Honble SINGHAL, J. - These special appeals and the writ petitions have been filed challenging the validity of Rule 64 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Produce Marketing Rules, 1963 and the non-allotment of the shops in accordance with the priority list prepared earlier. (2). Since common question of law is involved in all these cases, they are disposed of by this one common judgment. (3). Brief facts of the case are that Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti,Chomu issued a notification on 26.09.1988 for allotment of shops in New Mandi Yard Market, Chomu. All the petitioners/appellants are A Class licence traders/ brokers. According to the notifications, the applications were to be submitted by 12.10.1988 and 78 shops were to be allotted. A fees of Rs. 50/-was also to be deposited. In accordance with the guide-lines issued, it was provided that the period of licence, regular payment of Mandi Sulk and the turn over shall be taken into consideration for eligibility, for which 30, 30 and 40 marks respectively were fixed. It is submitted that thereafter, the guidelines were revised on 22.05.1989 and according to these guidelines, the marketing system was changed, in which 10 marks were fixed for the period of licence and 50 marks for regular payment of tax and for the turn over 40 marks as earlier were kept. This change in the marking system is informed so that the persons who have not carried on any business may not get priority only on account of period of licence and regular payment of Mandi tax may not be considered in priority than the persons who are actually carrying on the business. It is submitted that these guidelines have been issued under Sec. 34-A of the Rajasthan Agriculture Produce Marketing Act. (4). The matter with regard to the allotment of shops was challenged in Writ Petition Nos. 4474/88, 4475/88, 1/89 and 1276/89 wherein, the Division Bench on 6.4.1989, on account of the petitions not being opposed by the respondents, directed the Administrator, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Chomu to allot one shop to each of the petitioners on the basis of the list prepared by Computor. 4474/88, 4475/88, 1/89 and 1276/89 wherein, the Division Bench on 6.4.1989, on account of the petitions not being opposed by the respondents, directed the Administrator, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Chomu to allot one shop to each of the petitioners on the basis of the list prepared by Computor. Thereafter, the matter was again examined by another Division Bench on 27.11.1991, wherein the dispute was with regard to 3 shops out of 78 advertised for allotment and it was observed that the allotment of 3 shops shall be as per the priority of the petitioners and others including 17 petitioners whose petitions are pending before this court. In respect of the shops under construction, it was observed that new guidelines instructions for allotment issued by the Government shall be applied. Thereafter the matter came up before the learned Single Judge and the claim of 16 petitioners was examined in the said judgment dated 21.1.1992. Learned Single Judge has observed that allotment of 75 shops already made cannot be disturbed in accordance with the observations of the Division Bench and further directions have already been issued by the Division Bench with regard to the remaining 3 shops. In respect of the newly constructed 16 sh6ps, the directions given by the Division Bench have to be observed. (5). The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners/ appellants, is that the Mandi Samiti is bound by the directions which are issued under Sec. 34-A of the Act by the State Government and that according to the earlier guidelings when the computarised priority list has been prepared, it should not be disturbed. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Sriniketan Cop. Housg. Soc. v/s Vikash Vihar (1). "A burden song of all the allottee societies was that if the allotment orders in their favour are quashed, their members would stand almost permanently deprived of the opportunity to own a flot in Delhi because it is next to impossible for them to seek fresh allotment of land hereafter. Housg. Soc. v/s Vikash Vihar (1). "A burden song of all the allottee societies was that if the allotment orders in their favour are quashed, their members would stand almost permanently deprived of the opportunity to own a flot in Delhi because it is next to impossible for them to seek fresh allotment of land hereafter. It was also stated that the members had invested their life savings and many of them had even borrowed moneys to meet the cost of the land and these amounts had been lying with the Government for a number of years.and it would therefore be most inequitable to tell them that they should go without a flot for their residence in Delhi. Some of the societies also stated that they had spent considerable sums of mony in levelling and fancing the land and in employing watchman, staff and architects. There is no denying the fact that the members of the nine societies would be affected by the cancellation of the allotment order . But this cannot legitimise the allotment order passed by the Government in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner." (6). Learned counsel for the respondents have produced a copy of letter dated 29.11.1991 of the Deputy Secretary, Agriculture (Gr. But this cannot legitimise the allotment order passed by the Government in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner." (6). Learned counsel for the respondents have produced a copy of letter dated 29.11.1991 of the Deputy Secretary, Agriculture (Gr. 2-B), which reads as under: ^^kklu mi lfpo] —f"k ¼xzqi 2 ch½ foHkkx t;iqj ds i= Øekad % i- 10¼4½ —f"k@2@ch@88 fnukad 29 uoEcj 91] ds i= dh izfr tks fd funskd —f"k foi.ku foHkkx] t;iqj dks lacksf/kr gSA fo"k; % —f"k mRiknu lfpo ds d{k esa fnukad 14-6-91 dks vk;ksftr cSBd esa fy;s x;s fu.kZ;ksa dh fØ;kfUor ckcr~A mijksä fo"k;kUrxZr funsZkkuqlkj ys[k gS fd —f"k mRiknu lfpo egksn; ds d{k esa fnukad 14-6-91 dks vk;ksftr cSBd esa fy, x;s fu.kZ; tks fd bl foHkkx ds le la[;d i= fnukad 6-8-91 ds }kjk vkidks fHktok;s x;s gSa] ds lanHkZ esa fuEu fcUnqvksa dh fØ;kfUor ij jkT; ljdkj dh Loh—fr iznku dh tkrh gS %& 1- nqdkus@xksnke vkoaVu ds lanHkZ esa-& uohu e.Mh okMksZa esa nqdkus@xksnke vkoafVr ds fy, vuqKki=/kkfj;ksa dh ik=rk lwph nks izdkj ls cukbZ tkosxhA izFke lwph esa os ^^d** oxZ nyky o O;kikjh ¼e.Mh ds vuqKki=/kkjh gSa½ lfEefyr fd;s tkosaxs] ftudks nqdku vkoaVu grq uke iwoZ dh ojh;rk lwph esa ls lfEefr gS ,oa nwljh ojh;rk lwph mu vuqKki=/kkfj;ksa dh gksxh] tks nqdku@xksnke vkoaVu ds fy, ik= gSA vkoaVu ds le; iwoZ ds le; dh ojh;rk lwph dks izkFkfedrk nh tkosxh ijUrq mldh vUrj ojh;rk lwph u;s vkoaVu ds le; r; dh tkosxhA bl ojh;rk ij fopkj djus ds mijkUr gh vU; ij fopkj fd;k tk ldsxkA 2- xksnke de nqdkuksa dk fdjk;k-& e.Mh ;kMksZ ds xksnke de nqdkuksa dk fdjk;k fuEu izdkj ls olwy fd;k tkosxk-& ¼1½ ljdkjh laLFkkvksa@jkT; ljdkj dks Hkou fdjk;s ij nsus % ljdkjh laLFkkvksa vkSj jktdh; mi;ksx gsrq e.Mh ;kMksZ esa Hkou fdjk;s ij nsrs le; bu Hkouksa@nqdkuksa ,oa xksnkeksa dk fdjk;k lkoZtfud fuekZ.k foHkkx ls ,slles.V djkdj olwy fd;k tkosxkA ¼2½ O;kikfj;ksa ls-&fdjkk orZeku ykxr ij 9 izfrkr dh nj ls olwy fd;k tkosxk ftldk ,lsles.V —f"k foi.ku cksMZ@lkoZtfud fuekZ.k foHkkx ls fd;k tkosxkA ¼3½ dk;e IysVQkeZ-&i`Fkd ls vkoafVr ugha fd;s tkosaxs] fdUrq dsoy ¼Qy ,oa lCth½ e.Mh] t;iqj esa O;olk; dks fu;af=r djus ds n`f"Vdks.k ls f}rh; pj.k esa fufeZr IysVQkeksZa dks vkoafVr fd;k tkosxkA ftudh ojh;rk fcUnw la[;k ^^1** ds vuq:i fu/kkZfjr dh tk;sxhA ¼4½ bfUnjk xk¡/kh ugj {ks= esa —f"k mit e.Mh lfefr;ksa esa nqdkuksa ds vkxs pcwrjs dk fuekZ.k jktLFkku jkT; —f"k foi.ku cksMZ }kjk djok;k tkosxk ,oa bu pcwrjksa dk fdjk;k orZeku ij ykxr ij 9 izfrkr dh nj ls olwy fd;k tkosxkA ykxr dk ,lsles.V —f"k foi.ku cksMZ ns[ksxkA (7). According to the above guide-lines, two lists are contemplated,one in respect of the persons who were found entitled according to the old guidelines and another in respect of the persons who are entitled according to the new guidelines. In accordance with the above letter, it is clear that the persons who were found eligible under the old guidelines have to be allotted shops in priority than the new applicants. The only thing which is to be done is that the persons who were entitled under the old guidelines will have to be screened in accordance with the new guidelines and their inter-se-seniority will accordingly be prepared. The allotment to the new applicants will be only after that list is exhausted. Whenever a guideline is issued, it does not take the shape of any Act or rule and normally the authority to which it is issued, has to comply with it. The authority which has issued the guidelines has also the authority to amend it or to revise it from time to time and in the present case when the revision of the guidelines has been made on 22.05.1989, it cannot be said that the said authority has no power to issue guidelines or after issuance of the guidelines, the earlier guidelines shall still remain in force. These are the matters of procedure and shall apply even on the pending matters. The proposition which is made by the respondents now appears to be more reasonable and resolves the conflict between the parties. The inter-se-list prepared of the old applicants, which is now to be examined in the light of the new guidelines will make them entitled for allotment of shops in priority than the new applicants and, therefore , it is directed that in accordance with the directions contained in the letter dated 29.11.1991, the priority list of the old applicants and the new applicants may be prepared and the allotment of the newly constructed shops should be made first to the persons who are entitled from the old list in accordance with the new guidelines and thereafter allotment would be made to the new applicants. (8). The validity of Rule 64 has already been examined by this court in a case reported in 1978 W.L.N. 310 (2) and it was held that the said rule is a valid piece of legislation. (8). The validity of Rule 64 has already been examined by this court in a case reported in 1978 W.L.N. 310 (2) and it was held that the said rule is a valid piece of legislation. We also agree with the decision and it is held that the allegation of the petitioners/ appellants that the provisions of Rule 64 are violative of the fundamental rights is not the correct appreciation of position of law. It is only a reasonable restriction and, therefore, the said rule cannot be declared to be ultra vires. (9). In the light of the above observations, the above special appeals/ writ petitions are disposed of. (10). No order as to costs.