JUDGMENT : M.K. Mukherjee, CJ. All the ten Petitioners herein operate public service vehicles on the route Gorakhpur-Kaptanganj via Pipraich (hereinafter referred to as the 'route') According to them, the Regional Transport Authority, Gorakhpur, while granting permits for such operation had fixed an area near Gorakhpur Railway Station where from their vehicles were to start and terminate their journey. Their common grievance in this writ petition is that the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, in purported exercise of his powers conferred by Section 117 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short), read with Rule 93 of the U.P Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950, has issued an illegal and unjust order on 23-1-1992, whereby he has specified their bus stand at a place known as Asuran Chowk, which is four kilometres away from their original bus stand near the Gorakhpur Railway Station The contend that, even though the District Magistrate has indicated in that order that their 'halting siation' was being specified, for all intents and purposes he has specified there 'bus stand' as by the impugned order they have also been injuncted from plying their vehicle beyond the halting station of Asuran Chowk, While admitting that the District Magistrate has power u/s 117 of the Act to fix or shift a 'halting station' they assert that he has no power to fix or shift a 'bus stand'. 2. In assailing the above contention of the Petitioner, the Respondents, including the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, at whose instance and for whose benefit, according to the Petitioners. the impugned order has been passed, have contended that the impugned order relates to a 'halting station' and not a 'bus stand' and therefore the District Magistrate was competent to pass the impugned order. 3. After we had heard the matter and reserved our judgment, a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the Petitioners bringing to our notice that the impugned order dated 23-1-1992 was modified by a subsequent order dated 15-5-1992 wherein the 'halting station' of 'he Petitioners' buses has been shown at serial No. 10 instead of serial No. 7 as in the earlier order, without however in any way modifying the contents thereof and making a further prayer to quash this notification dated 15-5-1992 also. 4. 4. In the context of the respective contentions of the parties, the only question, which falls for determination in this writ petition, is whether by the impugned orders dated 23-1-1992 and 15-5-1992 the District Magistrate has declared a 'bus stand' or a halting station' and to answer this question it will be necessary for us to ascertain the distinction between the two. 5. In the case of Municipal Board, Pushkar Vs. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1965 SC 458 , the Supreme Court considered this question in the context of identical provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('1939 Act' for short), since repealed and replaced by the Act and in answering the question the Supreme Court observed that a 'bus stand' meant a place where bus services commence or terminate. According to the Supreme Court, the place where the buses stand for commencing their transport service or where they stand after terminating their service is popularly known as the bus stand. While interpreting Section 76 of the 1939 Act, which corresponds to Section 117 of the Act, the Supreme Court observed as under: When it is remembered that Chapter VI in which Section 76 occurs, is intended to deal with the control of traffic it becomes clear that the determination of places at which the motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time means the 'determination of parking places' while the determination of places at which public vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers means 'halting station for public service vehicles'. It is well worth noticing that while the determination of such places for stoppage in the latter portion of the section can be in respect of public service vehicles only the determination of places of standing in the first part of the section is in respect of motor vehicles in general. 6. From the above observations made by the Supreme Court it is evidently clear that while the 'bus stand' means a place where bus service commence or terminate, 'halting station' means, so far as public vehicles are concerned, a place where they stop for a longer time than is necessary for taking up and setting down passengers. 7. 6. From the above observations made by the Supreme Court it is evidently clear that while the 'bus stand' means a place where bus service commence or terminate, 'halting station' means, so far as public vehicles are concerned, a place where they stop for a longer time than is necessary for taking up and setting down passengers. 7. Coming now to the impugned orders, we find that the District Magistrate has first stated therein that he was fixing the halting station at Asuran Chowk in exercise of his powers u/s 117 of the Act; and, as such fixing of a halting station is within his powers, no exception can be taken to the same However, he has further indicated in the orders that the transport vehicles should not be allowed to go beyond that halting station. Implementation of this part of the impugned orders would mean that the vehicles have to terminate or commence their journey from that point and it would then be a bus stand. As the District Magistrate has no power to declare a bus stand, this part of the Impugned orders must be held to be patently bad. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Om Gautam Vs. District Magistrate, Mathura and Another, (1987) 2 SCC 397 , wherein it has been expressly held by the Supreme Court that a bus stand can only be notified by the Regional Transport Authority having jurisdiction over the area and the District Magistrate has no power to declare certain area as a bus stand 8. For the foregoing discussion, we hold that the impugned orders of the District Magistrate, so far as they relate to declaration of the halting station in respect of the vehicles of the Petitioners, are valid, but the other part of the orders, which directs the Petitioners not to ply their vehicles beyond the said halting station, is bad in law and we quash the same. The writ petition is accordingly allowed in part.