J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (code for short), the appellants have challenged the conviction and sentence order passed by the learned Sessions judge, Amreli, on 23rd February 1983, in Sessions. Case No. 47 of 1982. The appellant No. 1 who is the original accused no. 1 sentenced for the offence punishable under Section 394 of the Indian Penal code to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs. 100/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 days. He is further sentenced for offence punishable under section 332 read with Section 114 of the indian Penal Code to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The appellant No. 2 who is the original accused no. 2. is sentenced for offence punishable under Section 394 of the Indian Penal code to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 100/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 days. He is also sentenced for the offence punishable under Section 332 of the Indian Penal code, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The substantive sentences against the appellants have been ordered to run concurrently by the learned sessions Judge. ( 2 ) THE resume of the material facts giving rise to the present appeal, may be narrated, at this stage. The present appellants are the original accused persons who were prosecuted on the charges of offences punishable under sections 397, 326 and 333 of the IPC, alleged to have been committed by them, on 8-1-1982, at about 6. 00 p. m. in the forest area of Village Chanchai by committing theft of wood and by voluntarily causing grievous hurt to the forest Beat Guard Rambhai Bhimsinh, who was working as a public servant, with intention to obstruct him from exercising his function as a Public servant. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution version, the appellants who are original accused (for short accused No. 1 and 2-herein) were found to have been carrying forest property like wooden logs on the day of incident at about 6. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution version, the appellants who are original accused (for short accused No. 1 and 2-herein) were found to have been carrying forest property like wooden logs on the day of incident at about 6. 00 p. m. near forest area and the Forest Fire Guard Kathad hamir who is original complainant and injured Beat Guard Rambhai Bhimsinh, both public servants, who were performing and were on patrolling duty chased them and prevented them near village Chanchai. They asked them to go to the police outpost with them. The accused persons refused to oblige them and started quarrelling. The accused No. 2 Kathi Lakhu Abhal aimed an axe blow at complainant Kathad Hamir who avoided it with his hands. Thereafter, the accused Lakhu Abhal inflicted an axe blow on the person of injured Rambhai bhimsinh on his head. Consequently, the said Rambhai Bhimsinh fell down and he sustained serious injury on his head and then the accused ran away towards the forest side. ( 4 ) THE injured Rambhai Bhimsinh was brought to Village Chanchai by complainant Kathad Hamir and from there in Panchayat vehicle Rambhai bhimsinh was taken, at Primary Health centre, at Dhari. The First Information report was lodged at Dhari Police Station by Kathad Hamir. It was recorded by the Police Head Constable Jesing chhanabhai. Thus, the offence was registered against accused persons and investigation was started. The accused persons were arrested. It is a prosecution ease that accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal had discovered the axe in the presence of panchas which was seized by the P. S. I who was investigating into the offence. Wooden logs were also discovered by the accused persons. On completion of the investigation, accused persons were charge-sheeted in the Court of learned judicial Magistrate. First Class (J. M. F. C.), Dhari against accused persons. The accused persons were committed to the session Court to stand trial. The accused persons were charged with offences punishable under Sections 397, 326, 333 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal code by the Sessions Court on 3-2-1983 to which the accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the version of the defence the accused persons were falsely implicated in the charges. The accused persons were charged with offences punishable under Sections 397, 326, 333 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal code by the Sessions Court on 3-2-1983 to which the accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the version of the defence the accused persons were falsely implicated in the charges. It was further contended by the accused that they did not know anything about the incident and the witnesses were giving totally false evidence out of animosity. On appreciation of evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge, Amreli. held that accused No. 1 (appellant No. 1) is guilty for the offence punishable under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, he was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs. 100/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 days. The accused No. 1 was also guilty for the offence punishable under Section 332 read with Section 114 of the Indian penal Code and was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The learned Sessions Judge was also pleased to hold accused No. 2 (appellant no. 2) guilty for the offence punishable under Section 394 of the IPC and directed the accused No. 2 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 100/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 days. The accused No. 2nd was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 332 of IPC and was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Being aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence order passed by the learned sessions Judge in Session Case No. 47 of 1982, the original accused persons, have, now, come up in appeal before this court challenging the legality and validity of this conviction order by filing an appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the accused" persons Miss M. N. Mavalankar for Mr. K. G. Sheth, seriously criticised the impugned conviction judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. ( 7 ) THE injured Beat Guard of Forest department Mr. Rambhai Bhimsinh is examined at Exh. 6. K. G. Sheth, seriously criticised the impugned conviction judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. ( 7 ) THE injured Beat Guard of Forest department Mr. Rambhai Bhimsinh is examined at Exh. 6. It is very clear from his evidence that on the day of incident like that on 8-1-1982 at 6. 00 p. m. he and one Fire Guard of Forest Department complainant, Kathad Hamir, found both the accused persons carrying wooden logs like that forest property on the back of camel. Therefore, they chased them and stopped them near Village Chanchai. According to his evidence, accused persons were requested to go to the police station along with him and the complainant as they had obtained wooden logs illegally. The accused persons refused to oblige them. Thereafter, the accused no. 2 Lakhu Abhal aimed an axe blow at complainant Kathad Hamir who avoided it with his hands. Immediately, thereafter, accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal inflicted an axe blow on the head of rambhai Bhimsinh. There was serious injury on his head. He fell down. Thereafter, the accused persons fled away from the venue of offence. It becomes crystal clear from the evidence of injured rambhai Bhimsinh. Ex. 9 that accused no. 2 had attempted to inflict an axe blow on the person of complainant Kathad hamir which was averted and, thereafter, the accused No. 2 gave an axe blow on the head of injured. There is no reason to disbelieve this version of the injured rambhai Bhimsinh. ( 8 ) THE evidence of the injured Rambhai bhimsinh is also reinforced by the medical evidence of Dr. Sobhanabehn Mehta, at ex. 6. Dr. Mehta was working as Medical officer at Primary Health Centre, at dhari, at the relevant point of time and she had examined the injured at about 10. 45 p. m. , and she had found following injuries:1. Contused lacerated wound over left parietal region " lateral to saggital suture, slight oblique, 2" X " skull deep. 2. Tender sweeling around wound no. 1 medical certificate is also produced, at exh. 7. According to the medical evidence on record the head injury sustained by injured Rambhai Bhimsinh was possible by hard and blunt object. It is true that according to the medical evidence there was no grievous hurt. 2. Tender sweeling around wound no. 1 medical certificate is also produced, at exh. 7. According to the medical evidence on record the head injury sustained by injured Rambhai Bhimsinh was possible by hard and blunt object. It is true that according to the medical evidence there was no grievous hurt. The evidence of the injured is also supported by the medical Officer of the Hospital Junagadh, dr. B. S. Nimavat, at Exh. 14. The medical case papers are produced in the evidence of Dr. Nimavat. The version of the prosecution is also fully supported by note of witness- complainant Mr. Kathad Hamir, at Exh. ( 9 ) THUS, it becomes evident from the evidence on record that the injured rambhai Bhimsinh had sustained simple hurt on his head on account of blow of back and blunt portion of the axe given by the accused No. 2- Lakhu Abhal. The injured Rambhai Bhimsinh and the complainant were working as Beat Guard and Fire Guard, respectively, of the Forest department at the relevant point of time. Thus, they were working as public servants. It is not in dispute that the accused No. 1 Naja Nan had not played any role in inflicting injuries. The learned session Judge has found the accused persons guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 394, 332, r. w. Section 114 of the IPC. 9. It is contended on behalf of the appellant-original accused persons that prosecution has failed to examine independent witnesses and, therefore the version of the prosecution cannot be believed. In this connection the learned counsel for the accused Miss Mavalankar has relied on a decision of Supreme Court rendered in Bir Singh and Others v. The state of Uttar Predesh A. I. R. 1978 SC 59. Relying on the said decision, it is contended that the independent witnesses were available and non-examination of the witnesses would be fatal. This contention is not sustainable. The decision of the Apex Court relied on is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case before the Supreme court it was observed that it is the duty of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses if available. In the present case there were no eye witnesses other than the complainant. The prosecution has examined the complainant who fully supports the version of the prosecution. In the said case before the Supreme court it was observed that it is the duty of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses if available. In the present case there were no eye witnesses other than the complainant. The prosecution has examined the complainant who fully supports the version of the prosecution. In the case before the Supreme Court it was observed thai where all the eye witnesses examined by the prosecution has serious animus against the accused and were interested in implicating the accused and neither independent witnesses were examined nor any reasonable explanation was given by the prosecution. Therefore, it was found in that case by the Supreme Court that Court would be justified in the circumstances in drawing an adverse inference against the version of the prosecution. In the present case there were no eye witnesses to the incident occurred, at 6. 00 p. m. , on 8-1-1982, except the complainant who is examined. The evidence of injured is, fully, supported by the eye witness who is a complainant and who had lodged a first information report at the earliest point of time before the Dhari Police. Apart from that it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to examine each and every witness so as to multiply witnesses and burden the record. If the evidence of eye witnesses suffer from vice or infirmities the same could not be relied without being corroborated from independent witnesses who are available. The learned Counsel for the appellants is not in a position to make any slice of profit out of the said decision. ( 10 ) RELIANCE is also placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on decision in Bhagwali and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1976 SC 1449 . On the basis of the said decision it is contended that the witnesses who are named in FIR should be examined and failure to examine the witnesses mentioned in the FIR would be fatal to the prosecution version. This contention is without any substance. Having dispassionately examined the said decision of the Apex Court, it is found that the ratio of the said decision is not helpful to the accused persons in the present case. This contention is without any substance. Having dispassionately examined the said decision of the Apex Court, it is found that the ratio of the said decision is not helpful to the accused persons in the present case. On the contrary, it is held in the said decision that it would be unsound to lay down a general rule that every witness mentioned in the first information report must be examined by the prosecution in all circumstances and that the failure to do so would lead to the rejection of the evidence of all others. Not only that, even the First Information report at Exh. 18 in this case does not even remotely mention any names of the eye witness. So on all counts the said decision is not helpful to the accused persons. ( 11 ) RELYING on the decision of the supreme Court in Ishwar Singh v. The state of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2423 , it is contended that non-examination of the witness essential for unfolding the prosecution case is fatal to the prosecution version. In that case, it was held that witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be examined. Hence some of the eye witnesses named in the First Information report who were important witnesses for the unfolding of the prosecution case were kept back without giving any explanation and that non-examination of these witnesses acquires a special significance in view of the discrepancy between the f. I. R. and the version of the occurrence given by the prosecution in the Court. In the facts of the present case the said decision is not applicable. There is no question of non-examination of witnesses essential for unfolding the prosecution case. The injured is examined and he is supported by eye witness who is a complainant. There were no other eye witnesses. In the circumstances the accused persons cannot take any benefit out of the said decision. ( 12 ) NEXT it is contended that there is no evidence to prove guilt of the accused persons under Section 394 of the IPC. This contention appears to be justified in the facts of the case. Section 394 of the IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery. Robbery is defined in Section 390 of the IPC. ( 12 ) NEXT it is contended that there is no evidence to prove guilt of the accused persons under Section 394 of the IPC. This contention appears to be justified in the facts of the case. Section 394 of the IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery. Robbery is defined in Section 390 of the IPC. It reads as under : "in all robbery there is either theft or extortion. When theft is robbery : Theft is robbery if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint. "when extortion is robbery Extortion is robbery if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person, or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliever up the thing extord. " the case of the prosecution that there was theft in respect of wooden pieces by the accused persons is not established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It was alleged by the prosecution that the injured and the complainant who were working as forest guards at the relevant point of time and who were on patrolling duty apprehended that accused persons were carrying wooden pieces which were obtained illegally by them. However, this allegation is not substantiated. No independent evidence or documentary evidence is produced to show that the accused persons were carrying illegally the wooden pieces. No doubt, the injured witness and complainant have testified that two wooden pieces were taken on the back of the camel by the accused persons on the day of incident and they apprehended that the same were illegally obtained by the accused persons. This version of the prosecution that the accused No. 2 gave blow on the person of injured while they were committing theft of wood, is not proved to the hilt. This version of the prosecution that the accused No. 2 gave blow on the person of injured while they were committing theft of wood, is not proved to the hilt. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge that there was commission of theft of wood is not justified. That there is no clear and cogent evidence on record to hold that there was commission of theft in respect of forest property or wooden pieces. Unless theft is established, there cannot be a robbery and unless there is robbery there cannot be offence under Section 394. Though the prosecution has, successfully, proved beyond doubt that accused Lakhu Abhal had caused hurt on the person of injured rambhai Bhimsinh, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the said hurt was caused in committing robbery. The finding of learned Session Judge that there was commission of theft of wood is not sustainable. Therefore, the accused persons cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 394 of the IPC. ( 13 ) IT is also contended on behalf of the appellants accused that no offence is established in so far as the accused no. 1 is concerned. This contention also appears to be justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record. Mere presence at the scene of crime and disappearance after crime was committed, is not sufficient to transfix the culpability of the accused No. 1. It is an admitted fact that the accused no. 1 had not given any blow nor he had aimed any blow. It is also not the case of the prosecution that he was armed with any weapon. The prosecution has failed to prove that there was any theft of wood. The injury on the person of the injured Rambhai Bhimsinh was caused with the back portion of the axe by accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal. That there was an offence of volunlaily causing hurl to the Forest Beat Guard Rambhai bhimsinh by accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal. Therefore, the accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal can be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC. No offence is eslablished in so far as ihe accused No. 1 Naja Nan is concerned. That there was an offence of volunlaily causing hurl to the Forest Beat Guard Rambhai bhimsinh by accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal. Therefore, the accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal can be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC. No offence is eslablished in so far as ihe accused No. 1 Naja Nan is concerned. The learned Sessions Judge has committed serious error in finding the accused No. 1 guilty for the offence punishable under Seclions 394 and 332 of the IPC. There is no evidence worth the candle on record to prove the complicily of accused No. 1. Naja Nan, in so far as the charges under Seclions 394 and 332 are concerned. Seclion 332 of IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duly. The basic ingredient of Section 332 is the intent to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duties as such public servanl. In so far as the accused No. 1 Naja Nan is concerned, there is no evidence to connect him with the charge under Section 332 of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge has found accused no. 1 for the offence punishable under seclion 332 read with Section 114 of the ipc. This finding of the learned Sessions judge, wilh respect, is not only erroneous but is illegal in the facts of the case. No doubt, there is sufficient evidence on record lo hold that accused No. 2-Lakhu abhal had committed offence punishable under Section 332 of the IPC. Accused no. 2 had inflicted wilh the back portion of the axe on the head of injured Rambhai bhimsinh and no injury was caused by accused No. 1 Naja Nan nor any hurt is attributed to him. However, with the aids of Section 114 of IPC the learned sessions Judge held accused No. 1 guilty for the offence punishable under Section 332 of IPC. There is no doubl about the fact that the injured Rambhai Bhimsinh and complainant Kathad Hamir were working as Beat Guard of Forest department at the relevant point of time and they were performing duty. There is clear and consistent evidence that accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal inflicted an injury on the head of injured Rambhai bhimsinh with blunt and back portion of the axe. There is clear and consistent evidence that accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal inflicted an injury on the head of injured Rambhai bhimsinh with blunt and back portion of the axe. Thus, there is evidence to show that when Rambhai Bhimsinh and complainant who were public servants and who were on patrolling duty at the relevant point of time tried to prevent the accused persons from going away with wooden logs who were deterred by accused No. 2 Lakhu Abhal and not accused No. 1 Naja Nan. The fundamental ingredients of Section 332 is the intent to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. In so far as the accused No. 2 lakhu Abhal is concerned, prosecution has, successfully established his guilt under Section 332 of IPC. The prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused no. 1 Naja Nan for the offence punishable under Section 332 of IPC also. ( 14 ) THE learned Sessions Judge found accused No. 1 guilty with the aid of section 114 of the IPC. Section 114 of the IPC reads as under : abettor present when offence is committed : Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence. The meaning of this section is that if the nature of the act done constitutes abetment, then, if present, the abettor is to be deemed to have committed the offence, though in point of fact another man, actually, committed it. The section, therefore, prescribes that the present person is deemed to have committed the offence, not that he has committed it. It, simply, provides for the punishment of what English Law calls principals in the second degree. A person present abetting an offence is to be deemed to have committed the offence, though he does not, in fact, do so any more than a principal in the second degree applies. For example, a blow is struck by A, in the presence of, and by the order of B, both are principals in the transaction. A person present abetting an offence is to be deemed to have committed the offence, though he does not, in fact, do so any more than a principal in the second degree applies. For example, a blow is struck by A, in the presence of, and by the order of B, both are principals in the transaction. If two persons join in beating a man, and he dies, it is not necessary to ascertain exactly what the effect of each blow was. If A instigates B to murder Z, he commits abetment and is punishable in any event; if absent, he is punishable as an abettor, if the offence is committed, then under section 109, if present, he is by this section deemed to have committed the offence and is punishable as principal. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove- (1) that there was commission of principal offence, (2) that the accused was present whilst the offence was being committed, (3) that the accused would have been liable as an abettor of the said offence even if he were absent. It is, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to prove the acts which would constitute abetment if the accused was absent and then to show that the accused was present. The accused No. 1 was charged to have committed an offence under Sections 397, 332, 333 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The learned Sessions Judge found the accused No. 1 guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 394 and 332 read with Section 114 of the IPC. Under section 34 of the IPC if a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for that act as if it were done by himself alone; so that if two or more persons are present aiding and abetting in the commission of a murder, each will be tried and convicted as a principal, though it might not be proved which of them actually committed the act. This Section (Section 114) refers to cases somewhat different, namely, where a person by abetment, previous to the commission of the offence, rendered himself liable as an abettor, is present when the act is committed, but takes no active part in the doing of it. To bring a person within this section the abetment must be complete apart from the mere presence of the abettor. To bring a person within this section the abetment must be complete apart from the mere presence of the abettor. It is necessary first to establish or to make out the circumstances which constitute abetment so that, if absent, he would have been liable to be punished as an abettor and then to show that he was present when the offence was committed. Previous concert ordinarily is an essential factor in the constitution of the offence of abetment under this section. Abetment under the Indian Penal Code involves narrative complicity on the part of the abettor at the relevant point of time prior to the actual commission of the offence. Abetment is constituted (1) by a person to commit an offence or (2) by engaging in conspiracy or by intentionally aiding a person to commit it. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt any one of the aforesaid ingredients to constitute abetment. It is rightly contended on behalf of the prosecution that mere presence at the venue or at the time of commission of a crime cannot amount to intentional aid only it was intended to have that effect. Prosecution has failed to prove abetment on the part of the accused No. 1. Under the circumstancces, the conviction and sentence order passed by the learned sessions Judge under Sections 394 and 332 read with Section 114 of the IPC against the accused No. 1 (appellant No. 1 herein) is required to be quashed. There is clear and consistent evidence to prove the guilt of accused No. 2 - Lakhu Abhal for the offence punishable under Section 323 and Section 332 of the IPC. The contention that the accused No. 2 is also not guilty for the said offence cannot be accepted. ( 15 ) NOW a question would arise as to what quantum of sentence should be awarded to the accused No. 2 for the offence punishable under Section 323 and section 332 of IPC. Section 323 provides punishment for voluntarily causing hurt with imprisonment either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. The prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused no. 2 - Lakhu Abhal for the offence punishable under Section 323 and Section 332 of the IPC. The prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused no. 2 - Lakhu Abhal for the offence punishable under Section 323 and Section 332 of the IPC. Section 332 prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to public servant in the discharge of his duty with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. ( 16 ) THE appellant-original accused No. 2 has contended that in view of long delay involved in the case and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused No. 2 may also be given benefit of probation. This contention, prima facie, appears to be captivating but not convincing. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances and the nature of the offence against the public servant, this court is unable to uphold the said contention. Had there been the case of the person other than the public servant, deterring him from discharging his public duties, the aforesaid contention would have been assumed different dimension. The public servant is a servant of the society and needs protection so that he is not demoralised in the functions of his duties who must be free from fright. But the accused No. 2 though only gave a blow resulting into simple injury on the head has committed an offence punishable under Section 332 also and, therefore, the reasonable sentence of imprisonment along with reasonable fine would meet the ends of justice and not the release on probation. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record in the present case the contention that the accused No. 2 may be given benefit of probation cannot be accepted. Having regard to the facts of the present case the ends of justice will meet if the accused No. 2 is awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one month and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 days for the offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC and for the offence punishable under Section 332 of the IPC two months sentence of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo rigourous imprisonment for one month. 500/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 days for the offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC and for the offence punishable under Section 332 of the IPC two months sentence of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo rigourous imprisonment for one month. ( 17 ) IN the result, the conviction and sentence order passed by the learned sessions Judge against the original accused No. 1 (appellant No. 1 herein) is, hereby, quashed. The original accused no. 2 (appellant No. 2) is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 instead of Section 394 of IPC and he is directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one month and fine of rs. 500/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. The original accused No. 2 (appellant no. 2) is also held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 332 of the IPC and is ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and to pay fine Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. The aforesaid sentences passed against the accused No. 2 shall run concurrently. The amount of fine paid shall be refunded to the original accused No. 1 (appellant No. 1 herein) accordingly. The amount of fine, if any, paid by the original accused No. 2 shall be set off against the above sentence of fine. He shall also be given set off of the period as an undertrial prisoner, if any, undergone by him. The accused No. 2 shall surrender within a period of eight weeks from today and his bail bond shall stand cancelled. The bail bond of accused No. 1 shall stand cancelled forthwith. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Appeal partly allowed. .