JUDGMENT S. Venkataramani, Member - This is a revision under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation) and Rehabilation) Act, 1954 against the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner dated 13.5.64 (later corrected to 6.5.64 by the petitioner) whereby he allegedly rejected the application to the petitioner dated 5.12.63 for further extension of time under Rule 90 (11) of the Displaced Persons (Com. & Reh.) Rules, 1955, for depositing the balance sale price of property No. 156 Asifganj, Azamgarh and praying for cancellation of sale certificate dated 31.3.64 issued in favour of Dondha Ram S/o Govind Ram husband of respondent No. 3 issued by O.P. No. 2, Managing Officer, U.P., Lucknow and prayed for permission to deposit the balance sale money of Rs. 3,600/-. 2. During the proceedings the petitioner Mariyam Bibi died and was substituted by her heirs Jaheerudin and two others. 3. The revision petition was presented on 26.2.81, i.e., almost 17 years after the impugned order of the Asstt. Settlement Commissioner dated 6.3.64. The petitioner also filed an application for condonation of delay but has claimed in Para 10 of the application that in view of the ruling of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Navin Bharat v. Union of India there is no limitation for a revision under Section 24 (1) of the Displaced Persons (Com. & Reh.) Act, 1954. 4. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Smt. Riddhi Devi, O.P. No. 3 and the petitioner also filed rejoinder affidavit. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Jaheerudin and others, successors to petitioner Mariyam Bibi, and the learned counsel for the O.P. No. 3 Smt. Riddhi Devi as well as the State Government counsel on the question of limitation. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners drew attention to Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Com. & Reh.) Act 1954 by which the Chief Settlement Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record at any time. He contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is not a court and, therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to these proceedings. Section 3 and 4 on the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 refer; to 'courts'. He depended on the following rulings: 1. He contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is not a court and, therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to these proceedings. Section 3 and 4 on the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 refer; to 'courts'. He depended on the following rulings: 1. The ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji A.I.R. 1985 SC 1279 where it has been laid down that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "Courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. 2. Ruling of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sohan Lal and another Appellant v. Central Government and others - Respondents P.L.R. Vol. XXIV 1972 para 16 of the judgment it has been observed that the officers acting under the Act are not courts and they derive their authority from the provisions of the statutes under which they are functioning. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the O.P. No. 3, Smt. Riddhi Devi, contented that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is a court and that the instant revision petition is barred by limitation. He drew attention to the latest law on the subject which is a Full Bench decision of the (Hon'ble Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue and others 1990 R.D. page 291. The Hon'ble Full Bench in this case held that the Commissioner while deciding objections under Rule 285-I of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Rules will be a 'court', proceedings taken before him will be deemed to be judicial proceedings and the order of the Commissioner will be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue. Under Rule 285-I of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Rules, the Commissioner has to adjudicate certain rights and interest of the parties in respect of the immoveable property and the order passed by the Commissioner has been made final. 8. It has been pointed out in this judgment that ordinarily a 'court' is a place where justice is rendered. Under Rule 285-I of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Rules, the Commissioner has to adjudicate certain rights and interest of the parties in respect of the immoveable property and the order passed by the Commissioner has been made final. 8. It has been pointed out in this judgment that ordinarily a 'court' is a place where justice is rendered. Although the word 'court' has been defined in the Indian Evidence Act, the same is not exhaustive as the said definition has been given only for the purposes of the Indian Evidence Act. Reference has also been made to the case of Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 K.B. 309 wherein it was observed: "A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisities; (1) the presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact then ascertainment of the fact by means of the evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties, (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law." In Bouvier'e Law Dictionary, the term 'judicial' has been defined thus: "The term is used to describe generally those modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as a department of organized Government, and through and by means of which it accomplishes its purposes and exercises its peculiar powers." It has further been pointed out by the Hon'ble Full Bench that a Tribunal may be a 'court' though it may not have trapping of a court but by law or by legal fiction the Tribunal can be deemed to be a 'court' and the order passed by it will partake the nature of an order passed by a 'court'. A legal fiction assumes the existence of a fact which does not really exist. It is a legal assumption that a thing is true which is either not true or which is probably as false as true. A legal fiction assumes the existence of a fact which does not really exist. It is a legal assumption that a thing is true which is either not true or which is probably as false as true. It is by legal fiction that proceedings which are non-judicial could be taken as judicial and Tribunal or authorities deciding right, title or interest in property could be 'court'. 9. Applying the criteria in the case of Cooper v. Wilson (supra), it is clear that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is a court under the principle of legal fiction as enunciated by the Hon'ble Lucknow Bench. It, therefore, follows that the Indian Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. 10. The learned counsel for the O.P. Smt. Riddhi Devi, also referred to the ruling of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 2908 of 1977 Sri Ram and others v. Board of Revenue and others 1978 R.D. page 274 wherein it has been laid down that three years of limitation will apply where no limitation is prescribed. 11. As already pointed out above, the revision petition has been filed almost 17 years after the date of the impugned order of the Asstt. Settlement Commissioner. In the circumstances of the case it is not possible to give the benefit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 regarding exclusion of time of proceedings bona fide in court without jurisdiction. As pointed out by O.P. No. 3, Smt. Riddhi Devi in her objection in para 4 (e), the allegations on which the Civil Suit No. 176 of 1966 was filed wen within the jurisdiction of the civil court: it is now not open to Mriyam Bibi to allege that she was bona fide litigating in the wrong court as advised by her counsel when she lost her case upto the Hon'ble High Court. 12. The instant revision has been filed after a lapse of 17 years after exhausting all the remedies available and after being unsuccessful before the Hon'ble High Court. When no limitation is provided in the Act or Rules, the limitation will be three years only. Therefore, the revision petition is dismissed as barred by limitation.