J. M. Srivastava, J - This is an application under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. The applicant petitioner had filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Civil Rule No. 3955 of 1991 for refund of Rs. 75, 03, 483.58 realised from the petitioner as excise duty on aqua solution produced for captive use in manufacture of plywood together with interest. This Court on 7.6.91 directed the respondent authorities including the present opposite party the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Tinsukia to refund the said amount of Rs. 75. 03, 483 58 p. within two months. The applicant petitioner submits that the opposite party has not made the refund as directed by the Court. Hence this application. 3. The opposite party in the affidavit-in-opposition submitted that a special leave petition to appeal against the aforesaid order dated 7.6.91 was filed in the Supreme Court and hence the refund could not be made. 4. We have heard Sri P. G. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Sri K. N. Choudhury, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for the opposite party who has submitted that in view of the Central Excises and Custom Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991, hereinafter referred as the Act, which came into force on 20.9.91 any refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of the said Amendment Act and hence the action desired by the present applicant should not be taken. 5. We have considered the submissions for the parties. 6. Sri P.G. Baruah, learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner has cited Governor General in Council vs. Province of Madras, AIR 1945 PC 98 at page 101; Union of India vs. Delhi Cloth Mills, AIR 1963 SC 791 , In Re Sea Customs Act, AIR 1963 SC 1760 para 25 to emphasise that excise duty is levied on manufacture of goods and to contend that in the present case the v, excise duty was levied on `aqua' solution manufactured by the petitioner not for sale but for captive use as binding agent in the manufacture of plywood and hence the excise duty so wrongly collected from the petitioner had to be refunded. This matter has earlier been considered by the departmental appellate authority and this Court by order dated 7.6.91 directed refund and need not be gone into again for the purposes of the present application which, in our opinion, has to be considered in the light of the recently amended provisions of section 11B and new section 11 D of the Act. 7. Sri P.G. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on the words `notwithstanding anything to the contrary' in the newly inserted section 11D(1) of the Act with reference to the same word `notwithstanding' in Article 224 A of the Constitution, to contend that the petitioner's claim for refund as ordered by this Court in its order dated 7.6.91 was not affected by the said amendment. 8. It may be noted that by the aforesaid amendments a modified procedure has been provided for refund, etc. with emphasis on who actually had borne its incidence, of excise duty. 9. Section 11B(1) as amended in its proviso says that an application for refund made before the commencement of the said Amendment Act, 1991 shall be deemed to have been made under this sub-section as amended by the Act and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) substituted by that Act. Section 11B(2) provides the guidelines how the Assistant Collector shall deal with the matter and clauses (a) to (f) of the proviso specify the grounds or conditions in which refund may be ordered. Sri P. G. Baruah has submitted that the petitioner's claim for refund is covered by aforesaid clauses (c) and (d). This however is a matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector to consider and decide. 10. Section 11 B (3) reads: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in sub-section (2)." (emphasis supplied) 11. Sri P. G. Baruah has referred to section 11C as amended. However, the procedure to be followed in a case covered by section 11C is also laid down in section 11B(2). 12. Sri P. G. Baruah has referred to section 11C as amended. However, the procedure to be followed in a case covered by section 11C is also laid down in section 11B(2). 12. The new provision in section 11D(1) provides for paying of any amount collected from the buyer of any goods in any manner as representing duty of excise to the credit of the Central Government. Section 11D(2) provides for adjustment of the said amount against duty of excise payable by the person on finalisation of assessment, for credit of any surplus to the Fund, or as the case may be for refund to the person who has borne the incidence of such amount in accordance with the provisions of section 11 B. 13. It may be noted that `Fund' has been defined by insertion of new clause (cc) in section 2 of the Act and means the Consumer Welfare Fund established under section 12 C. 14. While it is true that earlier the opposite party had stated that in view of the SLP filed in the Supreme Court, the order of this Court dated 7.6.91 could not be carried out and now it is stated that it is not known what was the result of said SLP, in our opinion, the law in regard to refund as amended with effect from 20.9.91 has to be taken into consideration to see if any action as has been prayed by the petitioner, can be taken. 15. Section 11 B (2) makes it abundantly clear that after the amendment made with effect from 20.9.91, no refund shall be made except as provided in sub-section (2). 16. The basic change introduced by the amendment is that refund has to be made to the person who has borne the incidence of the amount collected as duty and that question has to be determined by the Assistant Collector who has exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and on its basis refund if any is to be made to the person so determined to be entitled. Sri Baruah has argued that the order dated 7.6.91 was made by this Court in exercise of its extra­ ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and could not be nullified by the amendment, and has cited a decision of Calcutta High Court-Tiraghur Paper Mills vs. Union of India 1992 (57) ELT 527 . Sri Baruah has argued that the order dated 7.6.91 was made by this Court in exercise of its extra­ ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and could not be nullified by the amendment, and has cited a decision of Calcutta High Court-Tiraghur Paper Mills vs. Union of India 1992 (57) ELT 527 . The decision of the Calcutta High Court does support Sri Barua's submission. The said decision, however, did not notice the effect of section 11B(3) on order for refund made earlier. The order of this Court dated 7.6.91 in our opinion cannot be given effect, in view of the clear provisions of section 11 B (3). 17. Sri Baruah has emphasised that in this case the excise duty was erroneously collected and hence the order of its refund was not affected by the amendment. We find it difficult to accept the contention. While there may be no doubt in view of the earlier decision dated 21.4.89 of this Court in Civil Rule No. 249 of 1982 [1989 (2) GLJ 141] and the order of the departmental appellate authority that collection of excise duty on aqua solution produced by the petitioner for captive consumption as binding agent in manufacture of plywood, was erroneous. Yet after the said amendment w.e.f. 20.9.91, the question of refund, even of any amount erroneously collected as excise duty, despite the order of this Court, in view of section 11B(3) has to be in accordance with the provisions of section 11B(2). The order dated 7.6.91 by this Court for refund therefore cannot be given effect after the amendment and on its basis no refund can be made. 18. The petitioner had earlier filed an application for refund before the Assistant Collector. The application has not yet been disposed of and is pending. Sri K.N. Choudhury, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel submitted that the application could not be disposed of because the petitioner had filed the petition in which the order dated 7.6.91 was made and later because the present proceedings have been initiated. Sri Choudhury has, however, stated that the authority opposite party shall dispose of the application if the Court allows time to do so. 19. Sri Baruah has submitted that the respondent authorities had refused to make the refund and nence it could not be said that the application was pending. Sri Choudhury has, however, stated that the authority opposite party shall dispose of the application if the Court allows time to do so. 19. Sri Baruah has submitted that the respondent authorities had refused to make the refund and nence it could not be said that the application was pending. The petitioner in his petition in Civil Rule No.3056 of 1991 had stated that the authorities had not taken any action on the application for refund despite repeated requests. Annexure 3 with the petition was another application dated 9.1.91 wherein the petitioner had reiterated that claim for refund had been submitted and hoped that the same would be considered sympathetically at the earliest. The petition in said Civil Rule was filed on 29.2.91. It should, therefore, be clear that the claim for refund was pending and had not been rejected. Besides, even if the submission be accepted, then the provisions of section 11B(1) would be attracted and a fresh petition would be required to be filed. 20. Sri Baruah has laid great emphasis on the facts that the amount was erroneously recovered and had therefore to be refunded and also on the earlier adjudication on the petitioner's claim for refund and this Court's order dated 7.6.91 to argue that there was really nothing left to be decided by the Assistant Collector. The submission seems logical, but because it ignores the clear mandate of section 11B(3), it should not be accepted. The change in the law in regard to refund in such cases, lays emphasis on the person who actually has borne the incidence of the amount collected and that is why the provisions of section 11B(2) require consideration of the matter on materials to be produced and determination by the Assistant Collector. It may be noted that in section 11D(1), the words are "who has collected any amount from the buyers of any goods in any manner as representing of duty of Excise ..." The words any amount are not without significance and in our opinion would clearly embrace collection of an amount which could not be collected as excise duty, as has been urged in the present case, but which was collected from the buyer as representing duty of excise. It, therefore, does not make any difference that the claims for refund in the instant case was for amount erroneously collected as duly of excise. 21. It, therefore, does not make any difference that the claims for refund in the instant case was for amount erroneously collected as duly of excise. 21. In view of conclusion above, the application for refund filed earlier has to be deemed an application under the amended provision of proviso to section 11B(1) of the Act and should be disposed of by the Assistant Collector opposite party, in accordance with the provision of section 11B(2). 22. We accordingly decline to proceed any further with this application and with the direction to the opposite party Assistant Collector to duly consider and dispose of the petitioner's application for refund in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from today, close this petition.