Judgment :- The Appellant herein was the second defendant while the respondents 1 and 2 herein were respectively the plaintiff and the first defendant. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No. 134 of 1986 on the file of the District Munsif, Paramakkudi for recovery of possession of the suit property, which is a Government Poromboke, on which a hut has been put up by her, According to her, she has been in possession and enjoyment of the same pursuant to the B memo issued and consequent penalty paid therefor by her and she had been dispossessed by the defendants by way of forceful occupation during her absence. 3. The defendants resisted the suit by disputing the claims of the plaintiff. 4. Learned District Munsif, on consideration of the materials placed before him, decreed the suit as prayed for with costs. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the second defendant preferred A.S. No. 162 of 1989 on the file of the District Court, Ramanathapuram at Madurai and learned District Judge, on perusal of the materials available on record and after hearing the arguments of learned respective counsel for the parties, dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court with costs, giving rise to the present action. 6. A perusal of the judgments of both the Courts below points out, in no uncertain terms, that the discussion of vital issues of fact and law had been considered in a threadbare fashion without giving any room for raising an argument of perverse appreciation for arriving at a just conclusion in granting the relief as prayed for by the plaintiff. 7. Learned counsel for the present appellant/second defendant made an arduous attempt before me to make it appear that the judgments of the courts below suffer from serious infirmity of grave error of law, in the sense of not taking due note of the application of the provisions of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 7. Learned counsel for the present appellant/second defendant made an arduous attempt before me to make it appear that the judgments of the courts below suffer from serious infirmity of grave error of law, in the sense of not taking due note of the application of the provisions of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act. In amplification of this argument, he would contend that since the averments the plaint itself indicate that the plaintiff had been duly dispossessed as early as on 15.1.1984 and the suit had been admittedly filed on 28.4.1986, after the lapse of two years, it goes without saying that the suit, as framed, is not maintainable, in as much as more than six months elapsed in filing the suit from the date of such dispossession. He would candidly submit that no doubt, such a defence had not been raised specifically in the written statement; but that will not pose as an insurmountable obstacle, because it is only a pure question of law. He would further state that though such a question had been raised before the lower appellate Court, yet the same had not been given proper consideration, which resulted in serious prejudice having been caused to the case of the appellant. 8. There can be no pale of controversy as to a pure question of law being raised at any stage, even without the factual foundation of a plea being raised therefor. In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the lower appellate court had not at all given any due consideration to the question of law as raised by the appellant herein. As a matter of fact, a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court reveals that a strenuous argument had been raised on this question of law and reliance was also sought to be placed on a decision of the Apex Court of this country in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1165. 9. Bearing in mind the ratio decidendi the said decision, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit filed as such is maintainable. 9. Bearing in mind the ratio decidendi the said decision, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit filed as such is maintainable. It should be borne in mind that S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to S. 9 of the Old Act) gives a summary remedy to a person, who has, without his consent, been dispossessed of immovable property, otherwise than under due process of law, for recovery of possession, without establishing his title, provided that a suit is brought within six months from the date of dispossession. To put it otherwise more clearly, in such a suit, no question of title can be raised or determined in working out a judgment and the object of the section is to clearly discourage forceful dispossession and to enable the person dispossessed to recover possession by merely proving previous possession and wrongful dispossession, without proving his title. But that is not his only remedy. He may, if he so chooses, bring a suit for possession on the basis of his title. 10. In case a suit is brought beyond the period of six months from the date of dispossession, it is legitimately permissible for the defendant to raise questions of title and if he does so, the plaintiff must have to establish a better title or otherwise fail. In other words the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit under S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, but that does not bar a suit, on prior possession, within twelve years and title need not be proved, unless the defendant can prove one. 11. The amended Arts. 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act bring out this difference. Art. 64 enables a suit within twelve years from dispossession for possession of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been disposed. 12. Art. 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the law. 13. 12. Art. 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the law. 13. In the case on hand, though the suit had been brought after the lapse of six months from the date of dispossession; but anyhow brought within a period of twelve years, the second defendant cannot at all be expected to succeed in the absence of proof of his title to the suit property and by no stretch of imagination, he can ever prove his title to the suit property in as much as the property is admittedly a Government Poromboke. No other question of law arises in this second Appeal. There are thus no merits in this Second Appeal. 14. As such, the Second Appeal deserves to be dismissed even at the admission stage and is accordingly dismissed.