JUDGMENT 1. Present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 12.10.1982 and 3.2.1982 passed by respondents 1 and 2 respectively. By means of the order dated 3.2.1982 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition), the Vice Chancellor of the Gorakhpur University accorded approval to the recommendation dated 8.11.1981 of the selection committee for appointment of the respondent Raghuvendra Saran Tripathi to the post of lecturer in Kisan Degree College Basti, which is affiliated to the University of Gorakhpur, in preference to the petitioner who was placed at serial No. 2 in the panel and by order dated 12.10.82, the Chancellor of the University rejected the reference made under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order dated 3.2.1982 passed by the Vice Chancellor, and upheld the approval accorded to the candidature of the 4th respondent by the Vice Chancellor. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The petitioner and the 4th respondent were amongst the candidates, who applied for appointment to the post in question pursuant to an advertisement of the vacancy in the post. The minimum qualifications for the post of lecturer in the Faculty of Arts (except the department of FineArts and Music) and the Faculty of Commerce and Science in any Collage affiliated to Gorakhpur University are laid down in statute 11.13 (1) of the First Statute of the University of Gorakhpur (in short the statute). These qualifications are: (a) An M. Phil, degree or a recognised degree beyond Master level or published work indicating the capacity of a candidate for independent research work; and (b) Consistently good academic record with at least first or high second class Master's degree or an equivalent degree of a foreign University, in a relevant subject. None of the two rival claimants was possessed of the prescribed qualifications. The petitioner fulfilled the first qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of statute 11.13 but lacked the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of the said statute. The fourth respondent on the other hand was possessed of the 2ndqualification prescribed in subclause (b) but lacked the first one prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of statue 11.13. The petitioner fulfilled the first qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of statute 11.13 but lacked the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of the said statute. The fourth respondent on the other hand was possessed of the 2ndqualification prescribed in subclause (b) but lacked the first one prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of statue 11.13. None of them could be appointed except on relaxation of any of the minimum qualifications in accordance with clauses (5) and (6) of statute 11.13. The selection committee placed the fourth respondent at serial no. 1 and the petitioner at serial no. 2 in the panel prepared by it for appointment to the post and sent its recommendation accordingly to the Management. Since no appointment could have been made by the Management unless prior approval of the Vice Chancellor was obtained, the papers pertaining to the selection were sent to the Vice Chancellor for approval. The Vice Chancellor as stated hereinafter, accorded approval by order dated 3.2.1982 to appoint the fourth respondent. 3. The controversy in the instant case centres round the interpretation: of the provisions contained in Section 31 of the U.P. State Universities Act read with those contained in Statute 11.13 of the First Statute of Gorakhpur University. Omitting unnecessary clauses, the aforesaid Statute reads as under: 11.13 (1). In the case of any college affiliated with the University, the following shall be the minimum qualifications for the post of a lecturer in the Faculty of Arts (except the Department of Fine Arts and Music) and the Faculties of Commerce and Science: namely (a) An M, Phil, degree or a recognised degree beyond Masters level or published work indicating the capacity of a candidate for independent research work;, and (b) Consistently good, academic record with at least first or high second class Master's degree or an equivalent degree of a foreign University, in a relevant subject. (2) . (3) (4) (5) If the selection committee is of the view that the research work of a candidate as evident either from his thesis or from his published work is of a very high standard, it may relax any of the qualifications prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1), or subclause (b) of clause (2) as the case may be. (3) (4) (5) If the selection committee is of the view that the research work of a candidate as evident either from his thesis or from his published work is of a very high standard, it may relax any of the qualifications prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1), or subclause (b) of clause (2) as the case may be. (6) Where no candidate possessing the qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) or subclause (a) of clause (2) is available or considered suitable the college on the recommendation of the Selection Committee may appoint a person possessing a consistently good academic record on the condition that he obtains such qualification within five years of his appointment, failing which he shall not be able to earn future increments until he fulfils the requirements. (7) For the purpose of this Statute: (a) the expression 'high second class marks' shall have the same meaning as given to it in subclause (a) of clause (7) of Statute 11.01; (b) the expression 'consistently good academic record' in relation, to Faculty of Education or Faculty of Law or other Faculties shall have the same meaning as given to it in subclause (b) or subclause (c) or subclause (d) of clause (7) of Statute 11.01 as the case maybe. 4. Since according to statute 11.13 (7) of the Statute the expression 'high second class marks and consistently good academic record, have, for the purposes of Statute 11.13, the same meaning as given to these terms in subclause (a) and (d) respectively of clause (7) of Statute 11.01, these subclauses are quoted as below: 11.01 (7) For the purpose of this Statute: (a) Marks above the midpoint between the minimum percentage of marks fixed by the University for award of first and second divisions are said to be high second class marks; (d) a candidate (other than a candidate for lectureship in the Faculties of Education and Law) having obtained either an average of 55 per cent marks in the two examinations prior to Master's degree that is say Intermediate and Bachelor's degree examination (irrespective of marks obtained in any of the two examinations) or 50 per cent marks in each of the two examinations separately, is said to have consistently good academic record. 5. 5. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the case in the light of the aforesaid statutory provisions, it is necessary to set out the qualifications of the petitioner and the 4th respondent as under: Dr. Ram Murat Upadhyay, the petitioner Name of Exam. Years Div. Percentage of Marks High School 1966 II 50.4 % Intermediate 1968 III 40% B. A. 1970 II 51.2 % M. A. 1972 II 54.4 % Ph. D. History Sri Raghvendra Saran Tripathi, 4th respondent High School 1971 II 53% Intermediate 1973 II 52% B. A. 1975 II 54.6 % M. A. 1975 II 59.5 % 6. Admittedly, as is also evident from the aforesaid chart, the petitioner was not possessed of the qualification mentioned in clause (b) of Statute 11.13 while the 4th respondent lacked the qualification prescribed by subclause (a) of clause (1) of Statute 11.13. The Selection Committee tad, however, made the following recommendations: The selection committee on the basis of performance unanimously recommends the panel of following names in order of performance for appointment as lecturer in History. 1. Raghvendra Saran Tripathi. 2. Ram Murat Upadhyay. In view of the research qualification and research paper the Selection Committee has relaxed the required qualification of Ram Murat Upadhyaya, Raghvendra Saran Tripathi needs no relaxation. But he should be appointed on the condition that he must obtain Ph. D. degree within five years from the date of appointment. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner made three fold submissions before me; firstly, that so long as a candidate (the petitioner himself) possessing the qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of the Statute 11. 13 (1) was available, the question of appointing the 4th respondent in exercise of the powers in clause (6) of statute 11.13 did not arise; secondly, that the Vice chancellor had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decisis on of the S election Committee granting relaxation to the petitioner with regard to the qualification of the 'consistently good academic record' prescribed by subclause (b) of statute 11. 13 (1); and thirdly that Selection Committee acted well in accordance with clause (5) in granting relaxation to the petitioner in respect of the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1) of statute 11.13. 13 (1); and thirdly that Selection Committee acted well in accordance with clause (5) in granting relaxation to the petitioner in respect of the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1) of statute 11.13. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent has refuted the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted before me that mere availability of a candidate possessing qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of the Statute 11.13 was not enough to abnegate the power conferred by clause (6) to appoint a candidate possessing a 'consistently good academic record' and further that the Vice Chancellor being 'appointing authority' was well within his powers to see whether the Selection Committee had granted relaxation in favour of the petitioner with regard to qualification prescribed by subclause (b) of clause (1) of the statute 11.13 in accordance with the Statutes. 8. It is evident from clause (6) of Statute 11.13 that the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance in as much as clause (6) specifically provides that where no candidate possessing qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) is available or considered suitable the college on the recommendation of the Selection Committee may appoint a person possessing 'consistently good academic record' on the condition that he obtains such qualification within five years of his appointment. The expression 'considered suitable' occurring in clause (6) of statute 11.13 is significant. The Selection Committee found on the basis of relative percentage of marks of the two candidates that the 4th respondent was more suitable for appointment on the post in question than the petitioner i.e. the 4th respondent deserved appointment, in the opinion of the Selection Committee, being more suitable on the basis of his performance and consistently good academic record. The availability of a candidate possessing the qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) is one thing and his suitability for the post s another. If on the basis of their relative performance, the Selection Committee found the 4th respondent more suitable and preferred him for appointment on the post in question it cannot be said that he could not have been appointed by giving him the benefit of clause (6) of Statute 11.13 merely because of the availability of the petitioner having a doctorate degree in the subject concerned. The fourth respondent was preferred to the petitioner by the Selection Committee in the best interest of the Institution and the Management had the power to accept such recommendation of the Selection Committee with prior approval of the Vice Chancellor. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the 4th respondent could not have been appointed so long as a candidate (the petitioner himself) possessing the qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) of Statute 11.13 was available. 9. As regards the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is noteworthy that clause (5) of Statute 11.13 is subjectively formulated. But nevertheless the Selection Committee has to form its opinion as to the relaxation of the qualification prescribed in subclause(b) of clause (1) in the context of research work of the concerned candidate as evident either from his thesis or from his published work. It has to act bona fide, reasonably and fairly in the formation of its opinion under clause (5) of Statute 11.13. Its decision must not be influenced by extraneous consideration and it must address itself to the research work of the concerned candidate. If the Selection Committee has so acted in granting relaxation of the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1) of Statute 11.13, it is to be accepted by all concerned. But if the opinion is not formed reasonably in good faith and on valid material the same may not be binding upon the Vice Chancellor, who has an implied power, while according approval under Section 31 (11) of the Act, to see whether a candidate recommended by the Selection Committee is possessed of the requisite qualification and whether the selection committee has performed its duties under clause (5) of Statute 11.13 in accordance with the Statutory provisions. 10. In Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1976)3 WLR 641 (referred to in HWR 'Administrative Law' fourth Edn, P. 37989) the House of Lords was considering a statutory provisions with subjective language. Lord Wilberforce said: The section is framed in a 'subjective' form if the Secretary of State 'is satisfied'. This form of section is quite well known, and at first sight might seem to exclude judicial review. Lord Wilberforce said: The section is framed in a 'subjective' form if the Secretary of State 'is satisfied'. This form of section is quite well known, and at first sight might seem to exclude judicial review. Sections in this form may, no doubt, exclude judicial review on what is or has become a matter of pure judgment, But I do not think that they go further than that. If a judgment requires, before it can be made, the existence of some facts, then although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court must inquire whether those facts exist, & have been taken into accnt.,. whether the judgment has been made upon a proper selfdirection as to those facts, whether the judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken into account. 11. The language employed in clause (6) of Statute 11.13 clearly suggests that it is a matter of pure judgment whether the research work of a candidate as evident either from his thesis or from his published work is of a very high standard. 12. In Dalpat Aba Saheb Solanke v. B.S. Mahajan AIR 1990 (SC) 434 (para 9) it has been held by the Hon. Supreme Court that It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committee and to scrutinise the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The Court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. It is not disputed that in the present case the University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of so called comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the Court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded in its jurisdiction. 13. The above principle has been reiterated in Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, AIR 1990 SC 1402 (paragraph 32). It is true that these authorities profess to lay down limitations on powers of the courts to review the decision of the Selection Committee but these limitations may reasonably be imposed upon the Vice chancellor u/s 31 (11) of the Act to scrutinize the recommendations of the Selection Committee. It is no doubt true that under Section 21 (11)(c), the Vice Chancellor, if he is satisfied that the candidate recommended by the Selection Committee does not possess the minimum qualification or experience prescribed or that the procedure laiddown in the Act for the selection of the teacher has not been followed, has the power to disapprove the recommendation and while examining the question under Section 31 (11) of the Act as to whether a candidate recommended by the Selection Committee is possessed of the minimum prescribed qualification, the Vice Chancellor has the implied power to go into the question of relaxation, if any, granted by the Selection Committee in respect of any of the two qualifications prescribed in statute 11.13 (1). He can disapprove a recommendation of the Selection Committee on the ground such as those indicated in the cases referred to above besides the ground indicated in Section 31 (11)(c) of the Act. To this limited extent I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Hon. N.N. Mittal, J. in Ram Niranjan Maurya v. Governor of U.P. 1989 (1) U.P. LBEC P. 513 cited at the bar. But while exercising the power under Section 31 (11) the Vice Chancellor in my judgment, cannot reappraise the standard of the research work of a candidate. But while exercising the power under Section 31 (11) the Vice Chancellor in my judgment, cannot reappraise the standard of the research work of a candidate. All that the Vice Chancellor can see is whether the Expert Selection Committee addressed itself to the question of relaxation on the basis of valid material before it in correct perspective as discussed herein before. It there was valid material before the Selection Committee on the basis of which it could form a view as to the standard of the research work of the candidate claiming relaxation and it is not found to have misdirected itself in any manner as discussed above, the Vice Chancellor shall have no jurisdiction to go behind the view expressed by the Selection Committee or to reappraise the research work and say that the relaxation was wrongly given. In view of this discussion I am of the firm view that it is the area specified in Section 31 (11) of the Act and the area indicated in the case law on the point referred to above within which the Vice Chancellor can sit in appeal over the decision of the Selection committee and exercise his power of interference therewith and not beyond the said area of interference. 14. Coming now to the 3rd submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner I find that the recommendation made by the Selection Committee as extracted herein before, does not indicate that the research work of the petitioner as evident either from his thesis or from his published work was found by the Selection Committee to be of a very high standard. The Division Bench decision in Smt. Rekha Joshi v. Dr. Radhey Shyam, 1984 UPLBEC 7C6, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable on the facts of the present case. There the Division Bench was concerned with following recommendation of the Selection Committee; In view of his high research work as evident by his thesis; and published work, the Selection Committee recommends that the requirement of qualifications specified in subclause (b) of clause (1) of statute be relaxed. It is evident that the Selection Committee in the case of Smt. Rekha Joshi while granting relaxation to Dr. It is evident that the Selection Committee in the case of Smt. Rekha Joshi while granting relaxation to Dr. Radhey Shyam, had formed its opinion, in view of his 'high' research work as evident from his thesis and published work, that he should be granted relaxation in respect of the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1). The Division Bench placed reliance upon another Division Bench case of this Court in Dr. Mrs. Prabha Gupta v. Lucknow University and others, 1984 (UPLBEC 647), wherein it was held that the expression 'high' itself implies excellence and the adverb'very' only emphasised the same, & mere omission to use the word 'very' with the adjective 'high' cannot vitiate the decision of the Selection Committee. It was in this background that the Division Bench held that omission to use the expression 'very high standard' did not vitiate the relaxation granted by the Selection Committee to Dr. Radhey Shyam in the Case of Smt. Rekha Joshi (supra). In the instant case, it is evident from the recommendation of the Selection Committee dated 8.11.1981 that the Selection Committee has not used either the word 'high' or 'very high' in its recommendation. All that it has said that in view of the research qualification and research paper, the Selection Committee has relaxed the required qualification of Ram Murat Upadhyaya. It is difficult to hold that the Selection Committee could reasonably be said to have evaluated the research work of the petitioner on the basis of his thesis or on the basis of his published work & found it a 'very high' standard. The ViceChancellor while according approval under Section 31(11) of the Act was justified in taking the view that relaxation that was granted to the petitioner was not proper and that it was no relax at taken on in the eye of law. In any case, I do not find manifest error in the view by the Vice Chancellor. 15. Assuming that relaxation to the petitioner as regards the qualifications prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1) of Statute 11.13 was granted substantially in accordance with clause (5) that by itself would be of no avail to petitioner in as much as an ever all consideration of merits, he was placed at a serial no. 2 in the panel prepared by the Selection Committee. 2 in the panel prepared by the Selection Committee. In Dalpat Abha Sahu Solanki v. B.S. Mahajan, AIR 1990 (SC) P. 434, it has been held that it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decision of the Selection Committee and to scrutinize the relative merit of the candidates. Whether a candidate is suitable for appointment to a post or not, has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The Selection Committee found the 4th respondent superior to the petitioner and accordingly placed him at serial no. 1 in the panel prepared by it for appointment to the post and he has been working for the last over 9 Years. In view of this even if it be held that the petitioner was entitled to relaxation of the qualification prescribed in subclause (b) of clause(1) he would not become entitled to a preference over the 4th respondent who has admittedly a consistently good academic record. In Shainda Hassan v. State of U.P. A.I.R 1990 (SC) 1381 Ms. Shainda Hassan worked as Principal in Karamat Hussain Muslim Girls College, Lucknow under the orders of the Court for over 16 years. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that it would be unjust to make her leave the post after 16y years. In view this discussion the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. In the result, the petition lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly. 17. Parties shall bear their own costs. (Petition dismissed.)