JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The petitioners are apprehending their arrest in a case F I.R0 No. 134 of 1992, dated 22nd May, 1992 under sections 302/ 201/34, L.P.C. registered at Police Station, Rohru. 2. On 25th April, 1992, the dead body of Bhagat Chand resident of village Gajandi, Tehsil Rohru, District Shimla, was found in Bagdhar forest. The matter was reported to the Police who came into action, got the dead body post-mortemed and interrogated a large number of persons of the area, including the petitioners. Ultimately, a F. I. R. was registered on 23rd May, 1992 at the instance of Prem Chand, brother of the deceased As per the statement of Prem Chand, under Section 154 Cr. P. C, on 23rd March, 1992, when the deceased was coming back to his village, he met the petitioners at a place known as Chuojar’ and later, at 6 00 p m they were found taking liquor In the shop of a Gurkha, namely, Chhotu Since the deceased had money transactions with petitioner Jagdish Chand, who had many a times threatened the deceased with dire consequences if his money was not paid in time, according to Prem Chand, he believed that his brother was killed by giving him poison in the liquor and also by beating him. 3. Besides the statement of Prem Chand, the Police has been able to bring on record the statements of Baldev Singh and Kishori Lal to the effect that petitioner Jagdish Chand used to tell them that if the money lent by him to the deceased was not returned as promised, he would take him to task. There is also the statement of Ramesh Chand that on 23rd March, 1992 at 5 30 p m. when the petitioners were taking tea at his shop, the deceased crossed in front of his shop and the petitioners had followed him. 4. These statements only point out the circumstance that the petitioners and the deceased were last seen together, From the postmortem report, no evidence is disclosed that the death of Bhagat Chand is homicidal During the pendency of the petition before this Court, the report of viscera was called for from the Director, Forensic Laboratory, Himachal Pradesh, according to which it did not contain any poison. As such, from the evidence on the Police tile, no prima facie case is made out against the petitioners, under sections 302/201/34, I.P.C 5. When the matter was taken up for arguments on 10th June, 1992, an application was moved on behalf of Prem Chand, brother of the deceased, through Sh. T. R. Chandel, Advocate, that he may be allowed to intervene and be heard in the matter, to which the learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sh. M. S Chandel, objected, mainly, on the ground that the complainant has no locus-standi to intervene and to be heard in a pre-arrest bail application. The objection raised is without any substance and is rejected. It is correct that section 301 (2) Cr. P. C. is the only provision which enables a third party to assist the prosecution and also submit written arguments with the leave of the Court in a case but in the interest of justice, a party can be allowed to mike a representation In the bail proceedings to supplement the submissions made by the prosecution, without being impleaded as an intervenor. Even under section 301 (2) Cr. P. C, the third party is not impleaded as a party to the proceedings but is given a right to assist the prosecution and to submit written arguments with the permission of the Court. If a third party is allowed to intervene in a proceedings. it is impleaded as a party and gets all the rights to make submissions as any other party to the proceedings For taking this view, this Court has taken support from P. S. Saravanabhavanandam and another v. S. Murugaiyyan and another, 1986 Cr LJ 1540, wherein the learned Judge held that:— "There is no provision in the Cr» P. C which enables a third party to get himself impleaded in the proceedings before the criminal court As already observed, we have only section 301 Cr P. C which enables the private parties to assist the prosecution and also submit written arguments with the leave of the court According to section 301 Cr P C, such assistance is to be given at the inquiry, trial or appeal in a criminal case. The question that arises is whether private parties can be allowed to intervene in the anticipatory bail petition with a view to represent matters before the court, when there is no provision for intervention in the Cr. The question that arises is whether private parties can be allowed to intervene in the anticipatory bail petition with a view to represent matters before the court, when there is no provision for intervention in the Cr. P. C. By "intervention" it is understood that a party who is in possession of facts may appear before the Court as an intervener and make his submissions on the matter in issue. In such cases, such a party is shown as intervener in the proceedings before the court. When a party cannot be impleaded in a criminal proceedings, as held by this Court, in the decision referred to above, he cannot be permitted to come in under the guise of an intervener But, at the same time bearing in mind the wholesome observations of the Supreme Court extracted above, the right of a party to represent matters before the court cannot be whittled down into a strait jacket formula of locus standi, which is unknown to criminal jurisprudence It is open to any party to make his representations in the bail proceedings pending before this Court before the inquiry or trial started.” 6. The observations of the Supreme Court referred to in the above para are from A.R. Antulay v Ramdas Srinivas Nayak and another, AIR 1984 SC 718^ wherein the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the concept of locus standi of complainant is foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In this judgment, the following observations are relevant for the point in issue:— "It is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Cr. P. C envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court, Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be tiled but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision........These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus-standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that any one can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contraindicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (See section 2 (n), Cr. P C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is under-taken in the name of the State representing the people, which would exclude any element of private vendatta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence save and except specific statutory exception........." 7. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that though the applicant Prem Chand has no right to intervene, yet, he is permitted to make a representation and is heard in the matter to supplement the sub missions made by the prosecution in the interest of justice and fair play. 8. Sh. R. M. Bisht, learned Law Officer, as well as Sh. T. R. Chandel, learned Counsel for Prem Chand, has seriously opposed the grant of bail on the ground that this will hamper the investigation and impede the cause of justice. According to them, there is also an apprehension that if the petitioners are bailed out, they will tamper with the prosecution evidence and Influence the witnesses. T. R. Chandel, learned Counsel for Prem Chand, has seriously opposed the grant of bail on the ground that this will hamper the investigation and impede the cause of justice. According to them, there is also an apprehension that if the petitioners are bailed out, they will tamper with the prosecution evidence and Influence the witnesses. They have relied upon Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1987 SC 737 ; Kiran Devi v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1988 SCC (Cri) 106 ; Shahul Hameed v. State of Kerala, 1988(3) Crimes 903 and Mool Chand v. State through the Director, CBI9 Scope Building, Lodhi Complex New Delhi, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 101 for emphasizing that in the case of murder, it is a general rule that pre-arrest bail should not be granted when the investigation is not complete. 9. This Court has examined these judgments. The case of Samundar Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, (supra) is of unnatural death of the daughter-in-law at the house of her father-in-law and the Supreme Court showing its concern over the wide spread belief that such cases are treated with some casualness observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, 4...It was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion prejudice by its very nature and timing......." The learned Judges of the Supreme Court sounded a note of caution for future that, “...The High Court is under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in a matter of this nature..." (Emphasis supplied). 10. The case of Kiran Devi v State of Rajas than and another (supra) was also a murder case though the facts thereof are not stated in the judgment. Setting aside the order of anticipatory bail, the Supreme Court observed:— “We are of the opinion that anticipatory bail should not have been granted in the murder case when the investigation was still incomplete. The proper course to adopt was to leave it to the trial Court to do the needful if and when the person concerned was arrested in the light of the record available at that point of time......" (Emphasis supplied). 11. The proper course to adopt was to leave it to the trial Court to do the needful if and when the person concerned was arrested in the light of the record available at that point of time......" (Emphasis supplied). 11. The question arises whether these observations are the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India which will have universal application Though the facts of the case are not mentioned in the judgment, yet, these observations cannot be read out of the context. Section 438 Cr. P. C. does not make any distinction between a murder case and any other case of other non-bailable offence The considerations for granting anticipatory bail are the same for murder as of other non-bailable offences As murder is one of the serious offences for which the sentence provided is death or life imprisonment, therefore, the Supreme Court, has sounded a note of caution that the High Court and the Sessions Court should not exercise its discretion under section 438, Cr.P.C. if the allegations of murder are made out and an opportunity should be given for investigation thereof. But if it can be shown that the allegations made are mala fide, for extraneous reasons, based merely on suspicion etc. etc the Court are at liberty to exercise their discretion to grant anticipatory bail. In the opinion of this Court, in the case of Kiran Devi v. State of Rajasthan and another (supra), the Supreme Court has not laid down the law of universal application that whenever the allegations of murder are made and the investigation is not complete, the Courts should refuse anticipatory bail as a matter of course. For taking this view, this Court has relied upon the law in respect of anticipatory bail laid down by the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 and Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1985 SC 1969 to which it will advert later. Similarly, the cases of Shahul Hameed v. State of Keralai and Mool Chand v. State through the Director, CBI, Scope Building, Lodhi Complex, New Delhi (supra) are the decisions on the facts thereof. 12. While dealing with the proposition that the discretion under section 438 Cr. Similarly, the cases of Shahul Hameed v. State of Keralai and Mool Chand v. State through the Director, CBI, Scope Building, Lodhi Complex, New Delhi (supra) are the decisions on the facts thereof. 12. While dealing with the proposition that the discretion under section 438 Cr. P. C. cannot be exercised in regard to an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, unless the Court at the stage of granting anticipatory bail is satisfied that such a charge appears to be false and groundless, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v The State of Punjab (supra) held that: ".....Now section 438 confers on the High Court and the Court of Sessions the power to grant anticipatory bail if the appellant has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed “a non-bailable offence." We see no warrant for reading into this provision the conditions subject to which bail can be granted under section 437 (I) of the Code. That section, while conferring the power to grant bail in cases of non-bailable offences, provides by way of an exception that a person accused or suspected of the commission of a non-bailable offence “Shall not be so released" if there appears to be reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If it was intended that the exception contained in section 437 (i) should govern the grant of relief u/s 438 (1), nothing would have been easier for the legislature than to introduce into the latter section a similar provision. We have already pointed out the basic distinction between these two sections Section 437 applies only after a person, who is alleged to have committed a non-bailable offence, is arrested or detained without warrant or appears or is brought before a court. We have already pointed out the basic distinction between these two sections Section 437 applies only after a person, who is alleged to have committed a non-bailable offence, is arrested or detained without warrant or appears or is brought before a court. Section 438 applies before the arrest is made and, in fact, one of the pre conditions of its application is that the person, who applies for relief under It, must be able to show that he has season to believe that "be may be arrested”, which plainly means that he is not yet arrested The nexus which this distinction bears with the grant or refusal of bail is that in cases falling under section 437, there is some concrete data on the basis of which it is possible to show that there appears to be reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In cases falling under section 438 that stage is still to arrive and, in the generality of cases thereunder, it would be premature and indeed difficult to predicate that there are or are not reasonable grounds for so believing. The foundation of the belief spoken of in section 437 (1), by reason of which the court cannot release the applicant on bail is, normally, the credibility of the allegations contained in the First Information Report. In the majority of cases falling under section 438, that data will be lacking for forming the requisite belief. If at all the conditions mentioned in section 437 are to be read into the provisions of section 438, the transplantation shall have to be done without amputation That is to say, on the reasoning of the High Court, section 438 (1) shall have to be read as containing the clause that the applicant shall not be released on bail if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In this process one shall have overlooked that whereas, the power under section 438 (1) can be exercised if the High Court or the Court of Sessions thinks fit to do so, section 437 (1) does not confer the power to grant bail in the same wide terms. In this process one shall have overlooked that whereas, the power under section 438 (1) can be exercised if the High Court or the Court of Sessions thinks fit to do so, section 437 (1) does not confer the power to grant bail in the same wide terms. The expression ‘if it thinks fit’, which occurs in section 438 (1) in relations to the power of the High Court or the Court of Sessions, is conspicuously absent in section 437 (1) We see no valid reason for re-writing section 438 with a view, not to expanding the scope and ambit of the discretion conferred on the High Court and the Court of Session, but for the purpose of limiting it. Accordingly, we are unable to endorse the view of the High Court that anticipatory bail cannot be granted in respect of offences like criminal breach of trust for the mere reason that the punishment provided therefor is imprisonment for life. Circumstances may broadly justify the grant of bail in such cases too, though of course, the court is free to refuse anticipatory bail in any case if there is material before it justifying such refusal." (Emphasis supplied). 13. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court quoted the observations in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn), AIR 197S SC 179 with approval that "there cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail" (Emphasis supplied). 14. Further, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following considerations for granting or refusing anticipatory bail or for cancelling bail:— “In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true, That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicants presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and "the larger interests of the public or the State” are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind white deciding an application for anticipatory bail The relevance of these considerations was pointed out in State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 622 ; (AIR 1962 SC 253) which, though, was a case under the old section 498 which corresponds to the present section 439 of the Code. It is of paramount consideration to remember that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purposes of the individual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free roan entitled to presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. In Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan and others (supra), three judges of the Supreme Court relied upon and further elaborated on the considerations for granting anticipatory bail. In Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan and others (supra), three judges of the Supreme Court relied upon and further elaborated on the considerations for granting anticipatory bail. They said: ".....Some of the relevant considerations which govern the discretion, noticed therein are the nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicants presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and the "larger interests of the public or the State" are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail. A caution was voiced that "in the evaluation of the consideration whether the applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it" 16. Similarly, in another judgment of the Supreme Court in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and another, AIR 1987 SC 1613, two judges of the Supreme Court observed that:— “......No doubt liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by a court, nonetheless when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the Court. Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution" 17. The ratio of the above noted judgments of the Supreme Court is that the discretion of granting anticipatory bail is to be exercised by the High Court and the Sessions Court, in cases of non-bailable offences, including the offence of murder, on the considerations such as, seriousness of the proposed charges ; the context of events likely to lead to the making of charges ; a reasonable possibility of applicants presence not being secured at the trial ; a reasonable apprehension that the witnesses will be tampered with ; the larger interest of the public or the State which includes collective interest of the community so that the parties do not lose faith in the judicial system and indulge in private retribution. These considerations are not exhaustive and are left to the best judgment of the High Court and the Sessions Court who are expected lo act objectively on the basis of their training and experience. The courts know that by granting anticipatory bail, some restrictions may be put on the investigation. This cannot be considered in isolation but in the context of other factors mentioned hereinabove. If the wide proposition propounded on behalf of the State and the complainant is accepted and the anticipatory bail is refused in a murder case in which the investigation is under progress without taking into consideration the other factors, it will be against the spirit of section 438 Cr P C By determent of investigation, the cause of justice is defeated whereas by refusing anticipatory bail the cause of liberty of an individual is defeated. Therefore, both these have to be weighed in a golden scale to come to a conclusion whether the case is fit for granting anticipatory bail or not 18. Applying these propositions to the facts of the present case, as stated hereinabove, the petitioner deserve to be released on bail. Therefore, both these have to be weighed in a golden scale to come to a conclusion whether the case is fit for granting anticipatory bail or not 18. Applying these propositions to the facts of the present case, as stated hereinabove, the petitioner deserve to be released on bail. The Police have been conducting investigation since March, 1992 and have also interrogated the petitioners a number of times but it has not been able to collect any evidence connecting them to the allegations of murder There is no substance in the submissions that there is an apprehension of the petitioners influencing the witnesses and tampering with the evidence If they were to do it, they had ample opportunity since the F. I R was lodged as far back as on 23rd March, 1992 No material has been placed on the record to substantiate these allegations. Any how, the Police/ prosecution may approach this Court for cancellation of their bail if it comes to their notice that the petitioners have committed any such act after their release. The release of the petitioners is subject to their joining investigation as and when called for; not tampering with the prosecution evidence and not influencing the witnesses In the circumstances, the application is allowed in these terms and conditions. The order releasing the petitioners in the event of their arrest has been passed separately. 19. Before parting with this order, it is made clear that the observations made during the course of this order shall -have no effect whatsoever on the merits of the case. Application allowed.