by the court and even if the relief for possession was not sought in the plaint, same could be added even at the execution stage. So that complete justice between the parties may be done, consequently revision and both the appeals are liable to be dismissed. 19. So that complete justice between the parties may be done, consequently revision and both the appeals are liable to be dismissed. 19. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties points for determination whether first suit was time barred and whether the suit was barred by Sections 14 and 16-C of the Specific Relief Act, whether the deficiency made good without the order of the court would enure for the benefit of Plaintiff-Respondent in the first suit, whether Section 149 of the Code was like a proviso to Section 6 of the Court Fees Act as amended in U.P. and whether the details of fraud etc have been given in the written statement by the Defendants of the first suit as required by Order 6 Rule 4, if not its result? Whether the property in dispute was Joint Hindu Family Property or self acquired property of Someshwar Nath Bhargava, the Defendant in the first suit, and in case it was Joint Hindu Family Property can deft in the first suit make an agreement for sale without the occurrence of other coparceners; and whether the findings recorded by the trial court of correct? 20. In a suit for specific performance of contract limitation was three years under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. Ex abundanti cautela statutory provisions of Article 54 of the Act are set out below. Article 54 54. For specific performance performance of a contract Three years The date fixed for the formance or, if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. 21. Before actually interpreting Article 54 of the Act, it would not be out of place to have certain cardinal principles having bearing on the interpretation of limitations of actions Statutes of limitation are beneficial statutes and ought to be construed liberally to the extent permissible under the relevant provisions and the approach must be with a view, so far as the same is consistent with the intention of the legislature and the words employed to make the cause of action alive, as even in those cases the right still survives only the remedy is lost. There is yet another principle that even the procedural laws have to be considered with a view to do complete, justice and not to create hurles as the procedure is meant to sub-serve and not to jeopardise the cause of justice itself. There is yet another principle that even the procedural laws have to be considered with a view to do complete, justice and not to create hurles as the procedure is meant to sub-serve and not to jeopardise the cause of justice itself. Statutes of limitation are, however, also known as statutes of repose, which are based in part upon the proposition that the Plaintiffs who slept upon their rights may lose them, and they are in fact, aimed at exercise of right of action within a reasonable period prescribed by the legislature and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims. In American jurisprudence 2nd Vol. 51, page 601, para 16, there is a statement that the statutes of limitation being statutes of repose, they are considered as a design to secure peace of society and to protect individual from being prosecuted upon stale claims See Shepheard v. Thompson 122 US 231 30 L.Ed. 1156. On the other hand, policy of repose expressed in statute of limitation may be outweighed if the interest of justice require vindication of the Plaintiffs right as where the Plaintiff has not slept on his right but rather has been prevented from asserting them 22. There are considerations also justifying the statute of limitation. In para 19 of the aforesaid volume 51 of American jurisprudence it has been stated that these statutes create repose and are practical and pragmatic devices to spare courts, from litigation of stale claims and the citizen from being put his defence if memories have faded, witnesses have disappeared or died and evidence has not been lost. Accordingly the fact that the barred claim is just one or has the sanction of moral obligation, does not exempt it from the statute of limitation. 23. Under para 605, page 266 of the Halsbury's Laws of England, IVth Edn Vol. 28, there is a following statement about the policy of Limitation Act: Policy of Limitation Act:-The courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of statute of limitation namely (i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them: (ii) that the Defendant might have lost evidence to disprove the stale claim; and (iii) that persons with reasonable deligance. See R.B. Policies at Lloyd's v. Butler (1950) 1 KB 76, Jones v. Well grove Properties Ltd. (1949) 2 KB 700.blockquote> 24. See R.B. Policies at Lloyd's v. Butler (1950) 1 KB 76, Jones v. Well grove Properties Ltd. (1949) 2 KB 700.blockquote> 24. There if a negative approach to the statute of limitation and it can be said that the Limitation Act is a disabling enactment and its various articles have to be considered on their plain language. The language so employed by the legistature to express its intention cannot be stretched in favour of a party which may not be permitted. The language employed has to be interpreted in favour of a party, but not against the plain language, and benevolent construction may be placed, (in favour of the party), whose valuable right is being taken away. The court, however, cannot enlarge the period of limitation so fixed by the legislature. But these principles have to be kept in mind while interpreting a particular provision prescribing the period of limitation. A bare reading of Article 54 (Fifty Four) evinces that for specific performance of contract three years period has been prescribed for filing a suit. But this three year period has to be counted in the mode indicated in the last column which is in two parts. The first part indicates that in case any date has been fixed for the performance of contract, in that event three years period will be counted from that date. But in the instant case there is no date fixed, hence the second clause would be applicable, which in substance is that "the period of three years would commence to run, when the notice of performance is refused by the Plaintiff". In the instant case on the basis of averments made in the plaint reply in the written statement and on the basis of evidence of both the parties it is to be judged as to from which date the Plaintiff could have noticed that the performance was refused by the Defendant. In order to ascertain it, we may have a look to the averments made in the plaint of the first suit. In para 10 of the plaint (page 39 of the first Paper Book) averments were made that the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of contract. In order to ascertain it, we may have a look to the averments made in the plaint of the first suit. In para 10 of the plaint (page 39 of the first Paper Book) averments were made that the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of contract. However, the Defendant (in the first suit) has denied this plea and in para 10 of the written statement only this much was stated that the Plaintiff has failed to perform her part of contract and is not entiled to any relief In para 22 of the written statement it was averred that the suit is time barred and that the suit was not maintainable. It was also stated that the Plaintiff has failed to perform her part of contract and was not entitled to any relief. 25. Under Order 8 Rule 3 of the Code it has been stated that the denial in written statement must be specific. It shall not be sufficient for the Defendant to deny the general grounds urged by the Plaintiff. Rule 4 provides that denial must not be evasive but the Defendant must answer the point of substance. Under Rule 5 the consequences of not denying specifically the allegations of the plaint, in written statement, have been indicated and if a plea in the plaint has not been denied specifically or by necessary implication or is said to be not admitted in the pleadings, it shall be taken to be admitted except as against the person under disability. There is, however, a proviso that the court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission In the present case fust Under para 10 of the written statement the plea taken by the Plaintiff that she was ready and willing to perform her part of contract, was evasively denied The commencement of limitation was stated in para 12 of the plaint, but the same was just denied, in para 12 of the written statement. It was further alleged in the written statement that no cause of action as alleged has accrued and the cause of action alleged is fictitious, whereas the Defendant (of the first suit) must have made positive denial with necessary pleadings and facts. It was further alleged in the written statement that no cause of action as alleged has accrued and the cause of action alleged is fictitious, whereas the Defendant (of the first suit) must have made positive denial with necessary pleadings and facts. It must have in our opinion, been shown by specific averments as to how the suit was barred by limitation But the same was not done. The enasive denial and denial not being specific, cannot rebut the plea taken by the Plaintiff in her plaint about the averments of readiness and willingness as required by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act and also the date of commencement of the cause of action and the plea of limitation We are constrained to say that the Defendant of first suit or the Plaintiffs of the second suit did not take plea about Section 16-C and the point of limitation very seriously, rather they took it for granted, that even some evasive denial itself would be sufficient to prove that the suit was time barred or that the plea required by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act was not pleaded. 26. While dealing issue No. 1 as to whether the suit was barred by time (in Suit No. 17/77 issue No. 1 was framed. whereas in the second suit issue No. 3 was framed. The trial court has discussed in detail the plea of limitation. It has given several reasons to arrive at the conclusion that the suit was within time. We have considered the question of limitation in view of the principles of interpretation pointed out above. The Defendant of first suit Sri Someshwar Nath Bhargava has filed an application for mutation of his name on the basis of sale deed in his favour. The order was passed on 2-11-72. Under the agreement itself both the parties agreed that within two months, from the date of obtaining permission from the District Magistrate and other authorities, the sale deed would be executed. In the agreement pertaining to sale of immovable property, time is not essence of contract the limitation could start only after two months from the date of obtaining permission the permission was not obtained. It is also the case of Defendant that the permission was not obtained. In the agreement pertaining to sale of immovable property, time is not essence of contract the limitation could start only after two months from the date of obtaining permission the permission was not obtained. It is also the case of Defendant that the permission was not obtained. Till 28th January 1975 the Defendant was seeking permission to execute the sale deed Otherwise also the trial court has held that the land was occupancy tenancy and strictly speaking permission to make sale was not required. In that event also the Defendants must have sent notice to the Plaintiffs that they wanted to execute the sale deed But this was net done. In the agreement also the condition was, as stated earlier, that after obtaining mutation Defendant has first to satisfy the Plaintiff about his transferable rights in the land. That was also not done. The notice was served on Defendant of First suit on 20-11-73, but no information or reply was sent by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. Immediately after coming to know the order of mutation in favour of Defendant in the first suit, notice was sent to the Defendant on 26-11-76 to the effect that Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of contract and she was ready to pay the balance of sale consideration and Defendant was directed to execute the sale deed. But after receipt of that notice the Defendant sent an incorrect information. Again second notice was sent indicating Plaintiff's readiness and willingness, but nevertheless the Defendant did not execute the sale deed. 27. As regards the cases Manik Lal Seal v. K.P Chaudhary 1976 Cal. 115 (supra) and 1976 Bom. 342 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellants. suffice it to say that the dictum laid down in those cases indicate how the limitation has to be counted. We agree with those principles, but in the present case as even after mutation the Defendant did not send any information to the Plaintiff, the first notice was sent by the Plaintiff indicating readiness and willingness, but that was replied incorrectly and second notice was sent by the Plaintiff on 26-11-76. Thereafter the suit was filed in 1977. The first suit by the Plaintiff was filed in accordance with the requirement prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Code 28. In Ramzan Vs. Thereafter the suit was filed in 1977. The first suit by the Plaintiff was filed in accordance with the requirement prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Code 28. In Ramzan Vs. Hussaini, (1990) 1 SCC 104 , while considering the scope of Article 54 of the Limitation Act it has been held by their Lordship of the Supreme Court that in a suit for specific performance of contract, in case there was any date fixed for performance, the suit has to be filed in accordance with that. In para 6 it has been considered that even in the agreement in that case, it was indicated that when you will get this house, (description of which is given below) redeemed from M/s. Jeth Mal Basti Mal and take the papers of registry in your possession, on that day I will have the sale deed of the said house, written, executed and registered in your favour. The question was whether date was fixed for performance of agreement and it was held that there was a date fixed and it was not necessary that a date from Calender must have been mentioned. In that case a suit for specific performance was filed immediately after redemption and question arose as to whether the suit was within time. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court rule that the suit was within time. The maxim "ID CERTUM EST QULD CERTUM REDDI POTEST" connotes that certainty need not be ascertained at the time for if, in the fluxion of time, a day will arrive which will make it certain, that is sufficient. In Duncombe v. The Brighton Club and Norfolk Hotel Co. (1875) 10 QB 371, even though time was not specifically mentioned in the agreement, but a particular date was given and when the goods were delivered would be ascertained and then the money would be payable at a certain time. In Duncombe v. The Brighton Club and Norfolk Hotel Co. (1875) 10 QB 371, even though time was not specifically mentioned in the agreement, but a particular date was given and when the goods were delivered would be ascertained and then the money would be payable at a certain time. In the present case also even though no specific date was mentioned in the agreement, but as the mutation of property in the name of Defendant in the first suit and obtaining permission from the necessary authorities were the requisite conditions which were required to be satisfied.' Even though the property was mutated in the name of Defendant but he did not inform the Plaintiff nor has satisfied the Plaintiff about the title of Defendant as contemplated in the agreement and the permission could not be obtained at all and in this way Defendant has refused the performance Consequently suit was filed within three years from the date of refusal of performance, as contemplated under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, it was certainly within time. The trial court has correctly decided the issue about the plea of limitation in both the suits and we are of the opinion, that trial court rightly held that suit (First suit) was within time. 29. Reverting to the point as to whether the suit was barred by Sections 14 and 16-C of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, suffice it to say that Section 14 deals with the contract not specifically enforceable, i.e. (a) contract for non performance of which compensation in terms of money is adequate relief; (b) contract running into minute details or which is depending on personal qualification; (c) contract which is in its nature determinable; and (d) performance of which involves performance of continuous duty. Section 10, however, provides cases in which specific performance of contract is enforceable. (a) In the case where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the non-performance; and (b) when the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief, Thereafter there is Explanation which provides that the court shall presume that the breach of contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money. In the present case also it was a breach of agreement to sell and to transfer the immovable property. In the present case also it was a breach of agreement to sell and to transfer the immovable property. Hence the court shall presume that compensation in money would not be sufficient compensation for damage. 30. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Amritsar Gas Service and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 533 , pages 542-43, the scope of Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act was considered. There the controversy was about distributorship agreement with the Indian Oil Corporation for sale of LP G. for running the personal service. In the award it was ' held that the distributorship agreement was revocable and the same being admittedly for running personal service, hence Sections 11 and 14 of the Specific Relief Act were made applicable. There as the contract was determinable, consequently Section 14(1) was held to be applicable. In the present case, however, the agreement for sale of immovable property was not a contract for running personal service. 31. Section 14 has to be read with Sections 10 and 12. We are satisfied that compensation in money would not be sufficient for the damage caused for non-performance of agreement to sell immovable property. 32. Reverting to Section 16-C as to whether the suit was barred by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act. In other words, whether the plaint contains averment that the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract. We have already noticed that in para 10 of the plaint (page 39 of the 1st Paper Book), the Plaintiff has made averments that she was ready and willing to perform her part of contract. The Defendant has just denied this plea in an evasive way in para 10 of the written statement. It was to the effect that the Plaintiff has failed to perform her part of contract and is not entitled to any relief. Under Rule 5 of Order 8 of the Code the consequences of non denying specifically the averments made in the plaint has been stated. It is to the effect that if a plea in the plaint is not denied specifically. it shall be taken to be admitted (against the Defendant) except as against a person under disability. There is, however, a proviso that it is for the court in its discretion to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. it shall be taken to be admitted (against the Defendant) except as against a person under disability. There is, however, a proviso that it is for the court in its discretion to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. All these pleas have been taken into account On the basis of first notice the Plaintiff has alleged that she was ready and willing to perform her part of contract. The Defendant of the first suit replied the same in an incorrect manner. Second notice was also served. The Defendant of the first suit and the Plaintiff of the second suit did not take plea of the suit being barred by Section 16-C of the Act in a positive and specific manner, rather in an evasive manner it was stated in para 10 of the written statement that the Plaintiff has failed to perform her part of contract and was not entitled to any relief The denial in the written statement, we are of the opinion, was evasive denial. By such denial it was not open to Defendant to challenge the averment in the plaint that the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of contract. However, in view of two notices served on the Defendant, we have perused the reply of the first notice and other relevant evidence on record. Ram Govind Misra, husband and Mukhtar-e-Aam of the Plaintiff of first suit has stated on oath that his wife (Plaintiff No. 1 of the first suit) was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract. She was also ready to comply with the terms of agreement. We have also perused the statement of DWs and there is nothing to rebut the averments made in the plaint and also the statement of PW 1. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract and the suit cannot be said to be barred by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act. 33. Suraj Singh v. Sohanlal AIR 1981 All. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract and the suit cannot be said to be barred by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act. 33. Suraj Singh v. Sohanlal AIR 1981 All. 303 (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for Appellant was a case in which a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a decree for specific performance cannot be granted unless the requirements u/s 16-C were complied with and even in the absence of any plea on the part of Defendant, 34. Mahmood Khan and Another Vs. Ayub Khan and Others, AIR 1978 Alld 463, was a Division Bench case of this Court holding that Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act is mandatory and the absence of necessary averment and in the absence of proof of the same that the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of contract, the suit cannot succeed even though the Defendant has not raised any plea to that effect in the written statement nor there was any issue framed on the point. 35. The aforesaid observation in the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant was in the teeth of the observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in R.C. Chandiok and Another Vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal and Others, (1970) 3 SCC 140 , where it was ruled by the apex court that the readiness and willingness cannot be treated as straight jacket formula. It has to be determined from the enormity of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the parties concerned. The statement of law on page 338, IIIrd Edn. of Halsbur's Laws of England, Vol. 34 were relied upon and quoted. 36. In Indira Kaur and Ors Vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor, (1988) 2 SCC 488 , the Supreme Court has considered the entire case law on the subject and held as follows: Whether it was the Plaintiff who had committed breach by not being ready and willing to perform his part of contract or whether it was Defendant, who had committed a breach of contract by refusing to convey the property in question to the Plaintiff in pursuance to the agreement to sell executed by him in favour of the Plaintiff, has to be ascertained. 37. 37. In Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh AIR 1990 SC 854 , it was held that decree for specific performance in respect of half share of the vendor brother can be granted and as the properties were immovable properties, the agreement was directed to be enforced against the vendor brother. If was held that the agreement was to make sale in respect of immovable property and it was also not a case for specific performance of the part of contract. In our opinion, the Plaintiff's readiness and willingness cannot be treated as straight jacket formula. In fact, it is to be determined from the entire facts and circumstances of the case relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. The Plaintiff of the first suit has given first notice and also second notice, but the Defendant of the first suit, the present Appellant was denying incorrectly and was not ready to execute the sale deed even after mutation of his name. Even though the permission from the ceiling authority could not have been obtained, but as the land was of occupancy tenancy, strictly speaking the permission was not at all required. On the basis of evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the suit cannot be said to be barred by Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act. The trial court was correctly decided the point. 38. The next point is as to whether the deficiency made good by the Appellant can ensure for the Plaintiff's benefit without an order of the Court. Section 6 of the U.P. Court Fees Act has to be read with Section 149 of the Code. Plaint was filed on 17-1-77 with deficiency in court fee of Rs. 100/-. It was registered on 27-1-77 and the Munsarim reported default in court fee. Thereafter the default was made good. The power has been given to the Court u/s 149 of the Code to direct the payment of deficiency in court fee on the plaint, and on that payment it shall be treated to have been filed on the date of presentation Section 149 of the Code mitigates the rigor of Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act If after the report of Munsarim the deficiency in court fee was removed by the Plaintiff of the first suit, there was no illegality. As a matter of fact Section 149 of the Code was like a proviso to Section 4 or 6 of the Court Fees Act as amended in U.P. The payment of deficiency after the Munsarim's report was a payment at the initial stage and there did not arise any necessity for the court to make an order to make good the deficiency. Under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code also the Court has power to make good the deficiency within the time fixed, by it. But that stage did not come and prior to that Plaintiff of the first suit has made good the deficiency on the report of Munsarim itself We are accordingly of the considered opinion that even if the deficiency was made good on the report of the Mupsarim and there was no order of the Court, there cannot be any defect in the plaint of the first suit. We are of the opinion that Section 149 is a proviso to Sections 4 & 6 of the Court Fees Act as amended in U.P. We respectfully agree with the view taken by a Full Bench in S. Wajid Ali Vs. Mt. Isar Bano Urf Isar Fatma, AIR 1951 All 64 . The view in this case was subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in Mannan Lal Vs. Chhotaka Bibi, (Dead) by Lrs. B. Sharda Shankar and Others, (1970) 1 SCC 769 . The submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is not correct and the cases cited are of no assistence to the Appellants in both the appeals. 39. Reverting to the point as to whether the property in both the suits was joint Hindu Family property or it was a self acquired property by Someshwar Nath Bhargava, the Defendant in the first suit. The trial court has discussed this aspect of the matter in detail. We have perused the relevant evidence and we do not find any mistake in the appraisal of evidence by the trial court. This may, however be stated that the property in dispute was not acquired with the nucleus of Joint Hindu. Further the Defendant of the first suit and his sons, Plaintiffs in the second suit may constitute Joint hindu Family, but there was no presumption that Joint Hindu Family has got any nucles the Plaintiff the first suit was in service. This may, however be stated that the property in dispute was not acquired with the nucleus of Joint Hindu. Further the Defendant of the first suit and his sons, Plaintiffs in the second suit may constitute Joint hindu Family, but there was no presumption that Joint Hindu Family has got any nucles the Plaintiff the first suit was in service. He purchased the property to establish a printing press with his savings and provident fund etc. But that cannot be said to be the property of Joint Hindu Family. There was no evidence that there was any Joint Hindu Family fund of which the Plaintiff of the first suit was in possession and charge. The salary and other emoluments as received by the Defendant of the first suit cannot be assumed to be the Joint Hindu Family property, as in such matters the provision of Gains of Learning Act would apply. The remuneration received by the Defendant of the first suit, Someshwar Nath Bbargava, while he was in service, was for the services rendered by him. This remuneration must, therefore, be a personal income of the Defendant and does not belong to Joint Hindu Family. (See Bhagwant P. Sulakhe Vs. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe and Others, (1986) 1 SCC 366 . 40. The property in dispute was purchased by Someshwar Nath Bhargava, the Defendant in the first suit along with Radha Kant on 18-11-63. In that sale deed it was not stated that Someshwar Nath Bhargava had purchased it from Joint Hindu Family nucleus, nor in the agreement for sale it was stated that the property was purchased from Joint Hindu Family fund, nor it was stated that his sons, the Plaintiffs in the second suit were coparceners. Had it been the fact that the land and property was acquired with the nucleus of Joint Hindu Family, that would have been stated in the first sale deed and also in the agreement for sale. As the agreement for sale was silent about the acquisition of property with the nucleus of Joint Hindu Family, that cannot be supplemented or contradicted by leading oral evidence. The findings recorded by the trial court that the land in dispute was not acquired with the nucleus of Joint Hindu Family was correct, Bageshwari Prasad Duivedi Vs. As the agreement for sale was silent about the acquisition of property with the nucleus of Joint Hindu Family, that cannot be supplemented or contradicted by leading oral evidence. The findings recorded by the trial court that the land in dispute was not acquired with the nucleus of Joint Hindu Family was correct, Bageshwari Prasad Duivedi Vs. Deopati Kuer and Another, AIR 1961 Pat 416 , relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant was a case based on different facts and was clearly distinguishable. 41. As regards the appraisal of oral evidence done by the trial court, our attention was drawn to the evidence on record, particularly oral evidence led from both sides, Once the trial court has appreciated the oral evidence, unless some special feature has escaped notice of the court, the appraisal of evidence by the trial court cannot be said to be erroneous and need not be interfered with, as in such matters the trial court has special advantage to watch the demeanour of witnesses, which advantage is not available to the appellate court. In such matters the appellate court must be slow and permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail, unless of course it clearly appears that some special feature about evidence of a particular witness has escaped notice of the trial court. There are catena of decisions in support of this proposition and few of them may be noticed (See Madhusudan Das Vs. Smt. Narayanibai (Deceased) by Lrs. and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 35 ; Sara Veeraswamy Talluri Narayya 1949 PC 32; Sarju Prasad v. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh 1950 SCR 781 ).p> 42. Coming to the question as to whether the relief for possession could have been permitted to be added in execution proceedings in the trial court, the point involved in Civil Revision, the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, are quite comprehensive and it provides that at any stage of the suit the amendment of pleading could be allowed. The suit for specific performance of contract (the first suit) was decreed by the trial court and in case the relief for possession was not asked for in the plaint, that was correctly ordered by the court to be added, even at the execution stage, so that complete justice may be done between the parties There was no error of jurisdiction 43. Coming to the last question as to whether the plea of fraud in the agreement etc. taken by the Defendant of the first suit and Plaintiffs of the second suit as tenable, under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code provides that in case where a party relies on fraud, misrepresentation etc, in that case particulars and details of fraud etc. are required to be stated in the pleadings. Unless it was specifically pleaded and details of fraud etc. were given, the plea cannot be made out We have considered the evidence or record including oral evidence of the Defendant's witnesses in the first suit and Plaintiff's witnesses in the second suit and other evidence available, and we are of the opinion that agreement for sale executed by the Defendant of the first suit in favour of Plaintiff of the first suit cannot be said to be fraudulent, nor the same could be said to have been obtained by misrepresentation or coercion etc. (See Afsar Sheikh and Another Vs. Soleman Bibi and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 142 . 44. In view of the premises aforesaid and applying Aristotalean and Baconian reasonings, we are of the opinion that the judgments and decrees rendered by the trial court does not call for any interference. 45. In the result, both the appeals and revision are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.