( 1 ) THE following order of the Court was delivered by Hon. A. R. Tiwari, this is a petition preferred under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) FACTUAL matrix is rather jejune. The petitioner had filed MJC No. 32/92 in the Court below, subsequent notice dated 24-2-92 (Annexure P/1) and obtained order of 'status quo' on 5-3-92 (Annexure P/3 ). He suffered some prejudicial actions, as pleaded, even thereafter. Irked by this, he submitted the report on 9-3-92 (Ex. P/5) containing allegations of cognizable offences. Aggrieved by the refusal to register the offences in terms of S. 151 (1), Cr. P. C. , the petitioner has sought writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to obey the law, register the offences and proceed in accordance with law. ( 3 ) THE respondents have filed the return and impugned the prayers. While admitting the receipt of the report, the linchpin of the petition, they inter alia contended that the police conducted preliminary enquiry but found the report to be false. According to them, nothing was left for further action like registration and full scale investigation. In this premise, they denied obligation to register the case obsequiously ex-voto and maintained that at their level the matter died its death in the face of the aforesaid conclusion having gone against the petitioner. ( 4 ) WE have heard Shri K. G. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Ashok Kutumbale, learned GA for the respondents at length. ( 5 ) SHRI Maheshwari's main thrust of argument was that once the report contained an information disclosing cognizable offences and satisfied the requirements of Sec. 154 (1), Cr. P. C. , the respondents had no option except to register the same. Reinforcing this contention, he heavily relied on Bhajanlal's case, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527) State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, and pointed out paras 31 and 32 in particular. He maintained that ex parte enquiries can be no substitute to the requirement of the registration and shall, if upheld, open flood-gate to caprice and chaos. After all, urged the counsel, the maker of the report must have definite say in the matter. Shri Kutumbale, on the other hand, vehemently countered the contention and supported the action. He invited our attention to paras 81 to 83 of this decision. After all, urged the counsel, the maker of the report must have definite say in the matter. Shri Kutumbale, on the other hand, vehemently countered the contention and supported the action. He invited our attention to paras 81 to 83 of this decision. Elaborating further, he urged that (a) preliminary enquiry was permissible, being unforbidden by law, (b) it was faithfully conducted in view of public interest action of ante encroachment drive, (c) allegations were found false, (d) The question of registration or further investigation did not survive thereafter. He thus urged that the petition deserved dismissal. ( 6 ) THIS issue, as projected, is thus uncomplicated. All that needs to be answered is whether an ex parte enquiry, prejudicially affecting the maker of the report, is enough and whether no cause consequently survived to direct reviviscence of the report ? In the face of this, there dis no visible need to examine the merits either of the report on the enquiry. The question is short, so can be the answer. And in our view, this should present no-enigma. ( 7 ) WE have read Bhajanlal's case (supra) as also two other judgments, P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 520 : (1971 Cri LJ 523) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, AIR 1964 SC 21 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 140) referred to in paras 80 and 81 of the aforesaid case. These cases related to the public servants governed by the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In. AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 140), it was observed that "merely making some preliminary enquiries upon receipt of information from an anonymous source or a source of doubtful reliability for checking up the correctness of the information does not amount to collection of evidence and so cannot be regarded as investigation. " again in AIR 1971 SC 520 : (1971 Cri LJ 523) it was pointed out that : "in our view the procedure adopted against the appellant before laying of the first information report, though not in terms forbidden by law, was so unprecedented and outrageous as to shock one's sense of justice and fairplay. " it thus emerges that the decision in bath cases turned on their own peculiar facts. " it thus emerges that the decision in bath cases turned on their own peculiar facts. It appears that the object behind the preliminary enquiry in that case was, as noted above, to elicit more facts in the face of obvious tenebrosity and in the process to ensure that the public servant was not lightly lugged into more serious proceedings, prone to entail incalculable harm, even if temporarily on vague, incomplete or meretricious imputation. ( 8 ) IT is, however, wholly unnecessary in the present case to decide about the permissibility or even efficacy of enquiry as this petition can be disposed of on its own facts. ( 9 ) SO we skip to the nature of the report in question. It is a written report disclosing cognizable offences with sufficient particulars and identity. It is resting on the fulcrum of an existence and violation of a prohibitive order of a Competent Court. In this particular backdrop, it seemed to be an inexplicable riddle as to why a preliminary enquiry was still deemed desirable or essential and why the maker was not heard ? The respondents have not clarified as to why such report had to be processed Ex-tacito ? The police, no less than the Courts, should appear to be extremely keen to ensure that the majesty of law and law Court - is maintained at all times by all concerned. Law, it is well to remember, is no respecter of men or matters, it cannot be gainsaid that authorities in a democratic set up are expected to be willing to quell quirk as well as quagmire. Law must be permitted to run its course without occlusion. ( 10 ) THE view expressed in the aforesaid decisions have, thus, to be understood in the context in which the same carne to be recorded. The Court in Ghajenlal's case (supra), while agreeing with these views, held in para 111 as under :-"reverting to the present case, the allegations made in the complaint, in our considered opinion, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a case and an investigation thereon". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . And the law has been succinctly laid down by this judgment as under :-"it is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer-in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154 (1) of the Code, the said Police Officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. " ( 11 ) WE may profitably reproduce the relevant provisions-s. 154 (1), Cr. P. C. "information in cognizable cases :- (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. " s. 157 (1), Cr. P. C. " (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer incharge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under S. 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. " ( 12 ) WE may make a reference to AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819) State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, wherein it is held that :-". . . . . . . . Once an offence is disclosed an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. "( 13 ) IT was not disputed that the allegations made in Ex. . . . . . . . Once an offence is disclosed an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. "( 13 ) IT was not disputed that the allegations made in Ex. P/5 constituted cognizable offences. The only opposition is that the enquiry was held and the allegations were found to be untrue. We are, however, unable to accept this contention at least on the grounds. Firstly, these seemed to be no justification for such an enquiry in a case like this. Secondly, the prejudicial decision to bury - the case at their level under deep debris without participation of the maker of report ex facie was violative of the principles of natural justice. In Bhagwantsingh v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1985 SC 1285 : (1985 Cri LJ 1521) it is held that : "but if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the first information report, the informant - would certainly be prejudiced because the first information report lodged by him would have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when the interest of informant in prompt and effective action being taken on the first information report lodged by him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained in Sub-Section (2) of S. 154, Sub-Sec. (2) of S. 157 and Sub-Section (2) (ii) of S. 173 it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in seeing that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process, because that would be culmination of the first information report lodged by him. " ( 14 ) IN the face of this legal position, one may legitimately pose a question in this way that if the informant has the valuable right of being heard even in the Court when his report is at the stage of culminating in the closure of the case, then can be made to accept the adverse conclusion without a demur at the hands of police and to suffer closure without being heard ? Even in AIR 1971 SC 520 : (1971 Cri LJ 523) (supra) it was observed that "any such enquiry must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner. Even in AIR 1971 SC 520 : (1971 Cri LJ 523) (supra) it was observed that "any such enquiry must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner. " The implication is that it would be inutile unless reasonable opportunity of being heard was afforded. The nagging question is whether report was liable to be dubbed as untrue and whether further action was capable of being anesthetized without hearing and without registration ? In other words, the moot point is whether ex parte enquiry can be permitted to soy the scheme of the law and to incinerate the accusation in its infancy ? To put it differently, can such a conclusion operate as scutellum and can the system be seen to be clutched like this ? Surely, the respondents know or ought to know the subtle difference between registration of crime and eventual charge sheet in the Court, if justified on collection of evidence. The former is on accusation while the latter is on legal proof of the same, so far as the investigative machinery was concerned, ours is a country where rule of law reigns supreme. The question that stares in the face is whether any enquiry of the nature referred to in the return could curb or curtail the right of a citizen to have anyone prosecuted in Court of law though the agency of the State even when he claimed to be able to prove facts justifying the charge-sheet ? It may be kept in mind that such a right is linked with the responsibility of a prosecution under Section 182/211, C. P. C. , as also 500 IPC in case his information was ultimately found to be false or constituted false charge of an offence with an intent to injure someone. The intendment of Section 154 read with 157, Cr. P. C. quoted above; is luculent. It is different matter that finally the information may not culminate in the charge sheet. However, there should not be pettifoggery. And the maker of the report, exposed to liability under the law, must know that his grievance was bona fide heard in accordance with law. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, we hold that the ex parte enquiry cannot put the lambrequin in the issue. The action after all must be shown to be fair and impeccable. Consequently despite alleged enquiry the report (Ex. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, we hold that the ex parte enquiry cannot put the lambrequin in the issue. The action after all must be shown to be fair and impeccable. Consequently despite alleged enquiry the report (Ex. P/5) is required to be registered imprimis in terms of S. 154 (1), Cr. P. C. Once it is so registered, the investigation in all fairness should be entrusted to a responsible police officer. Needless to mention that the enquiry and its conclusion, being ex parte, should be treated as non est and the investigation should be made without in any way being influenced by the same. ( 16 ) EX consequent, we direct that the respondents shall within a period of 15 days from today register the case on the basis of the report (Ex. P/5) in terms of Sec. 154 (1), Cr. P. C. and shall proceed to investigate it in accordance with law as observed above. ( 17 ) THE petition is, thus, allowed in terms indicated above with no order as to costs. ( 18 ) LET a writ be issued accordingly petition allowed. .