JUDGMENT S.K. Chawla, J. 1. The State has filed this appeal against acquittal of respondent Khilan Singh of the charge under Section 307 I.P.O. 2. The prosecution story briefly stated was that on 8-5-1984 at about 4.00 p. m. in villege Seoo P. S. Shamshabad near a flour-mill of one Maharaj Singh respondent Khilan Singh was giving a shoe beating to one Laxman Singh One Ramnath Singh alias Lalji (P. W. 2) tried to intervene and questioned respondent Khilan Singh as to why he was beating a guest who had come to the villege, meaning there by Laxman Singh. It is said that respondent Khilan Singh then gave abuses to Lalji and also dealt a knife blow on his chest. Lalji sustained a bleeding injury On his chest. Lalji was taken to Vidisha hospital, where on the arival of the police, Lalji lodged a report styled as Dehatinalashi (Ex. P-2) at 11-15 p. m., wherein the name of respondent Khilan Singh was expressly mentioned as the assailant Doctor Ashok Kumar (P. W. 15) medically examined Lalji and found an incised wound 11/2 x 1/2" cutting the third right intercostal space. Probing was not done in order to assertain the depth of the injury to prevent further bleeding and injury to internal organs. The muscles at the site of the injury were cut. Blood and air was coming from wound, vide injury report, Ex. P-12A. X-ray examination revealed that right side lung had collapsed and there was collection of fluid in that lung vide x-ray report Ex P-12-B. The respondent had thus committed the offence of attempted murder under Section 307 I P.C 3. The prosecution examined the victim namely Lalji (P. W. 2) and five more persons namely Harlal (P. W. 1) Laxman Singh (P. W. 5) Munshilal (P. W. 6) Rushid Khan (P. W. 11) and Bhagat Singh (P. W. 12) as eye witnesses. Of them all but Harlal (P. W. 1) and victim Lalji (P. W. 2) turned hostile. This left only the evidence of Harlal (P. W. 1) and Lalji (P. W. 2). 4. The evidence of victim Lalji (P. W. 2) was that respondent Khilan Singh had injured him by dealing a knife blow on his chest. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge Ganj Basoda who tried the case, was not prepare to act on the uncorroborated testimony of victim Lalji. 4. The evidence of victim Lalji (P. W. 2) was that respondent Khilan Singh had injured him by dealing a knife blow on his chest. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge Ganj Basoda who tried the case, was not prepare to act on the uncorroborated testimony of victim Lalji. He looked for corroboration to the evidence of victim and finding that the evidence of Harlal (P. W. 1) was of doubtful veracity, acquitted the accused/respondent. The legal position is that the evidence of victim Lalji has to be totally ignored from consideration for a reason to be disclosed immediately. But if the evidence of the victim were to be read in evidence, the approach of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in thinking that conviction could not be based on uncorroborated testimony of the victim of assault, was wrong. The evidence of an injured person must be rated high and if found satisfactory, should receive credence in as much as such a person does not ordinarily screen the real offender and does not in his place involve an innocent person. The only question that may arise with respect to the evidence of such a person may be, whether he had proper opportunity for seeing, recognising or identifying his assailant. 5. The reason why the evidence of victim Lalji (P. W. 2) has to be totally excluded from consideration is the circumstance that his cross examination was deferred and thereafter he died a death, which was most likely natural, before he could be cross-examined. It has come in the evidence of other witnesses that Lalji died around the close of the year 1987. It may be recalled that the incident of the present case had occurred way back in May 1984. The examination-in chief of Lalji had taken place on 17th April, 1986. At that time his cross-examination was deferred because the Court was busy in other cases and there was no time available on that day. It is unfortunate that thereafter Lalji could not be produced for cross-examination for nearly 11 years and he died before his cross examination could take place. It cannot be denied that cross-examination of a witness is an important weapon in the hands of the accused. By cross examination the accused not only has the opportunity of destroying the prosecution case but also the opportunity of establishing his own defence. It cannot be denied that cross-examination of a witness is an important weapon in the hands of the accused. By cross examination the accused not only has the opportunity of destroying the prosecution case but also the opportunity of establishing his own defence. In this case that opportunity was denied to the accused/respondent due to no fault of his own. The result is that the evidence of Lalji does not fulfill the requirements of Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act which requires that a witness shall be first examined-in chief and then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined and then (if the party calling him so desires) reexamined. When the oral evidence a witness does not satisfy the requirements of Section 138, it does not acquire the status of "legal and admissible evidence" and will have to be totally eschewed from consideration. A reference may also be made to the decisions, Maganlal Radhakishan v. Emperor AIR 1946 Nag. 173 Uttam Rao v. State 1960 JLJ SN 111, Motilal v. Sundarbai 1974 MPLJ 68 and Benibai v. State of M. P. 1979 (II) MPWN 109. It is rather unfortunate that the learned trial Judge did not notice the basic defect in the evidence of Lalji (P. W. 2) that it was bereft of cross-examination and could not therefore be taken into consideration at all. Instead the learned trial Judge endeavoured to find out if there was corroboration to his evidence. 6. No doubt, the F. I. R. (Ex. P-2) recorded as Dehati Nalshi at Vidisha hospital by Lalji (P. W. 2) expressly named respondent Khilan Singh as his assailant. An F. I. R. is ordinarily admissible in corroboration or contradiction of the maker and is not substantive evidence. Since in the present case the evidence of the maker of the F. I R. i.e. Lalji cannot be taken into consideration, the F. I. R. is itself of no use. An F. I. R may contain a statement about the cause of death of the maker, in which case it becomes admissible as dying declaration under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. A dying declaration is substantive evidence. There is however no indication in the present case that the chest injury referred to in the F. I. R. proved to be the cause of death of Lalji. A dying declaration is substantive evidence. There is however no indication in the present case that the chest injury referred to in the F. I. R. proved to be the cause of death of Lalji. The possibility that Lalji died a natural death after about 31/2 years of the incident is very much there. The F. 1. R. in the present case cannot therefore be read even as dying declaration. In the result, the F. I. R. (Ex. P-2) has to be totally excluded form consideration. 7. This leaves only the solitary evidence of Harlal (P.W.1). His evidence was that when the alleged incident took place he was in the bazaar of the villege. He heard there that a quarrel has taken place. He claimed that he reached the place of the occurrence at the flour mill at the "nick of the time" and saw the actual assault. Describing about the actual assault, he stated that respondent Khilan Singh was seen by him actually dealing a knife blow on the chest of Lalji. Lalji got injured and fell down unconscious. The respondent then left the place of the incident. This witness Harlal started his testimony by saying : MERE SAMNE KOI GHATNA NAHIN HUI (No occurrence took place in my presence). He also stated at another place that when he reached the place of the occurrence, Laxman Singh was not present. On the prosecution story, the respondent was giving shoe beating to Laxman Singh and when Lalji (P. W. 2) tried to intercede, the respondent reviled at Lalji and dealt a knife blow on his chest. If that was so. Laxman Singh was bound to be present when Lalji was actually assaulted But admission made by Harlal that Laxman Singh was not present when he reached the place of the occurrence, makes it doubtful whether at all he reached at the "nick of the time" or he really reached some time after the assault, which explains why he at the outset told that no occurrence took place in his presence. There ' is also good reason to think that Hatlal (P. W. 1) suppressed a part of the story. Laxman Singh had come to the villege as guest of Harlal on the day of the occurrence. There is also a counter report (Ex. There ' is also good reason to think that Hatlal (P. W. 1) suppressed a part of the story. Laxman Singh had come to the villege as guest of Harlal on the day of the occurrence. There is also a counter report (Ex. P-12) on record to show that Laxman Singh was alleged to have picked up quarrel at the flour-mill in question and to have caused injury by knife to one Kanhaiya, brother of flour-mill owner, some time before the present incident. The evidence of Harlal does not therefore carry conviction and the learned trial Judge was not unjustified in disbelieving this witness. 8. In the result, there was no satisfactory evidence to bring home guilt to the respondent. There is therefore no case for interference with the order of acquittal. 9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The bail bond of the respondent shall stand discharged.