Order This writ application is directed against an order of suspension dated 16th January, 1987, passed against the petitioner by the Regional Manager, Region-II State Bank of India, as also the charge-sheet-cum-show-cause notice dated 7th December, 1988, issued by the Disciplinary Authority. 2. Earlier the writ petitioner had moved a writ application, being Matter No. 4992 of 1987, challenging the order of suspension and complaining of other inaction on the part of the respondents. It appears that the said writ application was disposed of on 16th November, 1988, with a direction upon the respondent Bank to issue show-cause notice to the petitioner within four weeks from the date of communication of the order, failing which, the impugned order of suspension would stand revoked. In the said writ application, the learned judge had occasion to consider the propriety of the continuance of the order of suspension, but except for observing that it was not proper to keep the order of suspension for an indefinite period, the learned judge did not quash the order of suspension, but directed the respondent Bank to issue show-cause notice to the petitioner. 3. The charge-sheet-cum-show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 7th December, 1988, pursuant to the aforesaid direction in the earlier writ application, within the time prescribed by the learned judge. This default clause in the order did not, therefore become operative and the order of suspension continued to be in force. 4. On behalf of the petitioner it was sought to be contended by Mr. Asok Kumar Chakrabarti, learned advocate, that by virtue of the order dated 16th November, 1988, passed in the earlier writ proceedings the order of suspension stood revoked or should have been deemed to have been revoked before the Charge-sheet-cum-show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. 5. In the light of what has been stated above, such an argument is not tenable and the order of suspension continued to be in force. 6. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, thereafter, challenged the validity of the Charge-sheet-cum-show-cause notice and submitted that the same had been issued with mala fide intent as it had not been issued in the form indicated in the Shastri Award. Mr. Chakrabarti also attacked the Charge-sheet on the ground that the provisions of Clause 521 (3) of the Shastri Award had not been complied with, although, the same were mandatory in nature. Mr. Chakrabarti also attacked the Charge-sheet on the ground that the provisions of Clause 521 (3) of the Shastri Award had not been complied with, although, the same were mandatory in nature. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, the provisions of Clause 521 (3) of the Shastri Award are reproduced herein-below:- "521(3)-If after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee, or to get him prosecuted, for an offence he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of "gross misconduct" or of "minor misconduct", as defined below; provided that if the authority which' was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or comes to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in sub-paragraphs 9 and 10 infra-relating to discharge, but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice as directed in sub-paragraph (2) (supra). If within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the provisions mentioned in subparagraph (2) above shall apply." 7. In this regard, Mr. Charkrabarti also submitted that the Charge-sheet had been issued with a closed mind and the manner in which the charges had been framed would show that the Disciplinary Authority had prejudged the petitioner's guilt. 8. It was next contended that on 6th September, 1989, the petitioner had made a representation to the General Manager, State Bank of India, the Regional Manager, Burdwan, and the Branch Manager, Pursurah, praying that in view of the order passed on 16th November, 1988, by this Court, he should be allowed to join his duty. 8. It was next contended that on 6th September, 1989, the petitioner had made a representation to the General Manager, State Bank of India, the Regional Manager, Burdwan, and the Branch Manager, Pursurah, praying that in view of the order passed on 16th November, 1988, by this Court, he should be allowed to join his duty. It was submitted that before issuing the impugned Charge-sheet, the respondents had not considered the petitioner's aforesaid representation and had not given him a hearing, which amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice and also the provisions of Clause 521 of the Shasth Award. 9. It was also submitted on behalf of the petitioner that, although, a criminal case was started against the petitioner, on 22nd February, 1987, no steps had been taken therein for expeditious disposal and the trial was yet to commence. It was submitted that taking advantage of the pendency of the criminal proceeding, the Bank respondents had stayed the disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Chakrabarti submitted that the 'action of the respondents was completely mala fide, inasmuch as, while on the one hand no steps were taken in the criminal proceeding to expedite the same, on the other hand the disciplinary proceedings were also sought to be stayed, causing immense injury to the petitioner, as he continued to be under suspension indefinitely. 10. Mr. Chakrabarti further submitted that pursuant to the earlier order passed by this Court on 25th March, 1991, the petitioner had made a representation to the concerned respondent to consider the revocation or the order or suspension, but that, although, such representation was made on 11th May, 1991, the same has not been taken up for consideration by the said respondent. 11. In support of his aforesaid contentions Mr. Chakrabarti referred to and relied upon the following cases:- 1. The Chairman & Managing Director, Punjab National Bank vs. Dilip Kumar De, reported in 1987(1) C.L.J., at page 354. 2. Kalipada Roy vs. District Controller, Food and Supplies, reported in 1983(2) C.L.J., at page 406. 3. Dr. Anil Kumar Saha vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in 1985(2) C.H.N. at page 291. 4. Keshri Mal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1979(3) S.L.R., at page 1. 5. P. Sreeramulu and Another, vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 1970 A.P., at page 114. 6. 3. Dr. Anil Kumar Saha vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in 1985(2) C.H.N. at page 291. 4. Keshri Mal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1979(3) S.L.R., at page 1. 5. P. Sreeramulu and Another, vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 1970 A.P., at page 114. 6. Surendra Chandra Das vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 1982 L.I.C, at page 574, and 7. Subrata Bhattacharya vs. Bharat Process & Mechanical Engineers & Others, reported in 1984(2) C.H.N., at page 185. 12. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Chakrabarti submitted that both the Charge-sheet and the order of suspension impugned in the writ petition, were liable to be quashed. 13. Replying to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Lakshmi Kumar Gupta, learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that under Clause 521(10) of the Shastri Award, which had been retained in the Deasi Award, the respondents were empowered to suspend the concerned employee pending the enquiry which was to be held, on the basis of the Charge-sheet to be issued to him. Mr. Gupta submitted that it was on the basis of the petitioner's own representation that the disciplinary proceedings were stayed after the criminal case had been instituted against the petitioner. Mr. Gupta referred to the representation made by the petitioner to the Regional Manager, Region-III, State Bank of India, which has been annexed to the writ petition, in which the petitioner had stated as follows:- "Sir, you are further aware that a criminal case is pending on the self-same matters in dispute and in the said criminal proceeding the police have already produced charge sheet whereupon Trial is going to commence very soon and, as such, I cannot furnish you with any proper and effective Reply to the instant Charge-sheet issued by you without incurring the risk and peril to disclose My Defence to be taken in the said criminal proceeding." 14. Mr. Gupta submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were stayed on the basis of the said representation and it could not now be contended on behalf of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceedings had been stayed with mala fide intent only with the intention of causing prejudice to the petitioner. Mr. Mr. Gupta submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were stayed on the basis of the said representation and it could not now be contended on behalf of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceedings had been stayed with mala fide intent only with the intention of causing prejudice to the petitioner. Mr. Gupta further submitted that the Charge-sheet and Show cause notice, as issued, were perfectly valid and could not be faulted on the ground that the direction to show cause had been combined with the Charge-sheet in the self-same document. Mr. Gupta further submitted that under the Rules, the respondents were under no obligation to give the petitioner a hearing before passing the order of suspension. It was entirely upto the respondents to take a decision as to whether a disciplinary proceeding was required to be initiated against the concerned employee and in view of the powers given under Clause 521(10)(b), the respondents were within their rights to place the petitioner under suspension pending the enquiry. 15. Mr. Gupta denied that the Charge-sheet disclosed a closed mind or that the matter had been prejudged by the Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Gupta submitted that the language used in the Charge-sheet was not in absolute terms, but only spelt out the misconduct with which the petitioner had been charged to enable him to enter upon his defence. 16. Mr. Gupta lastly pointed out that the representation made by the writ petitioner on 11th May, 1991, had been duly disposed of on 14th September, 1991. 17. As far as the decisions cited on behalf of the petition were concerned, Mr. Gupta submitted that he had nothing to say as regards the principles enunciated therein except that the respondent Bank had not acted contrary to the said principles in the petitioner's case and the writ petition was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 18. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, I am of the view that although, there is some substance in the contention that the writ petitioner cannot be kept under suspension indefinitely, the writ petition cannot succeed on the said ground alone, without giving the respondent Bank a chance to take steps to have the criminal proceedings completed within a reasonable time. 19. 19. I have already held that the Judgment advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner to the effect that the order or suspension stood revoked or should have been deemed to have been revoked by virtue of the order passed by this Court on 16th November, 1988, in the earlier writ proceeding, is untenable. The said order only provided that in the event the respondent Bank defaulted in issuing the Charge-sheet to the writ petitioner within the time prescribed, then and only in such event, the order of suspension would be deemed to have been revoked. Since the Charge-sheet was issued within the prescribed time, the default clause did not come into operation and the order of suspension continued to be in force. In the said writ proceedings the learned Judge did not quash the order of suspension order on merits. 20. As far as the submissions relating to the validity of the Charge-sheet is concerned, I am afraid that the same cannot also be faulted on the ground that the format used by the respondent Bank was not in conformity with the Form prescribed in the Shastri Award. The object of the Charge-sheet is to intelligibly convey to the concerned employee the charges levelled against him. As has been explained by this Court in the case of Collector of Customs vs. Biswanath Mukherjee, reported in A.I.R. 1972, Cal., at page 401, and reiterated in several other cases, the charges in a disciplinary proceeding should not be equated with the Charge-sheet in a criminal proceeding. It should be fairly and reasonably interpreted in a common sense way to see that there is a plain statement of the thing complained of as wrong. 21. I am unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that the Charge-sheet had been issued with a closed mind. Both the Supreme Court and this Court have in several cases laid down the parameters within which the aforesaid question is to be considered. The expressions used in a Charge-sheet should not be in absolute terms which would reveal a closed mind where the guilt of the concerned employee could be said to have been prejudged. It is the choice of expression which will to a great extent determine as to whether a Charge-sheet had been issued with a closed mind or not. The expressions used in a Charge-sheet should not be in absolute terms which would reveal a closed mind where the guilt of the concerned employee could be said to have been prejudged. It is the choice of expression which will to a great extent determine as to whether a Charge-sheet had been issued with a closed mind or not. In the case of Arun Kumar Mitra vs. Central Vigilance Commission, reported in 1986(1) C.H.N., at page 390, a learned Single Judge of this Court observed that no fixed principle could he laid down for determining whether a Charge-sheet had been issued with a biased and/or closed mind. Each case has to be distinguished on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. In my view, the language which has been used in the Charge-sheet issued to the petitioner is not intemperate and does not show that the disciplinary authority had prejudged the matter. On the other hand, the charges against the petitioner have been couched in rather guarded language and cannot give rise to the apprehension that the guilt of the petitioner in respect of the said charges had been prejudged. The decision cited by Mr. Chakrabarti on this point, namely, Surendra Chandra Das vs. State of West Bengal & Others (supra), is of no help to the petitioner, since the choice of expressions in the Charge-sheet, does not, in my view, reveal a dosed mind. 22. As far as the submissions regarding denial of natural justice is concerned, I have not been shown anything in the Rules which provides for a hearing to be given to the concerned employee before a Charge-sheet is issued to him. It is not the petitioner's case that he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself or that the Bank respondents had acted in a manner whereby he had been prevented from effectively defending his case. The right to decide as to whether a departmental proceeding should be commennced against an employee or not vested in the Disciplinary Authority and at that stage no hearing is required to be given to the employee, unless the Rules expressly provides for the same. 23. The right to decide as to whether a departmental proceeding should be commennced against an employee or not vested in the Disciplinary Authority and at that stage no hearing is required to be given to the employee, unless the Rules expressly provides for the same. 23. Regarding the continued suspension of the writ petitioner, it has to be said that the Bank respondents ought to have been less casual and should have pursued the criminal proceedings with greater diligence, so that the petitioner was not kept in suspense for five years. Taking advantage of the fact that the criminal proceedings are pending, the respondent Bank has not proceeded with the disciplinary proceeding, leaving the petitioner in a state of suspended animation for all these years. 24. It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court and this Court that an employee should not be made to suffer an order of suspension for an indefinite period without positive steps being taken to end his ordeal either way. In the case of the Chairman and Managing Director, Punjab National Bank vs. Dilip Kumar De (supra), a Division Bench of this, Court had occasion to consider an order of suspension under which the petitioner in the said case was kept under suspension for more than 12 years on the ground that there had been delay in completing the criminal trial. In the said case it was held that the Punjab National Bank and its officers had very casually proceeded in the matter and had definitely contributed for the unusual delay in concluding the said trial. The Division Bench also observed that the different Government Circulars produced by the parties indicated that even in the case of pendency of a criminal trial, the Bank administration is required to review the situation and to decide whether continuance of suspension is desirable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Government Circulars clearly indicated that the Government was anxious that there should not be unnecessary delay in completing the departmental proceedings and criminal cases and efforts should be taken to expedite the criminal trial and the departmental proceedings against the delinquent Bank employees. The Government Circulars clearly indicated that the Government was anxious that there should not be unnecessary delay in completing the departmental proceedings and criminal cases and efforts should be taken to expedite the criminal trial and the departmental proceedings against the delinquent Bank employees. In the light of the aforesaid observations, the Division Bench felt that there was no occasion to interfere with the directions given by the learned Trial Judge in the said case staying the order of suspension and directing that the order of suspension should not be given effect to. The writ petitioner in the said case was given the benefit of full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled if the suspension order had not been passed. It was also directed that the writ petitioner would not join his duties, unless specifically asked for by the respondent Bank and the respondent Bank would be at liberty to post the petitioner in such a post or in such a place as it thought fit and proper. 25. The other cases referred to by Mr. Chakrabarti are not of much assistance to the petitioners' case. 26. In my view, in this case the interest of justice will be best served if a direction is given to the respondent Bank to take proper steps to have the criminal trial completed, as the petitioner can not be kept under suspension indefinitely. The principles laid down in the decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioner and referred to above, have been reiterated by the Supreme Court also in various cases. Following the decision of this Court in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, Punjab National Bank vs. Dilip Kumar De (supra) and having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been kept under suspension for more than five years, without any progress in the criminal trial or the departmental proceedings, I direct that if the criminal proceedings are not completed within six months from date the order of suspension dated 16th January, 1987, passed against the petitioner by the Regional Manager, Region-III, State Bank of India, will stand stayed after the expiry of six months and the writ petitioner will be entitled to full pay and allowances; as if the said order of suspension had not been made. The petitioner will not, however, be entitled to join his duties till such time as the criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings are completed unless the respondent Bank requires him to do so. The application is thus disposed of. There will he no order as to costs. Application disposed of by giving direction.