PUSHPA KUMARI v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI — 1992 DIGILAW 8 (DEL)

Sunanda Bhandare ( 1 ) THE petitioner was appointed as a Junior Vernacular Teacher by the Directorate of Education vide Office Order No. 28 dated 1. 2. 1957. She started working in the Government Girls School, Pulbangesh, Delhi. Later on she became a Head Mistress in the same School. The petitioner was thereafter transferred to Municipal Corporation of Delhi with effect from 1. 7. 1957 by virtue of the transfer of the School to the M. C. D. , and she worked as a Head Mistress. Later on, the petitioner was appointed as a Senior School Inspectress. The post of Senior School Inspectress was later on redesignated as Assistant Education Officer. The petitioner was sought to be retired by the respondent with effect from 31. 3. 1984 when she reached the age of 58 years on the ground that she belonged to the administration staff. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present writ petition challenging the said action and it is submitted that the age of retirement of a teacher is 60 years and not 58 years. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5051/85 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Smt. Shlela Puri dated 2. 12. 1988 and it Is submitted that since the initial appointment of the petitioner was as a Teacher her age of retirement should be 60 years, which is the prescribed age of retirement for all teachers. The Supreme Court in that case has upheld the judgment of this Court in C. W. No. 1365/84 wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held that the retirement age of a person holding any administrative post would be 60 years if the initial appointment was as a teacher. In our view the question raised by the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court mentioned hereinabove. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. . The order retiring the petitioner with effect from 1. 4. 1984 on her attaining the age of 58 years is set aside and the petitioner is held to be entitled to continue in service upto her age of 60 years i. e. upto 31. 3. 1986. Since the petitioner has now crossed the age of superannuation she is entitled to the back wages and other consequential benefits for that period. 1984 on her attaining the age of 58 years is set aside and the petitioner is held to be entitled to continue in service upto her age of 60 years i. e. upto 31. 3. 1986. Since the petitioner has now crossed the age of superannuation she is entitled to the back wages and other consequential benefits for that period. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. 46 (1991) DELHI LAW TIMES 634 (DB) DELHI HIGH COURT Present : Mr. Malik Sharief-Ud-Din and Mr. Dalveer Bhandari, JJ. M. C. D.-Appellant Versus SAVITRI DEVI-Respondent Crl. Appeal No. 181 of 1981-Decided on 2-12-1991 Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957-Sections 332/461-Prosecution for offence of making unauthorised additions and alterations in premises-Junior Engineer of MCD noticed the commission of offence-Prosecution sought to corroborate it with evidence of Police ASI and Photographer who were called to note the incident -Police ASI and Photographer not produced by M. C. D.- 637 petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relying upon a Full Bench decision of this Court dated 14th December, 1973 on reference made in Suit No. 64/69 in Re ; Tirlok Chand Jain and Ors. v. M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall and Anr, contends that the claim of privilege of the petitioner-commissioner of Income Tax pertaining to the years 1962-63 and 1963-64 was liable to be allowed by the learned trial Court. The Full Bench while considering as to the position of law prior to 1964 considered the question relating to the four situations incorporated in the decision and sustained the claim of privilege by the Income-Tax Department in each of the said situations. The Full Bench had also considered the position of law relating to privilege after the year 1964 and upheld the claim of privilege of the department in all the situations incorporated in the decision. The decision of the Full Bench was challenged by M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall before the Supreme Court only to the limited extent in relation to the position of law relating to privilege after 1964 where the documents, records, etc were filed by the assessee or the third party after April 1964 in respect of assessment years 1964-65 onwards. The decision of the Full Bench was challenged by M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall before the Supreme Court only to the limited extent in relation to the position of law relating to privilege after 1964 where the documents, records, etc were filed by the assessee or the third party after April 1964 in respect of assessment years 1964-65 onwards. M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall and Another were successful in that limited challenge and only to that extent the Full Bench decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in case M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall and Anr v. Tirlok Chand Jain and Ors. , reported in Judgment Today 1992 (1) S. C. 526. On the other questions decided by the Full Bench, the Supreme Court did not express any opinion and as such, the legal position as enunciated by the Full Bench, except to the limited extent reversed by the Supreme Court, remains the law applicable inrespect of claim of privilege Applying the principles of law laid down by the Full Bench the impugned order rejecting the claim of privilege pertaining to the production of record for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64 has to be set aside and claim of the petitioner-commissioner of Income Tax has to be sustained. For the reasons stated above, the petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The parties are left to bear their own costs.