Judgment :- The above writ petition has been filed for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records and quash the proceedings of the first respondent in K.Dis.No.1184 of 1989, dated 8. 1989 of the second respondent in Rc.No.4647/81/90, dated 3. 1990 and of the third respondent in G.O.(D) No.504, dated 5. 1991 and consequently direct the respondents to consider the renewal application filed by the petitioner on merits. 2. The petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition claims that he was the successful bidder and consequently he was granted a quarry lease for quarrying rough stones in Survey Nos.270/ 1, 391/1 and 1090/1A of Vikramasingapuram, Ambasamudram Taluk, Tirunelveli Kattabomman District for faslis 1396, 1397 and 1398, that the lease expired on 30.6.1989, that the terms and conditions of the lease are governed by the confirmation Order as well as the lease deed executed by the parties, that before the expiry of the lease, the petitioner made an application for its renewal on 14. 1989 agreeing to pay the enhanced rent of 10 per cent over the previous year’s rent as provided under Clause 10 of the Confirmation Order and that, while the said application for renewal was pending, the first respondent notified on 16. 1989 the auction of the quarry fixing the date of auction on 111. 1989. It is stated that the auction did not take place and got postponed. Aggrieved against the action of the District Collector in bringing the quarry to auction, the petitioner filed W.P.No.8561 of 1989 and by an order dated 17. 1989, this Court ordered the writ petition by issuing a direction to hold up the auction till the disposal of the application filed by the petitioner for renewal and till such disposal, the petitioner will not be disturbed from carrying on his quarrying operations It appears that the District Collector again notified the quarry for auction on 111. 1989 and that the petitioner raised objections to the said auctions and it was at that stage by a letter dated 21. 1990 claimed to have been served on the petitioner on 21. 1990 it was informed that by an order dated 8. 1989 the application for renewal was rejected on the ground of delay. The petitioner would claim that the order dated 8. 1990 claimed to have been served on the petitioner on 21. 1990 it was informed that by an order dated 8. 1989 the application for renewal was rejected on the ground of delay. The petitioner would claim that the order dated 8. 1989was never served on the petitioner, though it was claimed by the authorities to have been sent by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due. While claiming that the petitioner came to know of all these only on receipt of the letter dated 21. 1990. It is alleged that the order dated 8. 1989 should have been brought into existence after 111. 1989 when the petitioner is said to have objected to the proposed auction. 3. The petitioner further contends in the affidavit that the application was rejected solely on the ground that it was time barred, that originally the rules provided for the filing of the renewal application 60 days prior to the date of the expiry of the lease, that the said rule was so amended subsequently to stipulate that the renewal application shall be filed within three months from the date of expiry of the lease, that the petitioner was not aware of the said amendment, that the delay in filing the application was neither wilful nor wanton but due to the bona fide mistakes as stated above, and that as against the order dated 8. 1989 communicated to the petitioner on 21. 1990, the petitioner filed an appeal to the second respondent. It was again rejected on 3. 1990 on the ground that the time prescribed is not only mandatory but also a condition to obtain the renewal of the lease and consequently, the same cannot be condoned. The Appellate Authority seems to have referred to the decision made in W.A.No.575 of 1989 and thereupon the petitioner filed a further appeal to the third respondent on 4. 1990 which also came to be rejected on 5. 1991 on the ground that the application for renewal should have been made before 4. 1989 and that the order rejecting the renewal was in order. 4. On the above facts and circumstances, the petitioner contends that though Rule 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 had been amended on 18. 1988, the provision that existed on 21. 1989 and that the order rejecting the renewal was in order. 4. On the above facts and circumstances, the petitioner contends that though Rule 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 had been amended on 18. 1988, the provision that existed on 21. 1986 which is the date of the grant of the original lease in favour of the petitioner alone should apply and the application for renewal filed within two months from the date of the expiry of the lease should be treated as having been filed in time and the claim for renewal is to be decided on merits. It is also contended that the amendment to Rule 9(2) of the rule cannot be given retrospective effect so as to take away the existing accrued rights of a longer period of limitation and that the State Government which is the rule making authority under Sec.15 of the Act cannot make a retrospective amendment in the absence of such power specifically conferred under the Act itself. The respondents, according to the petitioner, committed an error in assuming that the period prescribed in Rule 9(2) of the rules is mandatory and the delay cannot be condoned, since according to the petitioner, Sec.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable and condonation of delay is possible, if sufficient cause is shown. It is also contended that the decision relied upon by the Appellate Authority does not apply to the facts of the case and, in any event, that decision requires reconsideration in the light of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, the applicability of which, it is claimed, has not been considered in that decision. 5.The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit in which the fact relating to the grant of mining lease is admitted, but it is stated in the counter affidavit that the writ petitioner in the appeal before the Government has stated that he was not doing quarrying operation after he took possession of the quarry though he will contend to the contrary in the affidavit filed in the writ petition. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the application dated 14. 1989 for renewal was received in the Office of the first respondent on 20.4.1989, that in the meantime, the petitioner moved this court in W.P.No.8561 of 1989, that thereafter, the first respondent rejected the renewal application on 8. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the application dated 14. 1989 for renewal was received in the Office of the first respondent on 20.4.1989, that in the meantime, the petitioner moved this court in W.P.No.8561 of 1989, that thereafter, the first respondent rejected the renewal application on 8. 1989 and the copy of the same was sent by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due on 8. 1989. It is also claimed that the said registered letter was returned to the first respondent’s Office with remarks by the Postal Authorities “left Madras without instructions on 18. 1989” and that the same indicated only a deliberate evasion to receive the copy and consequently, the allegations that the communication dated 8. 1989 should have been brought into existence after 111. 1989 has no basis and is untenable. It is also contended that in the face of an admission by the writ petitioner himself that the renewal application was not preferred in time, the plea that he was not aware of the amendment relating to renewal is untenable since ignorance of law is also ho excuse. The statutory requirement stipulated under Rule 9(2) of the rules as per the amendment applies to the case on hand and the plea to the contrary that the rights of parties are to be decided according to the laws which existed as on 210. 1986 when the lease was granted is not correct and that such a claim cannot be sustained. It is also claimed that the period prescribed in Rule 9(2) is mandatory and that the re is no provision for condonation and the plea based on the applicability of the Limitation Act is untenable. The first respondent also states that the petitioner is not continuing in possession and as a matter of fact for the illicit quarrying, a penalty of Rs.1225 was levied by the first respondent by his proceedings dated 4. 1991 and the writ petitioner remitted the penalty on 17. 1991. Consequently, it is contended that the writ petition has no merits and deserves to be dismissed. 6. The case law relied upon before me by the learned counsel appearing on either side in support of their submissions will be now taken up for consideration. 1991 and the writ petitioner remitted the penalty on 17. 1991. Consequently, it is contended that the writ petition has no merits and deserves to be dismissed. 6. The case law relied upon before me by the learned counsel appearing on either side in support of their submissions will be now taken up for consideration. The decision in State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 687: (1977)2 S.C.R. 149 : (1977)2 S.C.C. 77 , was one where the Supreme Court. On the terms and conditions of the lease of forest area for cutting of bamboo and salai wood from the leased forest area held that in truth and substance the transaction amounted to a sale. The observations made with reference to the amending bill fastening de novo liability made in the said case have no application to the case on hand. Similarly, the decision in Ramesh Chander v. Veena Kaushal, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1807: (1978)4 S.C.C. 70 : 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 508, also had no relevance whatsoever to the point for consideration in this case. The decision in Jamandass v. Gokuldass, A.I.R. 1984 Raj. 8, is one where a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has held that the provisions of Sec.6 as amended by the Amending Act 14 of 1976, being not retrospective in operation will not be applicable to suits or proceedings pending when Ordinance 26 of 1945 came into force. The observations in this case are also wholly irrelevant for the case on hand. The decision in Punjab University v. Subash Chander, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1415: (1984)3 S.C.C. 603 , is one wherein the apex Court while considering the case of a candidate who joined M.B.B.S., Course in 1965 but appeared for final examination only in 1974 and the claim of such candidate that the subsequent amendment in 1970 reducing the percentage of grade marks will not apply to him held as hereunder: “We do not agree with the learned Judges of the Full Bench of the High Court that there is any element of retrospectivity in the change brought, about by the addition of the exception to Rule 1.1 of the Calendar for the year 1970.” Retrospective “ according to the shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Third Edition, in relation to Statutes etc. means” Operative with regard to past time“. Third Edition, in relation to Statutes etc. means” Operative with regard to past time“. The change brought about by the addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 does not say that it shall be operative with effect from any earlier date. If is obviously prospective. It is not possible to hold that it is retrospective in operation merely because though introduced in 1970 it was applied to Subash Chander, respondent 1, who appeared for the final examination in 1974, after he had joined the course earlier in 1965. No promise was made out could be deemed to have been made to him at the time of his admission in 1965 that there will be no alteration of the rule or regulation in regard to the percentage of marks required for passing any examination or award relating thereto which were in force at the time of his admission would continue to be applied to him until he finished his whole course.” [Para. 11] Again in paragraph 12, it has been held by the learned Judges as follows: “Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that there is no question of the change in the rule made in the year 1970 having retrospective operation merely because it was applied in 1974 to Subash Chander who had joined the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when the rule regarding award of grace marks, was different. In these circumstances, we affirm the view of D.K.Mahajan and P.C.Jain, JJ. expressed in Sewa Ram v. Kurukshetra University, L.PA.No.97 of 1967, dt.17-7-1968 and disapprove the view taken by the learned Judges of the Full Bench in the decision under appeal in this case and hold that the University was right in holding that Subash Chander, respondent 1, was not entitled to 16 grace marks under the old rule but was entitled to only 4 grace marks under the new rule and had therefore not passed the examination in Midwifery.” 7. The first appellate authority itself has referred to the following two judgments of this Court in P.Manivannan v. The Commissioner and Secretary to Government Industries Department and another, W.A.No.575 of 1989 dated 17. 1989 and A.Easwaramoorthy and others v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others, W.P.Nos.8073 to 8077 of 1989 dated 110. 1989, in support of the stand taken for the respondents. 1989 and A.Easwaramoorthy and others v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others, W.P.Nos.8073 to 8077 of 1989 dated 110. 1989, in support of the stand taken for the respondents. The above two decisions of a Division Bench of this Court are not only directly on point but also are in respect of the very subject matter in issue and the applicability of the very amendment to Rule 9(2) of the Rules to an almost similar case. In the first of the judgments referred to above, it has been held that the prescription relating to the time within which the application for renewal has to be made is mandatory in nature and there is no question of condoning the delay. In the second of the judgments, the Division Bench of this Court held that the prescription of the time within which the application for renewal has to be made is not only mandatory but it is not a period of limitation but only a condition and as such there is no question of condonation from compliance with the condition stipulated. The plea based upon the applicability of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also been specifically considered and repelled by the learned Judges of the Division Bench. It has also been held that since the Collector before whom the application has to be filed is not “Court”, the question of invoking the provisions or applying the Limitation Act, 1963 does not arise at all. The decision of the Division Bench, in my view, completely answers the issues raised before me against the petitioner. Yet, there is an attempt for the petitioner, to relentlessly pursue by contending that the amendment issued in 1988 could not be applied retrospectively to the case of the petitioner and that it is only the rules as they stood on the date of the grant of the original lease in 1986 that should apply to consider the claim of the petitioner and that the application to the case on hand of the amended Rules takes away the rights of the petitioner for renewal. 8. The plea that the amendment introduced in G.O.Ms.No.764, Industries (K1) Department, dated 18. 1988 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 29. 1988 is sought to be given retrospective effect to deprive the petitioner of his vested right is wholly misconceived and does not merit acceptance. 8. The plea that the amendment introduced in G.O.Ms.No.764, Industries (K1) Department, dated 18. 1988 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 29. 1988 is sought to be given retrospective effect to deprive the petitioner of his vested right is wholly misconceived and does not merit acceptance. The amendment introduced to the rule in question is only prospective and it deals with the time within which an application for renewal of the lease has to be made. The application for renewal of a lease could arise only in respect of a period subsequent to the period for which the original lease has been granted. The lease expired only on 30.6.1989. As per the terms of the rule prior to its amendment the application could have been made on or before 5. 1989; but this rule was properly and validly amended as early as on 18. 1988 and published on 29. 1988 and inasmuch as the amended rule came into force long before the right to apply for renewal itself accrued to the petitioner, the new rule only shall govern the case on hand. Even assuming that as per the unamended rule the petitioner could have applied for renewal on 5. 1989, the amended law which has been brought into existence even long before this date could not be eschewed from consideration or ignored and the petitioner, if he wants to have the privilege of renewal must strictly comply with the conditions prescribed therefor. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1415, referred to supra squarely answers the claim of the petitioner, against him. 9. It is not the claim of the petitioner, nor it could be, that there was any promise or any such promise could be deemed to have been made at the time of the grant of the original lease, that there will be no alteration of the rules in any respect. The apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 711: (1981)2S.C.C. 306, while considering the effect and implication of an amendment issued in Rule 8-C of the Rules in respect of applications filed before and even pending on the date of the amendment held that no one has a vested right in matters of the kind and the application has to be considered in the light of the rules in force at the time of consideration. That apart, the apex court, has repeatedly held that when a rule or amendment is given effect only from the date when it was made or promulgated and not from an earlier date, merely because it may effect or govern existing cases or situations, it cannot be said to be on that account retrospective. The old rule 9(2) of the rules does not survive its amendment and on and from the date of its amendment it is only the new and amended rule that survived and could be said to be in force for prospective application in respect of all cases which come up for consideration thereafter, before the statutory authority designated for the purpose. Consequently, the plea based upon a grievance of retrospectivity and alleged deprivation of rights have no basis in law. 10.. For all the reasons stated above, in my view, the impugned orders do not suffer any patent error of law or perversity of approach and I see no justification to interfere with the impugned orders. The writ petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.