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1992 DIGILAW 827 (MP)

SHYAM BHAGWAN DUBEY v. SHAIKH NIZAM

1992-12-09

S.K.JHA

body1992
S. K. JHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THE only substantial question which has been framed in this suit at the time of admission of its appeal is "whether the amount deposited by the tenant in compliance to the provisions of S. 13 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, can be allowed to be refunded to the tenant even though the tenant was in arrears of rent and had deposited the same to seek protection against eviction. " ( 2 ) THE only relevant facts for the disposal of this appeal are these : there is a small shop which was let out by the appellant/landlord to the respondent/ tenants/defendants round about the year 1972 or 1973. The respondents/tenants defaulted in payment of rent. Hence, the present suit was filed by the appellant/landlord for eviction of the respondents/tenants from the suit premises. The issues framed in the suit were: (I) Whether the defendants could be evicted from the disputed premises or not? (ii) Whether the defendants had defaulted in the payment of rent on account of which they could be evicted? (iii) Whether the plaintiff/landlord was entitled to a sum of Rs. 150/- per month as rent or as compensation for occupation by the tenants? the answer with regard to all these three issues were in favour of the landlord/ appellant. It may be mentioned here that the question with regard to the rate of rent being Rs. 150/- per month which was claimed by the appellant landlord was disputed by the tenants/defendants who are respondents here. As already stated above, the trial Court on a discussion of evidence on record found that the claim of the plaintiff/ appellant with regard to the rate of rent being Rs. 150/- per month was correct. All the three issues which were decided in favour of the appellant by the trial Court were upheld in appeal filed by the tenants/defendants in the court of appeal below which had affirmed the decree for eviction. ( 3 ) THE court of appeal below, however, while upholding the decree directed the appellant to refund any amount deposited in terms of S. 13 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act No. XLI of 1961) for the period before institution of the suit. ( 3 ) THE court of appeal below, however, while upholding the decree directed the appellant to refund any amount deposited in terms of S. 13 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act No. XLI of 1961) for the period before institution of the suit. It is against this direction which has been incorporated as a part of the decree of the lower appellate Court that the appellant has come before this Court. I think the point is simple and the appeal has to be allowed. The relevant portion of S. 13 (1) of the Act of 1961 reads as follows:"13 ( 1): On a suit. . . . . . . . . being instituted by a landlord on any of the grounds referred to in S. 12 or in any appeal or any other proceedings. . . . . . . . . the tenant shall, within one month of the service of writ of summons or notice or appeal. . . . . . . . . as the case may be, or within such further time as the Court may on an application made to it allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made; and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate till the decision of the suit, appeal or proceeding, as the case may be. "it is quite clear that such a provision for the protection of the tenant from eviction by the landlord or the peril and hazard of having his defence struck out under S. 13 (6) has been incorporated by subsequent insertion of S. 13 (1), (2) and (6) of the Act with effect from 16-8-1983. This enabling provision has been incorporated beneficial to the defaulting or erring tenant as well as protecting the landlord's interest for damages for the use and occupation of the premises comprising the leasehold during the time that the protracted litigation continues in Courts of law. This enabling provision has been incorporated beneficial to the defaulting or erring tenant as well as protecting the landlord's interest for damages for the use and occupation of the premises comprising the leasehold during the time that the protracted litigation continues in Courts of law. One thing which is remarkable is that the payment which is in deposit or payment of the rent to the landlord covers the arrears during which the default has been made as well as the future rent from month to month. The Stature is very clear that the payment made to the landlord has been put at par with the deposit of arrears and current rent from month to month in the Court for the payment to the landlord. That should be end of the matter. Instead of making payment to the landlord directly, the tenants/defend ants have deposited the rent in the Court which the landlord/ appellant has withdrawn. There is no provision for any such direction or decree against a winning landlord. It is not the case of any party that the rate of Rs. 150/- which has been fixed by the trial Court on account of the dispute having been raised by the tenant is anything over and above the rent claimed by the landlord and withdrawn by him deposited in the Court. ( 4 ) IN this context, however, one thing must be made clear that such a provision is based upon the principle of relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent. Relief has been given upon the principle that, as the right of entry was intended merely as security for the rent, the lessor thereby recovered full compensation and was put in the same situation as if rent had been paid to him when it was originally due. Relief has been given upon the principle that, as the right of entry was intended merely as security for the rent, the lessor thereby recovered full compensation and was put in the same situation as if rent had been paid to him when it was originally due. As has been observed by Shah, J. (as he then was) explaining the object of such relief against forfeiture for nonpayment of rent in the case of R. S. Lala Praduman Kumar v. Virendra Goyal, AIR 1969 SC 1349 : (1969) 3 SCR 950 , "the covenant of forfeiture of tenancy for nonpayment of rent is regarded by the Courts as merely a clause for securing payment of rent, and unless the tenant has by his conduct disentitled himself to equitable relief, the Courts grant relief against forfeiture of tenancy on the tenant paying the rent due, interest thereon and costs of the suit. " ( 5 ) IN terms S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act makes payment of rent at the hearing of the suit in ejectment a condition of the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction and an appeal or any other proceeding by the tenant being a re-hearing of the suit in appropriate cases it is open to the appellate Court at the hearing of the appeal also to relieve the tenant in default against forfeiture. ( 6 ) ONE thing, however, which must be remembered in this connection is that many a time the argument that the period for which the non-payment of rent has been made has no relationship with such portion of the arrears of rent the recovery of which is barred by the law of limitation. This principle is incorporated in Section 13 (1) of the Instant Accommodation Control Act, 1961. When it is stated in the statutory provision with regard to the deposit in the Court or payment to the landlord that the amount should be 'an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default. . . . . . . . . When it is stated in the statutory provision with regard to the deposit in the Court or payment to the landlord that the amount should be 'an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default. . . . . . . . . 'the amount to be deposited for the equitable relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent is for the entire period for which the tenant had made the default and has no relationship with the recoverability of the money so due as rent for the accommodation in question. The period of default in such cases is conterminous with the rent payable by the tenant but not recoverable by the landlord. Dealing with such a provision, I had the occasion to construe such statutory provisions in the Accommodation Control Acts in the Full Bench case of Ram Nandan Sharma v. Maya Devi, AIR 1975 Patna 283 at page 294, in these terms:"as may be noticed from the provisions of the other State Statutes relating to the subject matter which has been elaborately discussed by my Lord the Chief Justice, most of such Statutes have provided a relief against forfeiture on account of non-payment of rent on the part of the tenant-defendant in the event of his paying all arrears of rent. ; whether recoverable or not. Such provisions analogous to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act which afford relief to the tenants against forfeiture are in the very nature of things bound to embrace within its sweep all arrears of rent whatever lawfully payable though not legally recoverable. For, the quintessence of relief against forfeiture is the equitable principle being enforced both by Court of equity and common law for long times. The true foundation of the relief in equity in all these cases is that, as the penalty is designed as a mere security, if the party obtains his money, or his damages, he gets all that he expected, and all that, in justice, he is entitled to. The true foundation of the relief in equity in all these cases is that, as the penalty is designed as a mere security, if the party obtains his money, or his damages, he gets all that he expected, and all that, in justice, he is entitled to. In reason, in conscience, in natural equity, there is no ground to say, because a man has stipulated for a penalty in case of his omission to do a particular act (the realobject of the parties being the performance of the Act), that if he omits to do the act, he shall suffer an enormous loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the other party. If it be said, that it is his own folly to have made such a stipulation, it may equally well be said, that the folly of one man cannot authorise gross-oppression on the other side. Where a penalty or forfeiture is designed merely as a security to enforce the principle obligation, it is as such against conscience to allow any party to pervert it to a different and oppressive purpose, as it would be to allow him to substitute another for the principle obligation. The whole system of equity jurisprudence proceeds upon the ground, that a party having a legal right, shall not be permitted to avail himself of it for the purposes of injustice, or fraud, or oppression, or harsh and vindictive injury. Founded upon these principles, wherever relief against forfeiture is provided for it ensures to the advantage and benefit of both the parties. While the tenant enjoys the immunity from eviction for default in the payment of rent, the landlord gets the corresponding benefit of recovering even such arrears as are not legally recoverable. The harshness is commensurate with the advantage that either party obtains in such a state of affairs. "such an equitable provision as is engrafted in Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act shall govern only to such an extent which does not run counter to any specific statutory provision. The harshness is commensurate with the advantage that either party obtains in such a state of affairs. "such an equitable provision as is engrafted in Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act shall govern only to such an extent which does not run counter to any specific statutory provision. ( 7 ) THIS appeal, therefore, must be allowed with costs and that part of the decree by which the lower appellate Court has directed the landlord to make a payment of any part of the amount withdrawn by him from Court which admittedly is not in excess of any rent legally and lawfully payable to him has to be set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to his costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250/- if certified. Appeal allowed. .