ORDER A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of the Connected Petitions No. M.P. No. 1604/92, M.P. No. 140/92 and M.P. No. 1606/92 filed under Article 126/227 of the Constitution of India which, with slight variation in factual position raise a single question of substantial importance 2. This question can be formulated as under :-- Whether on default of filing of the charge-sheet within the stipulated period of one year, as modified by Section 20 (4) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (For short 'TADA') read with Section 167 (2).(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (For short 'Code'), the order of ail must follow as of right or is still clogged by the constraints imposed by Section 20 (8) of TADA ? 3. We shall tersely note the facts of each petition : M.P. No 1605/91 : The petitioner's nephew Kewal Singh was arrested by the respondent under Suction 25/27 of the Arms Act, Section 3/4 of the TADA and Section 4/5 of the Explosive substances Act on 6-8-91 and produced in the Court on 7-8-91. The Court, thereafter, authorized the detention in custody from time to time be incarceratory orders. This continued even beyond the stipulated period of one year The accused applied to the Designated Court (Court of Sessions Judge, Indore) for bail or default of filing of the charge-sheet within one year. The learned Judge of the Designated Court, however, rejected this application by order dated 14-9-92. M.P. No. 1604/92 : The petitioner's brother-in-law Mahendra Singh, was arrested under the aforesaid Sections on 6-8-91 and produced in the Court on 7-8-91. His prayer was also rejected by the common order dated 14-9-92. M. P. No. 1402/92 : The petitioner Inderjeet Singh was arrested under the aforesaid Sections on 4-8-91. He applied for bail a day before the expiry of one year The challan is admittedly not filed on the expiry of this period. It was filed later on 10-8-92. The bail was prayed due to this delay. This prayer was also rejected by order dated 18-8-92 passed in Misc. Cr. Case No. 2214/92 by the aforesaid Designated Court. It is also pleaded that the allegations do not disclose offences punishable under TADA. M. P. No. 1606/92 : The petitioner's father Sada Singh was also arrested similarly. His prayer for bail was also rejected by Common order dated 14-9-92. Cr. Case No. 2214/92 by the aforesaid Designated Court. It is also pleaded that the allegations do not disclose offences punishable under TADA. M. P. No. 1606/92 : The petitioner's father Sada Singh was also arrested similarly. His prayer for bail was also rejected by Common order dated 14-9-92. The periscope of the order dated 14-9-92 rejecting the prayer for release on bail, so far as it is relevant for the purpose of these petitions, is culled out as under-- Admittedly, the challan was filed after one year of their arrest. True, the provisions of Sec. 167 (2) of the Code read with Sec. 20 (4) of the TADA Act do go to indicate and mean that if the challan is not filed within one year of the arrest of the accused he shall be released on bail, but I am afraid I do not agree with the contentions and submissions of the learned counsel, obviously because the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code ought necessarily to be subject to the conditions mentioned in Clause (8) of Sec. 20 of the TADA. 4. The aforesaid question has thus arisen in this way that despite default of prosecution as regards the charge-sheet the Designated Court declined bail on the ground that the conditions as imposed by Section 20 (8) were not satisfied. 5. The respondent-State has opposed these petitions. While admitting the fact of authorization of detention beyond the period of one year, without filing of the charge-sheet, the respondent has contended : -- (a) Additional limitations on power of bail, imposed by Section 20 (8) of TADA, remain operative even when charge-sheet is not presented within prescribed period of one year. (b) The accused persons stand deprived of their liberty only in accordance with the procedure established by law. (c) This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Section 439 or by recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code as laid down by Usmanbhai v, State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 922 and hence, these petitions are not tenable. (d) The remedy, if any, was under Sec. 19 of TADA i.e. an appeal to the Apex Court. 6. (d) The remedy, if any, was under Sec. 19 of TADA i.e. an appeal to the Apex Court. 6. We have heard Shri Jai Singh and Shri A. Saleem learned counsel for the petitioners in all these petitions and Shri S. K. Nigam, learned Government Advocate for the respondent State. In fact, we adjourned the hearing, pursuant to requests, again and again So as to enable the parties to throw luculent light on the jurisdictional point. Yet, nothing worth-while was brought to our notice. 7. Before going into finer aspects of the question, it seems proper to reproduce the relevant provisions :-- Section 19. APPEAL.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal, shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. (2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order of a Designated Court. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of judgment, sentence or order appealed from : Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. Section 20 (4)--Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications that-- (a) the reference in sub-section (I) thereof to "Judicial Magistrate" shall be construed as a reference to "Judicial Magistrate or Executive Magistrate or Special Executive Magistrate"; (b) the references in sub section (2) thereof to "fifteen days", "ninety days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "sixty days", "one year" and "one year" respectively; and (c) sub-section (2-A) thereof shall be deemed to have been omitted. Section 20 (8)--Not withstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless-- (a) The Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 167 (2) of the Cr. P.C. --The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction : Provided that-- (a) the Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,-- (i) ninety days; where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence. and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this Sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; 8. To begin at the beginning, we must imprecise answer the question of jurisdiction as also the submission about Section 19 of TADA, the twin points covered by (c) and (d) of para 5 above. To begin at the beginning, we must imprecise answer the question of jurisdiction as also the submission about Section 19 of TADA, the twin points covered by (c) and (d) of para 5 above. It clearly emerges from Section 19 quoted above, that appeal lies against orders which are not interlocutory in nature. The order under challenge, however, relates to the refusal of bail. In Usmanbhai Dawodbhai Memon and others v. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 922 , it is held-- The Court must interpret the words 'not being an interlocutory order used in S. 19 (1) in their natural sense in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act to exclude any interference with the proceedings before a Designated Court at an intermediate stage. There is no finality attached to an order of a Designated Court granting or refusing bail. Such an application for bail can always be renewed from time to time. That being so, the contention advanced on behalf of the State Government that the impugned orders passed by the Designated Courts refusing to grant bail were not interlocutory orders and therefore, appealable under S. 19 (1) of the Act, cannot be accepted. X X X It is thus, clear that the order under challenge, is an interlocutory one and as such, is not amenable to interference under Section 19 (1) of TADA. The submission about the applicability of this Section is thus devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected. As to the jurisdiction, it is clear that this Court does not possess it either under Section 439 or under Section 482 of the Code of Cr. Procedure The objection, however, totally overlooked the essential fact that the present petitions have been filed under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India on the linchpin of the violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 2) of the Constitution, contending that the absolute right to bail was illegally infringed by applying Sec. 20 (8) of TADA and thus, it was a case of deprivation of liberty contrary to the procedure established by law. No provision was, however, brought to our notice suggesting ouster of jurisdiction even on constitutional side. No provision was, however, brought to our notice suggesting ouster of jurisdiction even on constitutional side. It is apt to quote from the aforesaid decision Usmanbhai and others v. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 922 :-- At the very out set, Shri Poti learned counsel appearing for the State Government with his usual fairness, unequivocally accepted that the provisions of the Act do not take away the Constitutional remedies available to a citizen to approach the High Court under Article 226 or 227 or move this Court by a petition under Art. 32 for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order. It must necessarily follow that a citizen can always move the High Court under Art. 226 or Art. 227.... X X X In fact, Section 19, as quoted above, provided for an appeal or revision and does not seem to inhibit the filing of the petitions seeking constitutional remedies. In this view of the matter, we, placing reliance on the aforesaid dictum, find that there is no tenebrosity on this issue. Consequently, we repel the objections as regards jurisdiction and Section 19 of TADA and hold that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 9. This brings us to the merits of the matter. It is an admitted fact that the charge sheet was presented after the expiry of one year on 10-8-92. The question projected and posed is whether in a situation like this, relatable to Section 167 (2) (a) read with Sec 20 (4) of the Code and TADA respectively, there has to be bail or jail. The tussle is thus between rival claim of liberty on one hand and the liability of custody on the other. The subject matter of these petitions thus inevitably an exercise towards search of an answer to this simplex question of great importance. 10. Liberty of an individual is his precious possession. It is his soul. R. G. Ingersoll, in his Progress, very aptly described liberty in the following terms : What light is to eyes, what air is to the lungs, what love is to the heart, liberty is to the soul of man. The invasion of liberty can be justified only on showing due adherence to the procedure-established by law. It is his soul. R. G. Ingersoll, in his Progress, very aptly described liberty in the following terms : What light is to eyes, what air is to the lungs, what love is to the heart, liberty is to the soul of man. The invasion of liberty can be justified only on showing due adherence to the procedure-established by law. Article 21 of the Constitution mandates that-- No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 11. The right to move the Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the right, as quoted above is thus, guaranteed. It may be additionally noticed that such rights are not suspendable even during the operation of the proclamation of Emergency in the country (See : Art. 359 of the Constitution of India). The procedure, permitting eclipse on liberty. is established by Sec. 20 (4) of TADA read with Sec. 167 (2) (a) of the Code Any infraction of this will have to be tested inflexibly on the anvil of the mandate of Art 21 of the Constitution. Indisputably this Court is obliged to act as a sentinel. After all, a citizen, albeit facing arraignment, is not robbed of his fundamental rights, liberty being one of such rights. Rigescence does not go that far. 12. Sec. 167 (2) of the Code is antenatal to TADA Yet TADA has not pronounced about the inapplicability of Sec. 167 (2) of the Code as such. On the other hand, the act of modification about the period, enlarged to "one year" demonstrates the insistence on its applicability. This clearly means that benefits grantable on expiry of 90 days or 60 days in other cases, would be available on end of one year in relation to cases involving offences punishable under TADA. In our view, the expression "not withstanding anything contained in the Code" employed in Section 20 (8) of TADA ought to be construed as referrable to discretionary powers of bail conferred by relevant provisions of the Code in accord with Sec. 4 (2) and cannot be termed as delivering any dent on the applicability of Section 167 (2) (a) in full swing as and when the occasion arises because it is not Court's descretion but a legislative command. The non-obstante clause thus, seems to control general powers of bail as envisaged by Section 437 and 439 of the Code, which depend on discretion of the Court, and not Section 167 (2) (a) which rests on legislative command springing into action on expiry of the period. One is thus, discretion, whereas the other is command. The former enables, the latter entitles. If the fetters, as incorporated in Section 20 (8), were to be taken as applicable in all cases, irrespective of default and command, then extent of period, as modified would seem to lose significance and purpose. One may then legitimately ask as to why was the modification then introduced and what was the purpose behind it ? The dominant purpose underlying the statute, as suggested by enlargement of the period in Sec. 167 (2) (a) via Section 20 (4), has to be borne in mind. There would seem to be no logic in modification, if limitations of Sec. 20 (8) were to be applied in all cases. In construing the provision, the Court must see that the construction did not lead to an absurdity. In Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India and others AIR 1982 SC 1413 , it is held that-- The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognized canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. The first question to be posed is whether there is any ambiguity in the language used in the provision. If there is none, if would mean the language used, speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning. If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be restored to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. XXX 13. The mandate enshrined in Sec 167 (2) (a), quoted above is clear. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. XXX 13. The mandate enshrined in Sec 167 (2) (a), quoted above is clear. It demands that the accused shall be released on bail on default. Such release shall be deemed to be under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that chapter. It is thus, clear that any incarceratory authorization on expiry of the prescribed period would be ultravires of the powers and would be liable to be anaesthetized by appropriate orders of direction under Art. 226/227. Routine remand orders, passed mechanically in disregard of inhibition, would have to be demolished. In Madhu Limaye and others AIR 1969 SC 1014 , it is held that-- Once it is shown that the arrests made by the police officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters. This the State has failed to do. The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have been made mechanically. Those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously, observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corpus directing the release. XXX 14. The echo of same concern is contained in Nimeon Sangma and others v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Meghalaya and others AIR 1979 SC 1518 , in the following words : It is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have been such considerable delay in investigation by the police in utter disregard of the fact that a citizen has been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an offence. We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state of affairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under the constitution especially under Art. 21 as interpreted by this Court XXX 15. We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state of affairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under the constitution especially under Art. 21 as interpreted by this Court XXX 15. It is the obligation on the Court to see that the custody did not survive after expiry of the stipulated period. Investigative agency cannot be rewarded for its delay. In Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna AIR 1979 SC 1377 , it is laid down that-- When an under trial prisoner is produced before a Magistrate and he has been in detention for 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the Magistrate must, before making an order of further remand to judicial custody, point out to the under trial prisoner that he is entitled to be released on bail XXX 16. The position is, thus, incontestable. Law is clear, so is the case-law. The Courts cannot mechanically authorize detention, unconscious of the provisions which obligated them to monitor the proceedings. In Mantoo Majumdar and another v. The State of Bihar AIR 1980 SC 847 , it is pointed out that-- We know not how many others are languishing in prison like the petitioners before us. 'If the salt hat(sic) lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted?' If the law officers charged with the obligation to protect the liberty of persons are mindless of constitutional mandates and the Code's dictates, how can freedom survive for the ordinary citizen ? XXX 17. It is thus, obvious that the right to bail; accruing on non-filing of the charge-sheet, is absolute. The order passed on such right is one on default and is not on merits. It is improper to consider fetters of Section 20 (8) in a case where merits as such are not required to be gone into. Surely, law cannot be assumed to have envisaged any incongruity. The distinction between default (legislative command) and merits (Court's discretion) must be kept in mind. One can notice the fault implicit is an attempt to apply Section 20 (8) in a case on default. 18. It may be noticed that Section 20 (8) of TAD A indicates an occlusion of power when the person accused of an offence under that Act is "in custody". One can notice the fault implicit is an attempt to apply Section 20 (8) in a case on default. 18. It may be noticed that Section 20 (8) of TAD A indicates an occlusion of power when the person accused of an offence under that Act is "in custody". This naturally means permissible custody. On expiry of maximum period, statutorily provided the power to authorize further detention perishes. Any order of remand beyond this period would be contrary to the procedure established by law. 19. The learned counsel for the State has also drawn our attention to Section 20 sub-section (9) of TADA, and urged that this also clarifies the position. According to him, the fetters as provided by Section 20 (8), being additional to the limitations already indicated under the Code are required to be seen even in cases of bail-pleas on default. It is pertinent to reproduce the aforesaid Section 20 (9) :- Section 20 (9)--The limitations on granting of bail specified in sub section (8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. On a careful consideration of this submission, we find that when limitations as provided under the Code become irrelevant due to the legislative intent, as regards bail on default of presecution in the master of charge-sheet, then, it would be improper to invoke the provision of Section 20 (8). Logically there seems to be no justification because there would be no occasion for consideration of either limitations or additional limitations. In our view, this provision Section 20 (9), clarifies the fact that he relevance of the fetters could be there only when the limitations provided by the Code are operative. Absent this, there is no occasion or question to think in terms of additional limitations as envisaged by Section 20 (8) of TADA. The contention, therefore, lacks substance. We do not find anything in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishanlal AIR 1991 SC 558 , which may even remotely support the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent-State. On the other hand, the position that emerges is that on default of prosecution as regards the charge sheet, the Court must pass an order of bail and communicate it to the accused to furnish the requisite bail-bonds. 20. On the other hand, the position that emerges is that on default of prosecution as regards the charge sheet, the Court must pass an order of bail and communicate it to the accused to furnish the requisite bail-bonds. 20. In a recent decision reported in Aslant Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra III (1992) CCR 292 (SC), the Apex Court held that-- The provisions of the Code, in particular Sections 57 and 167, manifest the legislative anxiety that once a person's liberty has been interfered with by the police arresting him without a Court's order or a warrant, the investigation must be carried out with utmost urgency and completed within the maximum period allowed by the proviso (a) to Section 167 (2) of the Code. It must be realized that the said proviso introduced in the Code by way of enlargement of time for which the arrested accused could be kept in custody. Therefore, the prosecuting agency must realize that if it fails to show a sense of urgency in the investigation of the case and omits or defaults to file a charge-sheet within the time prescribed the accused would be entitled to be released on bail.... X X X 21. In a Single Bench decision, the Delhi High Court in Mohd. Shofi and another v. The State 1975 Cri. L. J. 1309, took the view of that the accused cannot be remanded to custody beyond the maximum period prescribed by Section 167 (2) (a) of the Code and prohibitions indicated do not apply at all... It is held that- When no charge-sheet has been filed within 60 days after the arrest of the accused, then the accused cannot be remanded to custody for a further period either under Section 167 or under Section 309 of the Code. The proviso to Section 167 only makes the provisions of Chapter 33 applicable to a person released on bail under the proviso. If under the proviso to Section 167, the Magistrate has no power to remand the accused to custody for a further period and if in the absence of a charge-sheet the Court has no power under Section 309 to remand the accused to custody, then the prohibition casts on a Magistrate under Section 437 (1) does not come into play. If under the proviso to Section 167, the Magistrate has no power to remand the accused to custody for a further period and if in the absence of a charge-sheet the Court has no power under Section 309 to remand the accused to custody, then the prohibition casts on a Magistrate under Section 437 (1) does not come into play. St is only when the accused can be lawfully remanded to custody that the power is given to a Magistrate under Chapter XXXIII to release him on bail. The Magistrate could then exercise such power subject to the prohibition contained in sub-section (1) of Section 437. The Magistrate, therefore cannot refuse bail to an accused person under the proviso to Section 167 on the ground that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused was guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. x x x 22. The aforesaid line of reasoning indicated that the prohibitions, may be in the Code or TADA or in any other law for that matter, cannot and do not come into apply when the prayer rests on the fulcrum of Section 167 (2) (a) of the Code. The Joint Select Committee had felt that the maximum period, within which the investigation must be completed, must be provided in the statute and right must be conferred on the accused for being released on bail if within the prescribed period the investigation is not completed. The power to authorize detention in custody is thus clipped in this manner. We are also fortified in our view by yet two more significant aspects. One is that Section 20 (4) of TADA has specifically omitted Section 2-A of Section 167 of the Code as inserted by the Cr. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1978. And the other is explanation to Section 167 added in 1978. We extract the provisions as under :-- Section 20 (4) (c)--Sub-section (2-A) thereof shall be deemed to have been omitted. Explanation-to Section 167 (2)- Explanation-I--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. It is, thus, clear that detention beyond the expiry of the period is permissible only so long as bail is not furnished. It is, thus, clear that detention beyond the expiry of the period is permissible only so long as bail is not furnished. The implication thus, is that bail is a right of such a dtente under the law. 23. The aforesaid provisions logically lead to an inference that Section 167 (2) (a) shall apply in full force whereas Section 167 (2-A) is totally excluded and rendered inapplicable in relation to offences punishable under TADA In case of default, the constraints contained in Section 20 (8) ace thus intended to go under hibernation. To our mind, any other view would introduce a sense of complacency in the investigating agency and would ruthlessly destroy the very purpose of instilling a sense of urgency as envisaged by Section 57 and 167 (2) of the Code The question of bail, a right conferred by the statute, when Sec. 20 (4) is read with Section 167 (2) (a), is a statutory paradise yielded by default unshackled by considerations of merits and thus, fetters linked with them. The power derived by a Designated Court to grant bail to a person accused of an offence under TADA, if in custody, is from the Code and not from Section 20 (8) In other words, constraints would apply when bail is sought or given on merits. In case of default, merits are not to be examined. Not at all. There is no question of discretion once the custody is sought to be besieged by the ban of Sec. 167 (2) (a) of the Code read with Sec. 20 (4) of TADA. 24. As a sequel to this, the constraints provided by the Code and TADA must go on holiday when the incarceration is sought to be incinerated by the thrust of Sec 167 (2) (a) providing the outer limit of detention pending investigation There is no choice left between jail and bail. After all, right is right permitting no infringement in the trite proposition of the law. 25. In this view of the matter, this Court, obligated to act as a sentinel, must interfere in writ jurisdiction so as to prevent 'derailment' of the scheme and 'miscarriage' of justice. None should be seen wronged by the misapplication of the provision. The real intent cannot be allowed to fade away into oblivion. On scrutiny, we find that oppugnation, although positive and poignant, is not worthy of being accepted. 26. None should be seen wronged by the misapplication of the provision. The real intent cannot be allowed to fade away into oblivion. On scrutiny, we find that oppugnation, although positive and poignant, is not worthy of being accepted. 26. It is thus, beyond with the pale of controversy that the cases, regulated by the legislative command, do not depend on Court's discretion. Lambrequin must then be drawn on merits and consequently on the additional limitations embodied in Section 20 (8). The word 'additional--is equally significant. In cases where there are no limitations as such due to default, there could be no question of any addition then. To put it differently, provisions of Sec. 20 (8) and (9) would apply only so far as limitations of the Code are operative. The default itself lapidates the limitations. When law decrees liberty on the ground of default, the command must be obeyed. It permits no scope either to oscillate or vacillate in the matter. The intendment of the law is clear. It is intended to be a fetter-free fortuity. It needs to be understood that in case of default, it is the right of the accused to obtain bail and this right is absolute one whereas in case of merits, with linkage of constraints of Sec. 20 (8) read with Sec. 20 (9), it is the discretion of the Court to decline bail. One can't be mixed with the other. Else, it would be case of an attempt to shake hands with a fist. 27. We, thus, answer the question in the negative and hold that on default bail is a matter of right not liable to be trampled down by constraints of Sec. 20 (8) and (9) of TADA. We, however, clarify the position and leave the matter for the Designated Court to decide it in accordance with the law 28. Accordingly, all these petitions succeed and stand allowed in the terms indicated below-- (a) The orders, passed by the Designated Court in the aforesaid cases rejecting plea for restoration of liberty on the ground of nonfiling of the charge-sheet within the prescribed period in terms of Section 167 (2) (a) of the Code, are quashed. Accordingly, all these petitions succeed and stand allowed in the terms indicated below-- (a) The orders, passed by the Designated Court in the aforesaid cases rejecting plea for restoration of liberty on the ground of nonfiling of the charge-sheet within the prescribed period in terms of Section 167 (2) (a) of the Code, are quashed. Consequently the Court is directed to decide the applications afresh in the light of the aforesaid observations/ (b) The Court is further directed to consider each particular case on merits as to whether it falls within the purview of Sec. 3/4 of TADA in order to satisfy itself, as is urged, whether it is triable by the Designated Court or transferable under Sec, 19 of TADA. There shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be placed in the records of each of the aforesaid petitions. 29. The question is answered Yet a parting note seems necessary. The legislative authority in its wisdom modified the period, extending it to one year, in an urge to ensure that those connected with such serious crimes do not succeed in earning incontestable release on default. This period, in our view, is sufficiently long, in fact four times the period provided for other cases like murder etc. It is a fact to be regretted that the investigative agency, unconscious of its obligations and unmindful of consequences, exhibited irremissible laxity and nonchalance upto a point where accused persons earned a plea almost on a plate to press it in their favour. Such ommissions decollate the spirit of the Act and defeat its very purpose. The inbred question is thus born. Should the investigator be permitted to Scythe the System and defeat the purpose so intrepidly ? Can any, one by sheer inaction, be allowed to force the orders which the law interdicted in public interest. ? The conduct of the person in charge of investigation seems to be exfacie inculpatory. It may appear to be a macula in the Scheme of law. The default in cases treating terrorism as a special criminal problem, in our view must receive special attention. We thus, trust and hope that the disciplinary authority of the erring investigating officer shall take action as may be deemed fit and necessary. So much for the day.