JUDGMENT S.C. Verma, J. - The building in which the disputed shop is situate is a waqf property and is represented by respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 4 is mutwalli of the same. 2. The respondent No. 3 through respondent No. 4 initiated proceedings under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in respect of three shops, being case No. 47 of 1977 against Smt. Gafooran, case No. 48 of 1977 against Sri Yaqoob Ali and case No. 49 of 1977 against Smt. Irshadi Begum. All the three cases were tried together by the Prescribed Authority and P.A. case No. 47 of 1977 was made the leading case. 3. In the release application it was alleged that the disputed property is recognised by Sunni Central Waqf Board and is in the nature of Waqf Alaulad. The Waqf Board has approved the resolution of the Waqf by order dated 11.3.1974 to demolish the building and to raise new construction in the shape of a market to augment the income of the Waqf. A plan has also been submitted and they have sufficient means for reconstruction. 4. An application under the provisions of Section 21(a) and (b) of the Act was filed for bonafide requirement of the Waqf and for new construction as the building was in dilapidated condition and required demolition and new construction. These applications were opposed on the ground that the need is not bonafide and the condition of the building is not such, which requires demolition as also the respondents do not have sufficient means to reconstruct the building. 5. The Prescribed Authority framed issues as to whether the respondent has authority to initiate proceeding and the nature of the Waqf. An issue was also framed as to whether the building is required for charitable and public purposes and lastly as to whether the building is in a dilapidated condition, requiring demolition and new construction. The Prescribed Authority held that the disputed property is a waqf property and the respondent No. 4, being mutwalli, has initiated proceedings for release of the disputed property to augment the income of the waqf and for compliance of the directions of Central Sunni Waqf Board. It was also held that the respondent Nos. 3 & 4 are in the capacity of landlord and the petitioner is a tenant thereof. It was also held that the respondent Nos. 3 & 4 are in the capacity of landlord and the petitioner is a tenant thereof. It was further held that the need of respondents is bonafide for demolition and re-construction of a market, as the tenants are only doing small business of 'Batasha' and 'Tea Shop'. It was further held that according to the offer made by the respondents that after the shops are re-constructed they would again be let out to the tenants. 6. In recording the finding with regard to the dilapidated condition of the building the Prescribed Authority was of the view that from conflicting reports of the expert regarding the condition of building it cannot be concluded that the building is in a dilapidated condition. However, as the bonafide need under Section 21(1)(a) has been upheld the building after demolition and re-construction is required by the landlord. 7. The Prescribed Authority with the aforesaid finding directed that the tenant could vacate the premises within one month and they would be entitled to two years rent as compensation. It was further directed that after the shops are re-constructed the respondents would again allow the tenants to be re-inducted and deliver them possession. 8. The appellate Authority held that the bonafide requirement is not beneficiary to the Waqf either for their own occupation for residence or for carrying on business. It was also held that since the waqf is alleged to be Waqf Alaulad, the object is not of utility or welfare to the general public and, therefore, it cannot be held to be public charitable trust so as to attract the applicability of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The appellate authority refused to release the accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. In dealing with the requirement under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act learned Judge on there being contradictory expert opinions regarding condition of the building inspected the premises himself and on the basis of material on record and various reports of the expert, as also on the basis of personal inspection recorded a finding that the building is in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction. Learned Judge in these circumstances, released the building in accordance with the provisions of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act and directed that possession be given to the landlord within one month, who shall construct the shop and give back to the tenant within one month, who shall construct the shop and give back to the tenant within a period of two months and the tenant would not be liable to pay any rent during which the shops are constructed. In case the landlord failed to deliver possession, a decree of possession shall be executed through the Court and they were also required to deposit Rs. 5,000/- in Court for awarding compensation. 9. The order of the IInd Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur dated 27.5.1990 has been challenged by Smt. Gafooran, against whom P.A. case No. 47 of 1977 was initiated being writ petition 9914 of 1980, by Smt. Irshadi Begum against whom P.A. Case No. 49 of 1977 was initiated being writ petition No. 9915 of 1980 and the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 being the landlords who were aggrieved by rejection of their release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act being Writ Petition No. 2737 of 1981. All the three petitions are being disposed of together as they relate to the same subject-matter of dispute. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner tenant in Writ Petition No. 9914 of 1980 and 9915 of 1980, contended before me that the Prescribed Authority has allowed the application only under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and as the Prescribed Authority did not find the building to be in a dilapidated condition, the release application under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act was rejected. The direction for re-entry given in the order of the Prescribed Authority was on account of concession made by the landlord themselves and it was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 1(1)(b) of the Act. It was further contended that the landlord did not file any appeal against the rejection of their release application under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act and the appeal filed by the tenant under Section 22 of the Act was only against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority releasing the accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 11. It was further contended that the landlord did not file any appeal against the rejection of their release application under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act and the appeal filed by the tenant under Section 22 of the Act was only against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority releasing the accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the appellate authority committed manifest error of law in releasing the disputed shop under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act after rejecting the release of the accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Apart from this legal submission, learned Counsel also submitted that the appellate authority after rejecting the experts opinion submitted from both the sides with regard to the condition of building made local inspection himself and only on the basis of his inspection report held that the building is in dilapidated condition. 12. First I would like to deal with the legal submission raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 13. The application for release filed by the landlord was purported to be both under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act holding that the need of the landlord is bonafide and the accommodation is required for demolition and new construction by the landlord. In dealing with the need of the landlord for release under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act the Prescribed Authority after holding that the building is not in dilapidated condition yet allowed demolition and re-entry of the tenant. In my opinion, the entire approach of the Prescribed Authority was confusing and incorrect. By allowing the application for release both under Sections 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act and permitting for re-entry of the tenant the order on the face of it is not in accordance with the law. If the release application both under Sections 21(1)(a) and (b) is allowed there is no question of granting re-entry to the tenant. The appellate authority, in these circumstances, after considering the entire evidence on record, has rightly disallowed the application for release under Section 21(1)(a) and corrected the error committed by the Prescribed Authority in rejecting the application both under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. The appellate authority, in these circumstances, after considering the entire evidence on record, has rightly disallowed the application for release under Section 21(1)(a) and corrected the error committed by the Prescribed Authority in rejecting the application both under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. Thus, it is not correct to allege that the Prescribed Authority had rejected the landlord's application under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act and had only allowed the same under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 14. The appellate authority on the basis of material on record set aside the finding of the Prescribed Authority regarding condition of building and recorded a finding that the building is in a dilapidated condition, which requires demolition and re-construction. Since re-entry to the tenant was permitted, the release can only be possible in accordance with the provisions of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act and the appellate authority, in the circumstances, has rightly disallowed the landlord's application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 15. Moreover, the appellate authority can always correct the error of the Prescribed Authority under Section 22 of the Act. Since the order of the Prescribed Authority was passed both under Sections 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act the landlord has rightly not filed any appeal and for that reason the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted that the order of the Prescribed Authority rejecting the release application under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act has become final. 16. As regards the challenge to the order of the appellate authority in respect of the finding and the condition of the building, the learned Judge was of the view that the affidavits filed by both the parties were evently balanced, as also the report of expert. Learned Judge after discussing the evidence on record, as also local inspection made by him, recorded a finding that the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and re-construction. Learned Judge also recorded a finding that requirement of Rule 17 of the rules framed under the Act are complied with. In my opinion, it is not correct to allege that the finding of dilapidated condition was recorded only on the basis of local inspection made by the learned Judge. The learned Judge stated that after inspecting the site he was of the view that the construction is very old and has no life to sustain. In my opinion, it is not correct to allege that the finding of dilapidated condition was recorded only on the basis of local inspection made by the learned Judge. The learned Judge stated that after inspecting the site he was of the view that the construction is very old and has no life to sustain. Of course, due to good maintenance it was not dangerous & likely to fall down in near future. The learned Judge after considering the entire evidence consisting of expert's report and the affidavit filed by the parties in the light of the facts, found by him at the time of local inspection, recorded the aforesaid finding. Thus, in my opinion the findings required for the release of the building under Section 21(1)(b) that the building is in dilapidated condition and required for the purpose of demolition and new construction does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 17. Moreover, the tenants are not being put to any loss as they have been permitted re-entry and a time schedule of two months has been fixed for re-construction of the shops. The order of the appellate authority putting all these restraints on the landlord to safeguard the re-entry of the tenant appears to be very just and equitable and the impugned order dated 25.9.1980 passed by the IInd Additional District Judge does not call for any interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. In Writ Petition No. 2737 of 1981 the landlord has challenged the order rejecting the release application in so far as it was held not maintainable under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. In my opinion, the grounds raised in the petition are also liable to be rejected mainly on the ground that the landlords in the release application have permitted re-entry of the tenant after re-construction of the building. Thus, they have given up their case for the release of the building under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Since the building in dispute has been permitted to be demolished and reconstructed and tenants have been allowed re-entry which was acceptable to the petitioners from very beginning, the petitioner in these circumstances, is not entitled to any relief in the present petition. The petition is liable to be rejected. 19. Thus, all the Writ Petition Nos. 9914 of 1980, 9915 of 1980 and 2737 of 1981 are dismissed. The petition is liable to be rejected. 19. Thus, all the Writ Petition Nos. 9914 of 1980, 9915 of 1980 and 2737 of 1981 are dismissed. The interim orders are discharged. 20. There shall be no orders as to costs.