JUDGMENT P.P. Gupta, J. 1. The Committee of Management. Guru Tegh Bahadur Public School, Meerut, runs a Public School known as Guru Tegh Bahadur Public School, Meerut Cantt., Meerut (Hereinafter referred to as the 'School'). It is a private unaided school. This school is affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'CBSE' and is a recognised institution. 2. The petitioner, Mrs. Harbans Kaur, was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the School on 2-7-1978 to teach Primary Sections. She was confirmed as Teacher on 27-11-91. In view of the good work and teaching experience of the petitioner, she was appointed as Teacher in T.G.T. grade with effect from 2-4-1985 on regular basis by the Committee of Management of the aforesaid school. All along, she discharged her duties as teacher satisfactorily. On 11-9-1990, she was served with a letter terminating services on the grounds that her work was unsatisfactory and that she did not posses requisite qualifications for the post. She was never served with any charge-sheet and was also not afforded any opportunity to show-cause against the termination order. In the circumstances, as alleged by the petitioner, the termination order was illegal. It also casts a stigma on the petitioner. This termination order was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 32647 of 1990. In the aforesaid writ petition, the operation of the termination order dated 11-9-1990 was stayed by this Court on 11-12-1990. The present contempt petition has been filed by the petitioner on the ground that though she served the certified copy of the stay order upon the respondents on 20-12-1990, she was never reinstated nor was paid her salary. 3. The respondents filed a counter affidavit in response to the notices issued to them by this Court. The main plea of the respondents is that by the interim order dated 11-12-1930 although the impugned order of termination dated 11-9-1990 was stayed, but it was left open to the respondents either to take or not to take work from the petitioner as Music teacher. They did not take any work from the petitioner and so they were under a bona fide belief that if no work was taken from the petitioner, no salary need be paid to her. It was under this bona fide belief that she was not paid any salary. They did not take any work from the petitioner and so they were under a bona fide belief that if no work was taken from the petitioner, no salary need be paid to her. It was under this bona fide belief that she was not paid any salary. Further on 15-1-1992, the entire salary due to the petitioner up to 30-12-1991 was deposited in her account. There was no wilful disobedience on their part and in any case they tendered unconditional apology also. 4. In the rejoinder affidavit the fact that the respondents deposited the entire salary due to her up to 31-12-1991 was not disputed. The learned counsel for both the parties were theard and the record of the case was also perused. " 5. The ad interim order passed in Writ Petition No. 32647 of 1990 is reproduced below : "Issue notice. Until further orders operation of the order dated 11-9-1990, Annexure 4 to the writ petition, will remain stayed. However, it will remain open to the respondents either to take or not to take work from the petitioner as music teacher." Obviously, there was no specific direction either to reinstate the petitioner or to pay her this arrear of salary. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. M. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171 . I am of the opinion that as there was no specific direction in the stay order passed by this Court on ' 11-12-1990 either for reinstating the petitioner or for paying her arrears of salary, technically, no case for committing contempt of this Court is made out against the respondents on the ground that the petitioner has not been reinstated and has also not been paid arrears of salary. 6. A person may be liable for contempt when the order that is alleged to have been disobeyed is clear, unambiguous and specific. It should not be a vague order. It should also not be capable of admitting two interpretations. Failure to obey a vague order is not contempt. In the instant case the operation of the termination order was stayed. It was left open to the respondents whether or not to take work from the petitioner. It should not be a vague order. It should also not be capable of admitting two interpretations. Failure to obey a vague order is not contempt. In the instant case the operation of the termination order was stayed. It was left open to the respondents whether or not to take work from the petitioner. The contention of the respondents is that since no work was taken from the petitioner, they remained under the impression that no salary was to be paid to her. In the ultimate analysis the view so taken by the respondents may not be found to be legally sustainable, but if such a view was taken bona fide, it cannot be said that it amounted to wilful disobedience, of the order of the Court. Lastly, the respondents have also deposited the arrears due to the petitioner up to 31-12-1990, during pendency of the present writ petition and have also placed themselves at the mercy of this Court by tendering unqualified apology. It is well settled that the power of the High Court to initiate contempt proceedings against an alleged contemnor is discretionary. The petitioner, who initiated the contempt proceedings has no vested right to claim that the contemnor must be punished. Once the petitioner brings the fact to the knowledge of the Court by pointing it that the contempt of Court has been committed, the water so far as the petitioner is concerned is over and thereafter the matter is between the Court and the contemnor. He is not entitled as a matter of right even to withdraw the Contempt Petition whenever it suits his purpose. In the instant case I am of the view that the impugned order alleged to have been disobeyed by the respondents was vague, inasmuch as that there was no direction either to reinstate the petitioner or to pay her arears of salary. It was also capable of two interpretations. It was left open to the respondents either to take work or not from the petitioner. No work as admittedly taken from the petitioner. The respondents, therefore, on a bona fide belief, did neither reinstate the petitioner nor paid her arrears of salary. Further, they also deposited the arrears of salary due to the petitioner up to 31-12-1990 and tendered unconditional apology. In the circumstances there was no wilful disobedience of the order on their part. 7. The respondents, therefore, on a bona fide belief, did neither reinstate the petitioner nor paid her arrears of salary. Further, they also deposited the arrears of salary due to the petitioner up to 31-12-1990 and tendered unconditional apology. In the circumstances there was no wilful disobedience of the order on their part. 7. My attention was also drawn to the fact that the petitioner's son, being the son of a teacher, was enjoying free-ship but after the termination of his mother's services this concession has been withdrawn. From this conduct of the respondents it was to be inferred that the respondents flouted the interim order of this Court. Free ship is a concession given to a student in Certain contingencies. No student has a vested right in it. This concession can be withdrawn at the sweet will and discretion of the committee. From this withdrawal it cannot be inferred that the respondents have wilfully flouted the order of this Court. Moreover, the petitioner has not filed the original order dated 24-12 1990 by which this concession was withdrawn, Only that could show the reason for withdrawing this facility. What the petitioner has filed is copy of letter dated 31-12-1990 of the Principal which is a reminder. It is of no help to the petitioner and serves no purpose. 8. Therefore, in the facts of the instant case, I am unable to hold that the interim order of the Court was purposely and intentionally interpreted by the respondents to circumvent the claim of the petitioner. On the contrary, the interpretation given by the respondents appears, prima facte, to be reasonable one though in this jurisdiction this point cannot be decided finally. For the foregoing discussions, I am unable to hold that the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the interim order dated 11-12-1990 of this Court, so as to make them guilty and hence liable for civil contempt. The contempt petition is, therefore, dismissed accordingly. The notices issued to the respondents are discharged. Costs of this petition are made easy. Petition dismissed.