JUDGMENT K.C. Bhargava, J. - Petitioner, Jagannath Prasad Shukla, was working as District Government Counsel (Criminal), Kanpur Dehat. In the year 1978 he was appointed as District Government Counsel (Criminal) Non-Metropolitan Area Kanpur. Thereafter his term was extended in 1979 for three years. In 1982 his term was renewed for one year and lastly in 1983 his term was extended for three years up to 28th August, 1986. After expiry of the term of the petitioner on 28th August, 1986, he was allowed to continue as such. On 25th May, 1987 the appointment of the petitioner as District Govt. Counsel (Criminal) was terminated vide order contained in annexure-1 to the writ petition. This order of termination of his appointment has been challenged by means of this writ petition. It has been mentioned by the petitioner that opposite party No.4 in collusion with opposite party No. 3 got the appointment of the petitioner terminated so that he may be appointed as District Government Counsel (Criminal). It may be mentioned that opposite party No. 3, Sri Nagendra Singh, was at the relevant time Minister for Agriculture, Government of Uttar Pradesh. It is also alleged that no adverse entry or material was ever communicated to the petitioner during his tenure as District Government Counsel (Criminal). It is further alleged that the order of termination of appointment of the petitioner without giving any opportunity of hearing violates the guidelines and norms as contained in the L. R. Manual; it is also violative of the principles of natural justice and the order of termination is unreasonable and utterly discriminatory as it does not disclose any reason for passing the order. The petition is opposed on behalf of opposite party No. 4. It was contended that after termination of the petitioner as District Government Counsel (Criminal) one Sri Shyam Mohan Sharma was placed in charge of the post of District Government Counsel (Criminal). There was no mala fide or collusion between the opposite parties 3 and 4 in getting the petitioner removed from the office of the District Government Counsel (Criminal). The said order of termination of the appointment of the petitioner is not in contravention of any provisions of the L. R. Manual and the order was passed after due consideration of the merit of the petitioner. The said order of termination of the appointment of the petitioner is not in contravention of any provisions of the L. R. Manual and the order was passed after due consideration of the merit of the petitioner. It is also alleged that the opposite party No. 4 is not a close associate of opposite party No. 3. The opposite party No. 3 never influenced the decision of the Government in withholding the renewal of the petitioner. The State Government has also filed a counter-affidavit denying the allegations of the petitioner and has alleged that opposite parties 3 and 4 have nothing to do with the discontinuation from the engagement of the petitioner as District Government Counsel (Criminal), Kanpur Dehat. His appointment was discontinued after a bona fide appraisal of the reports of the then District Judge and the then District Magistrate, Kanpur Dehat. It is further alleged that there is no question of communicating the confidential reports to the petitioner. The term of the petitioner was not renewed as adverse reports had been sent by the District Officer to the Government for not renewing the term of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the provisions of pars 7.08 of the L.R. Manual were not complied with in the present case. For the sake of convenience the provisions of para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual are reproduced as under :- "7.08. Renewal of term- (1) At least three months before the expiry of the term of a District Government Counsel, the District Officer shall after consulting the District Judge and considering his past record of work, conduct and age, report to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the statement of work done by him in Form No.9 whether in his opinion the term of appointment of such counsel should be renewed or not. A copy of the opinion of the District Judge should also be sent along with the recommendations of the District Officer. (2) Where recommendation for the extension of the term of a District Government Counsel is made for a specified period only, the reasons therefore shall also be stated by the District Officer. A copy of the opinion of the District Judge should also be sent along with the recommendations of the District Officer. (2) Where recommendation for the extension of the term of a District Government Counsel is made for a specified period only, the reasons therefore shall also be stated by the District Officer. (3) While forwarding his recommendation for renewal of the term of a District Government Counsel- (i) the District Judge shall give an estimate of the quality of the counsel work from the judicial stand point, keeping in view the different aspects of a lawyer's capacity as it is manifested before him in conducting State cases, and specially his professional conduct; (ii) the District Officer shall give his report about the suitability of the District Government Counsel from the administrative point of view, his public reputation in general, his character, integrity and professional conduct. (4) If the Government agrees with the recommendations of the District Officer for the renewal of the term of the Government Counsel, it may pass orders for re-appointing him for a period not exceeding three years. (5) If the Government decides not to reappoint a Government Counsel, the Legal Remembrancer may call upon the District Officer to forward fresh recommendations in the manner laid down in para 7.03. (6) The procedure prescribed in this para shall be followed on the expiry of every successive period of renewed appointment of a District Government Counsel. Note : The renewal beyond 60 years of age shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity and physical fitness of the counsel." A perusal of this provision goes to show that the District Officer after consulting the District Judge has to send his report to the Government. In doing so the District Officer has to consider the past record of the work, conduct, public reputation in general, his character, integrity and professional conduct. A statement of work in Form No. 9 is also to be sent to the Government. He has to give his opinion as to whether on these facts the term of the District Government Counsel has to be renewed or not. A statement of work in Form No. 9 is also to be sent to the Government. He has to give his opinion as to whether on these facts the term of the District Government Counsel has to be renewed or not. In the present case we find, from the averments made in the counter affidavit of opposite parties 1 and 2, that a report from the then District Judge and the then District Officer was sent to the State Government along with the opinion of the District Officer. After considering this report the State Government declined to extend the term of the petitioner. We find that in the present case the State Government after perusing the report of the District Officer has taken a decision in accordance with para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual and has not renewed the term of the petitioner. It cannot be said that the action of the State Government is arbitrary in any manner. 3. The next ground of the petitioner is that opposite party No. 3 exercised his influence in collusion with opposite party No. 4 and did not get the renewal of the term of the applicant materialised. Except the petitioner' averment there is no evidence on record to support this contention. As mentioned in the earlier para of the judgment the opposite party No. 3 at that time was Minister of Agriculture, Government of Uttar Pradesh. He was not the Law Minister and it is well known that the renewal of the District Government Counsel is not done by the Agriculture Minister, it is done on the recommendation of the Law Minister. Therefore in the absence of any evidence on record it cannot be said that the opposite party No. 3 in any way influence the decision of the State Government with regard to the petitioner in collusion with opposite party No. 4. This contention of the petitioner also fails. 4. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that before terminating the appointment of the petitioner the petitioner was entitled to a hearing. According to the learned counsel if the State Government had formed an opinion that the term of the petitioner should not have been renewed an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to explain as to why his term be not discounted. According to the learned counsel if the State Government had formed an opinion that the term of the petitioner should not have been renewed an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to explain as to why his term be not discounted. According to the learned counsel this opportunity should have been given in view of para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual. This para has been reproduced in the above part of the judgment and it no-where says that if the Government decides not to renew the term of the District Government Counsel then an opportunity has to be given to that Government Counsel. Unless there is specific provisions to this effect in the L. R. Manual that if the term of a Government Counsel is not to be renewed he should be given an opportunity of hearing, the petitioner cannot ask for opportunity of hearing. No principle of natural justice has been violated in the present case because no provision of law exists which require that an opportunity of hearing must be given to the petitioner before his term is not extended. The learned counsel for the petitioner on this point has placed reliance on the case of R.P. Singh v. State of U. P., (Writ Petn. No. 22578 of 1989 and other connected with petitions, decided by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court on 12-11-1990) : (reported in 1990 All LJ 971). A perusal of this judgment will go to show that the facts of that case were entirely different from that of the present case. In that case the rules which were applicable were the United Province Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942. In Rule 14 of the said Rules there was a provision of giving an opportunity to the State Counsel when he was going to be removed. That rule may be reproduced for the sake of convenience as under : "14. The Governor reserves to himself the right to remove or suspend any Law Officer at any time during his term of office for misconduct or dereliction of duty subject to the provision that no law officer shall be so removed unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence." A perusal of this rule shows that a Law Officer could not be removed unless he had a reasonable opportunity of hearing in defence. Interpreting this provision the Division Bench came to the conclusion that since no opportunity had been given to the State Law Officers under R. 14 of the United Provinces Crown Law Officers Rules, 1942 the order terminating the services of the State Law Officers was violative of the said provision. As no such rule exists in the present case this judgment of the Division Bench of this Court is of no help to the petitioner. Therefore, it is clear that unless specific provision is made in the L. R. Manual no opportunity of hearing can be afforded to the District Government Counsel. As mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment no such rule exists in the present case, hence the State Government was not in any way obliged to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 5. It is further argued that the report of the District Officer which was sent to the Legal Remembrancer and the facts disclosed in the said report should have been disclosed to the petitioner. This argument also cannot be accepted because in view of the provisions of para 7.08 of the L. R. Manual such facts cannot be disclosed to the District Government Counsel about whom a report is forwarded by the District Officer to the State Government. The said para does not provide that the report of the District Officer has to be disclosed to the District Government Counsel if the same is adverse to him. Therefore this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also fails for want of any specific provision in the above para of the L.R. Manual. 6. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that if a complaint is received by the State Government then he should be given an opportunity of hearing. No doubt it is true that a complaint was made against the petitioner for which an enquiry was held by the Additional District Magistrate but in that enquiry nothing came out against the petitioner. As nothing came out against the petitioner in the enquiry this fact has no impact of this matter. Had there been an enquiry without any opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioner and adverse inference drawn against the petitioner then it could have violated the principles of natural justice. Such is not the present case. 7. As nothing came out against the petitioner in the enquiry this fact has no impact of this matter. Had there been an enquiry without any opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioner and adverse inference drawn against the petitioner then it could have violated the principles of natural justice. Such is not the present case. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the reasons for removal of the petitioner have not been disclosed to him. According to the learned counsel unless the reasons are disclosed to the petitioner his services cannot be terminated. This argument of the learned counsel also has no legs to stand on. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., 1991 SCC (L & S) 742 : ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ) this aspect of the matter has been dealt with as under (at pp. 546 and 547 of AIR) : "The expression `at any time' merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and `without assigning any cause' means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, `without assigning any cause' is not to be equated with `without existence of any cause'. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, ( AIR 1984 SC 1271 ) that the expression `without assigning any reason' implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reason must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons of the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. The non-assigning of reasons of the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause (3) of para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of U P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the government, which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby save it from any attack to its validity. A perusal of this para clearly goes to show that the reasons for terminating the assignment should exist on the file and need not be communicated to the District Government Counsel. In the present case it has been challenged that no reasons for removal of the petitioner exist on the file. Even from the perusal of the record it is apparent that the report of the District Officer, after he had consulted the District Judge, was forwarded to the State Government and the State Government after due consideration to the report of the District Officer took a decision to terminate the appointment of the petitioner as District Government Counsel (Criminal). As there is no arbitrariness in the decision of the State Government it cannot be said that the decision of the State Government is bad in law. This ground of the petitioner also fails. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the renewal procedure has not been considered by the State Government and it should have been considered in accordance with the provisions of para 7.08 of the L. R. Manual. This ground of the petitioner also fails. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the renewal procedure has not been considered by the State Government and it should have been considered in accordance with the provisions of para 7.08 of the L. R. Manual. In the present case, as seen in the earlier part of the judgment, the renewal of the petitioner was considered by the State Government and for that purpose the District Officer sent his report to the State Government after consulting the District Judge and the State Government after consideration of the same came to the conclusion that the term of the petitioner should not be renewed. This is the precise procedure laid down in para 7.08 of the L.R. Manual. Once this exercise has been taken by the State Government and it is found that the State Government has not acted in a mala fide way or the action of the State Government is not arbitrary. The Court has to presume that the Government has exercised its powers in the way in which the Rules have laid down. Therefore it cannot be said that the procedure for renewal was not conducted by the State Government. 9. It has further been argued that the State Government should have also considered the suitability of the petitioner for being appointed as District Government Counsel (Criminal) even after the age of 62 years. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner there is no age of superannuation in the L. R. Manual. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that an eminent District Government Counsel should be continued by the State Government and the petitioner being a brilliant advocate his extension was in public interest. Para 7.13 of the L. R. Manual deals with the age of superannuation. Sub-clause (1) of this para reads as under: "7.13. Superannuation age.- (1) No legal practitioner shall be appointed as a District Government Counsel if his age exceeds 62 years, nor shall his term be extended beyond the age of 62 years, unless the Government for any special reasons, in any case, directs otherwise. Sub-clause (1) of this para reads as under: "7.13. Superannuation age.- (1) No legal practitioner shall be appointed as a District Government Counsel if his age exceeds 62 years, nor shall his term be extended beyond the age of 62 years, unless the Government for any special reasons, in any case, directs otherwise. The Legal Remembrancer may at any time call for such proof of age as he may consider necessary." This para is clear in its term and provides that if the District Government Counsel has attained the age of 62 years then his term shall not be extended beyond that age. A power has been vested with the State Government that if the Government for any special reasons directs otherwise the term of the District Government Counsel can be extended. This provision which has been made in para 7.13 merely empowers the State Government to extend the term or appoint a District Government Counsel after the age of 62 years and that too for certain special reasons. The special reasons may be that the District Government Counsel is a brilliant one or his continuance on that post is in the interest of the State working but for the exercise of this power the State Government has to pass a specific order. It is not a right which is vested on a District Government Counsel and he cannot as a matter of right assert for appointing him or for extending his term even after the age of 62 years. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner should have been considered for his term being renewed even after the age of 62 years cannot be accepted. This argument has been based on the fact that at the time of filing of the writ petition in 1987 the age of the petitioner was 59 years and by the time the petitioner came up for hearing the petitioner has crossed the age of 62 years. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the judgment of P.N. Seth v. State of U. P. (Writ Petition No. 47 (M/ B) of 1992) delivered by a Division Bench of this Court on 31st January, 1992, in order to show that there is no age of superannuation for the District Government Counsel. This judgment nowhere says that there is no age of superannuation. This judgment nowhere says that there is no age of superannuation. As a matter of fact this judgment says that the age of superannuation is 62 years. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that a number of certificates about the work of the petitioner issued by various courts appreciating his work should have been taken into consideration by the State Government at the time of considering the renewal of the term of the petitioner. It may be mentioned that individual courts have no right to issue certificates to individual advocates. They can at the most submit their reports to the District Judge when the District Judge calls for a report from them and the District Judge has to consider the reports sent by various courts before whom the District Government Counsel had appeared, and to form his opinion for being forwarded to the District Officer. There is no provision in the L. R. Manual or under any other law which authorises a judicial officer to issue certificate of the nature which have been issued in the present case. Therefore the State Government is not bound to consider those certificates or to take any notice thereof. Those certificates are of no value and non-consideration of those certificates by the State Government does not in any way give right to the petitioner. 11. In view of the above discussion it is held that the State Government had after consideration of the report of the District Officer validly refused the extension of the term of the petitioner as District Government Counsel (Criminal). The petitioner cannot have any grievance against the order of the State Government as he has failed to show that this order was mala fide or arbitrary in nature. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 12. The writ petition is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.