ORDER T.N. Singh, J. 1. Two petitioners have a common cause and essentially the same relief both having claimed, against same respondents, we have heard these two matters analogously. Order was reserved on 21-1-1992 when hearing was finally concluded and we did so because it was submitted that this Court's D. B. decision, rendered at the Indore Bench in M. P. No. 1344 of 1987, decided on 4-4-1989, Dhar Cement Ltd. v. Union of India deserved reconsideration. That decision is reported in 1991 (54) E.L.T. 178 (M.P.J.) 2. After we deliberated, giving to the matter our anxious consideration, we have reached finally the conclusion that, for reasons to follow, no case is made out for accepting the prayer. We are of the view that concession claimed in Excise Duty payable by the two petitioners on cement produced in their plants is misconceived and that the Government of India having duly discharged its obligation undertaken in the Press Note dated 11-1-1979 (hereinbelow extracted), in the manner statutorily envisaged, there is no scope for saddling further liability on the Government by issuing against it a mandamus to perform a statutory function as may not serve public interest but may oblige only the petitioners. 3. As in the case of Dhar Cement Ltd. (supra), the two instant petitioners also have invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the State to claim concession in the matter of payment of Excise Duty on the cement manufactured by them in their plants, described as "Mini Cement Plants". Prominent Cement Company's Plant is in District Bhind, at Malanpur and that of Gwalior Cement Co. is in District Shivpuri, at Bhaved. It is not disputed that each of the plants is a "Mini Cement Plant" within the terms of the Press Note dated 11-1-1979, Annexure P/1, in both case. It is petitioners' case that Prominent Cement Plant commenced production from 18-2-1984 and Gwalior Cement Co., on 25-2-1986. Both claimed that they are entitled to concession in Excise Duty for a period of five years from their respective dates of production. 4. The Press Note in question, No. 9-AS/78-Cam, dated 11-1-1979, was published under the signature of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Industrial Development and it discloses that for achieving rapid speed in production of cement, it was found necessary to give incentives for establishment of Mini Cement Plants. 4. The Press Note in question, No. 9-AS/78-Cam, dated 11-1-1979, was published under the signature of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Industrial Development and it discloses that for achieving rapid speed in production of cement, it was found necessary to give incentives for establishment of Mini Cement Plants. After considering the recommendation of the working groups regarding choice of technology and provisions of fiscal incentives, the Government took decisions and those were enumarated in the Press Notes; some of the relevant numbered items are extracted therefrom : - "(iv) The on-works price of cement produced by the Mini Cement Plants would be the same as the price admissible to now large sized plants viz. Rs. 296/- per tonne. This price will be assured for a period of five years from the date of going into commercial production; (v) Mini Cement Plants will be allowed a rebate in the payment of excise duty upto 50% for a period of five yrears; (vi) While Mini Cement Plants will be subject to price control under the Cement Control Order and shall not sell cement at a price of higher than the controlled price, they will be exempt from distribution control under-the Cement Control Order, 1962. The Mini Cement Plants will bear their own distribution costs and will not be required to adjust the right element with the Cement Regulation Account. The other elements in the F.O.R. destination price of cement will, however, be subject to adjustment with the Cement o Regulation Account as per the existing provisions. (vii) Mini Cement Plants set up in hilly and remote areas will be eligible for additional excise duty relief and/or cash subsidy on merit;" It is also stated, "Government hopes that with the present announcement of an attrative price as well as liberal incentives, entrepreneurs will come forward to set up as many Mini Cement Plants as possible of a widely dispersed hands in the country within the shortest possible time". 5. The other source of the plea is a statement which the Minister for Industry and Labour made on the floor of the House in the Lok Sabha on 23-12-1983 in answering Question No. 5223. Annexure 2 is an extract from Lok Sabha debates (Seventh Series), Vol. XXIII; and we extract from that the relevant question and the Minister's answer : - "Mini Cement Plants 5223. Annexure 2 is an extract from Lok Sabha debates (Seventh Series), Vol. XXIII; and we extract from that the relevant question and the Minister's answer : - "Mini Cement Plants 5223. SHRI PRATAP BHANU SHARMA : Will the Minister of Industry be pleased to state : (a) Whether Mini Cement Plants are economically viable now due to capital investments; (b) If so, the view of Government of India on these projects; , (c) Whether we have developed a technology for the successful cement plants; and (d) If so, the details thereof? THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND LABOUR (SHRI NARAYAN DATT TIWARI) : (a) and (b) one of the main conclusions of the Working Group on Incentives for Mini Cement Plants was that the cost of production in the case of Mini Cement Plants works out of about Rs. 50/- to Rs. 60/- per tonne over the prove per tonne admissible to a new large cement plant. The additional cost is neutralised by exempting Mini Cement Plants from the operation of distribution control under the Cement Control Order 1967 and by providing a rebate in the payment of excise duty upto 50 per cent for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production. (c) and (d) : Three Mini Cement Plants based on Vertical Shaft Kiln Technology have been commissioned. Their details are as follows : - M/s. Vedu Cement Industries-Hosadurga (Karnataka) - 30 tonnes/day. M/s. Lokapur Cement, Lokapur (Karnataka) - 30 tonnes/day. M/s. Kutch Cement, Bhuj (Gujarat) - 30 tonnes/day." 6. What is also undisputed is that on behalf of respondents, reliance is placed on the following Notification dated 30-5-1979 of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) and that too, therefore, deserves to be extracted in extenso : "NOTIFICATION. Cental Excise. C.S.R. (E) In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts cement, falling under item no. 23 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and manufactured in a Mini Cement Plant from so much of the duty of excise as in excess of rupees thirty two and paise fifty per metric tonne. 2. 23 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and manufactured in a Mini Cement Plant from so much of the duty of excise as in excess of rupees thirty two and paise fifty per metric tonne. 2. Nothing contained in this notification shall apply to : - (i) Cement manufactured by a company which is registered or registrable under Section 26 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (54 of 1969) or to which Section 29 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) is applicable; (ii) Cement manufactured in a unit operated by a large cement plant either as a separate plant or as a part of the main plant; (iii) White cement or other varieties of cement, the price of which is not controlled by Cement Control Order, 1967, as amended from time to time; (iv) Cement commonly known as - (a) Sagol obtained by heating lime stoe and burnt coal; and (b) ashmoh obtained by fine grinding of paddy husk ash and hydrated lime with an additive; Explanation : - In this notification, (a) The expression 'Mini Cement Plant' means a cement plant consisting of one or more kilns and having a total installed capacity not exceeding 200 tonnes per day. (b) The expression 'large cement plant' means a cement plant consisting of one or more kilns and having a total licensed or registered capacity exceeding 300 (sic) per day. 3. This notification shall be in force upto and inclusive of 31st day of March, 1984". 7. It is the case of the two petitioners that acting upon the representation of the 'Government of India, made in the Press Note and in the statement of the Minister, Gwalior Cement Co. was registered on 6-5-1983 and Prominent Cement Co., on 11-6-1982. Thereafter, the Companies acquired lands and arranged finance as well. From M. P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam, Ltd., commitment for financial assistance was obtained by Prominent Cement to the tune of Rs. 60 lakhs as per letter dated 25-2-1983 of that Nigam and from the same Nigam, a commitment for heavier amount of Rs. 90 lakhs was obtained by Gwalior Cement under Nigam's letter dated 6-2-1984. However, before that, industrial licence was obtained by Prominent Cement on 2-6-1982 and Gwalior Cement on 2-12-1982. 60 lakhs as per letter dated 25-2-1983 of that Nigam and from the same Nigam, a commitment for heavier amount of Rs. 90 lakhs was obtained by Gwalior Cement under Nigam's letter dated 6-2-1984. However, before that, industrial licence was obtained by Prominent Cement on 2-6-1982 and Gwalior Cement on 2-12-1982. On 4-4-1983, Gwalior Cement entered into an agreement with M/s. Hovers Ltd., Bangalore, for supply, execution and-commissioning of a complete Mini Cement Plant on turnkey basis at a price of Rs. 1 crore 43 lakhs. Similarly, on 11-2-1984, Gwalior Cement placed order with M/s. Applied Industrial Products (P.) Ltd., Bangalore, for supply, erection and commissioning of a complete mini cement plant on turnkey basis at the price of Rs. 1 crore 35 lakhs. Suppply of power too was sanctioned to the plant of petitioner Premier Cement on 8-8-1984 and to that of Gwalior Cement, on 20-10-1984. It is also their case that Premier Cement commenced production on 18-10-1984 and Gwalior Cement on 28-2-1986. However, surprisingly, for the first time it appears, formal claim of rebate in Excise Duty was made by Premier Cement on 19-8-1987 and Gwalior Cement on 16-10-1987 by serving the usual notice demanding justice prior to institution by them in this Court of the petitions on 10-10-1987 and 15-12-1987. 8. Both petitioners have made similar prayers submitting that they are entitled to 50% rebate on Central Excise Duty payable on Portland Cement manufactured by them covered by Tariff Item No. 23 of the first schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1984, for a period of five years from the respective date of commencement of production of cement by them and that for different periods, they are entitled to refund of different amounts which are illegally realised from them by not allowing the rebate on the Excise Duty fixed from time to time for different periods. They also prayed that till their entitlement ceased, of Prominent Cement on 18-10-1989 and of Gwalior Cement on 24-2-1991, direction be made that they are entitled to clear the cement manufactured by them at 50% of the rate of duty or 50% rebate be computed every month and refunded. They also prayed that till their entitlement ceased, of Prominent Cement on 18-10-1989 and of Gwalior Cement on 24-2-1991, direction be made that they are entitled to clear the cement manufactured by them at 50% of the rate of duty or 50% rebate be computed every month and refunded. In M. P. No. 798 of 1987, on 28-11-1987, after inter parte hearing, a limited interim relief was granted allowing the petitioner to clear the cement on payment of 50% of Excise Duty leviable and to furnish bank guarantee in respect of the' remaining 50% to the satisfaction of the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Gwalior. A similar order was passed in M. P. No. 1079 of 1987 on 17-12-1987, but care was taken in that matter to make a direction subsequently to the Office to ensure preparation of Paper Book to be completed and for listing the petition for hearing on 16-10-1989. It is unfortunate that though care was taken to hear analogously both petitions expeditiously and they have been listed too from time to time on different dates, since 1-12-1989, hearing had to be adjourned on prayer made by counsel, sometimes severally, sometimes jointly. 9. Return was filed on 12-4-1988 in M. P. No. 798 of 1987 and in M. P. No. 1079 of 1987, it was filed on 25-4-1988. However, subsequently on 15-11-1988, in M. P. No. 798 of 1987, on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4, Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Gwalior, filed a reply to the rejoinder of the petitioners and copies of two notifications therewith as Annexures R/2 and R/3. The plain and simple case of the respondents is that the petitioners had no genuine claim and it was speculative. It is submitted also that they are not entitled to invoke the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel because they are themselves estopped to make claim for refund or even for future exemption because the claim was inordinately delayed and lacked bona fide. Prominent Cement moved this Court, it is complained, almost three years after the production started and Gwalior Cement, after more than 1 1/2 years of commencement of production in their plant. Prominent Cement moved this Court, it is complained, almost three years after the production started and Gwalior Cement, after more than 1 1/2 years of commencement of production in their plant. On merits also, it is submitted, no case for promissory estoppel is made out relying on the Press Note dated 11-1-1979 because the promise made thereunder was executory and that was duly executed and fulfilled when statutory powers contemplated under Rule 8(1) of Central Excise Rules, 1944, were exercised and Notification dated 30-5-1979 was issued. It is further submitted that the Minister's statement made on the floor of the House in the Parliament on 23-12-1981 was not a representation of any future or further promise in respect of concessions in Excise Duty and that could not be a foundation of promissory estoppel. 10. Indeed, it is also submitted that (as averred in the "reply", aforesaid, dated 15-11-1989), the petitioners having set up Mini Cement Plants are still availing other benefits as contemplated under clauses (vii) and (viii) of the Press Note itself and they are also availing subsequently the other usual benefits available, applicable to other cement plants, as per Notifications, R/2 and R/3. It is averred that the concession contemplated under the Press Note was a one-time affair. Its object to be achieved was to encourage within the period subsequently specified in the statutory Notification dated 30-5-1979 for Mini Cement Plants to be set up throughout the country to boost production of cement in terms of a special technology. It was, therefore, deliberately not mentioned in the Press Note that the concession or rebate would be available to plants set up from the date of commencement of production by them and, on the other hand, it was clearly specified that plants should come up "within the shortest possible time" to avail the benefit contemplated. Because, there already existed large sized cement plants also and there was no ban for such plants to come up in future in any part of the country. 11. Because, there already existed large sized cement plants also and there was no ban for such plants to come up in future in any part of the country. 11. It is urged that the Notification dated 30-5-1979 or even the Minister's subsequent statement dated 23-12-1981 were relatable to the same Press Note dated 11-1-1979 and there is no representation in the Minister's statement that any Mini Cement Plant that may be set up at any time in future, would continue to enjoy rebate in Excise Duty for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production by it. Statutory power could be excerised, it is submitted, in terms of Rule 8(1), aforesaid, and that power was duly exercised and to that fact merely the Minister alluded in his statement. It is to be assumed, it is submitted, that power vested under Rule 8(1) is to be exercised reasonably and that the very purpose of levy of Excise Duty under the Act is to relate the levy to changed circumstances and conditions which may vary from time to time and that the same duty or the same concession is never contemplated as a permanent measure. They-vary according to the manufacturing cost, local conditions, sale-price etc. etc. 12. Slowly and steadily, the novel plea of promissory estoppel, which has gained currency in this country for some time, is acquiring the new dimensions shedding some of its pristine lustre in the process. Cladding of limitations has added to its authority focusing in sharp relief its precise ambit. A lot has been said judicially by our Apex Court in large number of decisions during last 1 1/2 decades, but Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.'s case, AIR 1979 SC 621 is still the leading authority. It is acknowledged, however, even in that case that inspiration for adopting the doctrine in this country came from English decision, as noted in para 7 of their Lordships' judgment and, therefore, we consider it apposite to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. It is acknowledged, however, even in that case that inspiration for adopting the doctrine in this country came from English decision, as noted in para 7 of their Lordships' judgment and, therefore, we consider it apposite to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 16, para 1514, from which we quote : "When any party has, by his words of conduct, made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot after words be allowed to revert to their previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualifications which he himself has so introduced". However, at para 1595 ibid, it is also stated that to found an estoppel a representation must be clear and unambiguous and that it "must be certain to every intent". Further, the statement "is not to be taken to mean more than it says" though "the whole of the representation must be looked at". Indeed, the House of Lords, in the case of Woodhouse Ltd. v. Nigerian- Produce Ltd., (1972) 2 All. E.R. 271, in dealing with a case invoking promissory estoppel, observed that it is not sufficient that meaning put on it by the representee reasonably appeared to him to be clear and unequivocal; it should appear to the Court that the representation relied on is "clear and unequivocal as to be foundation of the offer". In that case, surrounding circumstances were considered in respect of the representation in question made in a letter and their Lordships arrived at the conclusion that the parties were not in ad idem and that the representee was not entitled to rely on the representation in the sense understood by him as constituting an estoppel. 13. In M. P. Sugar Mills (supra), categorically it was held that the equitable principle underlying the doctrine could be foundation of a cause of action and that its scope need not be limited to defence. However, the burden on the person invoking the doctrine to establish that there was a clear representation and he did rely on that is not relaxed. However, the burden on the person invoking the doctrine to establish that there was a clear representation and he did rely on that is not relaxed. Indeed, in Delhi Cloth Mills' case, AIR 1987 SC 2414 the extant position of law was stated clearly : All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him; must have relied upon the representation made to him. Care was taken to limit its application and defences available to the Government were specified at the earliest in M. P. Sugar Mills' case. One postulate relevant to the controversy, we extract: - "Where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner - and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law - the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It may also be noted that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power" 14. Some doubt being expressed subsequently, on the scope of doctrine in the decision in Jit Ram's case, AIR 1980 SC 1285 , Bhagwati, C. J., who had delivered the judgment in M. P. Sugar Mills (supra), found it necessary to recall the manner in which the doctrine came to find its niche in this country, through Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 and spoke further on the scope of doctrine, in Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 806 . Significantly, he reiterated his earlier view that promissory estoppel could not be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. Significantly, he reiterated his earlier view that promissory estoppel could not be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. It was held that if it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made. 15. In the same line, taking the same view are other decisions also of the Apex Court and those are noted in Excise Commissioner v. Ram Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 2237 . It was contended that under an earlier notification, in vogue at the time of auction, sales of country liquor had been exempted from sales tax and, therefore, Government was estopped from demanding subsequently sales tax from the petitioner. It was held that Government cannot divest itself of its right incidental to its office by conduct. Reference was made to State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co., AIR 1973 SC 2734 in that connection, approving expressly its dictum; "the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel". 16. Prof. Wade, in Administrative Law, Fifth Edition, p. 341, has observed, "the doctrine of estoppel must be prevented not only from enlarging the powers of public authorities illegitimately (but) it must also be prevented from cramping the proper exercise of their discretion". Prof, de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, at p. 103, doubts how far the courts will, in the interest of "fairness" to the individual, derogate from orthodox notions of ultra vires and has observed that judicial remedy may be available when there is "a finding that those to whom the representations had been made had relied upon them to their detriment" and when assurance given is such as did not violate any specific statutory provision. Our view is also that when the doctrine is invoked by the petitioner, it would be his burden to establish firstly that there was a representation which contained a clear and unambiguous promise or assurance and that the petitioner was not only induced to rely thereon but he had actually relied thereon creating in his favour an equity. 17. It would be evidently necessary for the Court to reach an affirmative finding in petitioner's favour in regard to the administrative action of the Government or its functionaries that they had arbitrarily changed their position, relying on the promise, which resulted in the equity created in petitioner's favour being defeated. For that, it would be petitioner's burden to place adequate and cogent material before the Court. It would not be necessary indeed to consider any defence that may be set up by the State because the gist o of the doctrine which has so far been universally recognised and adopted in pur country appears to us to be actual reliance of the petitioner (to be established by him) on such representation which could be foundation for his cause of action. In Anglo Afghan (supra), the Court held, "it was still open to aparty who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution". 18. None of the petitioners in the instant case, in our view, has established that he actually did rely on any such "representation"of the Government of India which could induce any entrepreneur to set up any Mini Cement Plant anywhere in the country, at any time being assured of rebate of 50% in Excise Duty usually leviable and to enjoy that privilege for a period of five years from any date on which production may be commenced by such a plant. It has also, indeed, not been established that any such representation has, in fact, been made as would appear from our following analysis of the Press Note and the Minister's statement. It has also, indeed, not been established that any such representation has, in fact, been made as would appear from our following analysis of the Press Note and the Minister's statement. The question how far the Notification dated 30-5-1979 fulfilled the assurance held out in the Press Note and in regard to that Notification, if any direction can be made by this Court, is another question to which we shall address ourselves in due course. 19. Reading the Press Note as a whole, what appears clear is that as per clause (v), the assurance was simply that Mini Cement Plants contemplated under the Press Note "will be allowed a rebate in the payment of Excise Duty upto 50% for a period of five years". Although in preceding clause (iv), there is reference to the price of the cement to be produced by a Mini Cement Plant and in that connection there is reference also to "period of five years from the date of going into commercial production", what is clear is that as per clause (vi), the Mini Cement Plant and the large-sized plants are subjected alike to price control under the Cement Control Order; they are merely exempted from constraints of distribution contemplated under the Cement Control Order, 1962. By the concession in the excise duty price-parity would be maintained for a period of five years, was the assurance given in the Press Note. That position, the Minister made clear in his statement. He stated that production cost to the tune of Rs. 50/- to Rs. 60/- per ton was higher in Mini Cement Plants and that the "additional cost" was "neutralised" by the concession given in the excise duty. 20. For the incentives offered under the Press Note to be availed,, entrepreneurs were expected to set up "within the shortest possible time" mini plants throughout the country. Shri Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, laid great stress on the absence of a cut-off date in the last part of the Press Note and submitted that usually three to four years' time is taken for such a plant to go on stream. There could be no sense meaning in the incentives offered under the Press Note, according to learned counsel, if the period of five years contemplated under clause (v) was not reckoned as the period commencing from the date of production in the plant. There could be no sense meaning in the incentives offered under the Press Note, according to learned counsel, if the period of five years contemplated under clause (v) was not reckoned as the period commencing from the date of production in the plant. We do not think if it is permissible for the Court to supply meaning to the expression "within the shortest possible time" even if that is ambiguous. Nothing can be added to or substracted from the promise or assurance because that is to be regarded as sacrosanct, to be enforceable. Any liability which is not undertaken is not to be foisted arbitrarily. The Court can only interdict refusal arbitrarily by the party holding out the promise or assurance to abide by them; it is not competent to create any promise when it is not possible to attribute the same to the promisor. The two terminii of five years of the rebate proposed under the Press Note have been duly fixed, however, in the manner statutorily envisaged, by issuing subsequently the Notification dated 30-5-1979. Therein, the cut-off date of 31-3-1984 is clearly stated and by that, more than five years is given to the entrepreneur, who had taken note of the incentives offered under the Press Note on 11-1-1979. It was within the legislative competence of the Central Government to clarify the ambiguity in the Press Note in the manner done, by indicating clearly the cut-off date in the Notification. 21. In so far as the Minister's statement is concerned, that is to be read in its context and setting to understand the circumstances under which that was made. He was asked a general question on "Mini Cement Plants" and not any particular question in respect of the concession in excise duty promised to such plants. When that was done, the Notification dated 31-5-1979 was already in vogue. The Hon'ble Member who had put the questions was not concerned about new plants to come up, but with such plants which were already functioning. The statement obviously cannot reasonably be construed as any "representation" or "promise" of any kind to any entrepreneur to act on that. The Minister offered no inducement by his statement promising any kind of new incentive either to the Mini Plants already functioning or to be set up in future. The statement obviously cannot reasonably be construed as any "representation" or "promise" of any kind to any entrepreneur to act on that. The Minister offered no inducement by his statement promising any kind of new incentive either to the Mini Plants already functioning or to be set up in future. The Minister merely stated the fact that only three mini plants had been set up under Vertiola Shaft Kiln Technology and they would be availing the concession in the Excise Duty for a period of five years from the date of commencement of production. No other reasonable view can be taken of the Minister's statement except that he was stating the facts as they existed on the date when the question was put to him. Indeed, what he did was that he explained the measure already taken to fulfil the promise made under the Press Note although he did not expressly refer to it. He could not be expected to be discharging the legislative function of extending the cut-off date contemplated under the Notification. Such a presumption, this Court can legitimately make in terms of the judicially contemplated limitations of the doctrine. Indeed, had the Minister stated in clear and specific terms that there was another measure in the contemplation of the Government by which the provisions of the Notification made would be modified, the position would have been different. 22. Not a scrap of paper has been brought on record by the petitioners even to suggest that anyone of them did actually rely on the statement of the Minister or was, at any time, before deciding to undertake the venture, satisfied that the notification dated 30-5-1979 would not apply to their cement plants or that the Government of India would issue any other notification modifying the cut-off date stated therein. Both petitioners are significantly silent about efforts made by them to satisfy themselves about their entitlement in respect of concession in the Excise Duty to be available when their plants became operational. It was their burden to specify categorically not only the source of representation or promise on which they relied, but also the manner of their reliance thereon because that too is subject to judicial scrutiny. On records, are placed letters concerning allotment of land (Annexure P/5 of M. P. No. 798/87) and grant of the industrial licence (Annexure P/7 ibid). It was their burden to specify categorically not only the source of representation or promise on which they relied, but also the manner of their reliance thereon because that too is subject to judicial scrutiny. On records, are placed letters concerning allotment of land (Annexure P/5 of M. P. No. 798/87) and grant of the industrial licence (Annexure P/7 ibid). Indeed, from the Cement Directorate of the Directorate General of Technology and Development, the industrial licence was granted and there are other letters also from that Office which are on record. No clue, however, is to be read in that correspondence or any other document placed on record to suggest that the petitioners relied on any particular representation of the Government of India or had acted in pursuance thereof in setting up their mini plants. Their case is built upon a fantasy. One fine morning, some bird whispered in their ears that there was a Government Press Note of 1979 and that in the Lok Sabha Debates was printed a statement of the Minister made in 1981; they woke up to cash on that music. For a song which they heard, they cannot expect this Court to act. Solid facts and razor-sharp law only prick our conscience. 23. Now, the next question. Having duly fulfilled the assurance contemplated under the Press Note by issuing the Notification dated 30-5-1979, if the Government can be still held in default and by mandamus if it can be directed to issue a fresh Notification in order to exercise its legislative power contemplated under Rule 8(1) of the Rules. We do not think if the plea of promissory estoppel can extend to that length investing the petitioners with any right to claim from this Court such a direction. Such a course is forbidden as pointed out in the decisions aforenoted; the doctrine does not empower Courts to interfere with legislative functions. Power to control or fix selling price of cement did vest in the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Cement Control Order, 1967 made thereunder. Such a course is forbidden as pointed out in the decisions aforenoted; the doctrine does not empower Courts to interfere with legislative functions. Power to control or fix selling price of cement did vest in the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Cement Control Order, 1967 made thereunder. Similarly, under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Central Government was empowered to fix and vary from time to time the rate of excise duty of cement; the Rule 8(1) of the Rules framed thereunder vested the discretion in the State Government to exempt from time to time to such extent and for such period as it considered appropriate, duty payable on any excisable goods. The discretion is absolute and is not coupled with any duty towards the manufacturer. The discretion may be exercised in public interest to fulfil the object of any declared public policy. Express Newspapers' case, AIR 1986 SC 872 is an authority for the proposition that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not operate at the level of formulation of public policy. Obviously, Rule 8(1) inheres the prohibition that only by issuing the notification exemption can be granted to the extent made permissible thereunder in respect of excise duty; in no other manner that is possible. Mandamus cannot issue to the Central Government as will overcome that Rule; nor to exercise the discretion in any particular manner to modify the Notification dated 30-5-1979 which has already spent its force. 24. On two decisions of the Apex Court, Shri Gupta relied, but on facts, those are distinguishable. In Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala, (1987) 65 STC 1, the entitlement to exemption from sales tax was upheld because statutorily that was allowed; the question decided was of interpretation of the Notification made in exercise of the statutory power. That was, in terms made, to have deeming effect and, therefore, the Court held that there was no question of retrospective exemption. The other case, State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries (ibid 430), appears in a "Note"; in that case, there were two Resolutions of the State Government made in 1973 and 1976 and thereafter a Notification was issued in the exercise of statutory power. The other case, State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries (ibid 430), appears in a "Note"; in that case, there were two Resolutions of the State Government made in 1973 and 1976 and thereafter a Notification was issued in the exercise of statutory power. On facts, the Court found that relying on the 1976 Resolution, the Industry was set up and on behalf of the Government, the respondent had beem assured of exemption of sales tax in terms of the Resolution in question. It was, therefore, held that subsequently, the Government could not resile from that position and rely on the Notification. 25. Although Shri Mittal pressed the contention that the doctrine of unjust enrichment would kill the entitlement of the two petitioners based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, we need not deal with that contention for the obvious reason that we have not found the two petitioners entitled, to have established their plea. We need not, therefore, deal with the decision cited in that regard by Shri Mittal. To wit, Elson Machines Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 671. We do not also consider necessary to deal with the decision in Plasmac Machine Manufacturing Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 57 cited at the Bar as that has no immediate relevance to the controversy. 26. We feel compelled to stress, however, that delay defeats equity is a solemn principle of ancient lineage. Having submitted to imposition of normal Excise Duty and made no claim at all for concession before the authorities, the claim made for the first time in this Court, is to be regarded as still-born. By their own conduct the petitioners have failed to raise any equity in their favour. 27. For all the aforesaid reasons, both petitions fail and are dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners cannot escape the liability of costs. It appears, hearing has" been deliberately protracted. Each of them shall pay costs in the sum of Rs. 2,000/- to the respondents. 28. We make another direction before we part with the records. The interim orders passed on 28-11-1987 in M. P. No. 798 of 1987 and on 17-12-1987 in M. P. No. 1079 of 1987 stand vacated. It appears, hearing has" been deliberately protracted. Each of them shall pay costs in the sum of Rs. 2,000/- to the respondents. 28. We make another direction before we part with the records. The interim orders passed on 28-11-1987 in M. P. No. 798 of 1987 and on 17-12-1987 in M. P. No. 1079 of 1987 stand vacated. It shall be open to the respondents, we direct, to enforce bank guarantees furnished by the two petitioners under those orders.