SURYA PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a criminal revision against the judgment- and order dated 26. 6. 199 1 passed by the learned City Magistrate, Agra in Criminal Case No. 13 of 1991 State v. Sardar Singh and another under section 145 Cr. P. C. suspending the proceedings and directing for continuing attachment of the shop of the revisionist. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case giving rise to this criminal revision briefly stated are that the revisionist Nihal Singh filed a civil suit being the civil suit No. 463 of 1990 Nihal Singh v. Sardar Singh on 9. 4. 1990 for a permanent injunction against the defendant from in terfering with his possession over the shop No. 9/3 situate in Bagh Muzaffar Khan, Agra. The plaintiff Nihal Singh moved an ad- interim injunction application simultaneously with the institution of the said suit. An ex parte ad- interim injunction was obtained by him on the basis of that application. The defendant Sardar Singh filed objection against the ad-interim injunction application. The ad-interim injunction application was ultimately rejected on 11. 5. 1990 while setting aside the injunction order passed thereon. Against the rejection order dated 11. 5. 1990 the plaintiff Nihal Singh preferred a Misc. appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 149 of 1990 Nihal Singh v. Sardar Singh. That appeal was allowed by the learned IX Additional District Judge, Agra vide his detailed judgment and order dated 25. 4. 1991 while allowing the ad-interim injunction application and setting aside the order dated 11. 5. 1990 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Agra rejecting the same. The learned IX Additional District Judge, Agra restrained the defendant Sardar Singh through his aforesaid judgment -and order from evicting Nihal Singh illegally from the shop in dispute during the pendency of the aforesaid suit. ( 3 ) IT is further alleged that Sardar Singh concealing all the facts regarding the pendency of the aforesaid civil suit between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter moved an application before the City Magistrate, Agra on 20. 4. 1990 for the initiation of the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. The learned City Magistrate called for a report from the police station Han Parwat vide his order dated 25. 4. 1990. The police submitted report on 27. 4. 1990 allegedly in collusion with the opposite party No. 2 Sardar Singh. 4. 1990 for the initiation of the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. The learned City Magistrate called for a report from the police station Han Parwat vide his order dated 25. 4. 1990. The police submitted report on 27. 4. 1990 allegedly in collusion with the opposite party No. 2 Sardar Singh. A telegram to that effect was sent to the District Magistrate, Superintendent of P0 lice Agra, City Magistrate and S. H. O. , P. S. Han Parwat each vide Annexure-1. The police also initiated proceedings under section, 107/116 Cr. P. C. which is still pending. ( 4 ) IT is further alleged that the City Magistrate re-acting on the basis of wrong information supplied by the police, passed a preliminary order under section 145 Cr. P. C. and also ex-parte stay order dated 28. 4. 1990 for attachment of the disputed shop. But that order was not implemented during the period 28. 4. 1990 to 10. 5. 1990. The shop in dispute was, however, attached by the police on 11. 5. 1990. ( 5 ) IT is further alleged that the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. were collusive and illegal. The opposite party No. 2 Sardar Singh also moved a review application before the learned IX Additional District Judge, Agra, which was also rejected. The learned City Magistrate was under the influence of Sardar Singh. The appellant Nihal Singh moved a transfer application supported with an-affidavit vide Annexure-4 against the learned City Magistrate for transfer of the case from his court to some other competent court. It is further alleged that the transfer application was pending and a copy of the judgment and order passed by the learned IX Additional District judge, Agra was available and yet the learned City Magistrate passed the impugned order dated 26. 6. 1991, which is illegal and against the law and facts. This criminal revision has been preferred against the said order as mentioned earlier. ( 6 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. ( 7 ) THE civil suit No. 463 of 1990 was instituted by Nihal Singh against Sardar Singh in respect of the shop in dispute. That suit is still pending. The above ex parte ad-interim injunction order was obtained by the plaintiff. That was ultimately set aside. The above mentioned Misc. ( 7 ) THE civil suit No. 463 of 1990 was instituted by Nihal Singh against Sardar Singh in respect of the shop in dispute. That suit is still pending. The above ex parte ad-interim injunction order was obtained by the plaintiff. That was ultimately set aside. The above mentioned Misc. appeal was filed-against the order rejecting the ad interim injunction application and setting aside the order passed thereon. During the pendency of the aforesaid Misc. civil appeal, proceedings under section 145cr. P. C. were initiated by Sardar Singh in respect of the same subject matter. The judgment and order of the learned IX Additional District Judge, Agra has become final between the parties in respect of the subject matter in dispute so far. All the above facts do not stand disputed between the parties. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the revisionist has vehemently argued that the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. could not have been initiated during the pendency of the civil suit. In Ram Sumer Pun Mahant v. State of UP. and others, the Hon ble Supreme Court has observed as under: When a civil litigation is pending for property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated. We See hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondent 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the preposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction. Particularly when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of the receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed.- In Padam Ravinder Jeet Singh v. Jagat Singh and others. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed.- In Padam Ravinder Jeet Singh v. Jagat Singh and others. the Hon ble Supreme Court has observed as under: It is well established in law that criminal courts have to honour decision rendered by civil courts and on that principle, in view of the two decisions of the civil courts, possession of the property on the basis of title and dismissal of their claim of restoration of possession should have been upheld. T In Jeet Narain v. Naresh and others it has been inter-alia observed as under: It is the duty of the police officer to report about apprehension of breach of peace. If he proceeds further and gives any report regarding possession he exceeds his jurisdiction and unless he comes in the witness-box for giving evidence of possession, his report about possession cannot be perused. In Ranjeet Singh and others v. Moti Lal Katiyar and others where in the following observations have been made: I have already held that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. initiated in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bilhaur, Kanpur Dehat, by the opposite parties, is mala fide, vaxatious and with out jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil suit where the question of possession was involved was pending in the civil court on the date when the order under sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. were passed in the aforesaid proceedings and an injunction order was very much in operation. Therefore, the aforesaid proceedings cannot be allowed to continue as it would be nothing but abuse of the process of the Court. In Mahendra Prasad Singh and another v. Drig Pal Singh alias Babban Singh and others. the following observations have been made: Magistrate after having dropped the proceedings under section 145 has jurisdiction, to pass incidental or ancillary orders after withdrawing the attachment to direct, if there is sufficient material before him showing that the property was attached from the possession of one party, that the property should be delivered to him. the following observations have been made: Magistrate after having dropped the proceedings under section 145 has jurisdiction, to pass incidental or ancillary orders after withdrawing the attachment to direct, if there is sufficient material before him showing that the property was attached from the possession of one party, that the property should be delivered to him. If however after the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been dropped sufficient material does not exist on the record to enable the Magistrate to conclude from whose possession the property was attached without receiving additional evidence then the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to enter into such an enquiry. ( 9 ) HAVING considered all the facts and circumstances of the case and having perused the cases referred to above, I am of the opinion that the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. in case N8. 13 of 1991 to which this revision relates, should be quashed. The same are accordingly quashed. Consequently the orders dated 26. 6. 1991 and 28. 4. 1990 stand vacated. It is however, open to either party to move the civil court in the aforesaid civil suit No. 463 of 1990 for appropriate interim order, if so advised in the event of the dispute relating to possession. Petition allowed. .