JUDGMENT J. K. Mathur, J. - This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeks quashing of the first information report lodged against the petitioner and also a direction requiring the opposite parties not to arrest the petitioner. 2. A first information report was lodged against the petitioner on 13-2-1992. It was alleged that the petitioner while functioning as pradhan of gram sabha Jamunaha misappropriated an amount of Rs. 68305.98 P out of the funds of Jawahar Rojgar Yojana, thus committing an offence punishable under Section 409, I.P.C. 3. The validity of this report was challenged mainly on the ground that it had been written at the instance of Sub-Divisional Magistrate without any inquiry. 4. Annexure No. 2 appended to the petition itself discloses that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, while addressing the communication to the Block Development Officer, stated that a copy of the inquiry report had been sent to him by the Additional District Magistrate. It was on the basis of that report that he required the Block Development Officer to lodge a first information report. 5. It does, therefore, appear as a fact that an inquiry was conducted. However, even if it was not, it would not be a reason to believe that the allegations made in the first information report were false. 6. It is not disputed that there are specific allegations which if found correct would make out an offence. In these circumstances, there is no reason to quash the first information report or to stop the investigation. 7. It was then urged on behalf of petitioner that direction be issued to the Court below to dispose of the application for bail when moved by the petitioner on the same day on which the application is moved. He also sought a further direction that in case bail application cannot be disposed of the same day, the Magistrate may be directed to release the petitioner on his personal bond till such time as the application for bail can be disposed of or in alternative to require the Magistrate to issue a direction to the police not to arrest the petitioner till such time as the bail application has been disposed of. 8. On behalf of State issuance of any of these directions has been strongly opposed on the ground that each one of them is violative of law and cannot be issued. 9. 8. On behalf of State issuance of any of these directions has been strongly opposed on the ground that each one of them is violative of law and cannot be issued. 9. The first contention raised on behalf of petitioner was that in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution this Court was not bound by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and can issue such directions as may be just even if they are not strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. 10. Direction as may be issued by this Court are based on some well defined principles and are not a totally arbitrary exercise of power. The directions sought in this case are in the nature of mandamus, requiring the Court below to act in a particular manner in respect of the proceedings that may be initiated before it. The mandamus can be issued only to enforce a statutory duty. It is, therefore, essential that the Court to which such a direction may be issued is bound to act in a manner specified by law in respect of petitioner's right. 11. The parametres of directions in the nature of mandamus have been outlined in the case of the Bihar Eastern Gangestic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2149 (para 15) : "There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. [See Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian cum-Managing Officer, AIR 1966 SC 334 ], Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The General Body of the Nalanda College, AIR 1962 SC 1210 and Dr. [See Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian cum-Managing Officer, AIR 1966 SC 334 ], Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The General Body of the Nalanda College, AIR 1962 SC 1210 and Dr. Uma Kant Saran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 964 ." In exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot direct any Court subordinate to it to act contrary to the provisions of law. Howsoever broad the area of discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution may be, it cannot be totally unfettered, for then discretion will degenerate into arbitrariness. Disregard of law by this Court in issuing directions would hit at the very root of the principle of rule of law, the basic tenet which sustains this polity. The Courts of law including this Court are meant to enforce the law and not to supplant it. 12. We are clearly of the opinion that no direction can ever be issued by High Court as may require violation of any provision of law. 13. The first direction sought by the petitioner is that the bail application should be decided by the Court on the very day on which it is moved. 14. This direction once issued by High Court will have to be complied with by the trial Courts in all the cases irrespective of the individual situations. 15. For this it will be necessary to acquaint ourselves with the provisions which govern the determination of bail applications, as contained in Sections 437(1) and 439(1), Cr. P.C. "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence (1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or is brought before a Court other than the High or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but - (i) Such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. (ii) Such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence : Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (II) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm : Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in Clause (H) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason. Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court." "439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail - (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct - (a) That any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail and if the offence is of the nature specified in subsection (3) of Section 437 may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section. (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: Provided that the High Court or the Court. of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the public prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice." 16. The proviso to Section 439(1) specifically directs that in certain cases, notice of the application has to be given to the Public Prosecutor before the bail application is decided unless, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Court is of the opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. The offence in the present case is punishable with imprisonment for life. 17. Under Section 437 and even for the bails in respect of the offences not covered by the aforesaid proviso, there is no specific provision explicitly requiring the giving of the notice to the prosecution. However, the Court has to record its reasons in writing while releasing any person on bail under Section 437, Cr. P. C. 18. Thus it would be seen that in some cases is statutorily required to give notice to the public prosecutor before a bail application is heard and decided. 19. The purpose of the bail is to relieve a person of the arrest and detention pending investigation or trial. The purpose of such detention is primarily to ensure a fair trial and, therefore, some of the essential considerations in the grant of bails are : (a) the availability of the accused for the trial. (b) the likelihood of the accused tampering with evidence, intimidating witness or victim. (c) the previous history of the accused with a view to conclude whether he is likely to repeat the offence and be a hazard to the society or the State in particular context of the offence which he is alleged to have committed. and numerous other similar considerations. The fact of his previous convictions has been expressly made a ground under Section 437(1) (ii) of the Cr.P.C. 20. It is not disputed that the process to grant the bail is a judicial process. The discretion in the grant of bail is guided by the aforesaid considerations amongst others. It is, therefore, necessary for the Courts to consider these factors before deciding the question of grant of bail. 21. Each of these factors can be brought to the notice of the Court only by the prosecution. No accused would come to the Court saying that he is likely to intimidate witnesses or may tamper with the evidence. It is, therefore, necessary for the Courts to consider these factors before deciding the question of grant of bail. 21. Each of these factors can be brought to the notice of the Court only by the prosecution. No accused would come to the Court saying that he is likely to intimidate witnesses or may tamper with the evidence. The notice stipulated to be given to the prosecution is, therefore, essential with a view to enable the prosecution to produce this material before the Court for it to consider. 22. This material has to be obtained from each of the investigating officers concerned in the case. He may be located in a police station, scores of kilometres away from the place of sitting of the Court. 23. By directing the Court to necessarily decide the bail application the same day, the Court would be in fact denying the society the right to protect its interest through the prosecution in the bail considerations. Unless the entire material in respect of each of the offence is available with the District Government counsel or the Public Prosecutor in each of the districts, it is impossible for any one of them to procure it the same day when an application for bail is moved and to place it before the Court after summoning it. In actual practice, therefore, such a direction would not only run counter to the provisions contained in S. 439, Cr.P.C. statutorily requiring a notice to be given but would also frustrate a just consideration of a bail application by almost denying the prosecution opportunity to place the relevant material before the Court to come to a just decision about the grant of bail. 24. For the operation of this very provision contained in Section 439, this High Court has framed a rule (Rule 15 Chapt. 8) which requires at least ten days' notice before a bail application is moved before this Court. It is not infrequent that even after this notice has been given, a number of adjournments are granted to the prosecution to obtain instructions and it is so where the material has already been collected and placed before the Courts below. Validity of Rule 18 was upheld in the case of Ramesh Chandra Kapil, 1984 All Cri C (SOC) 58 : (1984 Cri LJ 1156). 25. Validity of Rule 18 was upheld in the case of Ramesh Chandra Kapil, 1984 All Cri C (SOC) 58 : (1984 Cri LJ 1156). 25. To expect the prosecution in the trial Courts to collect all the material within an hour or two after having been given the bail applications even from the police station situate far away and also considering the fact that investigating officers would be available during those precise hours sitting in the police stations in spite of the exigencies of their service, would be expecting almost impossible and will be frustrative of just decision in bail. 26. Giving of a notice is not a sheer formality. The discussion above would show that giving of such a notice has a specific purpose, of affording the prosecution an opportunity to collect and place the material before the Court. It cannot be said that the mere showing of an application for bail to the public prosecutor would be a sufficient compliance of the provisions of law and after showing the bail application, the Court can lawfully proceed with its determination. 27. The discretioin has been conferred on a Court which is considering a bail application to dispense with the giving of a notice. 28. By issuing of a direction by this Court to hear the bail application the same day, this Court is virtually usurping that discretion and in fact using it in a particular manner of denying the notice in every case. 29. No Court may exercise the discretion vesting in any other Court unless it has first been exercised by the Court on which it has been conferred. Also no mandamus can be issued to an authority or Court to act in a specific manner, if it has discretion to act in that matter. "No writ or direction could be issued in a matter which was essentially in the discretion of the Government." It was held in the case of D.D. Suri v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1596 . 30. It was then urged that the right of liberty has been guaranteed by the Constitution under Art. 21 and, therefore, a person cannot be kept in custody for any period of time whatsoever, only to be subsequently released on bail as it would unnecessarily curtail his liberty. 31. Article 21 of the Constitution has two components. 30. It was then urged that the right of liberty has been guaranteed by the Constitution under Art. 21 and, therefore, a person cannot be kept in custody for any period of time whatsoever, only to be subsequently released on bail as it would unnecessarily curtail his liberty. 31. Article 21 of the Constitution has two components. The first part of Article 21 guarantees the right of life and liberty to every citizen. The second part of this Article is equally important. It provides hedges around this right of liberty by providing that this right can be interfered with in accordance with the procedure established by law'. This last clause of Art. 21 seemingly places a curb on the right of liberty by subjecting it to the procedure established by law. Yet it is positive in content it seeks to protect the similar rights of other citizens from being jeopardised by the liberty of an individual. It prescribes parameters of personal liberty to keep it from intruding upon rights of other members of the Society, by permitting State intervention, to protect their interest, in accordance with the law. 32. These two clauses fused in Art. 21 of the Constitution, seek to strike a balance between the countervailing individual and social interest. 33. If such a liberty is permitted to be unbridled, or unrestricted liberty of an individual, it would in fact amount to licensiousness and may over-run the liberty of every other member of the society. It is, therefore, imperative to restrict the liberty of an individual to protect the similar liberty of other persons and to create an order in the society. It is well established that liberty of a person may be interfered with in accordance with procedure which is provided by a statute, which is reasonable, just and fair and is operated within the permissible limits. In the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 , at page 108, Das J. defined liberty as a right to do as one pleases within the law. "I say within the law because liberty is not unbridled licence," but a regulated freedom. He went on to quote Webster in his works Vol. II page 393. "Liberty is the creation of law essentially different from the authorised licentiousness that trespasses on right. "I say within the law because liberty is not unbridled licence," but a regulated freedom. He went on to quote Webster in his works Vol. II page 393. "Liberty is the creation of law essentially different from the authorised licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and refined idea, the offspring of high civilisation, which the savage never understand, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws The working of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, executive and judicial power favourable to liberty and justice. These checks and restraints are so many safeguards set around individual rights and interests. That man is free who is protected from injury." It has been held in the case of Shahzed Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 1 Reports (SC) 674 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1613 ), while considering the right to bail (at p. 1616 of AIR): "Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution. 34. In extent to which right of liberty operates vis-a-vis the restrictions placed by the Cr.P.C. was also discussed in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292 (para 7) : "Liberty occupies a place of pride in our sociopolitical order. And who know the value of liberty more than the founding fathers of our Constitution whose liberty was curtailed time and again under draconian law by the colonial rulers. That is why they provided in Art. 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according the procedure established by law. It follows therefore that the personal liberty of an individual can be curbed by procedure established by law. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is one such procedural law. That law permits curtailment of liberty of anti-social and anti-national elements. It follows therefore that the personal liberty of an individual can be curbed by procedure established by law. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is one such procedural law. That law permits curtailment of liberty of anti-social and anti-national elements. Article 22 casts certain obligations on the authorities in the event of arrest of an individual accused of the commission of a crime against society or the nation. In cases of undertrials charged with the commission of an offence or offences the Court is generally called upon to decide whether to release him on bail or to commit him to jail. This decision has to be made, mainly in non-bailable cases, having regard to the nature of the crime the circumstances in which it was committed, the background of the accused, the possibility of his jumping bail, the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on society and the possibility of retribution etc." Thus in case the petitioner in this case can be arrested and detained pending the decision of an application for bail under valid statutes such detention cannot be said to violate the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution. 35. In respect of the cognizable effence a person may be arrested by the police when there is a reasonable complaint, a credible information or a reasonable suspicion about his having been concerned in the commission of such an offence, under Section 41(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. A Magistrate can also arrest a person under S. 44(2), Cr.P.C. though such arrests are usually made when a person himself appears before a Court and surrenders. 36. A person so arrested may be remanded to custody during investigation under Sections 167 and 167-A, Cr.P.C. or may be released on bail under Sections 437 and 439, Cr.P.C. 37. In case the investigation has concluded, Sections 309 and 209, Cr.P.C. provide for remand during trial. 38. The validity of any one of these provisions has not been challenged before this Court. 39. Thus they constitute the procedure established by law, capable of overriding the right of liberty of an individual, if used in just and fair manner. 40. As has been discussed in detail above, the consideration of bail does require the material to be produced before the Court concerned on certain facts. 39. Thus they constitute the procedure established by law, capable of overriding the right of liberty of an individual, if used in just and fair manner. 40. As has been discussed in detail above, the consideration of bail does require the material to be produced before the Court concerned on certain facts. When the Court provides an opportunity to either of the two parties as is necessary to bring the material before it for bail determination, the provisions are operated absolutely reasonably and fairly and cannot be violative of provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution. On the other hand by compelling the hearing of the bail applications without either of the parties being permitted to produce the material before the Court, the Court would be compelled not to follow the procedure established by law in fair and just manner. Such a procedure would not be fair to the societal interest and will deny the Courts on opportunity to consider the application on accepted considerations. 41. The argument, that the person may not even be kept in custody when the bail application is being heard is, therefore, not a tenable argument and in no way would infringe the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution. 42. The other direction sought by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in case the bail cannot be granted the same day, the petitioner should not be arrested and the Magistrate should also direct the police not to arrest him. 43. Bail being release from custody an application can be moved only by a person who is in custody. The provisions of Section 438, Cr.P.C. which permit an anticipatory bail of a person who has not been arrested, are not applicable in this State. The law, therefore does not envisage a situation that a person who has moved an application for bail is still not in custody and does not have any restraint on his liberty. The very application for bail may not be maintainable in case the person does not surrender in Court and prays for bail or is not arrested. Even this appearance amount to surrender to custody, if bail is not granted he will have to be remanded. 44. The very application for bail may not be maintainable in case the person does not surrender in Court and prays for bail or is not arrested. Even this appearance amount to surrender to custody, if bail is not granted he will have to be remanded. 44. This Court in a Full Bench decision in Ram Lal Yadav v. State, (1989) 15 All LR 279 (1990 All LJ 47) has held that the High Court may not in exercise of its inherent power stay the arrest of a person by the police for the purposes of investigation. 45. By directing the Magistrate not to arrest him, this Court would be permitting an anticipatory hearing of the bail, a process which has been deliberately withdrawn by the legislature. Additionally in asking the magistrate to direct the police not to arrest the accused during investigation, this Court shall be directing a Magistrate to do something which it itself cannot do because of the law laid down in the aforesaid case. If even this Court which in addition to all the powers it has as a Court under the Cr.P.C. has inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot stay the arrest, directing the Magistrate to pass that order would amount to getting that act done which cannot be ordered by this Court, by proxy. Such a direction would patently be against the provisions of law. 46. By directing the Magistrate to immediately release a person on personal Bond, this Court would be innovating a procedure not provided by law. 47. The Code of Criminal Procedure is exhaustive in respect of matters specifically provided by it. (Gokul (1902) 29 Ind App 196). 48. The Criminal Procedure Code specifically provides for the manner in which person can be released on bail, in provisions contained in Section 436, Section 437 and 439, Cr. P. C. 49. As has been discussed above, there are well accepted considerations for passing of an order under either of these two provisions in granting of bail. If the trial Courts are compelled to grant bail in Section 437 or 439, Cr.P.C., this Court shall be compelling them to act in a particular way whereas they have discretion given to them by law. As discussed above no such direction can be legally issued. 50. If the trial Courts are compelled to grant bail in Section 437 or 439, Cr.P.C., this Court shall be compelling them to act in a particular way whereas they have discretion given to them by law. As discussed above no such direction can be legally issued. 50. Another principle which will come in the way of such an order is the one laid down long back in the case of Nazeer Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 . "Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden." This dictum was laid in a case where confessional statements were recorded by a Magistrate. Considering the provisions of Section 164, Cr.P.C. the Privy Council insisted that it ought to have been done only in the manner prescribed by law. 51. Similarly in the present case as given above, there are specific statutory provisions prescribing the manner in which the bail can be granted either by a Magistrate or by a Court of sessions. The bail has to be granted only in accordance with these provisions. These provisions cannot be added to or deviated from in grant of bail. Any direction to act otherwise than in conformity with these provisions would, therefore, not be a lawful direction. It may result in compelling a Magistrate to grant bail where he may not have the power to do so under Section 437. 52. By requiring the accused to be released on a mere personal bond and then requiring the Courts to consider his bail application on merit would in fact be adding a provision in each of the aforesaid sections and providing a process not provided for by law. This Court does not have any legislative functions and cannot add to or take away form the provisions of law. In the present case it is not to be attempted even as a part of the legitimate function of this Court in interpreting the law. Adding of provisions in this way is a blatant exercise of the legislative function which cannot be performed by this Court. 53. Even if this was to be done by way of interpreting the provisions of Section 437 or 439, Cr.P.C., it would still be not permissible. Adding of provisions in this way is a blatant exercise of the legislative function which cannot be performed by this Court. 53. Even if this was to be done by way of interpreting the provisions of Section 437 or 439, Cr.P.C., it would still be not permissible. "The High Court cannot do so, for the Court can merely interpret the section, it cannot re-write, re-cast or re-design the section. In interpreting the provisions, the exercise undertaken by the Court is to make explicit the intention of the Legislature which enacted the legislation. It is not for the Court to reframe the legislation for very good reason that the powers to legislate have not been conferred on the Court. It was so laid down in the case of State of Kerala v. Mathai Varghese, AIR 1987 SC 33 . 54. Even where the Court finds that something ought to have been provided in the law but has not been so provided, it cannot supply the provisions only in interpreting the law. "There is no scope for imperting into the statute words which are not there. Such importation would be not to construe, but to amend the statute. Even if there because omissus, the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by judicial interpretation. (Tarulate Syam v. Income-tax Commissioner, AIR 1977 SC 1802 ). 55. This Court cannot, therefore, ignore the statutory provisions and convert the process of bail in the trial Courts into a two stage process by directing necessary release of a person on a personal bond without considering the relevant determinants or permitting them to be considered by the Courts below, and then again to require the hearing of the application on merit to be decided on lawful considerations. Such a direction would be inconsistent with the existing provision of law and the intended process cannot be imported into the existing provisions either by interpreting the present provisions or otherwise. This task is exclusively left for the legislature. 56. Reliance has been placed on a number of cases in which such directions were issued. 57. In the case of Rajendra v. State of U.P., 1989 UP Cri R 49 : (1989 All LJ 223) such directions were issued. No reasons were given at all for issuing such directions excepting an observation that in the Courts at Saharanpur the bail applications are not decided on the same day. 57. In the case of Rajendra v. State of U.P., 1989 UP Cri R 49 : (1989 All LJ 223) such directions were issued. No reasons were given at all for issuing such directions excepting an observation that in the Courts at Saharanpur the bail applications are not decided on the same day. 58. Similar directions were also issued in the case of Lateef v. State of U.P., 1990 All Cri C 440: (1990 All LJ 659). In this case also it was merely noticed that there was delay in disposal of the bail application and that a duty lay on the Court to dispose of the bail applications the same day. 59. Similar orders were also passed in the case of Sheo Murat v. State of U.P., 1991 UP Cri R 257, Brahmanand Singh v. State of U.P., 1991 UP Cri R 285, Sipti v. State of U.P., 1991 UP Cri R 303, the last two being identical decisions. In none of these decisions the legality of any of these directions was considered each of these decisions have been rendered by a single Judge. 60. A Division Bench also issued similar directions in the case of Jyoti Prasad v. State of U.P., 1991 UP Cri R 99. In this case again no reason was at all given. 61. In another division bench case Nihal Singh v. State, 1991 Judicial Interpretation on Crimes 597, also such a direction was issued without giving any reason at all. 62. Another bench of this Court in the case of Mahendra Pal Singh v. State, 1989 Judicial Interpretation on Crimes 915, issued such directions only for the reason that the process of bail should not take longer time then necessary. This ratio is unexceptionable, yet as discussed above would not be sufficient to do away with the legal provisions relating to bail. The validity of such an order in context of the provisions relating to bail was not considered in this case also and, therefore, this case also would not help in determining the legality of these directions. 63. In another division bench case Lal Ji v. State (1992 Judicial Interpretation on Crimes 128) such directions were issued following the decision in the aforesaid cases of Rajendra (1989 All LJ 223) and Brahmanand Singh (1991 UP Cri R 285) (supra) without assigning any reason. 64. 63. In another division bench case Lal Ji v. State (1992 Judicial Interpretation on Crimes 128) such directions were issued following the decision in the aforesaid cases of Rajendra (1989 All LJ 223) and Brahmanand Singh (1991 UP Cri R 285) (supra) without assigning any reason. 64. It may be pointed out that mere directions do not amount to precedents. It is the ratio and the principle laid down which constitutes the binding precedent. (See Shamarao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480 . 65. Merely requiring the bail to be considered the same day without any reasons being given specially in finding whether such a direction is permissible under the existing provisions of law would not have any precedential value. Learned single judge in the case of Sipti (1991 UP Cri R 303) (supra) has merely assumed that it is possible to get the report the same day. This assumption is one of fact and does not respond to the ground of working conditions. It may not be possible for any Court to get a report from any out-station police station the same day as there are no specific persons assigned to do only this job and even the persons who come from the police station do not have vehicle and use only cycles or public conveyance. Even the journey to and from the police station even if a man can be deputed for each of the bail application, would take almost the entire working hours and that would also be possible if the Investigating Officer is available at the police station at the specific time when such man reaches there. 66. In view of this even the assumption of fact raised by the learned single judge cannot be said to be infallible. These assumptions should normally be drawn only after getting the information from the Courts which are actually working in that part of the system rather than from the mere assertions made by the parties or the members of the bar unless the judges have themselves participated in or seen that limb of Courts being operated. 67. In view of aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that this Court cannot direct the trial Court to hear the bail application the same day. 67. In view of aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that this Court cannot direct the trial Court to hear the bail application the same day. In cannot also direct the Court below not to arrest the person who surrenders himself and moves an application for bail and to direct the police not to arrest him. No direction can also be issued to release the applicant immediately after he surrenders on a personal bond without any other considerations and to hear again the application for bail on merits. 68. Each of these directions would, as discussed in detail above, violate the provisions of law and subvert the process inherent in the bail determination. 69. It is not that we are not equally concerned about the unnecessary deprivation of liberty of an individual. Yet we cannot persuade ourselves to bend the provisions of law relating to bail beyond the limit of elasticity and issue directions which would stretch them beyond the breaking point. However, in case this Court, in its administrative capacity considers simplification of this process of bail, the present harassment can substantially be reduced. 70. By an administrative direction every person is required to move an application for bail before a Magistrate before he moves the Sessions Judge. In cases where a bail can possibly be granted by a Magistrate under Section 437, Cr.P.C. such a direction is good and valid. However, there does not appear to be any justification far requiring a person to move application before the Magistrate which application the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to allow. It is a futile step being administratively added which unnecessarily results in lengthening of the proceedings. This Court acting administratively can consider doing away with moving of a bail application before a Magistrate when a person seeks bail in a situation where the bail cannot be granted by the Magistrate. 71. The Court can also reduce the hard ship or persons who are unnecessarily taken into custody and kept in jail till the prosecution is able to get instructions, by providing that a party who wants to surrender and move for bail can give a notice to the District Government Counsel or the Public Prosecutor, indicating also the day on which he would surrender and move for bail. The minimum period between the giving of the notice and the date of surrender can be fixed by the High Court by rules or by administrative directions. The prosecution can then have no reason not to be prepared to argue on the application for bail on the date on which the application for bail is actually moved. In case the bail application is to be moved before the sessions Judge, the applicant can surrender before the Magistrate, the Magistrate alone being empowered to arrest under the Cr.P.C. and move the bail application before the Sessions Judge for him to hear the application and decide it the same day after due notice is given. In absence of specific statutory provision arrest and remand during investigation by sessions judge will violate Art. 21 of the Constitution. 72. We, therefore, do not find it possible to issue any direction to the Magistrate as has been asked for in this case but would like to point out that the provisions of bail can effectively curb liberty of a man only to the extent they are used in the manner which is just and reasonable. Worked beyond these parameters they would cease to be effective countervailing procedure established by law and, therefore, would not be able to curb the right of liberty, which will spring back to become enforceable and the person concerned entitled to be released. The trial Courts should always be conscious of the right of liberty in hearing in every person and guaranteed by Constitution and the extent to which such a right can be reasonably suppressed for bail considerations. They, there fore have to see that the process of bail is expeditious and not stretched beyond the reasonable limits to make it unreasonable encroachment on liberty. In case the prosecution seeks time beyond reasonable limits, the trial Courts would always be at liberty to dispose of applications for bail expeditiously without adjourning the cases unnecessarily. In appropriate cases they may also consider the notice not to be issued as has been provided by the law. These would be the cases where the prosecution is already in the possession of all the material or the entire material is otherwise available in the Court. The incarceration of a person in jail at this stage can never by justified for punitive purposes. These would be the cases where the prosecution is already in the possession of all the material or the entire material is otherwise available in the Court. The incarceration of a person in jail at this stage can never by justified for punitive purposes. The process in the Court should reassure the innocents in not being harassed while the Court is proceeding to decide the application for bail or trying the case. It is only the judgment of the Court which has to provide necessary deference to the guilty. 73. Expecting that the bail application in this case, if moved, shall also be disposed of without undue delay, the petition is hereby dismissed. 74. A copy of this judgment be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for such action as he may deem proper.