BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is an original accused has challenged the conviction order passed against him under Sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (act for short hereinafter) and the sentence of simple imprisonment of three months and fine of Rs. 500. 00 or in default further simple imprisonment for 30 days passed by the learned Metropolitan magistrate, Ahmedabad in Summary Criminal Case, No. 92 of 1980. and confirmed by the City Sessions Judge, at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 1982. ( 2 ) THE resume of the material and relevant facts leading to the rise of the present Revision may, shortly, be stated at this stage. ( 3 ) THE present petitioner who is original accused was running a shop in Raikhad locality, at Ahmedabad, and was, also, dealing with groundnut oil. The petitioner was doing business in the name of kailas Kirana Store. The Food Inspector of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, opponent No. 2, original complainant, inspected the Kirana shop of the petitioner, on 18-9-1986, at about 9-45 a. m. The petitioner was doing business at the time of inspection made by the Food Inspector. ( 4 ) THE Food Inspector opponent No. 2, original complainant called a panch Kabruddin Mirzabmiya and in presence of panch the Food Inspector who is hereinafter referred to as complainant, purchased 400 gms. of groundnut oil from the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as accused" for the sake of convenience and brevity ). The accused, thus, sold groundnut oil from the open tin lying in his shop to the complainant, Food Inspector. The accused was paid Rs. 3. 00 by the complainant for purchase of sample of groundnut oil. The complainant observed necessary legal formalities in presence of panch and collected the sample of groundnut oil in three bottles which were separately packed in brown paper and labels with code number, serial number, and signature of Local Health Authority were applied. The signature of the accused and panch had also been taken and panchnama was prepared. ( 5 ) THE sample of groundnut oil collected by the complainant from the shop of the accused was analysed by the Public Analyst. On analysis it was found that the sample of groundnut oil collected from the shop of accused was adulterated. The signature of the accused and panch had also been taken and panchnama was prepared. ( 5 ) THE sample of groundnut oil collected by the complainant from the shop of the accused was analysed by the Public Analyst. On analysis it was found that the sample of groundnut oil collected from the shop of accused was adulterated. It was the opinion of the Public Analyst that the said sample of groundnut oil did not conform to the standard laid down under the provision of the Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (rules for short ). The report of the Public Analyst, at Exh. 10, also indicated that the sample groundnut oil was lacking the required quality and standard. In short, the sample groundnut oil was found adulterated which can be manifested from the following tabular data. Appendix B, as per Rule 5 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, provides the definition and standard of quality of the Food. A. 17. 03 in Appendix B, provides the standard of quality of groundnut oil. Found as per report. (a) Butyro-refractomcter 54. 0 to 57. 1 B. R. at 40c - 50. 0 reading 40c (b) Saponification value. 188 to 196 Sap. Value - 190. 3 (c) Iodine Value 85 to 99 Iodine value - 57. 69 (d) Unsaponifiable matter Not more than Unsap-matter - 0. 348% 1. 0 per cent (e) Free fatty acid as Not more than Free fatty acid - 2. 0304% oleic acid 3. 0 per cent (f) Bellier test turbidity temper- Bellier test - 22c ature Acetic acid method 39c to 41 C having found that the sample of groundnut oil was adulterated, the Food inspector, complainant, obtained written consent order of the Competent authority as required under Sec. 20 of the Act and instituted a criminal complaint before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad under the provisions of Sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) read with Sec. 7 of the Act. In said criminal trial being Summary Case No. 92 of 1980, the learned metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 6, Ahmedabad, on appreciation of evidence, found the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) of the Act and sentenced the accused for three months simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500. 00 and in default to further undergo simple imprisonment for 30 days. 500. 00 and in default to further undergo simple imprisonment for 30 days. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, the original accused preferred a Criminal appeal No. 74 of 1982 in the Court of City Sessions Judge at Ahmedabad. On appreciation of evidence and the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad was pleased to confirm the conviction and sentence order. Thus, the appeal was dismissed on 13-8-1982. Hence this revision. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner the original accused, Mr. Shah has, seriously, criticised the impugned conviction and sentence order. He has contended that the report of the Public Analyst, at Exh. 10, under rule 7 (3) of the Rules cannot be relied on in absence of the evidence of public Analyst. He has also placed reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mangilal Chamnaji v. State of Gujarat and Anr. , reported in (1974) XV GLR 852. This contention is without substance in the facts of the present case. The report of the Public Analyst can be admitted in evidence without examining the Public Analyst in the Court, in view of the provisions of Sec. 13 (5) of the Act. The report of the Public Analyst can be used as an evidence of facts stated therein without calling the Public analyst as a witness. It would be expedient to refer the provisions of Sec. 13 (5) of the Act at this stage which reads as follows :" (5) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub-sec. (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated, therein, in any proceeding under this Act or under Sees. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code: provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (not being a certificate with respect to the analysis of the sample of any article of food referred to in the proviso to sub-sec. (1a) of sec. 16) shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. Explanation : - In this Sec. and in Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1a) of sec. 16) shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. Explanation : - In this Sec. and in Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16 "director of the Central Food Laboratory" shall include the Officer for the time being in charge of any Food Laboratory (by whatever designation he is known) recognised by the central Government for the purpose of this Section. "the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mangilal Chamnajis case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case it was held that when the report of the Public Analyst which is not in the prescribed from as required by law, it is not admissible in evidence as evidence of the fact stated therein without examining the Public Analyst. The main question raised in that case was whether the report of the Public Analyst under the act which was net in the Form No. Ill prescribed by Rule 7 of the Rules was admissible in evidence under Sec. 13 (5) of the Act without examining the Public Analyst ? ( 8 ) THE matter was referred to the Division Bench on account of difference of opinion on the said question. The leaned Brother Surti, J. (as he then was) having found himself unable to agree with the interpretation of Sec. 13 (5) of the Act made by learned Brother D. A. Desai, J. (as be then was) in Criminal Revision Application No. 587 of 1972 decided on 17/07/1973, and that is how, the matter was referred to the Division Bench. The Division bench of this Court having regard to the relevant provisions etc. pertaining to the main question, accepted the view of the learned Brother D. A. Desai, j. (as be then was) that the report of the Public Analyst which is not in the prescribed form as required was not admissible as the facts stated therein without examining the Public Analyst. In the present case the report at Exh. 10 of the Public Analyst under Sec. 13 of the Act is as prescribed in Form no. Ill as per (he provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules. Apart from that the said decision of the Division Bench was rendered prior to the amendment made in Sec. 13 (5) of the Act. In the present case the report at Exh. 10 of the Public Analyst under Sec. 13 of the Act is as prescribed in Form no. Ill as per (he provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules. Apart from that the said decision of the Division Bench was rendered prior to the amendment made in Sec. 13 (5) of the Act. The amendment was made with effect from 1-4-1976, whereby, the proviso and explanation under Sec. 13 (5) has been introduced. The Division Bench decision was rendered on -0-12-1973. Therefore, under the circumstances the said Division Bench decision of this Court is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. ( 9 ) IT is also contended on behalf of the original accused petitioner herein that the provisions of Sec. 10 sub-sec. (7) have not been complied with and therefore the accused is entitled to acquittal. Section 10 (7) of the Act reads as under : (7) Where the Food Inspector takes any action under Cl. (a) of sub-sec (I), sub-sec. (2), sub-sec. (4) or sub-sec. (6), he shall (call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures)" ( 10 ) IT cannot be said in the facts of the present case that the provisions of the aforesaid sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 10 have not been complied with. The original complainant Food Inspector had got panch Kabruddin Mirzibmiya in whose presence the sample of groundnut oil was collected from the accusid which was found adulterated. The panch was present and the panchnama was also mide in his presence. No doubt, the panch was declared hostile as he did not support the version of the prosecution. It is, therefore, contended that the provisions of Sec. 10 (7) cannot be said to have been complied with. It is further contended that the evidence of hostile witness should be; totally disregarded. Such contentions are not sustainable. What is contemplated by provision of Sec. 10 (7) of the Act is that the Food Inspector while taking action for taking sample should call one or more persons to be present at that time. The mere fact that panch did not support would not tantamount to non-compliance of the Said provision. Such contentions are not sustainable. What is contemplated by provision of Sec. 10 (7) of the Act is that the Food Inspector while taking action for taking sample should call one or more persons to be present at that time. The mere fact that panch did not support would not tantamount to non-compliance of the Said provision. It is foud from the facts of the present case that the Food Inspector had observed all the necessary formalities while taking action for taking samole which was ultimately found to be adulterated. The evidence of the Food Inspector has remained unimpeachable. The evidencs of the hostile witness is required to be scrutinised carefully and with full of circumspection. However, it is not the proposition of law as argued before this Court on behalf of the petitioner original accused, that the evidence of hostile witness should be, totally, disregarded. The duty of the Court is to see the credibility and the trustworthiness of the testimony of the witness. The contention that the total evidence of the hostile witness should be excluded from the consideration is neither legal nor valid. Hence it merits rejection. ( 11 ) APART from that conviction can be based under the Act even on the sole testimony of Food Inspector or the complainant if his evidence inspires the confidence of the Court. This proposition of law is very well settled in Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1977 SC 56 . It is held therein that the conviction can be based on the sole testimony of Food Inspector under the provisions of Sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) read with Sec. 7 (1) of the Act. Thus, there is no rule of law that conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of Food Inspector. It is only out of sense of caution that Courts insist that testimony of Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. Such a caution is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law. If it were otherwise it would be possible for any accused or guilty person to escape the punishment by resorting to tempt or bribing the panch witness. The panch witness who turned hostile was, thoroughly, cross-examined. Such a caution is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law. If it were otherwise it would be possible for any accused or guilty person to escape the punishment by resorting to tempt or bribing the panch witness. The panch witness who turned hostile was, thoroughly, cross-examined. The version of the prosecution that the sample of groundnut oil which was found adulterated was taken from the open tin lying in the shop of the accused and in presence of panch after observing necessary formalities is also established from the evidence of the Food Inspector as well as panch witness. Even if the evidence of the hostile panch witness is, totally, excluded from the consideration then in that case also the version of the prosecution is spelt out and established from the evidence of Food inspector. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that there was non-compliance of provisions of Sec. 10 (7) of the Act is devoid of any force and hence it must be rejected. ( 12 ) NEXT it is contended that the consent order under Sec. 20 sub-sec. (1) is bad in law. It is, therefore, submitted that the accused is entitled to acquittal as there was no legal and valid written consent for launching prosecution as contemplated under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. In that, it is contended that the authority has not given reasons and facts did not disclose that there was application of mind on the part of the authority while passing written consent order. In this connection reliance is also placed on the Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Om Prakash Shaw v. Raniganj municipality and Anr. , reported in 1989 Cri. LJ 1973. Having examined the said decision, it does not support the version of the defence. This decision runs counter to the contention raised by the learned Counsel Mr. Shah. On the contrary it is held in that case that there is presumption that authority has given written consent order after satisfying that the prosecution was necessary and that the authority must not take formally in so many words in a ritualistic manner that it was so satisfied. This Court has lost to understand that how this decision supports the version of the defence. This Court has lost to understand that how this decision supports the version of the defence. Apart from that this point is also settled by this Court in a recent Division Bench decision rendered in Harshvadan Dahyalal Sevak v. Nareshbhai Devandas Vaghvani, 1991 (2) glh 615 . This Court has held in the said case that it is not necessary to record reasons once consent is given. Even without recording the reasons for the same it is not rendered invalid for want of reason. Therefore, the contention that the written consent order of the authority is illegal and invalid is without any substance. ( 13 ) IT is also contended that the prosecution has failed to prove that the sample of groundnut oil in question was collected and taken from the original accused. What is the use of polishing the brass when the whole ship is sinking. It is rightly said that a drowning man may even catch hold of a straw. In a desparate attempt to convince this Court, this submission is made for being is rejected. There is no dispute about the fact that this contention is raised for the first time before this Court in this Revision, wherein, the scope is very much circumscribed. However, this point was allowed to be agitated and on scrutiny of the facts it is found that this contention is totally meritless. In fact, there is voluminous evidence to show that the adulterated sample of groundnut oil (400 grams for Rs. 3. 00) was collected by the original complainant, food Inspector, from the original accused petitioner here in presence of panch and peon of Municipal Authority. The accused has also admitted in his statement under Sec. 313 of the Code that the original complainant had taken the sample of groundnut oil from him on 18-9-1980 at 9-45 a. m. for the purpose of analysis and that he was paid Rs. 3 for that purpose. Moreover in receipt exh. 5 and cash memo Exh. 6 it is specifically mentioned that the sample was collected by the Food Inspector from the accused who is petititoner herein before this Court. The evidence of the Food Inspector has remained unshaken on this point. Therefore, on all counts the said submission is without any merits. Therefore, it is required to be rejected. 5 and cash memo Exh. 6 it is specifically mentioned that the sample was collected by the Food Inspector from the accused who is petititoner herein before this Court. The evidence of the Food Inspector has remained unshaken on this point. Therefore, on all counts the said submission is without any merits. Therefore, it is required to be rejected. ( 14 ) IN fact both the Courts concurrently have found that the adulterated sample of groundnut oil was collected by the Food Inspector, original complainant, from the accused. This finding of fact has remained unassailable. In the facts and circumstances of the case and on the close scrutiny of the entire evidence on record, the conviction of the original accused, petitioner herein, under Sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) read with Sec. 7 of the Act is fully justified. ( 15 ) LASTLY, it was contended that the quantum of sentence in the facts of the present case is harsh and excessive. Needless to mention that learned metropolitan Magistrate has awarded minimum sentence of simple imprisonment for three months and fine of Rs. 500. 00 prescribed for such offence of food adulteration. Therefore, no question of reduction of sentence on the ground that it is harsh and excessive would arise. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate has taken a lenient view and has passed minimum sentence of simple imprisonment for three months and fine of Rs. 500. 00. It is very clear from the provisions of Sec. 16 (l) (a) (i) that if the offence is proved, minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term shall not be less than three months but which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 500/ -. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate has awarded minimum sentence which is rightly confirmed in the appeal by the City Session Judge. Therefore, the last contention is also totally meritless and deserves to be rejected. It was further submitted that in view of the long delay between the alleged commission of the offence and the hearing of this revision, the lenient view should be taken in that. It was contended that no conviction or sentence order should be passed after a long delay even if the guilt is proved. It was further submitted that in view of the long delay between the alleged commission of the offence and the hearing of this revision, the lenient view should be taken in that. It was contended that no conviction or sentence order should be passed after a long delay even if the guilt is proved. In view of the aforesaid provision which prescribes minimum penalty for the commission of the offence which is established against the original accused petitioner herein, this contention also must fail. Hence it is rejected. ( 16 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, the present revision is without any substance and requires to be rejected. At this stage the learned Counsel for the petitioner original accused, Mr. Shah contended that the accused may be given four months time to surrender. In the facts and circumstances of the case and after hearing the learned Counsels for the parties, the original accused petitioner herein is given eight weeks time to surrender. In the result, this revision petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. .