JUDGMENT Vijay Bahuguna, J. - By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner is challenging an order of dismissal dated 29th January, 1992, passed by the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission. , 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner was selected as Superintendent Grade II on 28-11-1984 by the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission. When the vacancy occurred in the post of Superintendent Grade I, instead of the petitioner Mr. V.K. Khanna was promoted. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 4185 of 1988 challenging the order of the Secretary of the Commission, dated 22-7-1988 appointing Sri V. K. Khanna as Superintendent Grade I. On the 27th of July, 1988, this Court issued a direction to the Commission to consider the representation of the petitioner against the appointment of Sri V. K. Khanna as Superintendent Grade I. The representation of the petitioner was rejected on 30th of July, 1988 on the reasoning that it was a temporary arrangement and no rights of the petitioner were affected. The petitioner thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 21908 of 1988 against the order passed on the representation of the petitioner. On 5-8-1991 this Court directed the Commission to take work of the post of Superintendent Grade I, from the petitioner till a regular officiating appointment was made in accordance with law. The relevant part of the order is quoted below i "The petitioner would be entitled to work on this post till a regular/officiating appointment is made in accordance with law. It will be open to the respondents to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law if his work and conduct is not found to be satisfactory. The respondents are directed to comply with these directions within 15 days of a certified copy of this order being placed before them." On 21st August, 1991, the respondent No. 2 called the petitioner to explain his work and conduct before complying with the order of the High Court dated 5-8-1991 and again issued a letter to the petitioner on 22nd August, 1991 to the effect that his conduct was objectionable and amounted to misconduct and asked for his reply till the 24th of August, 1991. It is pertinent to note that on 23rd of August, 1991, the Chief Accounts Officer, acting as Secretary of the Commission wrote a letter to the petitioner that as his conduct was improper it was not possible for the Commission to give the work of Superintendent Grade I to the petitioner a directed by the order of this Court dated 5-8-1991. This order of the 23rd of August, 1991, was passed a day before the expiry of time which was granted to the petitioner to explain his conduct by the letter of Sri Harish Chandra Saxena the respondent No 2 on the 22nd of August, 1991. 3. On 30th of August, 1991, the petitioner was placed under suspension. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 27163 of 1991 which was summarily dismissed by this court. Against this order the petitioner filed spoil Appeal No. 81 of 1991. In the Special Appeal a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the Commission and a Charge-sheet was annexed thereto. On the 29th of January, 1992, the impugned order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner. 4. The order of termination is being challenged on the ground that the same has been passed in breach of principles of natural justice as no charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to give his explanation to the charges levelled against him. It was further contended that the order of termination, which has been passed by the Chief Accounts Officer acting as Commission's Secretary, was illegal as he was not the appointing authority of the petitioner. The petitioner contents that the order of termination could be passed only by the Secretary under the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Regulations, 1988. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the impugned order is mala fide and has been passed on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The order of termination has been passed after the approval of the Commission. "appointing Authority" has been defined in Secondary Education Services Regulations, 1988. Regulation 3 (f) defines the appointing authority for Class C employees as the Commission itself and that the Secretary makes appointments only after the prior approval of the Commission. The order of termination has been passed after the approval of the Commission. "appointing Authority" has been defined in Secondary Education Services Regulations, 1988. Regulation 3 (f) defines the appointing authority for Class C employees as the Commission itself and that the Secretary makes appointments only after the prior approval of the Commission. A reading of the definition clause makes it dear that the appointing authority for Class C employees is the Commission and the secretary only communicates the order of the Commission and as such he cannot be said to be the appointing authority. The petitioner was appointed with the prior approval of the commission and his services have also been terminated with the prior approval of the Commission and as such in this regard there is no infirmity in the order of termination. 6. It has not been disputed that the petitioner was on medical leave from 30th August, 1991 till 30th January, 1992 and it is during this period of absence of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer issued the charge-sheet and concluded the enquiry, which forms the basis of the present termination order. In the enquiry report it is stated that the charge-sheet was sent to the petitioner vide registered post at his address 465, Katra, Allahabad, but the same was returned with the endorsement that the petitioner was in hospital and was not at his house. Thereafter, the charge-sheet was sent by U. P. C. on 5-7-1991 at the same address upon which an endorsement has been made that the same was refused. Thereafter the peons of the commission were sent to serve a copy of the charge-sheet on the petitioner on the 26th of November, 1991, and a report was submitted by the peons of the Commission that the petitioner refused to accept the charge-sheet, In event, as a copy of the charge-sheet had been filed along with the counter-affidavit in the Special Appeal filed by the petitioner in this Court, it cannot be said that the petitioner was unaware of the charge-sheet framed against him. He could have submitted a detailed reply to the charge-sheet explaining his conduct, it, therefore, cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer did not comply with the principles of natural justice as sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner and the petitioner was aware of the fact that a charge-sheet has been submitted against him but he did not choose to file his explanation to the charges levelled against him. Therefore, the enquiry proceedings cannot be said to have been held in contravention of principles of natural justice. 7. This Court has gone into the charges, which were levelled against the petitioner to satisfy itself as to whether the charges were of such a nature which could justify passing of the impugned order of termination. A bare perusal of the charges would indicate that the charges 1 to 5 pertain to slackness on the part of the petitioner in the discharge of his administrative work and there is to charge of financial irregularity or disobedience and negligence of work. 8. Stress was laid by the counsel on behalf of the Commission upon the sixth charge which related to the letter Which had been sent by the petitioner to the respondent No. 2 on 24th of August, 1991. A copy of the said letter has been annexed as Annexure-13 to the writ petition. Before examining the contents of the letter, dated 24th of August, 1991, which was written by the petitioner, it is necessary to glance through the order of this Court, dated 5th of August, 1991. A reading of the order makes it clear that this court had directed the Commission to give the work of Superintendent Grade I to the petitioner as he was the senior-most Superintendent Grade II. This court had, on perusal of the record, given a finding that there was no dispute with regard to the seniority of the petitioner and there was nothing very serious to indicate the adverse service record and the integrity of the petitioner and as such there was no reason to deprive the petitioner to work on the post of Superintendent Grade I. This Court, however, left it open to the Commission to observe the work and conduct of the petitioner and if necessary to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law. 9. 9. This court did not intend to confer a power upon the respondents to first look into the past service record and conduct of the petitioner before giving him the work of Superintendent Grade I. The said power was conferred upon the Commission to be exercised fairly and in accordance with law only if the conduct of the petitioner as Superintendent Grade I was not proper. The respondent No. 2, however, totally mis-construing the order of this Court wrote a letter to the petitioner to explain the nature of his duty and the work which had been performed by him in the past to assess as to whether the petitioner could be given the work of Superintendent Grade I. This will be apparent from a perusal of the letters sent by the respondent No. 2 to the petitioner on the 2ist. of August, 1991, the 22nd of August, 1991, and the 23rd of August, 1991. By letter, dated 22nd of August, 1991, sent by the respondent No. 2, time was granted to the petitioner till 24th August, 1991 to explain his conduct, but before the expiry of the dead-line an order was passed on 23rd August, 1991, against the petitioner and an opinion was formed that it was not feasible to comply with the order of this Court dated 5-8-1991 for giving the work of Superintendent Grade I to the petitioner. The letters of 21st of August, 1991, 22nd of August, 1991 and 23rd of August, 1991 make it crystal clear that the respondents were trying to find a way out not to comply with order of this Court, dated 5-8-1991 on some pretext or the other. 10. It was in the background of these developments that the petitioner wrote a letter to the respondent No. 2, Member of the Commission, on the 24th of August, 1991. In the said letter the petitioner has not levelled any charges of impropriety upon the respondent No. 2, but has mentioned what is alleged to have been spoken by the respondent No. 2 to the petitioner when the petitioner had approached him for complying with the order of this court dated 5th of August, 1991. In the said letter the petitioner has not levelled any charges of impropriety upon the respondent No. 2, but has mentioned what is alleged to have been spoken by the respondent No. 2 to the petitioner when the petitioner had approached him for complying with the order of this court dated 5th of August, 1991. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Harish Chandra Saxena respondent No. 2 it is specifically stated in Paragraph 9 that the petitioner was suspended after having written the letter, dated 24th of August, 1991 and that the said letter formed the basis for passing of the termination order. This court is very reluctant to accept the version of the petitioner that the respondent No. 2, who has a background of Higher Judicial Service, would utter the words which were referred to in the letter dated 24th of August, 1991, but it is also established beyond any realm of doubt that the respondents and especially the Respondent No. 2, were trying to giggle out of the directions contained in the order of this court, dated 5th of August, 1991, and as such to that extent their action was unjustified. 11. In view of the above discussions, this court finds that the order of termination passed by the respondents is an excessive punishment awarded to the petitioner ; and as such it is set aside. The petitioner shall be reinstated. However the petitioner will not be entitled to any back wages and the respondents shall censure him and the petitioner will also not be entitled to the next two increments in his salary. 12. With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs.