AGRAWAL, C.J.—This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has been filed by the petitioner challenging the notification of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (in short the Board) dated 11-4-1988 issued in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section-49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred as the Supply Act) whereby the provisional rate of fuel surcharge was fixed on eight paisa per unit from the billing month of May, 1988 chargeable from medium and large scale industrial consumers. It had been prayed by the petitioner that by an appropriate writ, order or direction it may be declared that no fuel surcharge is leviable from May, 1988 or in the alternative, the rate of fuel surcharge not liable to exceed four paisa per unit. Consequently, the prayer for quashing the aforesaid notification dated 11-4-1988 fixing the provisional rate of fuel surcharge was made. (2) The Rajasthan State Electricity Board created under the Supply Act enjoined with the duty of supply of electricity to all the consumers through out the State of Rajasthan and for that pupose it obtained power from the Thermal Power Houses in Rajasthan where actually the coal and oil were used as the main raw material. It also generated power from Hydel sources at Chambal in Rajasthan and got power from Bhakra and Byas Power Stations and Satpura Thermal Station in Madhya Pradesh. The Board also purchased the power from the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project and from several other power stations in the neighbourhood. The Atomic Power Project was owned and controlled by the Central Government and uranium and heavy water were the principal fuel which were used for producing energy at the Atomic Power Station. The power from Atomic Power Project was most uncertain and it goes out of order at any time and takes a long time to re-start. Since there was large gap between the demand and availability of electric power in the State of Rajasthan, the Board had to purchase electricity from other out-side sources. In order to tide over the difficulty of shortage of power in Rajasthan, the Board undertaken construction of two Thermal Power Stations at Kota in first stage, each of 110 MW KWH. One of which 110 MW was commissioned in January, 1983 whereas the second unit of 110 MW was commissioned in July, 1983. In order to tide over the difficulty of shortage of power in Rajasthan, the Board undertaken construction of two Thermal Power Stations at Kota in first stage, each of 110 MW KWH. One of which 110 MW was commissioned in January, 1983 whereas the second unit of 110 MW was commissioned in July, 1983. (3) According to the Board, the Thermal Power Stations which used coal and oil as the main fuel for generating power, are more dependable than other sources of power. The price of fuel specifically coal had gone up very high and rose constantly. The newly constructed Thermal Power Stations consumed coal and oil as main fuel. On account of the costly fuel (coal and oil) and on account of less electricity being available from the Hydel sources, the fuel surcharge was bound to be much more than the fuel surcharge calculated in the previous year. (4) The fuel adjustment clause had always been the part of the tariff for supply of electricity and made applicable by the Board from time to time since 1964. Upto the period "Tariffs for supply of Electricity, 1976" was in force, the provisional rate of fuel surcharge for the current period was to be charged from the High- Tension (HT) consumers in accordance with the final rates worked out for the last previous period and the final adjustments were to be made when the final rates of fuel surcharge for that period was worked out. The relevant part of the Fuel adjustment clause of the aforesaid tariff of 1976 reads as under :— "The provisional rate shall be charged for the current period according to the rate for the previous period and final adjustment shall be made when the final rates of fuel surcharge is worked out." (5) The Board pleaded that on account of non-finalisation of the tariffs by the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project, Government of India including the fuel surcharge (element C1 of the formula relating to fuel adjustment clause to be levied by R.A.P.P. on the Board) it was beyond the control of the Board to work out the final rate of fuel surcharge according to the formula of fuel adjustment clause for consecutive six years from 1974 to 1980. The R.A.P.P. tariffs were finalised for the said period in 1981- 82 and the Board, thereafter, worked-out final rates of fuel surcharge to be charged from its consumers and according to the final rates, arrear bills were sent to its HT consumers. The said final rates of fuel surcharge so worked out after a lapse of about more than six years were challenged by various writ petitions before this Court. (6) A learned single Judge of this Court by his judgment dated 16-4- 1983 upheld the levy for the aforesaid six years, but declined to grant interest claimed by the Board on such final rates. Special appeals were filed by some of the consumers as well as by the Board. The grievance of the Board was for holding by the learned Single Judge that the interest was not liable to be paid to it by the HT consumers. These matters are pending in the Supreme Court. (7) The Board experienced that the informations required from different agencies took sufficient time in collecting all the relevant informations in respect of the elements as required in the formula for fuel adjustment clause for working out the final rate of fuel surcharge, and till such time, the previous final rates worked out was to be charged for the subsequent current years as provisional rate. As a result of non-availability of complete formula, the Board remained deprived of its legitimate revenues for a long time although the amount on fuel escalations have been incurred by the Board, but could not be charged from its consumers due to the reasons mentioned above. To over-come this difficulty, the Board decided in 1981 to revise the procedure of charging provisional rate of fuel surcharge for the current period by making suitable amendments in the tariffs. As such, after processing the matter and carrying out all the formalities, the Board revised the tariff vide notification dated 7-7-1981 which is known as Tariff for supply of Electricity, 1981. So far as the charging of the provisional rate for the current period was concerned, it was revised as under :— "The consumer shall be charged for the current period at the provisional rate, as may be decided by the Board from time to time, for which the decision of the Board shall be final, and binding on the consumer. So far as the charging of the provisional rate for the current period was concerned, it was revised as under :— "The consumer shall be charged for the current period at the provisional rate, as may be decided by the Board from time to time, for which the decision of the Board shall be final, and binding on the consumer. Final adjustment shall be made when the final rate of fuel surcharge is worked out, for that period on the basis of formula mentioned above." (8) On account of this revision of the tariff, the HT consumers became liable to pay provisional rate as revised from time to time for the current period and it was not obligatory upon the Board to fix such provisional rate on the basis of the final rates of previous period. The Boards case was that for the reasons beyond the control of the Board, the provisional rates could not be worked out upon the final rates determined in earlier years. According to the formula, an estimate was made of the likely to increase in the rates of fuel from the basic rates provided in the formula and also of the probable units of electricity that could be made available to the respondent Board by generation or by purchase. After taking into consideration all the components given in the formula of fuel adjustment clause, the provisional rate of fuel surcharge was estimated. This provisional payment was for a temporary need suitable or acceptable in the existing situation, but subject to change or nullification. In other words, the provisional rate was tentative and conditional subject to final adjustment. If after the final rates of fuel surcharge are calculated for the period for which fuel surcharge was charged at provisional rates, any amount was charged less or in excess than the final rates of fuel surcharge, the same was liable to be recovered or adjusted in the subsequent bills sent to the consumers. (9) The Boards case was that due to increasing demand of energy from the consumers and on account of the less availability of power from Boards own sources, the Board also started purchasing power from the neighbouring sources, Badarpur Thermal Power Station, Guru Nanak Thermal Power, Singraufi Thermal Station etc. The Board used to revise quarterly the rates of fuel surcharge due to escalations. It had havey financial strain. Hence, in 1981, the Board. The Board used to revise quarterly the rates of fuel surcharge due to escalations. It had havey financial strain. Hence, in 1981, the Board. decided to bring about a change in the system by way of cost variation and fuel adjustment clause (Tariff of 1981) in which if the rates of HT PS power purchased as on 1-4-1981 were revised thereafter during the year, such element has also been taken into consideration in the revised formula of cost variation and fuel adjustment clause as prescribed in the Tariffs of 1981, made applicable from August, 1981. (10) From paragraph-J of the reply filed on behalf of the Board, its assertion was that the final rates of fuel surcharge upto April 1982 was worked out to 3.15 paisa per unit, for the year 1982-83 it worked out at 4.92 paisa per unit and for the year 1983-84 it had been worked out at 10.13 paisa per unit vide notification dated 19.6.1986. For the year 1984-85, the final rate of fuel surcharge was worked out at 12.57 paisa per unit vide notification dated 3.10.1986. (11) From paragraph K of the reply read with J, it appears that the rates of fuel surcharge were revised from time to time, but the basic rate of fuel (coal and oil) was not revised and variations in the rate of fuel etc. was compared with the old basic rate of August 1964 treating the same to be base upto the proposal for revision in the Tariff for supply of Electricity 1985. (12) From paragraph L of the reply, it appears that the fuel surcharge for the year 1983-84 worked out to about 10 paisa per unit which stood merged and included in the aforesaid revision of Tariff of the year 1985. The basic rates of fuel and power purchases as per the average rate prevailing in the year 1983-84 were taken as the base while fixing the provisional rate vide notification dated 29-8-1985 to be at 4 paisa per unit as provisional fuel surcharge. (13) Through this writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has claimed the following reliefs : i) that no fuel surcharge is leviable from the billing months of Jan. (13) Through this writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has claimed the following reliefs : i) that no fuel surcharge is leviable from the billing months of Jan. 1990 or in the alternative, the rate of fuel surcharge should not exceed 8.25 paisa per unit; ii) to quash the notification dated 22-12-1989 by which the provisional rate of fuel surcharge had been increased from 8 paisa per KWH. to 20 paisa per KWH; iii) to declare that the cost variation and fuel adjustment clause provided for supply of electricity 1985 is ultra vires the provisions of Sections 45 and 51 of the Supply Act, 1948; and iv) to restrain the respondent Board from realizing any amount of fuel surcharge from the petitioner from the billing month of Jan. 1990 in excess of 8.25 paisa per unit. (14) Some of the points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners are concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (1). In this case, the Supreme Court held : "This Court also held that the prescribing of different tariffs for high and low tension consumers and for different classes of consumers, such as industrial, commercial, agricultural and domestic, appear to be reasonable and far from arbitrary and is based on an intelligent and intelligible differentia. Accordingly, the judgment of the Kerala High Court upholding challenge to the validity of the upward revision of tariffs was set-aside. Broadly speaking, the substance of the main arguments advanced before us in these matters was repelled by this Court in the Kerala case. However, learned counsel for the appellants attempted to distinguish the Kerala decision and also tried to advance some additional arguments. We shall refer to those arguments presently." (15) Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that he did not challenge the tariff determined in this case, but only the manner in which fuel surcharge had been claimed by the Board from the petitioner. He urged that whatever decision was taken, the fuel charges would be per se arbitrary. (16) The relevant controversy that arises in this case is about the scope of judicial review in a case like the present. The contention of the petitioners counsel was that this Courts power of judicial review is wide. He urged that whatever decision was taken, the fuel charges would be per se arbitrary. (16) The relevant controversy that arises in this case is about the scope of judicial review in a case like the present. The contention of the petitioners counsel was that this Courts power of judicial review is wide. He contended that judicial review could exercised on the following basis : 1) Abuse of discretion 2) Abuse of jurisdiction 3) Violation of the rules of natural justice. He urged that most errors of law are susceptible to judicial review. (17)- The controversy relating to scope of judicial review was considered by the Supreme Court in two cases reported in Shri Sita Ram Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2) and Kerala State Electricity Board vs. M/s. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros. (3). In M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (supra), the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by special leave by several industrial concerns against the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board challenging the common judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court revising the electricity tariffs by the Board. The controversy in these appeals was also the controversy in another bunch of civil appeals arising out of a judgment of the Kerala High Court wherein a similar challenge had been upheld. (18) In Kerala State Electricity Board vs. M/s. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros, (supra), the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether HT tariff revised by the Kerala State Electricity Board was justified and valid. The Kerala High Court struck the upward revision of tariffs. The Supreme Court rejected the submission which had found favour with the Kerala High Court that in the absence of a specification by the State Government, the position would be as it was before the 1978 amendment, that is, the Board was to carry on its affairs and adjust the tariffs in such a manner as not to incur a loss and no more. While rejecting the submission, the Supreme Court observed as under: We are of the view that the failure of the Government to specify the surplus which may be generated by the Board cannot prevent the Board from generating a surplus after meeting the expenses required to be met. While rejecting the submission, the Supreme Court observed as under: We are of the view that the failure of the Government to specify the surplus which may be generated by the Board cannot prevent the Board from generating a surplus after meeting the expenses required to be met. Perhaps, the quantum of surplus may nt exceed what a prudent public service undertaking may be expected to generate without sacrificing the interests it is expected to serve and without being obsessed by the pure profit motive of the private enterpreneur. The Board may not allow its character as a public utility under-taking to be changed into that of a profit motivated private trading or manufacturing house. Neither the tariffs nor the resulting surplus may reach such heights as to lead to the inevitable conclusion that the Board has shed its public utility character. When that happens the Court may strike down the revision of tariffs as plainly arbitrary. But not until then. Not, merely because a surplus has been generated, a surplus which can by no means be said to be extravagent. The Court will then refrain from touching the tariffs. After all, as has been said by this Court often enough price fixation is neither the forte nor the function of the Court." It was further observed : Turning back to Section 59 and reading it alongwith Sections 49, 57, 67-A etc. we notice that the Electricity (Supply) Act requires the Electricity Board to follow a particular method of accounting and it is on the basis of that method of accounting that the Board is required to generate a surplus. Broadly, section 59 requires that a surplus should be left from the total revenues, in any year of account, after meeting all expenses properly chargeable to revenues. It has to be remembered that apart from subventions which may be received from the State Government, which depend entirely on the bounty of the government, the only revenues available to the Board are the charges leviable by it from consumers. Bearing this in mind, we may now consider what expenses are properly chargeable to revenues under the Electricity (Supply) Act. For this purpose, we may not be justified in having recourse to the principles of corporate accounting or the rules which determine what is revenue expenditure under the Income-Tax Act. Bearing this in mind, we may now consider what expenses are properly chargeable to revenues under the Electricity (Supply) Act. For this purpose, we may not be justified in having recourse to the principles of corporate accounting or the rules which determine what is revenue expenditure under the Income-Tax Act. It appears to us that the Electricity (Supply) Act prescribes its own special principles of accounting to be followed by the Board..." (19) In M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (Supra), the Supreme Court upheld the upward revision of the tariffs holding the power of-fixation of tariffs in the Board was valid. In paragraph 26 it observe. It is not unreasonable to take the view that the thermal power has become costlier on account of the increase in fuel cost and could notionally be allocated to the consumption by H.T. and power intensive consumers, and therefore, the fuel cost adjustment is made applicable tothem alone. In our opinion, the argument on behalf of the Board in this behalf is not unreasonable." (20) While rejecting the argument that the upward hike of tariff for the HT consumers including power intensive was arbitrary, the Supreme Court observed as under : — It was argued on behalf of the appellants with considerable force that the upward hike of tariff for the HT consumers including power intensive was arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as it was not related to the cost of generation and was based on irrelevant factors. It was argued that the L.T. tariffs and agricultural tariffs were relieved of this burden and the liabilities of the Board even of a capital nature were taken into account for increasing the tariff applicable to power intensive units. The contention is that these factors are irrelevant and do not permit exercise of the power to increase the tariffs. This argument was considered at length in Govinda Prabhus case ( AIR 1986 SC 1999 ) before it was negatived. We agree with the reasons given in that decision to repel this contention." (21) We have stated above that in fact the present controversy is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. M/s S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros., (supra) and M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electy. Board (supra). We agree with the reasons given in that decision to repel this contention." (21) We have stated above that in fact the present controversy is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. M/s S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros., (supra) and M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electy. Board (supra). In both the cases, the Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with the scope and interpretation of Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. (22) The argument of the petitioners counsel with regard to laying down the general principles for Boards finance covered much of the time. Since this has been discussed in details in the two judgments of the Supreme Court mentioned above, we do not consider it worthwhile to refer the same. Under Section 59 (as amended in 1978), the Board could adjust its tariffs so that after meeting the various expenses properly required to be met a surplus is left. However, where the Board has not been able to make that surplus, the same would not invalidate the tariffs fixed under section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. (23) We find support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Sitaram Sugar C. Ltd. vs. Union of India (supra), for the view that the price fixation is in the nature of a legislative action even though it is based on objective criteria founded on relevant material. Price fixation has to follow the same principles as framing of tariff. The Supreme Court in M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electy. Board (supra) while dealing with the limited power of judicial review in the field of price fixation, it held : "The limited power of judicial review in the field of price fixation was also indicated. This limited scope of judicial review in striking down revision of tariffs resulting in generation of surplus applied in Govinda Prabhu ( AIR 1986 SC 1999 ) cannot be defaulted in view of the long line of decisions of this Court on the point and reiteration of the same principle by a Constitution Bench in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 . Ltd. vs. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 . The surplus generated by the Board as a result of revision of tariffs during the relevant period cannot be called extravagant by any standard to render it arbitrary permitting the striking down of the revision of tariffs on the ground of arbitrariness." (24) What is the limitation of price fixation has been elaborately considered by the Supreme Court in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India (supra) in paragraphs 48, 49 and 50 which reads as under : "The doctrine of judicial review implies that the repository of power acts within the bounds of the power delegated and he does not abuse his power. He must act reasonably and in good faith. It is not only sufficient that an instrument is intra vires the parent Act, but it must also be consistent with the constitutional principles : Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (SCC pp. 314-15)." "Where a question of law is at issue, the court may determine the rightness of the impugned decision on its own independent judgment. If the decision of the authority does not agree with that which the Court considers to be the right one, the finding of law by the authority is liable to be upset. Where it is a finding of fact, the court examines only the reasonableness of the finding. When that finding is found to be rational and reasonably based on evidence, in the sense that all relevant material has been taken into account and no irrelevant material has influenced the decision, and the decision is one which any reasonably minded person, acting on such evidence, would have come to, then judicial review is exhausted even though the finding may not necessarily be what the court would have come to as a trier of fact. Whether an order is characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, or, whether it is a determination of law or fact, the judgment of the expert body, entrusted with power is generally treated as final and the judicial function is exhausted when it is found to have "warrant in the record" and a rational basis in law : See Rochester Tel. Corp. Vs. United States. See also Associated Provisional Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation." As stated by Lord Hailsham of St. Corp. Vs. United States. See also Associated Provisional Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation." As stated by Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. (HL) in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police vs. Evans : — "The function of the court is to see that lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment and not to attempt itself the task entrusted to that authority by the law. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court." In the same case Lord Brightman says : "Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made." (25) In the instant case, we are unable to find that the tariff had been arbitrarily fixed. It was done by the experts, who while revising the tariff took into account the rising trend of prices and expenditure incurred on various raw materials. (26) We are unable to find force in the submission of the petitioners counsel that the hike of tariff for the HT consumers was since occasioned because of the loose policy of the State Government to supply electricity to the villages, therefore, the hike must hold that whatever expenditure is incurred on the villages that should not be made to be borne by the HT consumers. He urged that heavy expenditure involved in the supply of electricity to villages was arbitrary and discriminatory. We find no substance. It is the State Government which has to determine it and High Court has no power in such matter to interfere and to hold the act of the State Government to be invalid on that basis. (27) Counsel for the petitioner urged that at the first instance an application had been filed by the petitioner for summoning the papers in possession of the Board to make out its case. The first point raised by the counsel for the petitioner was that production of documents, particularly accounts, balance sheet, figures of transmission losses and other allied documents was necessary to decide the controversy involved about the correctness of the tariff in this case. The first point raised by the counsel for the petitioner was that production of documents, particularly accounts, balance sheet, figures of transmission losses and other allied documents was necessary to decide the controversy involved about the correctness of the tariff in this case. In the absence of production of complete records and details of computation of figures, the petitioner would not be able to show that fuel surcharge had been unreasonably and unjustifiably raised from time to time. This according to the petitioner was not within the power of the Board conferred by S. 49 of the Supply Act. Counsel for the petitioner urged that he wanted to rely on audited account to build up his case and for that purpose the same was liable to brought on record in the present writ. (28) The application was contested by the Board. The direction for production of the papers demanded by the petitioner was objected on the ground that this Court did not have jurisdiction u/Art. 226 to do so. The controversy according to the Board raised by the petitioner in this writ petition was beyond the scope of interference and, as such, these papers could not be summoned. (29) By the judgment dated 12.12.1986, Honble Mr. Justice D.L. Mehta allowed the application directing : "Under such circumstances, it is directed that the audited statement of accounts including profit and loss account and balance sheet shall be supplied to the present petitioner for the year 1980-81 to 1984-85 on payment of costs. It is further directed that it is necessary for the just decision of the case that the Board shall furnish before the Court and shall also supply the copy of the statement to the Counsel for the petitioner showing the percentage of transmission losses for the years 1980 to 1985." (30) Against this order, the Board preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court. In the appeal, the following order was passed : — "Issue notice. Mr. Rajinder Singh, Advocate takes notice on behalf of the respondent. Counter affidavit may be filed in two weeks. Rejoinder Affidavit, if any, may be filed in one week thereafter. Call the matter after vacation. There shall be interim stay." (31) Counsel for the petitioner contended that despite the pendency of the special leave petition in the Supreme Court challenging the order of Honble Mr. Counter affidavit may be filed in two weeks. Rejoinder Affidavit, if any, may be filed in one week thereafter. Call the matter after vacation. There shall be interim stay." (31) Counsel for the petitioner contended that despite the pendency of the special leave petition in the Supreme Court challenging the order of Honble Mr. Justice D.L. Mehta, this Court is required to give judgment on merits. We do not agree with the submission of the petitioners counsel for the opinion given below. (32) As a result of the aforesaid order, the judgment of the learned Single Judge has been nullified and the Board is not required now to file any one of the papers which were demanded by the petitioner through the application allowed by Mr. Justice D.L. Mehta. Upon the rejection of the application, the consequence that follows is that the petitioner cannot refer to any one of the papers in support of the arguments raised in this writ petition. (33) This Court cannot act as an appellate authority over the accounts prepared by the Chartered Accountant. Article 226 of the Constitution confers limited jurisdiction on a Court to interfere when there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Nothing could be shown to us to hold that such a mistake had been committed. (34) We have already pointed-out that the nature of judicial review proceedings is different from ordinary litigation. Hence, discovery is not to be ordered in a situation like the present. Dealing with this controversy, Clive Lewis in his book says that the governing principle in ordinary writ actions is that the court should not make an order for discovery..." unless the Court is of the opinion that the order is necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs." The same test applies, in principle, in judicial review proceedings, so that discovery should be ordered whenever and to the extent that it is necessary in order to dispose fairly of a particular case or for saving costs. (35) If the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure is assumed to be applicable to a writ petition for the purpose of discovery, then the requirement was of complying with Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is necessary. (36) The extent of discovery in judicial review is more circumscribed than in a civil suit. (35) If the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure is assumed to be applicable to a writ petition for the purpose of discovery, then the requirement was of complying with Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is necessary. (36) The extent of discovery in judicial review is more circumscribed than in a civil suit. The discovery will only be ordered where it is necessary for the purposes of dealing with the judicial review application. It has been said by Clive Lewis on Judicial Remedies in Public Law at page 256 : "The courts will not allow fishing expeditions whereby an applicant seeks discovery of documents in the hope that something will emerge which might form the basis of a claim for review. The courts will not, for example, order discovery where the applicant claims that a decision is so unreasonable that it must be flawed and seeks discovery in the hope that it might turn up evidence to support another allegation, such as taking into account irrelevant, or failing to take into account relevant, considerations." (37) We have already noted above that the operation of the order of the learned Single Judge allowing the application of discovery was stayed by the Supreme Court. Hence, all those arguments which were made before us at length by the petitioners counsel about the balance-sheet filed by him in the present proceedings are not required to be dealt with. Otherwise, considering the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226, the discovery is unjustified. The proceedings are being treated by the petitioner as such, compliance of Order 11 C.P.C. has also not been made. (38) It is alleged that there is double adjustment in respect of cost of fuel and other expenses and, therefore, surcharge is not leviable. This argument is contrary to the accounting principles. The Tariff has been prepared on the basis of cost of fuel, coal etc. as prevailing in the base year i.e. 1964. It is not alleged that the tariff is on the basis of prevalent rates of the fuel, coal etc., as such whatever is received by the respondents from the consumer is only on the basis of figure of the base year. as prevailing in the base year i.e. 1964. It is not alleged that the tariff is on the basis of prevalent rates of the fuel, coal etc., as such whatever is received by the respondents from the consumer is only on the basis of figure of the base year. The rise in the cost of fuel, coal or purchase of electricity is considered in surcharge figure and this could be determined when complete figures are received from the different sources, from where the coal, fuel or electricity is procured. The sur-charge received in respect of the difference between figures of the base year and the actual figure in accordance with the formula is finally determined when the complete figures are received and the respondents thereafter issue the bills. The surcharge is thus received finally when the bills are raised. The receipts are shown as revenue receipts in the year in which they are actually received. Thus the respondents have not realised initially the cost of actual expenditure incurred on the purchase of fuel, coal and electricity, to which they are entitled. The difference is collected by way of sur-charge and this rise in the cost of coal, fuel and electricity is not realised twice from the consumer. From 1985, the interest and depreciation is adjusted in the net revenue and appropriation account, which was earlier not adjusted and previously a note only was given. Now the balance is carried to the balance sheet which is normally a debit balance and is shown on the asset side of the balance sheet. The debit balance remains in the balance sheet because the Board is not capable of meeting out the expenses and runs into loss and even the depreciation and interest was not capable of adjustment from surplus of the revenue receipts. It is not disputed that the charges in accordance with the tariff are based on the cost of fuel and electricity of base year i.e. of 1964 and subsequent increase in the rate of fuel has not been included in the normal tariff. It is also not disputed that the Board is competent to realise the difference by way of sur-charge. If the sur-charge is realised subsequently, then it cannot be said that there is double adjustment. The realisation is once and so the adjustment and, therefore, it is not a case of double adjustment. It is also not disputed that the Board is competent to realise the difference by way of sur-charge. If the sur-charge is realised subsequently, then it cannot be said that there is double adjustment. The realisation is once and so the adjustment and, therefore, it is not a case of double adjustment. The basic power under Sec. 49 is not controlled by the provisions of Sec. 59 of the Electric Supply Act, 1948. It has not been pointed out as to how the value of the various factors in accordance with the formula have not been worked out correctly. Section 51 does not restrict the powers to be exercised before the end of the next year and could be exercised after the actual liability is ascertained. The provisional payment contemplated under Section 51 are subject to the final liability and, therefore, the liability in respect of provisional payment cannot justifiably be challenged. The argument that the burden of preferential class of consumers like agriculture have been passed on the H.T. consumers is also incorrect since in accordance with the formula the total extra cost is divided by the unit purchased and generated and thus the cost per unit for sur-charge is arrived at and on that basis the individual H.T. consumers are charged. (39) Surcharge is additional price for consumption of electric energy and was thus neither a tax nor a fee. Therefore, when the State Electricity Board running into heavy loss on account of rise in cost of production and increase in expenses instead of introducing a revised tariff introduced a general surcharge for all consumers according to the different categories of consumers, such imposition cannot be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable. (40) The Supreme Court in Bisra Stonelime Co. Therefore, when the State Electricity Board running into heavy loss on account of rise in cost of production and increase in expenses instead of introducing a revised tariff introduced a general surcharge for all consumers according to the different categories of consumers, such imposition cannot be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable. (40) The Supreme Court in Bisra Stonelime Co. Ltd. vs. Orissa State Electricity Board (4) has observed as under : "The Supreme Court in another decision has observed that the word surcharge is not defined in the Act, but etymologically, inter alia, surcharge stands for an additional or extra charge and the payment of surcharge is thus a super added charge, charge over and above the usual and current dues, that it is in substance an additional to the stipulated rates of tariff and that the nomenclature, therefore, does not alter the position and enhancement of rates by way of surcharge is well within the power of the Board to fix or revise rates of tariff under the provisions of the Act." (41) In 1984 Raj. 131 (5), it has been held by a Division Bench that fuel surcharge is in substance an additional extra charge and its scope cannot be circumscribed by its nomenclature and must be held to be part of tariff. The Board could issue bills of fuel surcharge at provisional rates to be followed by supplementary bills after working out the final rate. (42) In our view, since the fuel surcharge is worked out on the basis of formula already contained in the tariff, it is already known to the consumers that the same would be worked out on its basis, no injustice has been done. By the judgment given in(1984) 32 BLJR 232 (6), the Patna High Court has also upheld the validity of imposition and demand of fuel surcharge and it was also held that the fuel surcharge has been made in accordance with the provisions of Section 49 was not arbitrary or unreasonable, such validity could not be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution. (43) The process of tariffs, as envisaged by S. 49 of the Act, is legislative in character. If one scrutinises the various steps, which are necessary to be taken for finalisation of tariffs, it would be found that it is placed before the Legislative Assemby for its approval. (43) The process of tariffs, as envisaged by S. 49 of the Act, is legislative in character. If one scrutinises the various steps, which are necessary to be taken for finalisation of tariffs, it would be found that it is placed before the Legislative Assemby for its approval. It is thus a piece of legislation and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was passed without hearing cannot invalidate the same. In Tharoo MaL vs. Pooran Chand (7), the Supreme Court held as under :— . "There is no right to be heard before the making of legislation whether primary or delegated unless it is provided by statute. In matter of fixation of municipal rates, the right to object even at the stage of proposals of the tax only as concession to the requirement of fairness even though the procedure is legislative and not quasi-judicial." (44) Coming to the question of observance of procedure of post decisional hearing, we have already held that there was no such need in the present case. Paul Jackson in his book Natural Justice has dealt with the same at page 18 in the following words : "The principles of natural justice are of wide application and great importance but they must be confined within proper limits and not allowed to run wild." (per Megarry J. in Hounslow L.B.C. vs. Twickenham Garden Developments (1971) Ch. 233, 258)." (45) Learned counsel for the petitioner next urged that the process of determination of amount was quasi-judicial and the petitioner was not only entitled to see the evidence on the basis of which calculation had been made but also to a hearing. The hearing to which the learned counsel was referring can be considered as post-decisional hearing. The idea of post decisional hearing has been developed to maintain a balance between administrative efficiency and fairness to the individual (See Maneka Ghandhi vs.Union of India (8). This was followed by Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India (9). (46) The details of this principle of post decisional hearing need not be considered by us inasmuch as a person is entitled to get a post decisional hearing if he was entitled to be heard before the decision was given but he was not given opportunity. In other words, a person, who is entitled to get pre-decisional hearing is entitled to post decisional hearing. In other words, a person, who is entitled to get pre-decisional hearing is entitled to post decisional hearing. This method has been evolved to satisfy those cases where pre-decisional hearing could not be provided. In the instant case, there was no question of pre- decisional hearing. (47) In a number of decisions given by this Court which are numbering about 200, the validity of the tariff has been upheld. Detailed reasons have been given in those judgments. We respectfully agree with them. (48) Mr. Kuhad, counsel for the petitioner also extensively urged about the Finance of the Electy. Board as to how was required to be maintained. By pointing out entries here and there, he argued that the present was a case double of adjustment of same entry. We have held above this function is beyond our power. All the entries were made in accordance with the principles of accountancy. (49) The Finance has been divided into two broad heads by Halsburys Laws of England Vol. 16 at page 43. Paragraph 68 deals with the general financial duties, whereas the paragraph 69 deals with Generating Boards Tariffs. (50) Paragraph .69 lays down that the tariffs must be so framed as to show the methods by which, and the principles on which, the charges are to be made as well as the prices which are to be charged, and must be published in such manner as in the Generating Boards opinion will secure adequate publicity for them. In substance the same procedure as is given in the Halsburys Laws of England has been followed and entries of revenue account and surplus revenues are maintained by the Electricity Board. There can be some variation in details, but that variation is meaningless. In substance the same procedure as is given in the Halsburys Laws of England has been followed and entries of revenue account and surplus revenues are maintained by the Electricity Board. There can be some variation in details, but that variation is meaningless. (51) The revenue account is mentioned in paragraph 71, which reads as under : "71 Revenue account The Generating Board and the area Boards must charge to revenue account in every year all charges which are proper to be made to revenue account, including, in particular, proper allocations, in the case of the Generating Board, to the generating reserve fund, in the case of an area board, to an area reserve fund, proper provision for the redemption of capital and proper provision for depreciation of assets or for renewal of assets, and all payments (including payments which are by the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 1947, or by any "other relevant enactment, to be deemed to be capital payments) which fall to be made in that year to any local authority,under Part II of the Electricity Act 1947 in respect of any loan of that local authority and references in the Act to out goings properly chargeable to revenue account must be construed accordingly." (52) Paragraph 72 deals with Expenses and paragraph 73 deals with Borrowing powers. It is not necessary for us to deal with this aspect in details for the reasons already disclosed by us above. The principal reason being that under Article 226 the High Court has limited jurisdiction and in exercise of that jurisdiction it cannot make an extensive survey for finding out faults. (53) The last argument urged vehemently by Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner was that in the absence of reasons for revision of tariff, the same was arbitrary. We are unable to accept this submission. (54) The function of tariff revision is such which does not require giving of reasons. We have already noted above that every change in tariff is brought through the legislature. No doubt reasons are a valuable check on both the exercise of formal and informal decision making. This, however, is not a case falling in that category. To necessitate giving of reasons by legislature in a matter like this would render the working impossible. (55) The arguments of Mr. Kuhad were adopted by Mr. No doubt reasons are a valuable check on both the exercise of formal and informal decision making. This, however, is not a case falling in that category. To necessitate giving of reasons by legislature in a matter like this would render the working impossible. (55) The arguments of Mr. Kuhad were adopted by Mr. M.D. Agrawal and several counsel appearing in the connected writ petitions. Other counsel also did not advance any argument in addition to those submitted by Mr. Kuhad. (56) In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs which is fixed at Rs. 1000/-.