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Allahabad High Court · body

1992 DIGILAW 779 (ALL)

Ramesh Chand Dixit v. State of U. P

1992-05-18

B.P.SINGH

body1992
JUDGMENT B.P. Singh, J. -- Ramesh Chand Dixit and two others have come in revision against the order dated 20.7.1990 passed by the C.J.M., Etawah in Crime No. 62 of 1990 (Criminal Case No. 55 of 1990)State v. Ramesh Chand Dixit and others under Section 307 I.P.C. 2. On 16th January, 1991 F.I.R. was lodged by Piyush Kumar Tiwari in P.S. Kotwali Etawah against Ramesh Chand Dixit, Anil Kumar Tiwari and Sanjai Dixit. The case of the first informant was that on 16th January, 1990, at about 7 a.m., all the three accused persons i.e., Ramesh Chand Dixit, Anil Kumar Tiwari and Sanjai Dixit, armed with country made pistols, came upon the house of the first informant and fired upon the first informant's brother Guddu with the intention to kill him. Although the shots were aimed at the chest of Guddu, he was hit upon the arm. The occurrence was witnessed by Rajendra Singh, Siddeshwar Misra and many others. A case under Section 307 I.P.C. was registered against all the three accused. The injured was medically examined. Routine investigation followed. After completing the investigation, the I.O. submitted a final report in the court of C.J.M., Etawah stating therein that no case was made out against the three accused persons. Piyush Kumar Tiwari moved an application on before the C.J.M., Etawah on 11.5.90 praying that the final report may be set aside and legal proceedings against the three accused persons may be initiated. 3. The learned C.J.M., Etawah went through the case Diary and the entire material procured by the I.O. during the court of investigation. Piyush Kumar Tiwari also examined himself and filed affidavit of Rajendra Singh. After going through the entire material learned C.J.M., Etawah disapproved the final report and passed an order on 20.7.1990 summoning the accused persons under Section 307 I.P.C. It is against this order that Ramesh Chand Dixit and his two Co-accused have come in revision. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. The main contention of the applicant's counsel is that the C.J.M. Etawah has committed a illegality in exercising his jurisdiction and the summoning order was illegal because the learned Magistrate did not follow the procedure prescribed for the complaint cases in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The main contention of the applicant's counsel is that the C.J.M. Etawah has committed a illegality in exercising his jurisdiction and the summoning order was illegal because the learned Magistrate did not follow the procedure prescribed for the complaint cases in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was further contended that the offences in question was triable by the court of Sessions and as such it was mandatory for the Magistrate to examine all the witnesses of the complainant. 5. On the other hand the contention of the learned counsel for the Opp. Party No. 2 and the State is that the order in question passed by the C.J.M. was perfectly valid and no illegality was committed by him because the learned Magistrate has exercised his powers under Section 190 (1) (b). 6. Section 190 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: "Section 190 (1). Cognizance of offences by Magistrate - Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in his behalf under sub- Sec. (2) may take cognizance of any offence. (a) upon receiving a complainant of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts: (c) Upon information received from any person other that a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offences has been committed." Thus it is quite clear that under Section 190 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon a police report which is submitted before him. The question is where the police submits a final report after investigation in a case and recommends that no action is called for against a person, it is open to the Magistrate to summon the accused persons while disagreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the I.O. who submitted the final report. The above question was considered by the Supreme Court in the cases of Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Misra, 1967 (3) SCR 668 , H.S. Bains v. State, 1980 (17) ACC 82 (SC)(Sum.) and India Cart P. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1989 (26) ACC 280. 7. The above question was considered by the Supreme Court in the cases of Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Misra, 1967 (3) SCR 668 , H.S. Bains v. State, 1980 (17) ACC 82 (SC)(Sum.) and India Cart P. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1989 (26) ACC 280. 7. After referring to the cases of Adhinandan Jha and others and H.S. Bains, the Supreme Court in the India Carat P. Ltd. case has observed as follows: "The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173 (2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190 (1) (b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. Section 190 (1) (b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the Investigating Officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made not a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the Investigating Officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, in exercise of his posers under Section 190 (1) (b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190 (1) (b) though it is open to him to act under 'Sec. 200 or Section 202 also. The High Court was, therefore, wrong in taking the view that the Second Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was not entitled to direct the registration of a case against the second respondent and order the issue of summons to him:" Thus the position of law is now well settled that the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence even if the police report under Section 190 (1) (b) Cr. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was not entitled to direct the registration of a case against the second respondent and order the issue of summons to him:" Thus the position of law is now well settled that the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence even if the police report under Section 190 (1) (b) Cr. P.C. is to the effect that in the opinion of the Investigating Officer of the case no offence was made out against the accused upon the material uncovered and collected by him during the course of investigating. The Magistrate is within his rights if he takes a contrary view and summons the accused after perusing the police papers, popularly known as the Case Diary. But if the Magistrate in addition also examines the complainant on oath and also peruses the affidavit of the witnesses filed by the complainant then the Magistrate is acting in exercise of his powers under Chapter XV of the Cr. P.C.. In that case he is bound to follow the procedure laid down in the Chapter and in case the offences is triable by the Court of Sessions the Magistrate is bound to follow the procedure provided in Section 202 (2) Cr. P.C. 8. In the present case the F.I.R. was lodged under Section 307 I.P.C. The learned C.J.M. has not only perused the police papers and the police report but has also referred to the statement of first informant which was recorded by him on oath as well as to the affidavit of the witness Rajendra Singh. When the Magistrate was also relying upon the evidence produced by the first informant he was bound to follow the procedure prescribed in Chapter XV. As the offence was triable by the Sessions Judge, it was mandatory for the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses. 9. In this view of the matter the order dated 20.7.90 cannot be sustained. The application for revision is allowed. The order dated 20.7.90 passed by learned C.J.M. Etawah in Crime No. 82 of 1990 is Hereby set aside. Learned C.J.M. is directed to call upon the first informant to produce all his witness and after examining them on oath, the learned Magistrate shall proceed in accordance with law.