JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order dated, 18.7.92, passed by the Additional District Judge No. 3. Kota, Camp Ramganj Mandi, whereby he has allowed the appeal filed by the defendants-non-petitioners and set aside the order of injunction passed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner on 29.5.90 but the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ramganj Mandi. 2. For the purpose of decision of this revision petition, it is necessary to refer to some facts. 3. The plaintiff-petitioner is a Public Limited Company. It is having a factory at Aditya Nagar, Morak, Tehsil Ramganj Mandi. district Kota, where the cement is manufactured. The construction of the Cement Factory started in 1978. According to the petitioner, the Railway Administration approved the cement loading complex plan and exchange yard for the purpose of loading and unloading the cement. The Compay spent a sum of Rs. 3 50 crores for the purpose of constructing the above complex and exchange yard. An agreement was entered into between the petitioner company and the Railway Admin station in the name of President of India on 2.3.81 regarding the terms and conditions of use and working of railway siding. This was done in term, of the Indian Railway Commercial Mannual As per Clause 17(c) of the agreement, free time and demurrage charges were calculated in accordance with the pilot to pilot schedule Daily loading quota of 35 wagons was fixed for loading cement. These 35 wagons were to be loaded within 8 hours and in case of failure, demurrage charges were payable. Each of these wagons was of 22 tonnes capacity. This total loading capacity of the wagons allotted to the petitioner came to be 770 M T. of cement. In the year 1982, Railway Administration introduced the schema of loading full Jumbo rake which consisted of 100 wagons and a total loading capacity of 22 M.T. The company was required to undertake the loading within 131/2 hours including shunting hours. Since the company found the system to be highly unworkable and arbitrary, it made a representation to the Railway Administration. On the basis of the representation of the Company the Railway Board vide its letter dated, 17.5.82 directed the Company to approach the General Manager, Western Railway. It was thereafter, agreed that joint trial be conducted to verify and determine the actual time required for loading the Jumbo Rake. On the basis of the representation of the Company the Railway Board vide its letter dated, 17.5.82 directed the Company to approach the General Manager, Western Railway. It was thereafter, agreed that joint trial be conducted to verify and determine the actual time required for loading the Jumbo Rake. Such joint trials were conducted between 23rd to 25th October, 1982. According to the plaintiff-petitioner, the Joint Trial Team came to the conclusion that 411/2 hours was the minimum time required for loading Jumbo rake at the site. The Joint Trial Team therefore, made recommendation to the General Manager, Western Railway, Bombay. The claim of the plaintiff is that the General Manager accepted these recommendations and the authorities of the Western Railway acted upon those recommendations till 1986. In the result, the petitioner was allowed free loading time 41-112 hours for one Jumbo rake with a provision of Rs. 3,000/- as penalty as and when 411/2 hours time schedule was exceeded. The petitioner company made a representation dated, 29.3.84 against the penalty of Rs. 3,000/- per rake. In response to this, the railway authorities at Bombay vide their letter dated, 14.11.84 expressed their inability to waive the penalty of Raj. 3,000/-. 4. Some times in the year 1986, the Goods Supervisor, Western Railway, orally informed the petitioner that the existing facilities of providing 411/2 hours as free loading time stands withdrawn and henceforth the company will be liable to pay demurrage in case of its failure to load the Jumbo rake within 13 hours. The petitioner then filed a suit for permanent injunction against the non-petitioners in the court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ramganj Mandi and claimed that the action of the non-petitioners was highly arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory as also contrary to clause 17 (c) of the agreement. By an ad interim injunction, the order dated. 5.4.86, the non-petitioners were directed to maintain tie status-quo as it existed prior to the withdrawal of the facility of 411 hours. This order was confirmed by the trial court on 20.3.87 after hearing the parties. The non-petitioners filed appeal before the District Judge, Kota, who remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh decision after proper service on the Divisional Railway Manager. The trial court again heard the parties and passed the order of injunction dated, 25.9.90. The non-petitioners appealed before the District Judge, Kota. The non-petitioners filed appeal before the District Judge, Kota, who remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh decision after proper service on the Divisional Railway Manager. The trial court again heard the parties and passed the order of injunction dated, 25.9.90. The non-petitioners appealed before the District Judge, Kota. The case was transferred to the Additional District Judge No.3 and the learned Additional District Judge has passed the order dated, 18.7.92. He has set aside the order of the trial court and dismissed the application of injunction filed by the petitioner. 5. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has in the first instance, argued that the appellate court has committed a serious illegality in interfering with the order of injunction passed by the trial court. While reversing the order of injunction passed by the trial court, the appellate court has completely over-looked the limitations within which the appellate court can interfere with the order passed by a trial court on an injunction application. Shri Agrawal submitted that without holding that the trial court has acted in contravention of law or acted perversely or capriciously, the learned Additional District Judge No. 3 has interfered with the findings recorded by the trial court. He argued that the appellate court disposed of the appeal as if it was hearing the original injunction application. Merely because, the appellate court could form a different opinion than the one formed by the trial court it was not justified for the appellate court to have interfered with the order of trial court. Shri Agrawal placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur, AIR 1977 Raj. 196 , Smt. Rama Devi v. Sanganer Cooperative Housing-Society Ltd., 1986 R.L.R. 1018 , Bhaura Singh v. Dulari and another, 1992 (1) Western Law Cases Raj. 634 . He also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (Supp) S.C.C. 727 and Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, 1992 (1) S C. C. 719 . He then argued that from the various documents which have been placed on record clearly establish that the railway administration had fixed the time of 411 hours on the recommendation of the Joint Trial Team. He then argued that from the various documents which have been placed on record clearly establish that the railway administration had fixed the time of 411 hours on the recommendation of the Joint Trial Team. The General Manager of the Western Railway was fully competent to extend the free time facility available to the petitioner. He referred to section - (g) of the India, Railways Act. 1890 as also the provisions of Chapter II and submitted that the General Manager of a zonal railway is authorised to act on behalf of the railway administration. Since, the General Manager, Western Railway had extended the facilities, it was not open to the non-petitioners to subsequently withdraw that facility and arbitrarily compel the petitioner to avail free loading time of only 13 hours. Shri Agrawal then argued that the time for loading of the wagons must start from the point when the wagon is in the position of being loaded. He also argued that the total free time has been allowed to M/s Vikram Cement and to the factory of Cement Corporation of India, by the same Western Railway Administration, which had arbitrarily deprived the petitioner of 41 1 hours free time facility. Shri Agrawal then argued that while the trial court had considered all the material which was placed before him, the learned lower appellate court has not taken into consideration the important documents. The appellate court has ignored the recommendation made by the Joint Trial Team and has erroneously held that the agreement dated, 2.3.81 was still in force and therefore, free time of 41 z hours should not be allowed to the petitioner. He argued that since the appellate court has failed to consider the documents, order passed by it must be held to be vitiated. He referred to the decision of this Court in Chhagan Lal v. Nane Shah, AIR 1933 Raj. P.6 , Minerva Shiksha Samiti, Bharatpur v. Smt. Mithlesh Kumari, 1984 RLR 992 . Shri Agrawal lastly argued that since a seriously debatable question has been raised by the plaintiff petitioner in the suit the order of injunction passed by the trial court ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. He argued that the decision of Railway Administration has not only caused injury to the petitioner, but, has also resulted in public injury. He argued that the decision of Railway Administration has not only caused injury to the petitioner, but, has also resulted in public injury. The Railway Administration h s been made to lose lacs of rupees per day on account of such decision. He argued that in such matters public interest demand warrants that order of injunction passed by the trial court should be restored. 6. Shri G.C. Garg, learned counsel for the non-petitioners, argued that the agreement dated, 2.3.81 was subsisting between the parties. No fresh agreement had been arrived at between the parties which provided for free time of 411/2 hours. Shri Garg argued that the letters written by the Divisional Railway Manager and the General Manager can only be considered as recommendations for enhancement of the free time applicable to the petitioner. He argued that in the absence of any specific agreement superseding the previous agreement, the General Manager was not entitled to take any contrary decision. He further submitted that the factum of waiver of demurrage charges goes to show that the plaintiff was defaulter. The General Manager was only entitled to waive the demurrage charges. He has no authority to alter, amend or supersede the agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Government of India through the competent authority. Shri Garg urged that since there was no conclude contract between the parties for allowing free time of 411/2 hours, the petitioner could not specifically enforce or seek performance of such contract. Shri Garg made a reference to Paras-7 to 10 of the application for injunction filed by the petitioner and its reply and submitted that from these pleadings it is evident that neither there was an agreement between the parties for 411/2 hours of free time nor had the railway administration granted any sanction for that much of free time. Shri Garg also invited my attention to the decision of Railway Board contained in Circular letter No. C-124/1/4/Vol. V, dated. 27.1.84, which has been printed in the form of a pamphlet issued by the Western Railway. 7. I have given my serious consideration to the rival submissions and I have carefully gone through the orders passed by the learned Munsiff as well as the learned Additional District Judge and the record of the trial court. 8. V, dated. 27.1.84, which has been printed in the form of a pamphlet issued by the Western Railway. 7. I have given my serious consideration to the rival submissions and I have carefully gone through the orders passed by the learned Munsiff as well as the learned Additional District Judge and the record of the trial court. 8. In his order the ]earned Munsiff has recorded a finding of prima facie case in favour of the petitioner on the basis of the fact that the Joint Trial Team had recommended 411/2 hours free time. This was accepted by the General Manager, Western Railway and the authorities issued a letter dated, 7.4.83 for that purpose. Thereafter, the petitioner continued to be given the facility of 41 1 /2 hours of free time. However, all of a sudden, this facility was withdrawn by telegraphic message of the Assistant Chief Commercial Superintendent which was sent to the D.R.M. Kota on 20 2.86. The learned Munsiff then held that in terms of the definition of Railway Administration used in Section-3 (6) of the Indian Railways Act, the General Manager will be deemed to be the Railway Administration, and since the decision had been taken by the General Manager, it was not open to the Assistant Chief Commercial Superintendent to have cancelled the facility. He further held that no decision of the Railway Board rejecting the recommendation of the Joint Trial Team or reversing the decision of the General Manager was placed on record. The learned Munsiff also referred to the facilities provided to Vikram Cement Factory, Lakheri Cement Factory and CC[ Cement Factory. Javad Road and held that when in cases of other factories full time is allowed, there was no justification for the railway administration to compel the petitioner to fill the Jumbo rake in 13 hours. The learned Munsiff then considered the question as to whether the suit was barred by the provisions of section-26 of the Indian Railways Act and held that the bar contemplated by section 26 was not attracted. He further held that the free time would he calculated only from the point when wagon is bought in the position of being loaded. The learned Munsiff then considered the question as to whether the suit was barred by the provisions of section-26 of the Indian Railways Act and held that the bar contemplated by section 26 was not attracted. He further held that the free time would he calculated only from the point when wagon is bought in the position of being loaded. Learned Munsiff also held that irreparable injury will be suffered by the petitioner if it is forced to pay penalty fur availing longer free time and that the factory is likely to be closed if the Railway Administration is not restrained by a proper order of injunction. 9. The learned Additional District Judge also referred to the pleadings of the parties and observed that free time facility and demurrage charges though, related with each other, are different matters. The free time is determined by the Railway Board, whereas, the demurrage charges are levied by the General Manager. By making a reference to the letter dated, 30.3.83 of the General Manager the learned Additional District Judge held that the said letter does not amount to sanction of 411/2 hours of free time. Instead, the General Manager had made recommendations to the Railway Board with a further stipulation that till the decision is received, the nominal penalty in the form of demurrage charges will be levied and rest will be waived. He also noted that the claim of the petitioner was not in respect of the demurrage charges but related to its claim for free time facility. The learned Additional District Judge then considered the plea of the petitioner on the question of promissory estoppel and held that the non-petitioners can be bound by promissory estoppel only if a decision had been taken by a competent authority and, since the Railway Board has not taken a decision in the matter, the question of promissory estoppel does not arise. The learned Additional District Judge referred to the letter of the Board dated, 12.12.83 & held that when the Board has taken a decision regarding free time facility, it is not open to the Civil Court to fix other free time facility by issue of a temporary injunction. The learned Additional District Judge referred to the letter of the Board dated, 12.12.83 & held that when the Board has taken a decision regarding free time facility, it is not open to the Civil Court to fix other free time facility by issue of a temporary injunction. He also held that the learned trial Court has no authority to issue an order of injunction which would he contrary to the provisions of siding agreement entered into by the parties and since the petitioner agreed to take the wagon to the place of loading, it cannot claim that the free time will commence only when the wagon is in the position of loading. The learned appellate Judge also held that the trial court had committed a serious error in recording the conclusion on the question of irreparable injury and balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner.The parameters & limitations of the jurisdiction of the appellate court to interfere with the order of the trial court in granting or refusing to grant injunction are well settled. As early as in Printers (Mysore) Pvt.Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, AIR 1960 S.C. 1156 their Lordships laid down the principles on the subject. That was a case in which an application for stay filed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act was dismissed by the trial court. While dealing with the question relating to the powers of the appellate court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "Where the discretion vested in the court under s. 34 has been exercise by the trial court the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of the said discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it has considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion forth, of the trial judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercise g its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously ' r has ignored relevant facts and has adopted an un judicial approach then it would certainly be open to the appellate court-and in many cases it may be its duty-to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. In cases falling under this class the exercise of discretion by the trial court is in law wrongful and improper and that would certainly justify and call foe interference from the appellate court. These principles are well established; but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L C. in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnstion, 1942 A.C. 130 the 1aw as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established. and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case." 10. The same principle has been reiterated in a recent decision in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd, 1990 (Suppl.) S.C.C. 727 . In that case, the Supreme Court interfered with an order of the Division Bench of Madras High Court granting injunction in favour of the respondent by reversing an order of Single Judge of the same court declining injunction in favour of the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench re-assessed the material considered by the Single Judge and came to a different conclusion. It was not permissible for the Division Bench to interfere with the order of the Single Judge by substituting its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. 11. M. L. Joshi J. (as he then was), summarised the principles in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur, 1977 R.L.W. 326 when he observed : "The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. 11. M. L. Joshi J. (as he then was), summarised the principles in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur, 1977 R.L.W. 326 when he observed : "The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily the court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial court & substitute for it, its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order however, may be justified if the lower court acts arbitrarily, perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all relevant records." "The mere possibility of the appellate court coming to a different conclusion on the facts and evidence will also not justify interference". If the appellate court interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial court, the High Court will be justified in interfering with such an order in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C." 12. While exercising discretionary power of granting or refusing to grant injunction, the court has to decide the question of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. In order or decide the question of prima facie case, the court has to apply its judicial mind to the materials which are placed on record. Every piece of evidence produced by either party has to be taken into consideration in deciding the existence of prima facie case to justly issuance of temporary injunction. The court is also required to examine as to whether or not the plaintiff can be adequately compensated by damages. The court has also to determine the likely injury which either party may suffer on account of grant or refusal of the injunction. It is also settled principle that the burden is on the plaintiff to place sufficient material before the Court for establishing a prima facie case in his favour which needs adjudication and the trial. The existence of prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or other right is a condition precedent for grant of temporary injunction. However, prima facie case is rot to be confused with prima-facie title which is to be established on evidence at the trial. The court is not required to go into the evidence with a critical attitude for its minute analysis. Regarding irreparable injury also it is not required that there must he no physical possibility of repairing the injury. However, prima facie case is rot to be confused with prima-facie title which is to be established on evidence at the trial. The court is not required to go into the evidence with a critical attitude for its minute analysis. Regarding irreparable injury also it is not required that there must he no physical possibility of repairing the injury. It only means that the injury must he material one, namely, one that cannot be ado quately compensated by way of damages. While granting or refusing to grant injunction. the court must exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compared it with one which is likely to be caused on account of grant of injunction. If after weighing competing possibilities and probabilities regarding the likely injury, the court considers that pending the trial of the case status-quo should be maintained, an order of injunction would be issued. 13. In the light of these principles, facts of this case need to he examined. The agreement dated, 2.3.81 entered into between the petitioner and the President of Union of India through the Administration of Western Railway, contained clause 17(c) which deals with free time and demurrage charges. This clause reads as under : "Cl. 17(c) Wagons requisitioned for loading but not used and returned empty shall also be subject to the above charges plus demurrage at the rates shown in the Goods Tariff in force for the time being, calculated from the time the wagons were placed in the siding to the time they were returned empty. Notwithstanding what is stated in clauses above mentioned of this Agreement, the free time and demurrage charges will be calculated in accordance with the pilot to pilot Schedule as may be in force from time to time and agreed to by the Railway Administration and the applicants." 14. Jumbo rakes were introduced some-times in the year 1982. According to the petitioner, it was extremely difficult for it to load full Jumbo rake within 13 hours (8 hours free time for loading plus 5 hours internal shunting time). A representation was. therefore, made to the Chairman. Railway Board on 24th April 1982 and a request was made that the Regional Office be advised to grant to the petitioner some realistic time for loading a Jumbo rake. A representation was. therefore, made to the Chairman. Railway Board on 24th April 1982 and a request was made that the Regional Office be advised to grant to the petitioner some realistic time for loading a Jumbo rake. Reference was given to the case of Lakheri Cement Works and it was stated that about 42 hours are taken to load a full Jumbo rake. Vide letter dated, 17th May 1982 of the Govt. of India, the petitioner was directed to contact the General Manager, Western Railway to whom petitioner's letter was forwarded. The General Manager directed that free time he assessed on the basis of Joint Trials which may be conducted for loading of Jumbo rakes. A Joint Trial Team was constituted which conducted the trials between 9 8.82 to 12.8,82. The Joint Trial Team submitted its recommendations to the Railway Administration. Thereafter, the General Manager, Western Railway, recorded a note on 20/30.3.83. This decision was communicated to the petitioner by the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Western Railway, to the Divisional Manager. Kota vide letter dated, 7 4.83 and was reiterated by another letter dated, 18.4.83. In the note dated, 20/30.3.83, the following decisions amongst other were recorded : "The above subject was discussed by G. M. with myself and DFTS this afternoon. This subject had also been discussed earlier by GM with FA & CAO (WST). The following policy decisions have been given by GM in connection with permitting Free time in case of Jumbo Rake 1oc.ding and waiving demurrage charges till the extended free time is approved by the Board. (a) We should accept that time arrived at as a result of trials conducted by committees of officers with the representatives of the party and recommend to the Board extension of free time, as recommended by the trial committees. Any arbitrary reduction in the time would not be correct. (b) Till the approval of the Board is received to the extension of free we should waive demurrage charges taking into account trial time, but at the same time imposing a nominal penalty as a disincentive to detention to wagons. The penalty should be imposed in the manner, indicated in para (c) below. (c) Even though the extended free time is found necessary it would b desirable to introduce a system of same form of incentive to reduce gradually the extra free time. The penalty should be imposed in the manner, indicated in para (c) below. (c) Even though the extended free time is found necessary it would b desirable to introduce a system of same form of incentive to reduce gradually the extra free time. This has to be monetary in nature so that the firms invest in appropriate loading facilities and bring down free time to normal limits. The best system would be taken penalty operating with extended free time. The penalty should be imposed in the following manner." 15. It was also decided that, if total servery trial times is taken in loading a Jumbo Rake is more than 36 hours but up to 48 hours subject to minimum limit of time recommended by the Trial Committee, a penalty of Rs. 3,000/- may he collected waiving the rest of the demurrage charges The Chief Commercial Superintendent vide his letter dated, 15-12-83 communicate the decision of the Board contained in its letter No. TCI/20/201/10, dated. 12-12-83. This decision was in turn communicated by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Kota, to the Station Superintendent, Kota and other Station Masters. The Railway Board Decided that Jumbo rakes consisting of B. C. ans CRT wagon will be allowed 10 working hours in case of group of 71 and above wagons This decision was to be effective from 1-1-84. Apparently, this decision of the Railway Board was not acted upon by the Western Railway Administration for quite some years and the petitioner Company was allowed 411/2 hours. This is evident from the letter dated 14-11-84 written by the Chief Commercial Superintendent to the managing Director of the petitioner Company. In para 3 of this letter, it came to be mentioned that reference has already been made to Railway Board for obtaining their sanction to allow free time arrived at for loading Jumbo Rake. The Railway Board has given advice to examine whether the introduction of pilot to pilot system world serve the purpose and issue is under examination. Prior to this a letter dated, 7-12-84 was sent by the Senior Divisional Commercial Superintendent. The Railway Board has given advice to examine whether the introduction of pilot to pilot system world serve the purpose and issue is under examination. Prior to this a letter dated, 7-12-84 was sent by the Senior Divisional Commercial Superintendent. Kota to the General Manager of the petitioner company pointing out that heavy dues were outstanding against the petitioner Company Regarding the facility of free time available to M/s Vikram Cement and M/s CCI Cement Factory it is to be noted that both these lines are meter Guage lines and they are not provided with Jumbo Rake. 16. The finding of prima facie case arrived at by the learned Munsif is based on complete misreading of the documents, to which a reference has been made here-in-above. the learned Munif has failed to take note of the fact that the petitioner had itself made representation to the Chairman, Railway Board on 24-4-82 for revising the free time schedule and the General Manager, Western Railway had in his note dated, 20/30-3-83 clearly recorded that his decision was till receipt of the approval from the Railway Board. The learned Munsiff also ignored the fact that the plaintiff-petitioner has not produced any document before the Court showing that the Railway Board had approved the recommendations made by the Joint Trial Team and the General Manager, Western Railway. Contrary to this the letter of the Railway Board dated, 12-12-83 clearly contained a specific guideline regarding free time for loadings and un-loading of Jumbo Rakes. The decision of the Railway Board became effective from 1-1-84. Therefore, the General Manager, western Railway, Had no authority to allow the facility of free time of 411/2 hours to the petitioner. Even from the letter dated 14-11-84 it has not borne out that the Railway Board had agreed to the proposal of allowing of 411/2 hours free time to the petitioner. The learned Munsif had also committed a serious error of law in holding that the decision to impose token penalty of Rs. 3,000/- will be deemed to be a decision by the Railway Administration and, therefore it was not open to the Railway Administration to reduce free time facility available to the petitioner. Equally erroneous is the conclusion of the learned Munsif that the General Manager, Western Railway, would be deemed to be the Railway Administration for the purpose of free time facility. Equally erroneous is the conclusion of the learned Munsif that the General Manager, Western Railway, would be deemed to be the Railway Administration for the purpose of free time facility. When the material placed on record unquestionably show that the decision was to be taken by the Railway Board and in fact, the Railway Board had taken by the Railway Board and in fact, the Railway Board had taken decision which became effective from 1-1-84, the General Manager Manager had no authority to allow free time facility of 411/2 hours after 1-1-84. No right much less a vested right came to accrue in favour of the petitioner on the basis of the practice adopted by the Western Railway at Kota, I am clearly of the view that the learned Munsif Had proceeded on a wholly erroneous premised that there exited a decision of the Railway Board for allowing free time of 411/2 hrs. to the petitioner and such decision could not be altered arbitrarily. Equally erroneous is the finding of the learned Munsif about the lack of bona fides on the part of Railway Administration, learned Munsif has placed reliance on the decision of the Western Railway authorities at Ratlam regarding Vikram Cement and C.C.I. Cement factory, Jawad Road. While making reference to these cases, the learned Munsif completely ignored the fact that no facility of Jumbo rake had been provided either to M/s Vikram Cement or CCI Cement Factory. Another grave error committed by the learned Munsif was to have taken himself upon the task of deciding as to whether the facility 13 hours free time was sufficient or not. The Railway Board is the competent authority to determine the schedule of free time which is made available to the various cement factories throughout the country. In such a policy decision the court must be extremely slow to interfere even while finally deciding a case. Here, the learned Munsif has given go-bye to the policy decision of the Railway Board while deciding an injunction application. The learned Munsif has assumed the role of substituting the decision of the Railway Board by his own decision. The entire approach of the learned trial court was Board by his own decision. The entire approach of the learned trial court was therefore perverse and capricious. The learned Munsif has assumed the role of substituting the decision of the Railway Board by his own decision. The entire approach of the learned trial court was Board by his own decision. The entire approach of the learned trial court was therefore perverse and capricious. The learned Munsif has also placed unnecessary emphasis on the fact that token penalty was being charged from the petitioner. Charging of penalty (demurrage) do not give any right to the plaintiff-petitioner to avail any particular free time. Equally erroneous and perverse approach of the learned Munsif is regarding the commencement of the point of free time. The provisions contained in the agreement entered into between the parties is very specific on the subject and there was no warrant for the learned Munsif to have deviated from the provisions contained in the agreement. 17. The learned Additional District Judge has, in my considered opinion, very correctly applied the principle of law while interfering with the order of the trial court. It has correctly held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable. The General Manager was authorised only to waive the demurrage charges, but had no authority to fix the free time schedule and he had in fact, not taken any final decision regarding free time schedule More-over, before the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be invoked, it was for the plaintiff-petitioner to have established that on the basis of any promise made to it , it had acted in a particular way. The plaintiff-petitioner has not established that it had incurred any additional financial liability or had changed its position on the basis of promise made by the competent authority. The very fact that in the note of the General Manager, the free time facility was made a subject matter of sanction by the Railway Board unquestionably show that the Railway Authorities could not be bound down to provide free time facility of 411/2 hours. 18. Learned Additional District Judge has very correctly held that it was not permissible for the trial court to pass an order contrary to the Siding Agreement entered into between the parties. In Paras 17(a) to 17(e) clearly Stipulate the point from where the free time will commence. 18. Learned Additional District Judge has very correctly held that it was not permissible for the trial court to pass an order contrary to the Siding Agreement entered into between the parties. In Paras 17(a) to 17(e) clearly Stipulate the point from where the free time will commence. Clause 17(e) provides that, as soon as wagons are placed at the point referred to in Clause 17(a), the Station Master will fill up parts-1 and 11 of Annexure `A' and obtain the applicants signature to part-I and sign part 11 and make it over to the consignee, whereupon wagons will be deemed to have been handed over to the applicants and free time permissible under the Rules will then commence. It was not open to the learned Munsiff to have ignored this part of the agreement while determining the question relating to commencement of free time. 19. Since, the findings recorded by the learned Munsiff have been found to be perverse and capricious the entire decision ai rived at by the learned Munsiff was contrary to the material available on record. There was every justification for the learned appellate court to have interfered with he order of injunction passed by the trial court. The approach of the learned Munsiff regarding irreparable injury and balance of convenience was also erroneous. Learned Munsiff has not taken note of the fact that in the event of success of the suit, the court could make appropriate order for refund of the amount which may have been paid by the petitioner. Therefore, there was no justification for binding that the petitioner suffered irreparable injury if injunction was not to be granted. 20. Thus, I do not find any ground to quash the order dated, 18.7.92 passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The revision petition fails and it is hereby dismissed without costs. It is however, made clear that the dismissal of the injunction application of the petitioner will not preclude it from approaching the Railway Board with the request of revision of free time schedule. Before parting with the case. I also wish to take note of the statement mace Shri G C. Garg, learned counsel for the non-petitioners that if the petitioner do not want to avail facility of Jumbo rake, it will be provided full free time facility as has been done in the case of the other Cement Factories.Revision dismissed. *******