JUDGMENT S.K. Chawla, J. -- 1. Appellant Narayan Prasad challenges his conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted there under. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief was that on 7.6.1983, at about 6.30 p.m., deceased Hari Shankar was passing through Sarafa Market in the town of Sironj, when the appellant Narayan Prasad suddenly appeared and dealt a blow by a pair of scissors (Khapcha), used for cutting of biri-leaves, on the deceased, resulting in two parallel 'injuries on the chest of the deceased. The deceased died shortly afterwards of the injuries. The appellant fled away soon after the incident. The cause of the incident was previous enmity between the parties. 3. Shri J.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, gave up challenge to the finding about guilt of the appellant, which was even otherwise soundly based on the evidence of eye-witnesses Narayan Hari Soni (P.W.1) and Shiv Prasad (P. W. 4), a few words spoken by the deceased, consisting of his oral dying declaration, that "Narayan Soni has run away after assaulting me, "evidence of Bishma Kumar (P.W. 5), who saw the appellant running away from the place of the incident with a pair of scissors and F.I.R. (Ex. P-1.) lodged at 6.55 p.m. by one of the eye-witnesses named Narayan Hari Soni (P.W. 1) expressly naming the appellant as the assailant~ Shri Gupta mainly confined his arguments at showing that the appellant had at the most committed the offence under Section 304 (part II) and not the offence of murder under Section 302I.P.C. In this regard, Shri Gupta referred to a number of decisions, namely Gurudeep Singh v. Jaswant Singh in AIR 1992 SC 987 , Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu in AIR 1984 SC 759 , Jagrun Singh v. State of Haryana in AIR 1981 SC 1552 , Hari Ram v. State of Haryana in AIR 1983 SC 185 Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab in AIR 1982,SC 55. On the other hand, reliance was placed on behalf of the prosecution on the decisions of Aditya Mohapatra v. State of Orissa in AIR 1980 SC 2110 " Gudar Dussadh v. State of Bihar in AIR 1972 SC 952 , Mohinder Singh v. State in 1991 CriLJ 739 (SC) and Gochipathula Samudraiu v. State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992 CrL L.J. 2488 (AP. High Court) to contend that offence really committed by the appellant was under Section 302 I.P.C. of which he has been properly convicted by the trial Court. 4. Before embarking upon the controversy as to what offence was really committed, it may be proper to notice the injuries which were sustained by the deceased. Dr. Suresh Jain (P.W. 2) had performed autopsy on the deceased and had found two parallel stab wounds on the chest of the deceased as follows: (1) Stab wound 2 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. x left thorasic cavity deep in 3rd inter costal space about 4 c.m. lateral to the sternum. (2) Stab wound 11/2 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. x right thorask cavity deep in 3rd inter costal space just lateral to the sternum. On internal examination pieaura and pleural cavity were found to be injured on both sides. Pleural cavity was found to be full of blood. Mid zone of right lung in an area of 2 c.m.x 2 c.m. was injured. Pericardium was injured over left ventrical. Myo cardiuim of left ventricle was punctured over anterior and medical part. In other words, one of the injuries had pierced into the heart. The doctor further deposed that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In fact, the injuries proved fatal on the same day within a short time, when the deceased on being taken to hospital was declared to be dead by the doctor. It was also the evidence of Dr. Jain (P.W. 2) that both the injuries could be caused by single blow by a pair of scissors -- (Art. A) shown to him -provided the blades of the scissors were separated from each other in a semicircle position. This fitted with the' evidence of the eye-witnesses that a single blow by a pair of scissors was dealt by the appellant 5. What was the offence committed by the appellant? In cases where death of a victim result from a single blow by weapon dealt by an accused, it is usually argued by the defence counsel, often with success, that the accused could not have an intention to kill the deceased and hence the case is not that of murder. What was the offence committed by the appellant? In cases where death of a victim result from a single blow by weapon dealt by an accused, it is usually argued by the defence counsel, often with success, that the accused could not have an intention to kill the deceased and hence the case is not that of murder. It is not realised that clause (1) to section 300 I.P.C. does not exhaust all cases of murder and that cases may be murder also because the case attracts any of the clauses (2),(3) or (4) of that section. To begin with, Clause (1) applies to a small minority of clear cut cases where from the circumstances it may be evident that the intention of the accused was to kill the victim, for example, when the weapon used may be a fire-arm or other inherently dangerous weapon, which if used, and the circumstances in which it is used, it is in all probability likely to cause fatal wound; or where whatever the weapon used the blows by the weapon are persisted or repeated until the victim actually dies. Clause (2) of section 300 is mainly confined to those cases where the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or immature age or other special circumstances, to be killed' by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death, Clause (4) relates to those cases in which there is no "intention" either to cause death or to cause bodily injury but there is knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous, for example, indiscriminate firing in a mob without any just excuse, that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Like the cases in Clause (1), the cases under Clauses (2) and (4) are bound to be rare. To a majority of cases of murder the clause which is generally attracted is Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge in the present case also held that the offence committed by the appellant was murder because the case fell, according to him, under Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C. 6. It may be proper here to extract Clause (3) or Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. "Section 300. Murder. -- Except in cases hereinafter excepted. It may be proper here to extract Clause (3) or Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. "Section 300. Murder. -- Except in cases hereinafter excepted. culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused --Thirdly.-- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or --" For the applicability of Clause Thirdly, it will be seen, that there are two requirements. The first requirement is that .the particular injury found on the deceased should have been "intended" by the assailant. If this requirement is satisfied, then the second requirement is that objectively that injury should have been sufficient in the ordinary course of .nature to cause death. The ingredient of" intention" is important and on that a given case may turn whether the offence committed was murder or not. In this regard distinction between "knowledge" and "intention" assumes great significance. This distinction has been beautifully explained in the decision Jai Prakash v. State (1991)2 SCC 32 . Speaking briefly, "knowledge" is awareness of certain facts, in which human mind remains supine or inactive. On the other hand, "intention" is a state in which mental faculties are summoned into action or aroused into activity for the purpose of achieving a conceived end. '.'Intention" may be said to be shaping of one's conduct so as to bring about a certain event. Intention need not necessarily involve 'pre-meditation. So also it is not necessary that in order that any injury may be intentional, the accused should have intended an injury of a particular degree of seriousness. Circumstances such as the weapon used, the degree of force employed in wielding it, the antecedent relations of the parities, the manner in which the attack was made, that is to say sudden or premeditated, whether the injury was inflicted during the scuffle or grappling, the number of injuries inflicted and their nature and the part of the body where the injury was inflicted may all have to be considered, while determining" intention" in relation to infliction of injury. 7. 7. Coming to concrete cases, even if the injury caused by single blow of a weapon may be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death, if the said injury happened to be caused on an unexpected and chance meeting between the accused and the deceased, if there was no previous enmity and the accused acted without premeditation suddenly on the spur of the moment or the injury happened to be caused in the course of grappling and scuffle, it has been held that the particular injury actually found on the deceased was not "intended to be inflicted'" by the accused, rendering Clause Thirdly of section 300 I.P.C. inapplicable and therefore reduced the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A reference to cases relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant given in paragraph 3 of this judgment may be made. On the other hand, where no circumstances of the above kind are present, the offence committed was held to be murder falling within Clause Thirdly of section 300 I.P.C. Reference may be made in this regard to decisions relied upon by the prosecution, also given in paragraph 3 of the judgment. ' 8. Coming to the present case, it is not known what was the immediate cause for the assault made by the appellant. It has appeared in the evidence that the appellant's family lived on rent in the house of the deceased. The appellant's father was unwilling to vacate that portion, which caused bad blood between the parties. It is also the evidence, of Shiv Prasad (P.W. 4) that he had mediated in that dispute and was able to bring about a compromise between the parties, in pursuance of which the appellant and his family had vacated the said portion. Even this had happened some 7 to 8 years back. If there was a compromise, that militates against the possibility that enmity between the parties would continue and more so when the matter was no more than a past history between the parties. There was absolutely no evidence to indicate that the alleged embers of enmity continued to be kept alive between the parties during the long interval of 7 or 8 years' before the incident took place. There was absolutely no evidence to indicate that the alleged embers of enmity continued to be kept alive between the parties during the long interval of 7 or 8 years' before the incident took place. On the prosecution evidence the incident in which the deceased Hari Shanker lost his life, took place because of, what was most likely a chance meeting unexpectedly between the deceased and the appellant in the Sarafa market. It is not known what exactly transpired to drive the appellant to attack the deceased. The appellant chose for the attack not any kind of conventional weapon. He used for the attack whatever was in his hand, i.e. a pair of scissors (Khapcha), used for cutting of biri leaves. It is not unlikely that the appellant was innocently holding that Kapcha. That Khapcha is a crude iron pair of scissors with blades of the length of 7" each. The appellant dealt a single blow, and no more, on the deceased. The Khapcha was no doubt dealt quite forcibly in that it caused injuries penetrating into the heart The twin injuries caused by a single blow of Khapcha were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. In that way, one of the two requirements for the applicability of Clause Thirdly was satisfied. But was the other requirement also satisfied? Did the appellant "intend" to cause that particular injury? Having regard to the totality of all the circumstances given above, it is not unlikely that the appellant did not particularly aim the Khapcha to strike on any particular part of the body of the deceased. Merely because the khapcha blow landed on the chest of the deceased, divorced from the circumstances in which the blow was given, it would be hazardous to say that the appellant" intended" to cause that particular injury. This rendered Clause Thirdly inapplicable and therefore the instant case is not that of murder. The appellant could, however, be safely credited with the knowledge that by forcibly dealing a Khapcha on the deceased, he was likely to cause the death of his victim, as actually he did. This made the appellant's act fall within section 304 (Part II) I.P.C. amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The appellant's conviction for the offence under section 302 I.P.C. is accordingly altered to one under section 304 (Part II) I.P.C. 9. This made the appellant's act fall within section 304 (Part II) I.P.C. amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The appellant's conviction for the offence under section 302 I.P.C. is accordingly altered to one under section 304 (Part II) I.P.C. 9. The appellant was sentenced by the Sessions Court on 3rd September, 1984. The appellant has been suffering sentence from that point of time. In other words, he has already suffered sentence of 8 years. Prior to that he was also under pre- conviction detention. We consider the sentence already undergone by the appellant as more than sufficient. 10. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of appellant Narayan Prasad is altered from section 302 to Section 304 (part II) IPC. He is sentenced for the said offence to imprisonment already undergone by him. He shall forthwith be released, if not required in any other case.