JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged order dated 2.9.83 (Annexure 4) passed by the disciplinary authority whereby a penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed on the petitioner. 2. In respect of an alleged delinquency of the petitioner, which he is said to have committed in the year 1966 during the period of his posting as Accounts Clerk in Panchayat Samiti Roopwas, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short 1958 Rules) vide memorandum dated 21.7.77 issued by the Government of Rajasthan Department of Personnel The petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet on 11.10.77. By an order of the Government dated 19.10.77 issued under Rule 18 of the 1958. Rules, a joint enquiry was ordered to be held against the petitioner, Shri Nuranjan Singh, the then Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Sannti Roopwas and Shri S.C. Sharma, the then Overseer. The joint enquiry was held by the Additional Commissioner (I), Departmental Enquiries, Jaipur. A report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer held that the petitioner has co-operated with the other delinquents in the commission of irregularities. On the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer and his conclusion, the Governor imposed the penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect on the petitioner. 3. In his writ petition the petitioner has stated that report of the Enquiry Officer was not made available to him before passing of the order of punishment. He was not given any notice regarding the proposed punishment and he had not been given any opportunity to submit his explanation in respect of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. It is also the case of the petitioner that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, which had been accepted by the disciplinary authority, are perverse inasmuch as these findings are based on no evidence. The. petitioner has also stated that no charge was levelled against him of having co-operated with other delinquents in commission of irregularities and he had no opportunity of defending himself in respect of that charge. Nevertheless the disciplinary authority agreed with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and punished the petitioner on the basis of that charge. 4. The. petitioner has also stated that no charge was levelled against him of having co-operated with other delinquents in commission of irregularities and he had no opportunity of defending himself in respect of that charge. Nevertheless the disciplinary authority agreed with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and punished the petitioner on the basis of that charge. 4. In reply to the writ petition one respondent have stated that the petitioner had failed to discharge his duties sincerely and that gave an opportunity to other delinquents to commit serious irregularities and caused pecuniary loss to the Panchayat Samiti. A regular departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner. In all 12 witnesses were examined in respect of the charges levelled against the petitioner and other-co-delinquents. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and then passed the order of punishment. The respondents have stated that only a punishment of withholding of two grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed on the petitioner and it was not necessary to furnish him with a copy of the enquiry report under Rule 16 of the 1958 Rules. It was also not required to give petitioner and opportunity to explain his case before passing of the order of punishment. The respondents have denied that there has been any violation of Rule 16(10) or 16 (12) of 1958 Rules. 5. The first argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a penalty of withholding of grade increments with cumulative effect is a major penalty under Rule 14(iv) of 1958 Rules. Such a penalty could have been imposed only after following the procedure prescribed in Rule 16 of the 1958 Rules. That procedure however, has not been followed inasmuch as after the receipt of the enquiry report the disciplinary authority did not apply its mind to the record of enquiry and did not record its own findings on the charge levelled against the petitioner. Copy of the enquiry report was not made available to l k the petitioner. Notice proposing punishment against the petitioner was served upon him and he was not given any opportunity of making a representation. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has on the other hand argued that the punishment was imposed on the petitioner after following the procedure under Rule 16 of 1958 Rules. Notice proposing punishment against the petitioner was served upon him and he was not given any opportunity of making a representation. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has on the other hand argued that the punishment was imposed on the petitioner after following the procedure under Rule 16 of 1958 Rules. It was not necessary to give a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner or to give a show-cause notice to him. 6. The first question which requires to be determined is as to whether the punishment of stoppage of grade increments with cumulative effect can be treated as a major punishment. I need not undertake a lengthy discussion on the issue in view of the conclusive pronouncement of this Court in Krishna Dutta Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1987(1) RLR 346 , as also of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1990(6) SLR 73 (SC) . This Court as well as the Supreme Court have in unequivocal terms held that a penalty of stoppage of grade increments with cumulative effect is a major punishment under the 1958 Rules. The next question which follows for consideration is as to whether the enquiry has been held against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 16 of the 1958 Rules. An ancillary question which requires to be determined is as to whether non-supply of the copy of the enquiry report is fatal to the order of punishment passed by the Governor. Rule 16(10) (i) (a), it is stood upto 20.6.65, specifically required that after receipt of the copy of the enquiry report the disciplinary authority shall, if it intends to impose a major punishment on a delinquent Government servant, furnish him with a copy of enquiry report and also give him a showcause notice against the proposed punishment. By a notification dated 10.6.83, which had been published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 21.6.83, requirement of issue of a second showcause notice has been dispensed with. By a notification dated 10.6.83, which had been published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 21.6.83, requirement of issue of a second showcause notice has been dispensed with. As Rule 16(10) stands after its amendment by notification dated 21.6.83, requirement of giving a showcause notice has been dispensed with Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of Patna High Court in Managing Committee v. State of Bihar, 1974 (1) SLR 203 , in support of her submission that the proceedings started with the old rules shall be concluded in the old rules even though new rules have come into force during the pendency of the proceedings. In my opinion, it is not necessary to decide this question because I am clearly of the view that even after the amendment of Rule 16(10)(i) of 1958 Rules, it is necessary for the disciplinary authority to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent Government servant in all cases where the disciplinary authority decides to impose any of the major penalties specified in Rule 14(iv to vii) of 1958 Rules. Rule 16(7) enjoins the enquiring authority to prepare a report of the enquiry regarding its finding on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. In case the enquiring authority finds that a charge different than the one originally framed is established, it is open to the enquiring authority to record findings on such charge after giving an opportunity to the Government servant to defend himself against such charge or where the Government servant has admitted the facts constituting a particular charge. Rule 16(8) refers to various documents which constitute record of the enquiry. It says that the record of the .enquiry shall include the charges framed against the Government servant, the statement of allegation furnished to him, his written statement of defence, if any, the oral evidence taken in the course of enquiry, the documentary evidence considered in the course of enquiry, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the enquiring authority in regard to the enquiry and the reasons therefore. Rule 16(9) imposes an obligation on the disciplinary authority, if it is not the enquiring authority, to consider the record of the enquiry an record its findings on each charge. Rule 16(9) imposes an obligation on the disciplinary authority, if it is not the enquiring authority, to consider the record of the enquiry an record its findings on each charge. While undertaking this exercise the disciplinary authority is free to remand the case for further/de novo enquiry in case it finds that the enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the rules or the enquiry already conducted is laconic in some respect. Then comes the stage of Rule 16(10). Under the un-amended Rule 16(10) it was obligatory for the disciplinary authority to give a show cause notice to the employee in case it proposes a penalty of dismissal/removal, reduction in rank, compulsory retirement or the penalties specified in Rule 14(iv) of 1958 Rules. What has been dispensed with by amended Rule 16(10) is the giving of show-cause notice to the delinquent employee. The result of the amendment is that after the coming into force of the amended rule, the delinquent employee does not get an opportunity to make his submissions on the quantum of punishment proposed against him. That however, does not imply that the obligation imposed on the disciplinary authority to furnish a copy of enquiry report has also been dispensed with. The question has specifically been examined by me in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1285/85 (1991(1) Western Law Cases (Raj.) 102). Tejkaran Jain v. State of Rajasthan decided on 8.2.91 . In that case I have examined the necessity of furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent in detail. I had observed:- "Rule 16(10) as it stood prior to the amendment made in it vide notification dated 2t.6.83 was plain. It was obligatory for the disciplinary authority to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent Government servant, give him a notice of the proposed punishment and also give him an opportunity to make his representation. After receipt of the representation, if any, and after considering the material on record, the order of punishment of major penalty could be passed by the disciplinary authority. After receipt of the representation, if any, and after considering the material on record, the order of punishment of major penalty could be passed by the disciplinary authority. Such order was required to be communicated to the Government servant with the copy of the inquiry report and a statement of findings of the disciplinary authority together with brief reasons of disagreement, if any, with the findings of inquiring authority unless they have already been supplied to him and also a copy of the advise, if any, given by the Commission. The disciplinary authority was also required to give brief statement of reasons in case the advise of the Commission has not been accepted. After amendment of rule 16(10) by notification dated 21.6.83, the disciplinary authority is now empowered to make an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14(iv to vii), once it forms an opinion, on the basis of its findings on the charges levelled against the delinquent that such a penalty shall be imposed. The amended rule makes it clear that it shall not be necessary to give a Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. Proviso to rule 16(10) as it stands after amendment requires consultation with the Commission and the disciplinary authority is to take into consideration the advise of the Commission before making the order imposing any of the major penalties on the delinquent Government servant. Thus, so far as the plain language of the rule is concerned, the only express exclusion is of giving an opportunity of making representation to the Government servant on the penalty proposed to be imposed. The question is as to whether there is an implied exclusion of the principles of natural justice as interpreted and applied by the various courts of this country in cases relating to the disciplinary actions against the Government servants, whereby requirement of furnishing of copy of the inquiry report and/or findings of the disciplinary authority has been held to be mandatory. In Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, [1985(2) SLR 576 (SC)] a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court by its majority judgment (per Madon, J.) considered the various facets of the principles of natural justice. The court observed that the principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14. Article 14 is not their begetter but their constitutional guardian. The court observed that the principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14. Article 14 is not their begetter but their constitutional guardian. The court then discussed various aspects of natural law and then proceeded to make the following observations: "How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative processes. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is "nemo judex in causa sua" or "nemo debetesse index in propria causes" as stated in (1605) 12 Co. Rep. 114, that is, "no man ought to be a judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party". The form "nemo protest esse simul actor et judex", that is, "no one can be at once suitor and judge" is also at times used. The second rule and that is the rule with which we are concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petitions is "audi alteram partem", that is, "hear the other side". At times and particularly in continental countries the form "audietur et altera pars" is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely, "qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit", that is, "he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have done what is right" (see Boswell's Case (1605) 6 Co. Rep. Rep. 48b, 52a.) or, in other words, as it is now expressed, "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done." The court then discussed the relationship between the Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the principles of natural justice and after refer ring to the various American and English cases on the subject and also the decision of the Supreme Court in E.P. Roiappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974 (1) SLR 497 (SC)] , State of Andhra Pradesh v. Natrajan Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1456 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 248 and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Muzeeb Shrabadi, [1980 (3) SLR 467 (SC)] , the Court concluded as under: "The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject matter of that Article. Shortly, put the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of the State action, it is a violation of Article 14 : therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating the will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of State in Article 12 is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court then referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 , A.K Karaipak v. Union of India, [1969 SLR 445 (SC)] , Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha, [1970 SLR 748 (SC)] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 and considered the scope of application of principles of natural justice in different circumstances. J.N. Sinha, [1970 SLR 748 (SC)] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 and considered the scope of application of principles of natural justice in different circumstances. Their Lordships then held that in certain given circumstances, the principles of natural justice will stand excluded. In Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade (VIth Edition) Page 538, while dealing with the principles of natural justice under the head "right to know the opposing case" the following remarks have been made: "A proper hearing must always include all fair opportunity to those who are parts in the controversy for correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their view. The natural justice often requires the disclosen of evidence in possession of deciding authority." In Kanda v. Government of Malaya, 1962 AC 322 , the Privi Council declared the dismissal void because the adjudicating officer was in possession of a report of a board of inquiry, which made charges of mis-conduct but which was not available to the police officer. Lord Daning added; if the right to be heard is to be real right which is worth an it must carry with it a right in the accused men to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him : and then he must be n a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them. In A.G. v. Ryan, 1980 A.C. 718 a decision refusing application for citizenship was quashed on the ground that reasons which constituted the basis for this refusal were, not disclosed to the affected person.Can it be said that by virtue of amendment of Rule 16(10) the requirement of giving a copy of the inquiry report or the findings of the inquiring officer and giving of an opportunity to the delinquent employee to make his representation against such findings or the report stands excluded by implication?So far as Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is concerned, even after amendment, it guarantees a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee to show cause against the charges levelled against him during the course of enquiry. What meaning should be ascribed to this term 'reasonable opportunity and what is the extent and scope of the same? What meaning should be ascribed to this term 'reasonable opportunity and what is the extent and scope of the same? The report of the inquiry officer constitutes a very important material, on which the ultimate findings of the disciplinary authority rests. The inquiry officer inquires into the charges, records the evidence and the charging officer is permitted to produce witnesses, cross-examine the witnesses and challenge the evidence during inquiry, but the inquiry does not conclude at that stage. The inquiry concludes only after the material is considered by the disciplinary authority. This material includes the inquiry officer's report and the record containing findings on the charges. In fact, in large number of cases, the disciplinary authority does not hold this inquiry, but delegates this function to some other officer. * The inquiry officer records the oral as well as documentary evidence. The delinquent is entitled to rebut the evidence produced by the department before the inquiry officer. He can produce his own evidence oral as well as documentary. It is for the inquiry officer to consider the material and then record a finding as to whether the charge is established or not. The disciplinary authority has to act on the report of the inquiry officer, which constitutes a part and parcel of the record of inquiry. If he desagrees with the report of the inquiry officer, reasons have to be recorded by it as per the requirement of Rule 16(9) and also Rule 16(12). If the inquiry officer submits a report, which is adverse to the delinquent, certainly it constitutes a material, which is always open to be used by the disciplinary authority against the delinquent.In the State of Assam v. Vimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC 1612 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority has to consider the inquiry officer's report before recording its own finding on the charges. In State of Maharashtra v. Bhai Shanker Avatram Joshi and others, [1969 SLR 268 (SC)] and also in Narain Mishra v. State of Orissa, 1969 SLR 657 the Supreme Court held that if the disciplinary authority wanted to rely on the charges, of which the delinquent was acquitted with warning that the same was going to be used against him, it was all against the principles of fair play and natural justice. The delinquent ought to have been apprised of the intention of the disciplinary authority to ignore the findings of the inquiry officer and give him an adequate opportunity of defending himself.From the above observations of the Suppreme Court, it is clear that if the inquiry officer submits a report and that report is against the charged officer, since the report constitutes material, the charged officer must have an opportunity to make his representation against the report. With such an opportunity he may be able to satisfy the disciplinary authority that the inquiry officer's report does not contain proper appreciation of evidence or that it has ignored the material evidence or that the factors which are favourable to him have not been considered on that the conclusions drawn by the inquiry officer about the charges are not correct. Even if the report is favourable, it may not bring out all points. At times, the inquiry officer may ignore the important points supporting the delinquent. The disciplinary authority itself may not be in a position to fully appreciate such points and if opportunity is not afforded to the delinquent, serious prejudice would be caused. It would offend the principles of natural justice. Thus wherever the report is adverse to the delinquent or wherever the disciplinary authority records reasons for disagreement with the report, the disciplinary authority must comply with the principles of natural justice by giving a copy of the report to the delinquent and give him an opportunity of making his representation against the inquiry report or the reasons for disagreement. Article 311 as it stands amended or Rule 16(10) after its amendment only excludes giving of second show cause notice against the proposed penalty. Article 311 as it stands amended or Rule 16(10) after its amendment only excludes giving of second show cause notice against the proposed penalty. In my opinion, it does not by implication excludes the requirement of supply of copy of adverse material, namely, the inquiry report and/or the findings of the inquiry officer, which is nothing but a requirement of the principles of natural justice.It is no doubt true that the disciplinary authority is not required to hold an inquiry at which evidence of witnesses viva voce is to be recorded if at the earlier stage there has been fair and full inquiry before the inquiry officer; but I am not persuaded to agree with the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate that after receipt of the report of the inquiry officer by the disciplinary authority, the delinquent has no right whatsoever to make representation against the charges levelled against him before the disciplinary authority. The departmental proceedings continued till the disciplinary authority takes a final decision in respect of the charges levelled against the delinquent. The proceedings conclude only when final order is passed by the disciplinary authority after recording its finding on the charges levelled against the Government servant as required by Rule 16(9) of 1958 Rules. The order of punishment can be passed by the disciplinary authority on the basis of its find' It is only at the stage of passing of final order of punishment that the delinquent is not required to be heard as per amended Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and Rule 16(10) of 1958 Rules. However, till the last stage is reached, the delinquent must be afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard so far as the charges levelled against him are concerned and there would be a clear denial of opportunity of hearing if he is not given an opportunity of making representation against the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. This is possible only if the report of the inquiry officer which contains findings on the charges levelled against the delinquent is made available to him." 7. The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, [1991 (1) SLR 159 (SC) J, was referred to only for the purpose of buttressing the conclusion which I had already reached independently after a closer examination of the scope of Rule 16(8), 16(9), 16(10) and 16(12). The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, [1991 (1) SLR 159 (SC) J, was referred to only for the purpose of buttressing the conclusion which I had already reached independently after a closer examination of the scope of Rule 16(8), 16(9), 16(10) and 16(12). Same principle has been reiterated in Chandanmal Saraswat v. State of Rajasthan, WLR 1991 (S) Raj. 716 , as also in a recent decision B.K. Pareek v. New Bank of India, 1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 353 . 8. In view of these decisions, it must be held that supply of copy of enquiry report is necessary in each and every case where the disciplinary authority takes a decision for imposing any of the punishments specified in Rule 14 (iv to vii) of 1958 Rules. Admittedly in the present case copy of enquiry report was not made available to the petitioner. Therefore, on this ground alone the order of punishment is liable to be quashed. 9. However, I have examined other aspects of the case and I find that there are two other reasons for qusahing of the impugned order of punishment. The disciplinary authority, namely, the Governor in this case, was required to consider the record of the enquiry in terms of Rule 16(9) of 1958 Rules. Only after such consideration the disciplinary authority, namely, the Governor was to record his finding on the charges levelled against the petitioner. A bare reading of the order of punishment, Annexure-40, however, shows that the Governor has simply considered the record of the enquiry officer and the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. The following portion of the order clearly shows that the Governor did not consider the record of the enquiry: " mDrkuqlkj rhuksa nks"kh jkT; lsodksa ds fo:) vkjksi fl) gSA jkT;iky egksn;] tkWap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr dh xbZ tkWap izfrosnu o mu }kjk fudkys x;s fu"d"kksZ dks Lohdkj djrs gq, o vkjksiksa dh xEHkhjrk dks ns[krs gq, mDr rhuksa nks"kh jkT; lsodksa dks fuEu izdkj ls n.M nsus ds ,rn~ }kjk vkns'k iznku djrs gSA " The above quoted portion clearly show that the Governor did not examine the evidence, oral as well as documentary, which was produced during the course of enquiry. Instead of applying its own mind independently, the Governor simply concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer. Instead of applying its own mind independently, the Governor simply concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer. That cannot be treated as procedure followed under Rule 16(9) of 1958 Rules. This view of mine is fully fortified by a decision of Division Bench of this court in Vasudeo K Hardasani v. The State of Rajasthan and another, 1989 (1) RLR 99 . 10. The second additional reason for quashing the order of punishment, and which in my opinion equally goes to the root of the matter is that the petitioner has been punished for some allegations with which he was never charged. The petitioner was not charged with an allegation of having entered into a conspiracy with the Vikas Adhikari and the Overseer of the Panchayat Samiti and also/ or of having co-operated with them so as to enable them to commit irregularities. The charge against the petitioner was that he had failed follow Zila Parishad Financial and Accounts Rules, 1959 and the Government's instruction regarding approved firms and approved rates. The petitioner had no occasion to defend against an allegation of conspiracy or co-operation with the co-delinquents for causing financial loss to the Panchayat Samiti. It is one of the basic requirements of the principle of natural justice that a person can be punished only in respect of the charges of which notice has been given to him and if an opportunity of defence is given to him. Unless a charge is levelled against a delinquent, he could never be punished on the basis of that charge. This view has been taken by the Apex Court in Sur Enamel and Stampling Works Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1963 S.C. 1914 . Same view has been expressed in State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh and others, 1972 SLR 85 (SC) . That was a case in which a member of the Punjab Electricity Board was removed for a charge which was not levelled against him. The enquiring officer has not recorded a finding of guilt against the member in respect of any of the charges levelled against him. However, two other reasons were given for removing the member from the office. That was a case in which a member of the Punjab Electricity Board was removed for a charge which was not levelled against him. The enquiring officer has not recorded a finding of guilt against the member in respect of any of the charges levelled against him. However, two other reasons were given for removing the member from the office. While up-holding the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had resulted in upsetting the order of the Minister, the Supreme Court observed:- "It may be noted that Shri Bakhtawar Singh was not charged with having not discharged his duties impartially. None of the charges levelled against him accused him of not discharging his duties impartially. Hence the Minister was not justified in taking into consideration a charge in respect of which the member was not given any opportunity to explain his position........" 11. In Capt. Virendra Kumar v. Chief of the Army Staff, New Delhi, 1986 (1) SLR 422 (SC) , action of the Bar Council in removing a member on the basis of a charge of withholding of certain information at the time of his admission was set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground that the member was not given an opportunity to defend himself in respect of that allegation. In Annamunthodo v. Oil Fields Workers Trade Union, 1961 (3) All. E.R. 621 , a similar view has been expressed by the Privy Council. That was a case in which the appellant was expelled from the trade union. The Privy Council found the expulsion to be unfounded because the rule created a separate and distinct offence with which he has not been charged. Lord Denning speaking for the Bench -observed as under:- "The first question is : Dis r. 11(7) create a separate and distinct offence of "conduct prejudicial to the interests of the Union"? for in that case it ought to have been separately charged or did r. 11(7) merely merely empower the general council to impose more severe penalties for the various other offences specified in the rules, provided that the conduct of which he was convicted under them was prejudicial to the interests of the union? for in that case it ought to have been separately charged or did r. 11(7) merely merely empower the general council to impose more severe penalties for the various other offences specified in the rules, provided that the conduct of which he was convicted under them was prejudicial to the interests of the union? for in that case r. 11(7), so it was said, need not be separately charged, but only the other offences PHILIPS,J. in the Supreme Court and ARCHER AND RENNIE, JJ., in the Federal Supreme Court (2) thought that r. 11(7) only empowered the general council to impose more severe penalties, and sought support for this view from some observations of Eve. J., in Wolstenholme v. Amalgamated Musicians' Union (3). But Wylie, J., thought it created a separate and distinct offence, and their Lordships agree with him. As he said (4): "It stands entirely on its own, authorising expulsion of a member who is proved to the satisfaction of the general council to have been guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interests of the Union." In the opinion on their Lordships, it should not have been invoked for the purpose of expelling the appellant unless he was given notice of the charge under it and had a fair opportunity of meeting it. But, even if r. 11(7) only empowered more severe penalties, nevertheless those severe panalties could only be imposed when the conduct was prejudicial to the interests of the respondent union; and their Lordships think that even on that view, the rule should not have been invoked without giving the appellant notice of it. Counsel for the respondent union sought to treat the spec formulation of charges as immaterial. The substance of the matter lay, he said, in the facts alleged in the letter as to the meeting which the appellant had attended and the allegations he had made. Their Lordships cannot accede to this view. If a domestic tribunal formulates specific charges, which lead only to a fine, it cannot without notice resort to other charges which lead to far more severe penalties." 12. In Birdhi Chand v. Jaipur Development Authority, 1992 (1) WLC (Raj.) 309 the petitioner had been punished with the penalty of stoppage of four grade increments with cumulative effect on the charge that he had taken loan of Rs. In Birdhi Chand v. Jaipur Development Authority, 1992 (1) WLC (Raj.) 309 the petitioner had been punished with the penalty of stoppage of four grade increments with cumulative effect on the charge that he had taken loan of Rs. 4,000/- from one Chand Behari Lal Goyal and Suresh Kumar Gupta and his action was contrary to rule 19(4)(i)(a) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 and that this amounted to corruption and mis-conduct. The petitioner challenged the order of punishment before the appellate authority on the grounds that he had been punished on the charge which has not been levelled against him. The appellate authority agreed with the submission of the delinquent but held that the plea of the petitioner was a technical one. This court quashed the order of punishment by holding that when no allegation was levelled against him about his having been taken loan from Chand Behari Lal Goyal or Suresh Kumar Gupta, he had no opportunity to meet such allegation. 13. As already observed by me in the earlier part of the order, the petitioner has been punished for a charge which was not levelled against him. Thus, the order of punishment has been passed in clear disregard of the basic canon of natural justice, namely, that a man should not be condemned unheard. 14. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. Order dated 2.9.83 issued by the Government in Department of Personnel is quashed, so far as it concerns the petitioner. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. Since the enquiry, relates to an alleged incident of the year 1966, in respect of which enquiry was initiated after more than a decade and a period of over 26 years have elapsed since then. I consider it to be a fit case in which the non-petitioners should not be permitted to hold a fresh enquiry in the matter. I accordingly direct that the non-petitioners shall not reopen the enquiry after a lapse of 26, years, counted from the date of incident and after a lapse of 15 years from the date of service of the charge-sheet. Costs made easy.Petition allowed. *******