JUDGMENT : S.C. Verma, J. The Plaintiff Respondent no 3 filed suit against the tenant Petitioner on three grounds; firstly, the Defendant has committed default in payment of rent, secondly the Defendant has made alteration in the building under tenancy, and, thirdly, the Defendant has denied the title of the landlord. 2. In Writ Petition No 5407 of 1979 filed by the present tenant against the orders of the court below decreeing the suit for ejectment, only on the ground of denial of title, the learned Single Judge set aside the findings and the orders of the court below and held that there is no finding by either of the two courts below whether the Plaintiff had not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The learned Judge held that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and the other findings recorded by both the courts below were set aside and the case was remanded for fresh decision only on the issue whether the landlord has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant within meaning of Clause (f) of Section 20(2) of the Act. 3. As regards the first part of this Sub-clause it was held that the conclusion of the courts below that the Petitioner had denied the title of the landlord is correct. The issue whether the suit was incompetent for want of notice u/s 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act, the trial court was directed to give a finding as to whether notice u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act had been given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and if not, what is the effect of that omission on the maintainability of the suit. 4. The trial court was directed to give opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the above issues and the trial court was required to give fresh findings. 5. The trial court again by order dated 26-5-1981 decreed the Plaintiffs suit. The revision preferred before the 2nd Additional District Judge was also rejected by order dated 20-1-1982. 4. The trial court was directed to give opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the above issues and the trial court was required to give fresh findings. 5. The trial court again by order dated 26-5-1981 decreed the Plaintiffs suit. The revision preferred before the 2nd Additional District Judge was also rejected by order dated 20-1-1982. Both the courts below recorded findings that although the Plaintiff did not serve the notice u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, the notice u/s 111(g) of the Act was not necessary for the maintainability of the suit in the present circumstances when notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was already served on him. Both the courts below held that there was no evidence regarding waiver of the right of re-entry or the conduct of the tenant in denying the title has been condoned. 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner alleged that the landlord opposite party No. 3 has waived his right to re-entry and condoned the conduct of the tenant as envisaged u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act in as much as he filed the application u/s 8 of the Act for enhancement of rent in which written statement on 24-4-1974, was filed denying the title of the landlord. The continuance of proceeding by Respondent no 3, which was ultimately decided on 10-2-1975, the landlord has accepted the enhanced rate of rent which indicates that he has condoned the conduct of the tenant and has also waived his right to re-entry. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then submitted that admittedly notice u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act was not given by the Plaintiff and the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on 23-1-1974 whereas the fact of denial of title came in existence on 22-4-1974. The notice u/s 106 of the Act would not endure to the benefit of the Plaintiff and the second notice u/s 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary for the maintainability of the suit. 8. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the material on record Firstly, both the courts below have concurrently held that there was no material to establish that the landlord has waived his right to re-entry and has condoned the conduct of the tenant after denial of title. 8. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the material on record Firstly, both the courts below have concurrently held that there was no material to establish that the landlord has waived his right to re-entry and has condoned the conduct of the tenant after denial of title. The proceedings u/s 8 of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 were initiated in 1974. The provisions of Section 8 of the Act relate to the dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or to the amount of enhancement in rent permissible u/s 5 or 6 or to the date with effect from which such enhancement shall take effect. 9. In the present case from the material on record it is established that proceedings were initiated for enhancement of 25% rent as required u/s 5 of the Act and in these proceedings on 22-4-1974 the tenant filed written statement denying the landlord's title. The proceeding with regard to enhancement of rent concluded on 10-2-1975 and thereafter the Plaintiff filed suit on 28-2-1975. The material on record establish thereafter the notice u/s 5 of the Act the tenant did not remit enhanced rent and therefore, proceedings u/s 8 of the Act for enhancement in rent, as permissible u/s 5 of the Act. Were initiated These proceedings in my opinion were initiated as the landlord was given a right In accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act to enhance 25% of rent. The provisions for enhancement of rent u/s 5 of the Act is a right given to the landlord under the Act and he may initiate proceedings irrespective of the fact whether X would be his tenant or 'Y' would be his tenant. The enhancement of rent was in respect of building and was not qua a particular tenant. It cannot be inferred under the facts and circumstances of the case, that as the suit for ejectment was filed immediately after completion of these proceedings the conduct of the landlord in prosecuting the earlier proceedings for enhancement of rent would amount to waiver of his right of re-entry or to condone the conduct of the tenant when he denied the title. Merely because the landlord prosecuted these proceedings, which were ultimately decided on 10-2-1975 the courts below have rightly held that this would not amount to waiver of his right of reentry or has condoned the conduct of the tenant The tenancy of the tenant was also terminated on 23-7-1974 much before the conclusion of the proceeding u/s 8 of the Act. Although in the notice u/s 106 of the Act demand was made for rent which was fixed previously at the rate of 15/-. 10. The said suit was filed for rent at the rate of 23 44 paise the enhanced rate as by that time proceeding for enhancement of rent had concluded and the landlord was entitled to claim enhanced rent. It is established from the material on record that after service of notice u/s 106 of the Act dated 23-1-1974 no rent was accepted by the landlord. 11. In the written statement filed in the present suit the tenant himself had not taken any such plea earlier and there was no material on record to establish that the landlord has waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant after denial of title. The mere instance that the landlord allowed the proceedings for enhancement of rent to complete, would not in any way indicate that he has waived his right to re-entry or condoned the conduct. No other evidence or incidence has been placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to establish that the Plaintiff could be non suited in this regard. 12. As regards the second argument in my opinion identical controversy was considered in detail and has been fully resolved in the decision of Smt. Chanda Devi and Another Vs. Dr. Tara Pad Sinha and Another, AIR 1980 All 270 . After dealing the similar controversy which was raised in Gyasi Ram Vs. Ram Chandra Singh, AIR 1978 All 376 , it has been held as under: These observations do not amount to saying that the allegations in the notice which terminates the tenancy must be that the lessee had for-feited his tenancy on account of denial of title. In my opinion the implication of the above observation was only this that the tenancy must be determined by a notice prior to the institution of a suit for ejectment on the plea of Section 111(g). In my opinion the implication of the above observation was only this that the tenancy must be determined by a notice prior to the institution of a suit for ejectment on the plea of Section 111(g). If the contrary propositions can the read into that paragraph I only respectfully say that it was obiter. The point which had arisen for decision in Gyasi Ram's case was only as to whether the denial of tenancy preceded the institution of the suit or not and since in that case the disclaimer had come for the first time in the written statement it was ruled that the requirements of Section 111(g) were not satisfied. In fact the last sentence of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is the foundation of the whole edifice of the Appellant argument, it self does not say that the ground for forfeiture of the tenancy on account of denial of title must be made the basis of notice. It merely provides that the intention to determine the lease i.e. not to continue the tenancy of the tenant must be communicated to the lessee by actually determining his tenancy by a notice. The underlying principle is obvious If the tenancy is not terminated it would not be possible to evict the lessee. After all where the forfeiture is incurred by reason of an act or omission on the part of the lessee the lessor has an option to take advantage of it or to waive it. Hence he must so act evidencing his intention to determine the lease and once the notice has been served terminating the tenancy 'simpliciter', there is no impediment left for the less r in instituting a suit for ejectment on the plea of Section 111(g). To retain the tenancy and yet sue for ejectment on the basis of disclaimer of title would be a contradiction in terms. This is the only object of giving notice as contemplated by the last sentence of Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. It would be erroneous to read anything more into that provision. The case of Gyasi Ram (supra) has also been over ruled by a Division Bench in Narayan Das Khanna v. Jwaharlal Bhatia 1982 (2) ARC 1. 13. It would be erroneous to read anything more into that provision. The case of Gyasi Ram (supra) has also been over ruled by a Division Bench in Narayan Das Khanna v. Jwaharlal Bhatia 1982 (2) ARC 1. 13. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner cited before me that decision of learned Single Judge in Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. Smt Kandi Devi 1980 AWC 720 . i am not inclined to follow this decision firstly no reason, whatsoever, has been given in taking the view and secondly it had not noticed any of the earlier decision including Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision mentioned in the decision of Smt Chandra Devi (supra). In my opinion the denial of title, as in the present case, in proceedings u/s 8 of the Act which concluded prior to the institution of the suit, would not make any difference and the law laid down in the aforesaid case cannot be distinguished on the ground that the denial was in the written statement of the suit itself. After indicating the underlying principle that where the forfeiture is incurred by reason of an act or omission on the part of the lessee, the lessor has an option to take advantage of it or to waive it. Hence he must so act evidencing his intention to determine the lease and once notice has been served terminating the tenancy 'simpliciter', there is no impediment left for the lessor in instituting a suit for ejectment on the plea of Section 111(g) it is obvious if the tenancy has not been terminated it would not be possible to evict the lessee. In either of the two contingencies or in case of both the contingencies the requirement is the notice of termination of tenancy and after the tenancy of the lessee has been duly terminated by a notice it would be wholly redundant to require a second notice to be given to the lessee expressly mentioning the ground of forfeiture occasioned by denial of title. 14. In my opinion the courts below have not committed any error of law or jurisdiction nor there is any error apparent on the face of record, which may require interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution The writ petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.