JUDGMENT R.R.K. Trivedi 1. In this petition counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and learned counsel for parties have agreed that the petition may be disposed of finally at the stage. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that respondent no. 2 filed an application on 2-1-1990 before the Prescribed Authority under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of the petitioner from the accommodation in dispute which consists of two rooms of House No. 285 Bada Kajipada, Sadar Bazar, district Mathuna. A copy of the application has been filed as Annexure I to the writ petition. A perusal of the application will show that it was filed under section 2-A (5) read with section 21 (I) (a) of the Act. Respondent no. 2 stated that petitioner was allowed to occupy the two rooms in the ground floor for a short term of three months for purely residential purpose in the year 1980 by the father of Mahabir Prasad who expired on 18-4-1981 and after father's death he became the Karta of the joint Hindu family being the only son and thus became landlord and owner of the property. Petitioner was requested to vacate the premises several times but he refused on one ground or other. He is occupying the building illegally without any right. It was stated specifically that no rent was accepted at any point of time. It was further stated that his family consists of 12 members and there is acute paucity of accommodation and the need of the landlord for the additional accommodation is genuine and bona fide and in case the petitioner is not found to be a licensee and cannot be evicted under section 2-A (5) of the Act, the application may be allowed in the alternative under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. A notice was given on 29-1-1987 to vacate the accommodation in dispute. After receiving the notice petitioner started asserting himself to be tenant of the disputed premises although there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. The aforesaid application was resisted by petitioner on number of grounds by filing an objection. A copy of the affidavit of petitioner has been filed as Annexure II to the writ petition. After receiving the notice petitioner started asserting himself to be tenant of the disputed premises although there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. The aforesaid application was resisted by petitioner on number of grounds by filing an objection. A copy of the affidavit of petitioner has been filed as Annexure II to the writ petition. Petitioner asserted that it is not correct to say that he was admitted as licensee for a period of three months only. He claimed himself to be tenant occupying the accommodation in dispute since 1978. It was also contended that he cannot be evicted under provisions of section 2-A (5) of the Art. Bona fide need set up by respondent no. 2 was also denied. 3. Prescribed authority after giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence and after hearing them, by order dated 11-1-1991 allowed the application under section 2-A (5). It recorded a finding that petitioner's occupation is as licensee and he he is liable to be evicted under section 2-A (5). Finding has also been recorded that petitioner is not tenant. It is this order which has been questioned in the present proceedings. 4. I have heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondent and I have also perused the order and other materials on record. Learned counsel for petitioner pressed the petition only on a legal ground that the petition filed by respondent no. 2 landlord for eviction of petitioner was not legally maintainable as section 2-A (5) of the Act was not applicable. The contention is that on the facts alleged in the application it is clear that the licence was not created under the provisions of section 2-A of the Act, hence order of eviction could not be passed under section 2-A (5) of the Act. Learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that as possession of petitioner is illegal and without authority of law. he is not entitled for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel has placed reliance in case; Smt. Bharat Devi Gupta v. Prescribed Authority, Allahabad, 1984 (2) ARC 258. 5. Learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that as possession of petitioner is illegal and without authority of law. he is not entitled for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel has placed reliance in case; Smt. Bharat Devi Gupta v. Prescribed Authority, Allahabad, 1984 (2) ARC 258. 5. I have thoroughly considered the submissions made by learned counsel for parties and, in my opinion, the serious question involved in this petition is as to whether a person occupying the building as licensee, to which the provisions of the Act are applicable, can be evicted under section 2-A (5). In my opinion, there is nothing in the provisions contained under section 2-A (5) to restrict the provision in cases of licenses granted under section 2-A alone. For applying sub-section (5) conditions necessary appear to be that admission in building should be on basis of a licence and the period of licence should have been expired. Then the licensor may make an application to the prescribed authority for eviction of the licensee and if the conditions mentioned in sub-section (5) are satisfied, the order of eviction could be passed after hearing the parties. It is true that sub-section (5) falls under section 2-A which contains a special provision for short term licences but it is well known that the heading alone of a section is not final to determine legislative intention behind enacting of provision. Section 2-A was introduced by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 with effect from 5-7- 1976. Prior to making section 2-A a part of the Act, there was no provision dealing with licences. Section 2-A for the first time recognised the right of landlord or tenant to create a purely temporary licence for residential accommodations It also restricts the period of licence and it could exceed the period of three months, however, with the order of the Collector the period of licence can be extended upto six months in aggregate. It contains a prohibition also that a building once given on licence could not be given on licence again within a period of one year. Thus section 2-A regulated the granting of licenses. It contains a prohibition also that a building once given on licence could not be given on licence again within a period of one year. Thus section 2-A regulated the granting of licenses. Section 14 of the Act recognised even those licences which were continuing from before to be legal and valid subject to condition that no suit or proceeding was pending before any court or authority on the date of such commencement. Language of section 14 clearly provides that the person concerned shall be deemed to be authorised licensee of the building, A perusal of section 14 clearly shows that irrespective of the time of granting licence the person in occupation shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee and such an authorised licensee could be legally evicted under sub-section (5) of section 2-A of the Act. 6. Now, the question for consideration is whether the licensee who is not occupying the building under a licence created under section 2-A of the Act or cannot be deemed to be an authorised licensee under section 14 of Act, can also be evicted under sub-section (5) of section 2-A of the Act. In my opinion, it will not be proper to destrict the operation of sub-section (5) of section 2-A of the Act to the licences of the category detailed above. If the prescribed authority after considering the material on record comes to the conclusion that in a building which is covered under the provisions of the Act, any body occupied the building or any part of it as licensee and the period of licence has expired it could pass an order of eviction. There is nothing in the language of sub-section (5) which may be said to be against the view that even the licensee; to which section 2-A and section 14 are not applicable can be evicted under sub-section (5). The legislative intent is more clearly manifested from other provisions of the Act. Under section 16 (4) of the Act and section 18 (3) of the Act, District Magistrate has been authorised to put back the landlord or the allottee in possession in case they could not be able to obtain possession of the building and for this purpose it could use such force as may be necessary. Under section 16 (4) of the Act and section 18 (3) of the Act, District Magistrate has been authorised to put back the landlord or the allottee in possession in case they could not be able to obtain possession of the building and for this purpose it could use such force as may be necessary. Similarly, under section 18 (3) in case the order under section 16 or section 19 is rescinded, the District Magistrate could on an application being made to him place the parties back in possession which they would have occupied but for such order But under section 2-A (5) the legislature has not entrusted the authority, of eviction of the licensees after expiry of licences, to the District Magistrate The application has to be filed by the licensor before the prescribed authority. Thereafter the proviso to sub-section (5) provides that order shall not be made except after giving to the parties concerned reasonable opportunity of hearing. Sub-section (6) provides for the execution of the order under section 23. The legislature thus was fully conscious about the gravity and importance of the rights of licensees. Though sub-section (5) of section 2-A of the Act deals with special provisions for short term licensees, but for eviction a full fledged enquiry has been contemplated. The other reason for taking the aforesaid view is that provisions of sub-section (5) are independent and are not controlled by any other provision contained in section 2-A of the Act. For applying sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) it is not necessary to refer to any other provision and in my opinion it has an independent place though within section 2-A of the Act. The scheme and object of the Act also appeared to be that the buildings which are covered by the provisions of the Act should be made available to the Rent Control authorities quickly and swiftly to cater to the need of the public. In my opinion, the view expressed above is more nearer to the scheme and object of the Act. If a person continuing under licence from before 5-7-1976 can be evicted under sub-section (5), I do not find any reason why a person who is admitted as licensee subsequent to that can also not be evicted under sub-section (5). In my opinion, the view expressed above is more nearer to the scheme and object of the Act. If a person continuing under licence from before 5-7-1976 can be evicted under sub-section (5), I do not find any reason why a person who is admitted as licensee subsequent to that can also not be evicted under sub-section (5). It is note-worthy that section 2-A though regulates the grant of short term licences but at the same time it does not contain any prohibition like sections 11 and 13 which may render the licence granted by the landlord illegal or unauthorised. Though the licence of the petitioner was created in 1980, it cannot be said that it was unauthorised. In my opinion, the prescribed authority was fully competent to pass an order under sub-section (5) of section 2-A in favour of the licensor as the conditions stood satisfied. From the findings recorded, it is clear that the petitioner has never paid any rent. He is occupying the building as licensee and by notice dated 28-1-1987 his licence was revoked and thus he was not legally entitled to continue in possession. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner cited before me a Division Bench case, Miss Asha Lata E. Robin v. Radha Swami Satsangi Sabha, Dayalbagh, Agra, 1982 (2) ARC 528, in support of his contention that the ejectment of the petitioner is illegal. I have considered the case relied on by the learned counsel. The facts of the case before the Division Bench were that a suit was decreed for ejectment of the licensee and the Division Bench was hearing the First Appeal from that decree. In First Appeal it was contended that as a licence could be ejected under section 2 (A) (5) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, the suit is barred. The Division Bench considered this legal plea and held that suit is not barred. The argument before the Division Bench was that since special Act provides remedy for eviction of licensee, the general remedy by way of suit in the Civil Court will be without jurisdiction. The Division Bench in para 24 held; as under ; "We are unable to agree with the same. The Act does not prohibit filing of the suit against the licensees as it does in case of tenants by section 20. The Division Bench in para 24 held; as under ; "We are unable to agree with the same. The Act does not prohibit filing of the suit against the licensees as it does in case of tenants by section 20. Thus, even, if sub-section (5) of section 2-A was applicable, the suit could not be barred." Thus the question in the present writ petition was not directly involved before the aforesaid Division Bench. The submission made by the learned counsel is thus not acceptable. 8. There is yet another reason for which the petitioner is not entitled for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Admittedly, there is no order of allotment in favour of the petitioner and in case his contention that he was admitted as tenant in 1978 is accepted, the creation of tenancy on his own showing was wholly illegal and void in view of the prohibition contained in section 11 and 13 of the Act. His possession so far as the authorities under the Act are concerned is wholly illegal. In such a situation, the extra ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be extended to help a person occupying the building illegally. The interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitutions will not be equitable. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by this Court in the case of Smt. Bharti Devi Gupta v. Prescribed Authority, Allahabad, 1984 (2) ARC 258. For the reasons recorded above, this petition has no merits and is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is allowed three months' time to vacate the accommodation in dispute. In case he fails to hand over peaceful possession to respondent no. 2 on or before 31-8-1992, it shall be open to respondent no. 2 to proceed with the execution of the order dated 11-1-1991. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.