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1992 DIGILAW 73 (GAU)

Numali Kayastha (Rajput) v. Hemanta Kumak Baruah

1992-04-01

D.N.BARUAH

body1992
In this second appeal two questions viz. (i) Whether the plaintiff's suit is hit by principles of res-judicata, and (ii) Whether the appellate Court failed to consider material documents on record, were formulated as substantial questions of law. At the time of hearing Dr. MK Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted before this Court that another ground i.e. whether there was substantial compliance of Rule 31 of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code in passing the impugned judgment. On these three questions of law, Dr. Sharma has submitted that the appellate judgment of the Assistant District Judge passed in Title Appeal No. 62 of 1983 cannot be sustained. The respondent was the plaintiff in the original suit. He filed the suit for recovery of possession of the suit land by evicting the appellants/defen­dants. The plaintiff's case is that he instituted the Title Suit No. 83 of 1969 in the Court of Munsiff No. 1, Jorhat, for declaration of his right, title and interest and for recovery of khas possession of the suit land. The said suit was decreed by the Munsiff. On appeal, the appellate Court also confirmed the decree. Thereafter, the plaintiff started as execution case to execute the decree and the decree was executed on 4.3.73 by evicting defendant from the suit land and the plaintiff took possession of the suit land on execution of the decree. In 1977 two criminal proceedings under section 145 Criminal Procedure Code in respect of some lands covered by Dag No. 1134/436 were initiated at the instance of the defendants-appellants. The respondent was also made party. However, the respondent did not contest as it related to some lands, to which he was not concerned. The possession was declared in favour of appellants in both the criminal proceedings. On 4.3.78, the appellants in collu­sion with Assistant Sub-Inspector. Pulibor, demolished the structure raised by the respondent on the decreetal land. Hence, the respondent filed a suit. The defendant contested the suit and filed the written statement denying that the plaintiff got possession over the land in suit in execution of the decree (Title Execution No. 83 of 1969). The appellants, contentions were that the respondent recovered possession over only one fifth of the suit land. The rem­aining land was with the appellants. Their house was not demolished. Both sides adduced evidence by examining witnesses. The appellants, contentions were that the respondent recovered possession over only one fifth of the suit land. The rem­aining land was with the appellants. Their house was not demolished. Both sides adduced evidence by examining witnesses. The Munsiff decreed the suit by his judgment dated 4.8.82. The appellants preferred appeal (Title Appeal No. 62 of 1983). One of the grounds of the appeal was that the trial Court failed to frame issue regarding res-judicata. The Assistant District Judge also dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal. I have heard both sides. Dr. Sharma's first contention is that the judg­ment of the lower appellate Court is perverse as its findings are not borne by record. Dr. Sharma has drawn my attention of the deposition of DW 1, where he stated suit land was taken over by the respondent by demolis­hing their houses standing thereon. In the cross examination also he stated that it was not true that he trespassed into the land after the plaintiff took possession of the suit land in execution of the decree. DW 3 also stated that the houses of the DW 1 were not demolished and they were residing on the said land without any disturbance. The defendant at the time of hearing submitted that the entire decree was not executed. This point was again raised before the appellate Court. The appellate Court held thus: "I do not find any reason to believe that the respondent would not fully execute the entire decree and came with a fresh suit for the same subject matter and cause of action. When he got the decree he was at liberty to get it executed. So, the contentions of the appellants that only one forth of the suit land was recovered from them by way of execution is not tenable." While coming to this finding, the appellate Court did not discuss any evidence in this regard, on the assumption that he having obtained decree for eviction, there was no reason for him not to execute a decree and to come with a fresh suit. While deciding the case the appellate Court ought to have discussed the evidences without rushing in conclusion of mere assumption. Dr. While deciding the case the appellate Court ought to have discussed the evidences without rushing in conclusion of mere assumption. Dr. Sharma, has further submitted that on 26.6.82, the appellant filed a petition stating that the defendant's Advocate wanted to ask some relevant questions as regards the issues No. 4, 5, 6 and 7 which according to him was necessary for the Court to come to just decision. The defendant further stated that the aforesaid questions have important bearing on the point of resjudicata. The trial Court rejected the request of the defendant holding that it was not necessary, without however giving any reason. Under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, Court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness who was examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him the as Court thinks fit. In the petition, appellant stated that recalling of witnesses as prayed for was necessary for just determination of important issues. The petitioner also had shown the reasons for recalling the witnesses, but the Court rejected the prayer. In my opinion, the Court below ought to have allowed defendant to put question to the witnesses, as he intended to do just for the ends of justice. But unfortunately that was not done. The appellate Court also while affirming the judgment did not discuss any material evidence. It also did not come to a definite finding on the point raised by the appellant. On perusal of the appellate judgment, it cannot be said that it is an appellate judgment in proper sense. Dr. Sharma has drawn my attention to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 and has submitted the provisions contained in the said Rules are to be complied with strictly. In this connection Dr. Sharma placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in (AIR 1950 Assam 79) and also a Single Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1971 Assam and Nagaland 165. Besides that Dr. Sharma also relied an another decision of this Court reported in (1991) 2 GLR 147 [1991 (1) GLJ 453] In the said decision this Court has held that the judgment of the appellate Court should be self contained. Besides that Dr. Sharma also relied an another decision of this Court reported in (1991) 2 GLR 147 [1991 (1) GLJ 453] In the said decision this Court has held that the judgment of the appellate Court should be self contained. A judgment of the first appellate Court should state the points for deter­mination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision, Even when affirming a decision of the Court below, the appellate Court which is the final Court of facts must independently weigh the evidence, and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication. The object of the Rule is to clear up the pleadings, and focus the attention of the Court and of the parties on the specific and rival contentions of the parties. It s also the duty of the appellate Court to set forth the evidence relied upon and after shifting of the evidence must come to its own independent conclusion. The ratio of the decision cited above, is that the substantial compliance of the Rule 31 of Order 41 is necessary. In this case, the appellate judgment did not discuss any of the point raised by the appellant. The appellate Court also failed to discuss the material evidence on the points raised by the petitioner. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that appellate order cannot be sustained and it should be set aside. I, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment. The appeal is remanded to the appellate Court to decide the case afresh by considering the evidence on record of the witnesses already examined and further evidence on recalling the witnesses. This is a long pending case, therefore the appellate Court should decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible at any rate within three months from the date of appearance of the parties mentioned below. Parties to appear in the Court of Assistant District Judge, Jorhat on 27.5.92. The defendant shall take steps for summoning witnesses within four days from the date of appearance.