JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 24.10.89, issued by the Assistant Engineer (0 and M), R.S.E.B., Tonk and communication dated, 26.10.90 of the Executive Engineer, R.S.E.B., Tonk. By the order dated 24.10.89 a penalty of stoppage of four grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed on the petitioner and recovery of a sum of Rs. 3288/- has been ordered from his salary. By the communication dated 26.10.90 the petitioner has been informed that his appeal against the order of punishment has been rejected. 2. The petitioner was prosecuted for an offence under Section 379 I.P.C. in the court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Tonk. The charge levelled against the petitioner was that he had committed a theft of 800 meters wire, Pin-Insulator and Shakle-Insulator in Tonk on 22.5.84. The learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner for the offence alleged against him. He therefore, acquitted the petitioner. He further directed that the seized wire be returned to the Executive Engineer, R.S.E.B., Tonk. The Judgment dated 21.12.88 of the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Tonk, has become final, because, no appeal has been filed against the said judgment. 3. A charge-sheet dated 7.2.89 was, therefore, issued to the petitioner by the Assistant Engineer, R.S.E.B., Tonk. In this charge-sheet, the allegation levelled against the petitioner was that he had taken away 800 meters of copper wire which was given to him by one Abid, Helper, for depositing the same in the office and thus he has committed misappropriation of the wire. 4. The petitioner submitted a reply and denied the charges. He was then placed under suspension by an order dated 5.6.89. By an order dated 24.10.89 issued by the respondent No. 2, two penalties, of which reference has been made herein above,`have been imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner submitted an appeal against the order of punishment. The same.has, however, been rejected as time barred and the rejection has been communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 26.10.89 of the Executive Engineer. 5. The petitioner submitted an appeal against the order of punishment. The same.has, however, been rejected as time barred and the rejection has been communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 26.10.89 of the Executive Engineer. 5. The order of punishment has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that once a Court of competent jurisdiction has acquitted him in the criminal case involving charge of theft of wire measuring 800 meters, it was not open to the Disciplinary Authority to have initiated disciplinary proceedings and to have punished the petitioner for the same charges. The further case of the petitioner is that once a Court has given finding to the effect that the petitioner is not guilty, it was not open to the Disciplinary Authority to record a different conclusion. It is also the case of the petitioner that the wire seized by the Police had been returned to the Executive Engineer under the orders of the Court and, therefore, there could be no justification for making any recovery from the pay of the petitioner towards the costs of the wire allegedly stolen by the petitioner. The dismissal of the appeal has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the Executive Engineer has acted arbitrarily in refusing to entertain the appeal filed by the petitioner. 6. The respondents have not filed any reply to the writ petition. Therefore, the facts stated in the writ petition have remained uncontroverted. 7. Two fold contentions have been advanced by Shri S.S. Hasan, learned counsel for the petitioner. The first contention is that the charge levelled against the petitioner in the criminal case was that he had committed theft of 800 meters of copper wire by removing the same from 17 poles beyond the Tonk Jail. He argued that exactly on the same charge the departmental proceedings were held. Once the petitioner had been acquitted by the Court of competent jurisdiction, it was not open to the Disciplinary Authority to impose any punishment on the petitioner. The second submission of Shri Hasan is that the order of punishment has not been passed in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Technical Employees Service Rules, 1975 and the principles of Natural Justice in as much as the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing and that the respondent No. 2 had acted with bias. 8. 8. A perusal of the judgment dated 21.12.88 of the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Tonk in Criminal Case No. 38/84 shows that according to the prosecution case, a first information report had been lodged by Shri Suresh Chand, the Assistant Engineer, R.S.E.B., Tonk on 22.5.84 to the effect that a telephonic call was received at about 3 P.M. from the Jail that electricity is not available in the Jail. Then Mohmmod Hayat and Mohmmod Aslam were sent for starting the line. At the gate of the Jail it was found that 800 meters, of copper wire of 17 poles 8, 2, Pin-insulators and three shakle-insulators with hardware goods had been stolen. It was reported that between 9.45 to 11.45 A.M. three persons had taken away the wire. When the Jail Warden Kishore Singh asked the three persons as to why they were doing so, these persons told the Warden that the wire had been damaged and therefore, they were removing the same. These persons gas z out that they were employees of the Power House. They had brought a wooden stair-case on two cycles. On the basis of the first information report, a case under Section 379 I.P.C. was registered by the Police Station, Kotwali, Tonk. Challan was filed against the petitioner. Prosecution examined S/Shri Suresh Chand, P.W. 1, Maya Charan P.W. 2, Refiulla P.W. 3, Shyam Mathur P.W. 4, Suresh Chand Sharma P.W. 5, Leeladhar P.W. 6, Kishore Singh P.W. 7, Durga Lal P.W. 8, Goverdhan Singh P.W. 8A, Bhairu Singh P.W. 9 and Laxmi Narain Meena P.W. 10. In his cross-examination P.W. 1, Suresh Chand, who was posted as Foreman at the Power House, has stated that he does not consider the petitioner to be a thief and he had himself not seen the petitioner committing theft. R.2, Maya Charan, who was posted as U.D.C. in District Jail Tonk, also expressed his ignorance about the involvement of the petitioner in the theft. P.W. 5, Suresh Chand Sharma who was holding the post of Assistant Engineer, has also not implicated the petitioner. P.W. 7, Kishore Singh stated that the petitioner was not amongst the three persons who had cut the wire. P.W. 5, Suresh Chand Sharma who was holding the post of Assistant Engineer, has also not implicated the petitioner. P.W. 7, Kishore Singh stated that the petitioner was not amongst the three persons who had cut the wire. On the basis of the evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution, the learned Munsiff recorded a finding that none of the witnesses of the prosecution had made-any statement to the effect that they had seen the petitioner cutting wire or taking it away. The alleged recovery made from the house of the petitioner has also been discarded by the learned Munsiff. On the basis of his analysis the learned Munsiff held that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond doubt that the petitioner was guilty of committing any offence under Section 379 IPC. He therefore acquitted the petitioner. The seized wire was ordered to be returned to the Executive Engineer, R.S.E.B. 9. After the judgment of the learned Munsif, the respondent No. 2 issued charge-sheet to the petitioner for holding a departmental inquiry. Before the issue of charge-sheet some preliminary inquiry was held, wherein a finding was recorded that the petitioner was responsible for misappropriation of 800 meters of wire. On receipt of charge-sheet the petitioner filed a reply and denied the allegation levelled against him. Thereafter the respondent No. 2 declared that the petitioner was guilty of committing theft of 800 meters of copper wire. The respondent No. 2 concluded that the petitioner had committed offence of cheating and theft. He also held that the petitioner had violated criminal law as well. On that basis of respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order of punishment. Thus it is clear that whereas the court of competent jurisdiction has recorded a specific fording that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence of theft,-the respondent no. 2 has recorded a contrary conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner. 10. A trial for criminal offence and a departmental/domesgic inquiry do not stand on the same footing. The degree of proof required in the departmental proceedings is not the same as it is in a criminal case. In a criminal case the prosecution is required to prove beyond doubt the guilt of a person charged with an offence, unless by some special provision of law the. burden of proving innocence is placed on the person accused of an offence. In a criminal case the prosecution is required to prove beyond doubt the guilt of a person charged with an offence, unless by some special provision of law the. burden of proving innocence is placed on the person accused of an offence. But in a departmental inquiry the charge can be established on the basis of some legally admissible evidence which may in all case be not sufficient for bringing home the charge of a criminal offence. However, in departmental inquiries also the primary burden lies on the charging authority to lead sufficient evidence to prove the allegation. Mere suspicion can not be made basis for punishing a person in a departmental inquiry. 11. It is one of the well recognised principle of law that the employee may hold a departmental inquiry in respect of some act of delinquency which can also give rise to prosecution in a court of law. However, if the disciplinary proceeding is based on the same set of facts on which a criminal action has already been initiated, it is always proper for the employer to await the result of the prosecution before a competent court. If the employer proceeds simultaneously with the departmental action during pendency of criminal prosecution, the court may on petition of the employee stay the prosecution once it is satisfied that the two actions are based on the same facts and the same cause. These are the general principles. However the question which requires an examination in the present writ petition is as to whether after acquittal by a competent court a person can be proceeded against by way of disciplinary action and is it permissible for the disciplinary authority to record a finding which is contrary to the finding arrived at by the court. 12. Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India contains the requirement of seasonable opportunity of being heard to the holder of a civil post before an order of punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank can be passed by a competent authority. Second proviso to Article 311(2) specifies three contingencies in which the requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard is not applicable. Second proviso to Article 311(2) specifies three contingencies in which the requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard is not applicable. In term., of clause (a) of this proviso it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to a member of civil service where the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is based on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Regulation 21 of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Technical Workman Service Regulation, 1975 specified the acts and omissions of the workmen which may constitute mis-conduct. Regulation 22 lays down the detailed procedure which is required to be followed for taking disciplinary action against the workmen for his alleged act of misconduct. Regulation 22(3) lays down that reasonable opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the workmen against whom action is taken for an allegation of misconduct. Regulation 23 which is couched in the same language as has been used in second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, provides that it shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in Regulation 22(3) in three contingencies including the one where a workman is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of his conduct which has led to his conviction on criminal charge. The language employed in second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, Regulation 23 of 1975 Regulations' and similar provisions contained in other service rules gives a clear indication of the intention of the legislature, namely, that the finding of guilt recorded by a court against an employee on a criminal charge should be treated as final. Once the court gives a verdict of conviction by holding an employee guilty of an offence, the employer has an absolute right to pass an order of punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. The evidence recorded by the court and appreciation of the same made by the court for recording a finding of guilt against the employee is treated as conclusive. The employer is not required to hold any departmetal enquiry in respect of the allegations which constituted the basis of criminal charge. The employer is not required to record evidence afresh for holding the employee guilty of such charge. The employer is not required to hold any departmetal enquiry in respect of the allegations which constituted the basis of criminal charge. The employer is not required to record evidence afresh for holding the employee guilty of such charge. The only thing which is required to be done by the employer is to look into the conduct of the employee which led to his conviction on a criminal charge. This is required to be done only for the purpose of determining the quantum of punishment, which the employer may impose on the employee. The employee does not have a right of hearing by the employer before an order of punishment is passed by the employer on the ground of the conduct of the employee which led to his conviction. At one time their Lordships of the Supreme Court had in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellapan, AIR 1975 S.C. 2216 , took the view that even after conviction of an employee by a court for an action which amounts to criminal offence it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to give a notice to the employee concerned about the proposed punishment and, give him an opportunity to make representation against the proposed punishment. Subsequently that decision has been overruled by a majority of 4:1 in a Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Tuisiram Patel AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 . The. same principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Trikharam v. V.K.Seth, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 285 . In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench and the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to give a notice to the employee even on the question of quantum of punishment which it decides to impose on the basis of the conviction of the employee by a competent court. This decision clearly brings out the intendment of the law making authority in respect of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and similar other provisions. 13. When the legislature has thought it proper to confer finality to the decision of the court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the conviction of an employee on a criminal offence, the court must give full effect to this intention of the legislature while interpreting the relevant provisions of the rules. 13. When the legislature has thought it proper to confer finality to the decision of the court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the conviction of an employee on a criminal offence, the court must give full effect to this intention of the legislature while interpreting the relevant provisions of the rules. If the employer can act on the basis of finding of guilt recorded by a court for punishing an employee, converse of it must also be treated as correct. It is therefore logical to bold that the employer cannot ignore the finding of not guilty recorded by a court and proceed with the disciplinary action on the basis of same allegation which constituted the part of the criminal charge. The finality which is attached to the conclusion arrived at by a court of law cannot be discarded in the case of a finding of not guilty. When the disciplinary authority can act on the basis of the conviction of an employee recorded by a competent court, for the purpose of imposing punishment, it is not open to the employer to ignore the acquittal of the employee by such court and record a conclusion which is contrary to the finding of the court and then punish the employee for an act of alleged delinquency which constituted a part of the charge in the criminal case, in which the employee has been acquitted. I am clearly of the opinion that once a competent court records a finding of not guilty against an employee in respect of an act involving criminal offence, it is not open to the disciplinary authority to proceed against the employee departmentally on the same facts and pass an order of punishment by holding the employee guilty. This principle will of course be not applicable where the employer proceeds against an employee on some different charge after a finding of not guilty has been recorded by the competent court or where the acquittal is based on technical grounds like lack of jurisdiction, want of sanction or bar of limitation etc. 14. There is yet another reason why the finding recorded by a court should be treated as final. It is one of the basic principles of jurisprudence that administrative authorities cannot sit in judgments over the verdict of court of competent jurisdiction. The executive authorities cannot act as appellate authorities over the findings recorded by the court. 14. There is yet another reason why the finding recorded by a court should be treated as final. It is one of the basic principles of jurisprudence that administrative authorities cannot sit in judgments over the verdict of court of competent jurisdiction. The executive authorities cannot act as appellate authorities over the findings recorded by the court. Any such attempt will be total. subversion of the system of administration justice. Therefore, here an employee has been acquitted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction after a regular trial and such acquittal is on merits, whether by giving benefit of doubt or otherwise, it is not permissible for the disciplinary authority to record a fording of guilt and punish the employee on the basis of the criminal charge. In some of the decided cases distinction has been sought to be made between the cases where the acquittal is honourable and cases where the benefit of doubt has been given to the accused. The distinction though appears to be attractive in the first blush, is in reality wholly fallicious. The distinction is not based on any rationale. It is a settled principle of law that even in departmental enquiries a finding of guilt can be recorded only on the basis of some legally admissible evidence. An employee cannot be punished merely on the basis of some suspicion. There has to be some legal basis for recording of finding of guilt against the employee. In Union of India v. H.C. Goyal, AIR 1964 S.C. 364 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that suspicion cannot form a valid foundation for punishing an employee. That being the position it must be held that once an employee is found not guilty by a court of law, the employer cannot subsequently say that though the evidence' has been found to be insufficient by the court for recording a fording of guilt, yet he is guilty of an allegation of misconduct in the departmental enquiry. It will be extremely anomalous if in respect of an act of an employee which constitute a criminal offence, the departmental authorities do not take sufficient care to assist the prosecution agency to bring home the guilt of the employee but at the same time seek to rely on the same set of evidence for recording a finding of guilt against the employee in the disciplinary proceedings. It is not possible to accept a situation that an employee is proceeded against a criminal offence by the court of competent jurisdiction and is acquitted by the court on the premise that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge by leading cogent evidence still the departmental authorities can punish him on the same set of evidence. 15. In the present case it is apparent from perusal of Annexure 1 and 2 that whereas the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate recorded a categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of theft against the petitioner, non-petitioner No. 2 has recorded a finding that the petitioner, has committed mis-appropriation of 800 meters of wire; that he has committed theft and has also committed breach of criminal law. This is clearly impermissible. The non-petitioner No. 2 could not have ignored the fording of acquittal recorded by the competent court. Thus order of punishment passed by non-petitioner is not sustainable in the eye of law. 16. Apart from the above conclusion, I am of the opinion that the order of punishment passed against the petitioner is otherwise also legally unsustainable. Regulation-22(3) of 1975 Regulations, provides for the procedure which is required to be followed. This Regulation reads as under: "22(3) Any workman found guilty of any misconduct enumerated above in Regulation-21 is liable to be dismissed without notice or compensation in lieu thereof or discharged from service or reduced to a lower cadre or post or his increment or promotion may be with-held, provided that no such order shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the misconduct alleged against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges of misconduct against him and where it is proposed after enquiry to dismiss him or reduce to a lower cadre or post untill he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry." 17. A perusal of the above Regulation shows that before an order of with-holding of increments is passed, the workman is required to be informed in writing of the mis-conduct alleged against him and he is required to be given reasonable opportunity of hearing in respect of the charges. A perusal of the above Regulation shows that before an order of with-holding of increments is passed, the workman is required to be informed in writing of the mis-conduct alleged against him and he is required to be given reasonable opportunity of hearing in respect of the charges. Sub-Regulation 5 of Regulation-22 further provides that, in awarding punishment under the Regulations, the Competent Authority is required to take into account the gravity of the mis-conduct, the previous record if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. The phrase `reasonable opportunity of hearing' has not been defined in the scheme of the Regulations of 1975, but, it has received judicial interpretation in several cases decided by the Appex Court. In the context of Article 311, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had examined the scope of expression "reasonable opportunity" in Khem Chand v. Union of India (AIR 1980 S.C. 300) . The same very expression has been interpreted in U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. V.N. Bajpai ( AIR 1980 S.C. 840 ). The term reasonable opportunity of hearing would include the right of the employee to deny the charges, to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses relied upon by the employer and to adduce his own evidence. The phrase will also comprehend an objective application of mind by the competent Authority to the evidence adduced during the course of enquiry, consideration of the record of the delinquent employee and then passing of a reasoned order for imposing a particular punishment or exonerating the employee. Passing of a speaking order is an implied duty of every quasi-judicial authority. One of the postulates of the principles of natural justice which has developed over the years as a part of system of Rule of law in this country is that every quasi judicial authority must pass a reasoned order. The reasons must not only be incorporated in the order but, must be communicated to the person affected by the order. At times the orders passed by quasi-judicial authorities are appealable or revisable. The High Courts and the Supreme Court have got vast jurisdiction to review the orders passed by the quasi-judicial authorities/Tribunals. Therefore, by merely omitting to give reasons such quasi judicial body or the Tribunal cannot stultify the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court. At times the orders passed by quasi-judicial authorities are appealable or revisable. The High Courts and the Supreme Court have got vast jurisdiction to review the orders passed by the quasi-judicial authorities/Tribunals. Therefore, by merely omitting to give reasons such quasi judicial body or the Tribunal cannot stultify the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Even a right to prefer departmental appeal/revision is reduced to farce in case the order passed by the quasi judicial authority is a non-speaking order. The aggrieved person has a right not only to challenge the conclusion but also to assail the decision making process adopted by the quasi-judicial authority. The decision making process can be assailed only when the reasons are given in support of the order. 18. In Bhagat Raja v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 S.C. 1606 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that even in the absence of statutory rules or regulations a quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its order. Similar view has been expressed in M/s. Mahavir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1970 S.C. 1302 ) , Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India ( AIR 1979 S.C. 798 ) , Rama Verma Bhartan v. State of Kerala (AIR 1979 (4) S.C.C. 782 ). In a recent decision, S.N. Mukherji v. Union of India (1990 (4) SCC 586) , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has recapitulated the entire law on the subject, not only in India but, Australia, America and England and has, thereafter, held that the duty to give reasons is implied in the discharge of quasi-judicial function by every public authority. Only in case of express exclusion the requirement of recording and communication of the reasons can be dispensed with. 19. In the light of the above principles and the clear provisions contained in Regulation-22(3) and 22(5), there can be no manner of doubt that the respondent No. 2 was under an obligation to pass a reasoned order for imposing punishment on the petitioner. The order under challenge is however, singularly laconic in this respect. The Assistant Engineer has not recorded any reason in support of his conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner. He has simply recorded one line conclusion that the petitioner had committed theft and had cheated the 800 mtrs. wire. The order under challenge is however, singularly laconic in this respect. The Assistant Engineer has not recorded any reason in support of his conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner. He has simply recorded one line conclusion that the petitioner had committed theft and had cheated the 800 mtrs. wire. The order does not contain any reference to the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. There is no reference to evidence recorded during the inquiry. The order is silent about the consideration of record of the petitioner by the respondent No. 2. The non-application of mind is evident from the fact that the respondent no. 2 had ordered recovery of cost of wire from the salary of the petitioner completely ignoring the fact that the learned Magistrate had ordered return of the seized wire to the Executive Engineer of R.S.E.B. The order of punishment passed by the respondent no. 2 must, therefore, be declared as illegal on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. So far as the appellate order is concerned, it shows that the appeal has been dismissed only on the ground of delay. In my opinion once the original order has been found to be invalid, the appellate order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 20. As a result of the above discussion, I allow this writ petition and quash the orders dated 24.10.89 and 26.10.90. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. Costs made easy.Writ Petition Allowed . *******