JUDGMENT Per Gyani, J. 1. This S.A. u/s 100 CPC filed by legal representatives of the plaintiff is directed against, appellate judgment and decree dated 12.2.1984 passed in C.R.A. 146-A/84, by Fifth Additional Judge, to the District Judge, Indore, thereby reversing trial Court’s judgment and decree dated 28.3.1983, as passed by the trial Court, C.O.S. No.424-A/82. 2. A learned Single Judge of this Court, who heard this appeal, faced with conflicting views, as expressed in judicial pronouncements, referred to the order and puzzling problems, as regards interpretation of the expression ‘living jointly with’ occurring in clause 2(e) of section 2 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1961’), raised the following question : “Whether the expression ‘living jointly with’ appearing in clause 2(e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, qualifies only the words ‘brother’s’ son or unmarried daughter, or any other relation dependant on landlord, or it qualifies all the relations enumerated therein?” 3. For being referred to a Larger Bench, the matter has accordingly been placed before us. The question as referred to us, is purely a question of statutory construction and interpretation. 4. Brief facts of the case are : “Plaintiff-appellant Narmadabai filed a suit for eviction against tenant-defendant-respondent. The suit house in question, situated in Kuwarmandi, Indore bearing Municipal No.27, was owned by Luhanji, his wife Narmadabai filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and mesne profit against defendant-respondents, (who occupied a portion of the house -- two rooms on the first floor and half of the ‘Dagla’ on the 2nd floor as tenant), on the ground of bona fide requirement for herself and members of her family consisting of 23 persons which included her 7 sons and their wives and children. Trial Court decreed the suit but the lower appellate Court, on the basis of evidence and material placed on record, set aside the decree, that the family members of plaintiff’s sons were not dependent on her, nor could such family members of plaintiff’s sons be treated as dependent on the plaintiff. Lower appellate Court also took note of the fact that it was not plaintiff’s pleaded case that the family members of her sons were dependent on her. Lower appellate Court also took note of the fact that it was not plaintiff’s pleaded case that the family members of her sons were dependent on her. Lower appellate Court following a decision of this Court as reported in 1977 JLJ 207 (Gopinath v. Girdhardas), rejected plaintiff’s claim of bona fide requirement of the suit accommodation, for her sons’ family members and consequently setting aside the decree of eviction as passed by the trial Court. 5. Plaintiff Narmadabai died on 30.11.1989 and the present appeal was filed by her sons. 6. Sub-section 1 of section 12 bars filing of suit for eviction against a tenant from tenanted accommodation, and clauses A to P, thereof enumerates the conditions or events on the existing or happening of which a landlord gets right to file a suit for eviction. Clause (e) of sub-section 1 of section 12 which relates to accommodation for residential purpose and the bona fide requirement of such accommodation, reads as follows : Section 2(1)(e) : “that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.” It would seen that this clause, speaks of bona fide requirement of the landlord himself or any member of his family, if he is the owner of the accommodation. Member of family is defined in clause (e) of section 2 of the Act, which reads as follows : “Section 2(e) : “member of the family” in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle’s wife or widow, or brother’s son or unmarried daughter living jointly with, or any other relation dependent on him.” 7. Reading section 12(1)(e) of the Act, it would be observed, that it merely speaks of ‘members of his (landlord) family’ which has been defined u/s 2(e) of the Act. It is this definition u/s 2(e) which speaks of other relations, dependant on him (landlord). 8. Reading section 12(1)(e) of the Act, it would be observed, that it merely speaks of ‘members of his (landlord) family’ which has been defined u/s 2(e) of the Act. It is this definition u/s 2(e) which speaks of other relations, dependant on him (landlord). 8. Reading the impugned judgment under appeal, it is abundantly clear that the plaintiff-appellant had been non-suited solely, on the ground that family members of plaintiff’s sons were not dependant on her. It is the question of their dependancy and not the question of their being member of the family which seems to have weighed with the lower appellate Court. The question of joint living of the members of the family with the landlord so as to attract the expression ‘living jointly with’ has not even been remotely touched by lower appellate Court. It is solely on the ground of dependancy of the family members of plaintiff’s sons, that plaintiff stands non-suited. The lower appellate Court judgment essentially proceeds and turns on dependency rather than on joint living of family members. Thus, on a plain reading of the lower appellate Court’s impugned judgment, the question as raised and referred, to my mind, does not arise, answered accordingly. 9. In my view as recorded above, it is not necessary to deal with a host of authorities pertaining to statutory interpretation and the legislative history, as traced. Per Qureshi, J. 10. The question which has been referred to the Full Bench by the learned Single Judge, while considering S.A. No.166 of 1985, is as under: “Whether the expression “living jointly with” appearing in clause 2(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 qualifies only the words “Brother’s son or unmarried daughter or any other relation dependent on landlord” or it qualifies all the relations enumerated therein?” My learned brother Shri Gyani, J. has stated the facts leading to this reference and I need not repeat the facts of the case. After going through the reference order and the facts of the case my learned brother came to the conclusion that the lower Court’s judgment essentially proceeds and turns on dependency rather on joint living of family members. Thus, on a plain reading of the lower appellate Court’s judgment the question raised and referred does not arise and, therefore, he found that it is not necessary to answer the question referred to this Bench. 11. Thus, on a plain reading of the lower appellate Court’s judgment the question raised and referred does not arise and, therefore, he found that it is not necessary to answer the question referred to this Bench. 11. While interpreting the definition of ‘memer of family’ given in section 2(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act) a Single Judge of this Court Dr. T.N. Singh, J. while deciding C.Rev. No.414 of 1984 Lalta Prasad v. Ramcharan, reported in 1986 JLJ 713 , has held as under : “In a case where the landlord needs bona fide the accommodation not for his own use but pleads needs of any “member of his family” that necessity arises to circumscribe the right statutorily contemplated. If we read the term “living jointly” in juxtaposition with the sister clause following it, “or any other relation dependent on him”, there could evidently be sufficient scope to take the view that the two expressions have created rights in separate classes of relations of the landlord of which the conjunction “or” is primarily suggestive. In other words, a person “living jointly” with the landlord need not necessarily be a person “dependent on him”. If it is claimed that a person is living jointly with the landlord, the joint living itself envisaged a separate class of cases if the term “living jointly” has to carry any meaning. It must only mean that the person must be actually living or residing continuously, indeed for all intent and purposes jointly, with the landlord factually exercising the right to live with the landlord jointly, envisaged under section 2(e). This interpretation has support of the fact that while other relations “dependent” on the landlord may have a right to live jointly because of the “dependence” factor, those relations who are named in the first part of clause 2(e) itself such as son, unmarried daughter etc., are concerned evidently with cases of persons actually living jointly because they are naturally expected to enjoy a joint living in normal and natural circumstances under Indian social system the matter may be different in the case of “any other relation”. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that the Act is a piece of beneficient social legislation. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that the Act is a piece of beneficient social legislation. It also bears emphasis that a strict construction of the definition clause is statutorily mandated by the term “means” used in it advisedly by the legislature.” According to the learned Judge when a landlord needs the accommodation bona fide for any member of his family, then the term “living jointly” used in section 2(e) of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that in case of all the members of the family named in the definition should live jointly with the landlord if the case of eviction is based on the bona fide need of such members. As regard the other members of the family not specifically mentioned in the definition they fall in another category and for them it is further necessary to prove that they are dependent on the landlord. Therefore, reading the term “living jointly in juxtaposition with the clause any other relation dependant on him”, the only interpretation which can be given to the definition is that the right of eviction on the ground of bona fide need of the members of the family is circumcised with the condition of their joint living with the landlord. This view was reiterated by the same Judge in Parwat Rao v. Babulal [1987 MPRCJ Note 44], and Smt. Kamla Sharma v. Smt. Radha Bai [1987 MPRCJ, 278]. 12. Another Single Judge of this Court Shri P.C. Pathak, J. while deciding S.A.No.808 of 1982 in the case of Omprakash v. Gopaldas, decided on 1.8.1986 (IB), has taken a view that the definition envisages three categories of the members of the family; one is of those who are natually the members of the landlord’s own family, the other is that of brother’s son or unmarried daughter and the third is of the other relations and as such he was of the view that the persons named in the first category i.e. spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal unlce’s wife or widow are not governed by the term “living jointly” or the term “dependent on him”. 13. 13. In the instant case although the first appellate Court had decided the case on the question of dependency, but it is manifest from the judgment that the term “dependent on him” has been made applicable to all the relations named in the definition. The learned referring Judge was, therefore, of the view that the view taken by Dr. T.N. Singh, J. being in conflict with the view taken by Shri P.C. Pathak, J. this controversy should be resolved and further the question being of general and public importance, a Larger Bench has to be constituted to decide this issue. 14. I agree with the learned referring Judge that the question being of general and public importance it has to be answered by a Larger Bench and the controversy which arose because of the two different interpretations, has to be resolved. Therefore, in my opinion the question referred to by the learned Single Judge has to be answered. 15. Now, the main controversy in view of the two decisions is about the extent of the applicability of the qualifying clauses “living jointly” and “dependent on him”. This controversy arose because of treating the member of the family, named in the definition in three categories according to Shri P.C. Pathak, J. and in two categories according to Shri T.N. Singh, J. According to Dr. T.N. Singh,J. the term “living jointly with governs all the members of the family specifically named in the definition and the term “dependant on him” qualifies only any other relation. As such it appears that the conjunction “or” has to be held to be disjunctive, according to Dr. T.N. Singh, J. when he held that the term ‘dependent on him’ will govern any other relation. This leads automatically to a question that why the word “or” used after the widow and brother’s son should not be held to be disjunctive. 16. To understand the above problem properly let us look at the definition of the ‘member of family’ as given in section 2(e) of the Act. This leads automatically to a question that why the word “or” used after the widow and brother’s son should not be held to be disjunctive. 16. To understand the above problem properly let us look at the definition of the ‘member of family’ as given in section 2(e) of the Act. It reads as under : “(e) “member of family” in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle’s wife, or widow or brother’s son or unmarried daughter living joinlty with, or any other relation dependent on him.” A plain reading of this definition would show that the legislature intended to create three categories of relations of the landlord one category being of those persons who are dependent members of the family i.e. spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grand-father, mother, grand-mother, brother unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle’s wife or widow. Thereafter, the word “or” is used and brother’s son or unmarried daughter have been included in the definition for which a condition has been imposed of “living jointly with” and a third category has been provided,which speaks of other relation, but for that also a condition has been imposed that they have to be ‘dependent on him’. As such the Legislature in its wisdom has used the word “or” after enumerating the first category and then brother’s son or unmarried daughter “living jointly with” have been named and thereafter the word “or” is again used to indicate any other relation with the condition of dependency on the landlord. As such in the context and the scheme of the Act the aforesaid use of “or” at two places is clearly disjunctive, thus creating three different categories of members of the family. Therefore, the qualifying words used after each category shall govern that category only for which the qualifying terms are used in view of the rule of last antecedent. 17. It is a settled position of law that the relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are applied to the antecedent immediately preceding. In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice Shri G.P. Singh (4th Edn.) page 199 there is a very useful discussion on the rule of Last Antecedent. 17. It is a settled position of law that the relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are applied to the antecedent immediately preceding. In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice Shri G.P. Singh (4th Edn.) page 199 there is a very useful discussion on the rule of Last Antecedent. The learned Author has based his opinion on the decided cases of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal [AIR 1960 SC 935, p.939], Ashwani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabindo Bose [ AIR 1952 SC 369 , p.376], and G.G. in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. [AIR 1946 FC, 16 . 23]. In the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court this principle has been reiterated with a further elucidation that the basic principles of interpretation put by the Court should not be lost sight of, which require that the interpretation put by the Court should not lead to absurdity or which may frustrate the policy of the Legislature. It has also to be kept in view that the interpretation of any term has to be made in the context in which it is used. Even when a Court may seek aid from the dictionary meaning of a particular word out of many meanings of the dictionary, the one which is consistent with the policy of the Legislature and the context of the main text has to be adopted. It is true that the Act is a beneficial legislation brought on the Statute Book for affording protection to the tenants, but in the same Act rights have been given to the landlord to get the suit accommodation vacated for the bona fide need and on other grounds also. Now the Legislature in its wisdom allowed the landlord to get the house evicted not only for the bona fide need of himself, but also for the members of his family and for that purpose in the definition of the member of family certain categories of the relatives have been named. Reading the definition as a whole one cannot conceive that all the relations named in the definition fall in the same category. 18. My learned brother Dr. Reading the definition as a whole one cannot conceive that all the relations named in the definition fall in the same category. 18. My learned brother Dr. T.N. Singh, J. has also gone through the report of the Select Committee and Bill as it was originally presented before the house to seek external aid for interpretation and is right when he says that the initial idea of the family consisting of the joint Hindu family was given up and instead the present definition was substituted to make it applicable to all the citizens. But the Indian tradition and culture of the families living together even after marriage and even being separate by mess has not been given a go-bye. The definition shows that this idea was very much in the mind of the Legislature when this Bill was converted into an Act. As such, if we read the relations named in the definition minutely, we find, that in the first category the persons who are naturally supposed to live together in one family have been put in a separate class because after the words paternal uncle’s wife or widow a comma has been put and thereafter the word ‘or’ is used and then brother’s son or unmarried daughter have been named with a condition that they were living jointly with the landlord, and thereafter again the word “or” is used and the words any other relations dependant to him have been inserted. As such in the aforesaid context the conjunction “or” is used in the aforesaid definition at two places is manifestly disjunctive and, therefore, if the rule of Last Antecedent is made applicable, we find that the qualifying term “living jointly” shall be applicable only in the case of brother’s son or unmarried daughter and the term “dependent on him” shall be applicable in the case of only any other relations. 19. To conclude, in the definition of ‘member of family’ there are three categories -- one consisting of spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle’s wife or widow; the second category is that of brother’s son or unmarried daughter and the third category is of any other relations and in view of the rule of Last Antecedent the term “living jointly with” qualifies only brother’s son or unmarried daughter and the term “dependent on him” qualifies only any other relation. The term “living jointly with” or “dependent on him” does not govern the relations enumerated in category one above. The reference is answered accordingly. Per Jha, J. Having carefully gone through the opinions proposed by my learned brothers V.D. Gyani, J. and A.G. Quresh, J. I am in agreement with the conclusion recorded by A.G. Qureshi, J. in para 10 of his opinion. .............