JUDGMENT The reason why the evidence of victim Lalji (P.W. 2) has to be totally excluded from consideration is the circumstance that his cross-examination was deferred and thereafter he died a death, which was most likely natural, before he could be cross-examined. It has come in the evidence" of other witnesses that Lalji died around the close of the years 1987. It may be recalled that the incident of the present case had occurred way back in May 1984. The examination-in-chief of Lalji had taken place on 17th April, 1986. At that time his cross-examination was deferred because the Court was busy in other cases and there was no time available on that day. It is unfortunate that thereafter Lalji could not be produced for cross-examination for nearly 1 1/2 years and he died before his cross-examination could take place. It cannot be denied that cross-examination of a witness is an important weapon in the hands of the accused. By cross-examination the accused not only has the opportunity of destroying the prosecution case but also the opportunity of establishing his own defence. In this case that opportunity was denied to the accused/respondent due to no fault of his own. The result is that the evidence of Lalji does not fulfill the requirements of section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act which requires that a witness shall be first examined-in-chief and then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined and then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined. When the oral evidence of a witness does not satisfy the requirements of section 138, it does not acquire the status of legal and admissible evidence and will have to be -totally eschewed from consideration. A reference may also be made to the decisions, Maganlal Radhakishan v. Emperor (AIR 1946 Nag. 173), Uttam Rao v. State (1960 JLJ SN 111), Motilal v. Sundarbai (1974 MPLJ Note 68), and Benibai v. State of M.P. [1979 (II) MPWN 109]. It is -rather unfortunate that the learned trial Judge did not notice the basic defect in the evidence of Lalji (P.W. 2) that it was bereft of cross-examination and could not, therefore, be taken into consideration at all. Instead, the learned trial Judge endeavoured to find out if there was corroboration to his evidence. No doubt, the F.I.R. (Ex. It is -rather unfortunate that the learned trial Judge did not notice the basic defect in the evidence of Lalji (P.W. 2) that it was bereft of cross-examination and could not, therefore, be taken into consideration at all. Instead, the learned trial Judge endeavoured to find out if there was corroboration to his evidence. No doubt, the F.I.R. (Ex. P-2) recorded as Dehati Nalshi8 at Vidisha hospital by Lalji (P.W. 2) expressly named respondent Khilan Singh as his assailant An FIR is ordinarily admissible in corroboration or contradiction of the maker and is not substantive evidence. Since in the present case the evidence of the maker of the F.I.R. i.e. Lalji cannot be taken into consideration, the F.I.R. is itself of no use. An FIR may contain a statement about the cause of death of the maker, in which case it becomes admissible as dying declaration under section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act A dying declaration is substantive evidence. There is, however, no indication in the present case that the chest injury referred to in the F.I.R. proved to be the cause of death of Lalji. The possibility that Lalji died a natural death after about 3 1/2 years of the incident is very much there the FIR in the present case cannot, therefore, be read even as dying declaration. In the result, the FIR (Ex. P-2) has to be totally excluded from consideration. This leaves only the solitary evidence of Harlal (P.W. 1). His evidence was that when the alleged incident took place he was in the bazaar of the village. He heard there that a quarrel had taken place. He claimed that he reached the place of the occurrence at the flour mill at the "nick of the time" and saw the actual assault. Describing about the actual assault, he stated that respondent Khilan Singh was seen by him actually dealing a knife blow on the chest of Lalji. Lalji got injured and fell down unconscious. The respondent then left the place of the incident. This witness Harlal started his testimony by saying: MERE SAMNE KOI GHATNA NAHIN HUI (No occurrence took place in my presence). He also stated at another place that when he reached the place of the occurrence, Laxman singh was not present. Lalji got injured and fell down unconscious. The respondent then left the place of the incident. This witness Harlal started his testimony by saying: MERE SAMNE KOI GHATNA NAHIN HUI (No occurrence took place in my presence). He also stated at another place that when he reached the place of the occurrence, Laxman singh was not present. On the prosecution story, the respondent was giving shoe beating to Laxman Singh and when Lalji (P.W. 2) tried in intercede, the respondent reviled at Lalji and dealt a knife blow on his chest. If that was so, Laxman Singh was bound to be present when Lalji was actually assaulted. But admission made by Harlal that Laxman Singh was not present when he reached the place of the occurrence, makes it doubtful whether at all he reached at the "nick of the time" or he really reached some time after the assault, which explains why he at the outset told that no occurrence took place in his presence. There is also good reason to think that Harlal (P.W. 1) suppressed a part of the story. Laxman Singh had come to the village as guest of Harlal on the day of the occurrence. There is also a counter report (Ex. P-12) on record to show that Laxman Singh was alleged to have picked up-quarrel at the flour-mill in question and to have caused injury by knife to one Kanhaiya, brother of flour-mill owner, sometime before the present incident. The evidence of Harial does not, therefore, carry conviction and the learned trial Judge was not unjustified in disbelieving this witness. In the result, there was no satisfactory evidence to bring home guilt to the respondent. There is, therefore, no case for interference with the order of acquittal.