JUDGMENT : M.L. Bhat, J. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh, dated 27-1-78. The Appellants were Defendants and the Respondents were Plaintiffs in the main suit. 2. The trial court had decreed the suit in favour of the Appellants. On appeal, the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court was set aside by the Additional Civil Judge and he dismissed the suit of the Respondents. 3. The Appellants bad filed a suit for payment of maintenance and for cancellation of sale-deed which is said to have been executed by Respondent No. 1 on 14-9-71 in favour of his mother so as to defeat the claim of the Appellants with regard to the relief of maintenance which was likely to be granted in their favour by the Court. 4. Appellant No. 1 is the wife of Respondent No. 1 and Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are the minor children of Respondent No. 1. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are living with Appellant No. I and are said to have been left uncared for by Respondent No. 1 who is bound to maintain them and Appellant No. 1. It was avered that Respondent No. 1. had married another woman for which he was convicted u/s 494 IPC for an offence of bigamy and that conviction has become final. It is also avered that Respondent No. 1 and treated the Appellant No. 1 with cruelty and deserted her willfully. Appellant No. 1 claimed that maintenance be paid to her and her two children at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. With a view to defeat the claim of payment of maintenance, Respondent No. 1 is said to have disposed of his property in favour of his mother Respondent No. 2. 5. The trial court had on conclusion of trial decreed the suit allowing the maintenance to Appellants at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month, with effect from the date of judgment passed by the trial court. The trial court also granted relief for cancellation of sale-deed executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2. 6. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has raised preliminary objection that findings of the appellate court were based on facts, therefore in second appeal, this Court cannot upset the facts and take a contrary view. The trial court also granted relief for cancellation of sale-deed executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2. 6. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has raised preliminary objection that findings of the appellate court were based on facts, therefore in second appeal, this Court cannot upset the facts and take a contrary view. Even if appreciation of evidence is erroneous that would not be a ground for setting aside the judgment and decree in second appeal. This argument turns upon the provisions of Section 100 CPC Learned Counsel for the Respondents has relief upon an authority, Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer and Others Vs. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer and Another, AIR 1961 SC 1720 : AIR 1961 SC 1720 , Considering the provisions of Section 100, it was observed by the Supreme Court that High Court would not interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact on the ground of the said finding being erroneous. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has argued that finding recorded by the trial court could not be set aside by the Ist appellate court because the finding on issues recorded by the trial court turned on oral evidence. The oral evidence was recorded by the trial court. It had observed the conduct of witnesses when they gave their testimony. General rule is that the appellate Court should permit the finding of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies. This argument is supported by Madhusudan Das Vs. Smt. Narayanibai (Deceased) by Lrs. and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 35 : (1983) 1 SCR 851 . 8. I have considered the arguments submitted by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record of both the (Courts below. Findings recorded by the trial court are correct only in part. So far as the question of payment of maintenance was concerned the trial court's findings on the said question seems to be based on evidence and some cogent material. It is a fact that Appellant No. 1 is legally wedded wife of Respondent No. 1. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are children of Respondent No. 1 who are incapable of maintaining themselves. It is a fact that Appellant No. 1 is legally wedded wife of Respondent No. 1. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are children of Respondent No. 1 who are incapable of maintaining themselves. Respondent No. 1 has failed to maintain them therefore, claim of the Appellants for payment of maintenance was justified. It was in evidence that Respondent No. 1 had married another woman and he was convicted u/s 494 IPC for an offence of bigamy. The first Appellant, therefore, could not be compelled to live with Respondent No. 1, nor could Respondent No. 1, make payment of maintenance conditional on the ground that Appellant No. 1 should have lived with him. Respondent No. 1 has created a situation which made it impossible for Appellant No. 1 to live with Respondent No. 1 and discharge her marital obligations. 9. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are admittedly children of Respondent No. 1. They are incapable of maintaining themselves therefore, it was the responsibility of the Respondent No. 1 to maintain the said Appellants without any precondition. Respondent No. 1 was duty bound to maintain Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 as also Appellant No. 1. Respondent No. I seems to have treated Appellant No. 1 with utmost cruelty inasmuch as he bad married second time during the subsistance of first marriage with Appellant No. 1. This, by itself is cruel and would amount to cruelty. Cruelty need not be physical cruelty alone. Mental cruelty is as bad as physical cruelty. The order of maintenance passed by the trial court in favour of the Appellants does not suffer from any infirmity. 10. However, the trial court's judgment and decree with regard to cancellation of sale-deed purported to have been executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2 in 1971 does not seem to be correct. The sale-deed was executed long before the institution of suit, out of which the second appeal has arisen. At the time of sale Respondent No. 1 could not visualise that in future maintenance suit would be brought against him by the Appellant and he might be directed to pay maintenance to the Appellant. At that time there was no intention of defeating any order by Respondent No. 1 that might have been passed against him in a suit for maintenance. That suit was still born when the sale deed had been executed. At that time there was no intention of defeating any order by Respondent No. 1 that might have been passed against him in a suit for maintenance. That suit was still born when the sale deed had been executed. The challenge to the sale deed on the ground that it as executed to defeat the claim of creditors who were the Appellants, is not tenable. None of the claims of the Appellants against Respondent No. 1 was subjudiced in 1971, nor was enforced by any court. They, therefore, cannot be clothed with the status of creditors in 1971. The relief with regard to sale-deed of 1971 for its cancellation is misconceived and there is no evidence on which the trial court could have declared the sale-deed as fraudulent or ineffective against the claim of Appellants. 11. The first appellate court also has fallen into grave error by dismissing the claim of the Appellants in to. It was justified in dismissing the claim of the Appellant so far as the relief of cancellation of sale-deed executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2 on 14-9-71 was concerned. The sale-deed could not be cancelled for it was neither fraudulent nor executed with a view to defeat any of the claims of the Appellants. Much before institution of the suit, the sale deed was executed. The claim with regard to cancellation of the sale deed was rightly refused by the Ist appellate court and to that extent the suit of the Appellants was liable to be dismissed However, the first appellate court's judgment with regard to the relief of payment of maintenance to the Appellants is not legally sound. The Appellants had proved their claim against Respondent No. 1 for payment of maintenance which could not be refused to them by the Ist Appellate court. The Ist appellate court has refused the claim of payment of maintenance on the basis of irrelevant considerations and ignored the relevant considerations There was no obligation cast an Appellant No. 1 to live with Respondent No. 1 because Respondent No. 1 had created a situation by marrying another woman during the subsistance of his first marriage. Therefore, he could not have insisted upon Appellant No. 1 coming to him and living with him. Therefore, he could not have insisted upon Appellant No. 1 coming to him and living with him. The first appellate court had not at all cared to take into consideration the order of the criminal court by which Respondent No. 1 was convicted u/s 494 IPC. That being so the finding of the Ist appellate court with regard to refusal to pay the maintenance to Appellant No. 1 and other Appellants is perverse and based, no evidence. The first appellate court's findings are contrary to the evidence which is on record. The statement of Appellant No. 1 coupled with the findings of criminal court against Respondent No. 1 was sufficient to uphold the claim of Appellant No. 1. The claims of Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are quite independent, They could not be refused maintenance on the ground that they were living with their mother of their own will. The Ist appellate court's finding that Respondent No. 1 has not willfully neglected to maintain the Appellants is perverse and based on no evidence. On the basis of material on record it is established the Respondent No. 1 has willfully neglected to maintain the Appellants. Therefore, he is obliged to pay the maintenance to them and the claim of the Appellants should have been allowed and not rejected by the Ist appellate court 12. For the reasons stated above. the decree and judgment of the Ist appellate court is set aside in part. The appeal succeeds partly. The suit of the Appellants for payment of maintenance against Respondent No. 1 at the rate at which it has been decreed by the trial court with effect from the date mentioned in the trial court's judgment, deserves to be decreed and is decreed hereby. To this extent the judgment and decree of the Ist appellate court is set aside. However, the judgment and decree of the trial court with regard to the cancellation of the sale-deed dated 14-9-71 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent No. 2 has rightly been set aside by the Ist appellate court. The suit for relief of cancellation of sale-deed dated 14-9-71 shall stand dismissed. To this extent the decree and judgment of the Ist appellate court is maintained. 13. The suit for relief of cancellation of sale-deed dated 14-9-71 shall stand dismissed. To this extent the decree and judgment of the Ist appellate court is maintained. 13. The Appellants are free to execute the decree for payment of maintenance at the rate and with effect from the date, recorded by the trial court in Ist judgment and decree dated 5-1-77 in case No. 105 of 1974 against Respondent No. 1. Record of the court below shall be sent back. 14 The appeal has been partly allowed, therefore, there will be no order as to costs.