JUDGMENT 1. - The above numbered writ petitions are either by the Khatedars or by the Housing Co-operative Society/Societies or members of the Society/Societies who have been allotted the plots for construction of residential houses and as the challenge is primarily to the award/awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer on identical grounds, primarily the ground being that the awards have been made after two years of the extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) to this State, I will proceed to dispose of all these writ petitions by this common order. 2. It will be proper to state at the very outset that in few writ petitions the Khatedars of the land have opposed the grant of reliefs and have claimed that their lands have been acquired and the Land Acquisition Officer, or the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) who is the successor of the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur (UIT) may be asked to pay them the compensation determined under the award/awards. 3. The acquisition proceedings commenced under the Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (for short, the UIT Act). A notification under Sub-section(2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was issued on October 10, 1979 in respect of land in dispute and other lands. In the said notification it was stated that the State Government is of the opinion that the land is required for public purpose i.e. for the improvement and planned development and extension of urban area of Jaipur city and therefore interested persons were called upon to file their objections. Later on a notification under Sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was issued on April 20, 1984. In none of the writ petitions the said two notifications are under challenge and as said earlier the primary challenge is to the award/awards also on the ground that they were made after two years of the extension of the Act to this State i.e. September 24, 1984. So far as legal position under the UIT Act is concerned, it will be seen from a bare reading of sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act that when a notice under sub-section(1) of Section 52 is published in the official gazette, the land shall on and from the date of such publication, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. 4. 4. After the extension of the Act to this State w.e.f. September 24, 1984, as said earlier, so far as field of land acquisition is concerned by virtue of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India, the Act will prevail and therefore the State Government made the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1987 (Ordinance No. 17 of 1987) which was repealed by the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987 (for short, the Amendment Act). The purpose of the aforesaid Amendment Act was to bring the provisions of the UIT Act in conformity with the provisions of the Act. Such of the provisions which were not in conformity with the provisions of the Act were deleted. Section 60A was inserted in the UIT Act which reads as under: "60-A. Transitory provisions for pending mattes relating to acquisition of land-Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in sub-section(1) of Section 52, where in any matter relating to the acquisition of land pending on the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1987 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the date of commencement), and action, thing or order has been taken, done, or made under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act as it stood before the date of commencement such action, thing, or order shall not be re-opened or reviewed or be liable to be challenged on the ground that such action, thing or order was at variance with that provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) (hereinafter in this section referred to as the Land Acquisition Act) subject however that any further proceeding, action or order in such matter conducted, taken or made on or after the date of commencement shall subject to the other provisions of this section, be made under and in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act. (2) The amount of compensation or interest or that payable for any other reasons shall in a matter pending on the date of commencement be payable under and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the money paid prior to the date of commencement shall be deducted from or adjusted against the said amount. (2) The amount of compensation or interest or that payable for any other reasons shall in a matter pending on the date of commencement be payable under and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the money paid prior to the date of commencement shall be deducted from or adjusted against the said amount. (3) Where in a matter pending on the date of commencement, a notice under sub-section(2) of Section 52 or a notice under sub-section(1) thereof has been served or as the case may be published such notice shall be deemed to be the notification or declaration published or made under sub-section(1) of Section 4, or as the case may be, under sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the declaration or award in such a matter shall be made within a period of one year or, as the case may be, two years from the date of commencement. (4) Where any land has, prior to the date of commencement, vested in the State Government or its possession has been taken in accordance with the provisions of this Act as it stood before the date of commencement, such vesting or possession of land shall not be liable to be challenged on the ground that no amount of compensation was tendered and paid in accordance with sub-section(3-A) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act subject, however, that such amount shall be tendered and paid within a period of six months from the date of commencement. (5) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a matter pending on the date of commencement, the market value of the land at the date on which the notice was published in the official Gazette under clause (b) of sub-section(6) of Section 53 as it stood before the date of commencement shall be taken into consideration. (5) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a matter pending on the date of commencement, the market value of the land at the date on which the notice was published in the official Gazette under clause (b) of sub-section(6) of Section 53 as it stood before the date of commencement shall be taken into consideration. (6) An appeal filed under Section 54 or Section 56 or a dispute referred under Section 55 or Section 59 and pending on the date of commencement shall be decided having regard to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act." A bare reading of the aforesaid Section 60A as inserted by the amendment Act in the UIT Act will show that No far as pending acquisition matters under the UIT Act are concerned, any action, thing or order, taken, done or made in accordance with the provisions of the UIT Act as it stood before the date of commencement of the Amendment Act i.e. August 1, 1987 under and in accordance with the provisions of the UIT Act were saved and were not to be re-opened or reviewed or were not liable to be challenged on the ground that such action, thing or order was in variance with the provisions of the Act. However, so far as any further proceedings, action in pending matter as aforesaid is concerned, it was to be made or taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The land had vested absolutely in the State Government after publication of the notification under sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act which notification dated March 7, 1984, was published in the official gazette on April 20, 1984. The provisions of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted in the said Act by the Amendment Act in 1987 were considered by a Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member, in the case of Bishambhar Dayal v. State of Rajasthan and others D.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 1666/1986 alongwith other connected writ petitions, decided on January 23, 1989 and this Court after elaborate discussion in pars 10 had deduced the following principles: "1. The State legislature was competent and is competent to enact the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, the same being with respect to matters partly enumerated in Entry 5 of State List (List II) and partly entry 42 of the concurrent list (List III). (ii) Acquisition or Requisitioning of property' is not an incidental matter and therefore while enacting law under Entry 5 for Improvement Rusts under the State List (List II) (Chapter VII of the UIT Act and moreso to its Sections 52 to 59A could not be enacted). Th ,~y were enacted under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. (iii) The doctrine of `Pith and Substance' as evolved by the Judicial Committee and as applied to the laws made under the three lists of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India in order to see under which Entries of the three list of the VII schedule of the Constitution will apply, but even if the said doctrine is applied it only permits some overlapping or encroachment so long there is no conflict between the law passed by the Parliament and that enacted by the State Legislature in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List but in case of conflict in view of the provisions of clause (2) of Article 254 alongwith its proviso the Central legislature must prevail. (iv) The principle is well established that if an act contains several parts and if invalid part is really separable in its operation from the other part and rest are not inseverally connected with it, then only such part is invalid unless of course the whole object of the Act would be frustrated by the partial exclusion. If the object which is beyond the legislative power is perfectly distinct from that which is within such power, the Act can be ultravires in former while intravires in the latter. (v) The expression Acquisition or Requisitioning of property' in Entry 42 of the concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule is a particular or specific expression and therefore as per the rules of construction that the general language in one head yields to particular expression in the other where the latter is unambiguous will be attracted and so far as the above quoted expression in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List is concerned, it being a specific entry will hold the field with respect to the matters in that expression. (vi) As the subject of Acquisition or Requisitioning of property' is a subject of Entry 42 of the Concurrent List and as such the law can be made by both the State Legislature and Parliament, by extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended and extended to this State by the Amendment Act of 1984 w.e.f. September 24, 1984 in view of clause (2) including the proviso to Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Central Act to the extent of repugnancy as aforesaid shall prevail over the aforesaid provisions of Chapter VII of the UIT Act because the Parliament intended to make complete law in respect of acquisition or requisitioning of property. (vii) Only sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted vide Section 4 of the Act as 1987 is repugnant to the provisions of Section 11-A of the Central Ad. (viii) If on or before the date of extension of the Central Act i.e. September 24, 1984 and land has vested in the State Government, under the provisions of sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood or if possession had been taken either under the sub-section (5) or (6) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, then by virtue of sub-section(4) of Section 60 of the UIT Act, the same cannot be challenged on any ground whatsoever, but the amount of compensation under the provisions of Section 17(3) of the Central Act shall be tendered within 6 months from the date of commencement of Act of 1987, and further action shall be taken under the provisions of the Central Act. (ix) Applying the principle(iv) aforesaid, the provisions of chapter VII of the UIT Act being separable from the other part of that Act after the extension of the Central Act with effect from September 24, 1984, to this State, the provisions of Central Act will hold the field and the provisions of chapter VII and moreso its Sections 52 to 59A will give way. After the aforesaid extension of the Central Act the proceedings for acquisition of property under the UIT Act will not come to an end but will be continued under the provisions of the Central Act. After the aforesaid extension of the Central Act the proceedings for acquisition of property under the UIT Act will not come to an end but will be continued under the provisions of the Central Act. It will be seen from the aforesaid principles deduced by this Court in the case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) that only sub-section (3) of Section 60A as inserted by Section 4 of the Amendment Act in the UIT Act was held to be repugnant to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and rest of the provisions were held to be valid. It will further be seen that this court under the principle (viii) deduced as aforesaid said that if on or before the date of extension of the Act i.e. September 24,1984, any land has vested in the State Government under Sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood or if possession had been taken either under sub-section (5) or (6) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, then by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 60A of the UIT Act the same cannot be challenged on any ground whatsoever, but the amount of compensation under the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act shall be tendered within six months from the date of commencement of the Act of 1987 and further action shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This Court in that case further said that the proceedings pending under the UIT Act will not come to an end but will be continued under the provisions of the Act. It was given out by the learned counsel for the parties that the aforesaid case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) was challenged by filing SLP No. 4944/1990 and 4945/1990 UIT v. Niranjanlal and others , and a copy of the order of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid SLP is available in the file of S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6973/1991, Ghasi and others v. State of Rajasthan and others . It will be seen that the view of this court that Sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted by the Amendment Act was ultravires was not interfered with and thereby it was up-held. It will be seen that the view of this court that Sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted by the Amendment Act was ultravires was not interfered with and thereby it was up-held. It can also be said that there was no interference by the Apex Court in so far as this Court had taken a view that other Sub-sections of Section 60A of the UIT Act including Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (4) were intravires and constitutional, was also not interfered with. Be that as it may, it can be said that a Division Bench of this Court has upheld the validity of Section 60A as inserted by the Amendment Act in the UIT Act except its sub-section(3). Therefore, there can be no dispute that by virtue of Sub-section(4) of Section 60A of the UIT Act, the vesting of the land in the State Government free from all encumbrances and possession if taken in accordance with the provisions of the UIT Act cannot be challenged on the ground that no amount of compensation was tendered or paid under Section 17(3A) of the Act. But as said earlier, this Court did not and was not called upon to examine the question directly, whether it was necessary under the UIT Act or under Section 11 of the Act to pass an award and if award has not been passed within two years then under Section 11-A of the Act the proceedings will lapse or the further proceedings were to be continued under the Act by virtue of Sub-section(1) of Section 60A of the UIT Act read with Section 52(2) of the UIT Act. It was also not in issue in that case whether if the award is not made as aforesaid the land will revert to its owners or not. Though, the question as said earlier was not directly in issue but a perusal of the case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) will show that the proceedings will not come to an end and will continue under the Act after the same was extended to this State on September 24, 1984 and the amount shall be determined. Though, the question as said earlier was not directly in issue but a perusal of the case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) will show that the proceedings will not come to an end and will continue under the Act after the same was extended to this State on September 24, 1984 and the amount shall be determined. In this connection reference may be made to principle(ix) deduced by this Court wherein this court said that after the aforesaid extension of the Act the proceedings for acquisition of property under the UIT Act will not come to an end but will be continued under the provisions of the Act. The Court dealt with the cases of Hindaun UIT in para 11 of the aforesaid judgment. In those cases the notifications under Section 52(2) and 52(1) of the UIT Act had been issued before the extension of the Act to this State and the land had also vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances by virtue of Sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood. But because of some stay order of the court possession could not be taken and the amount of compensation which was to be determined under Section 53 of the then UIT Act could not be determined nor was paid. The court said - "...notice under sub-section(s) of Section 52 of the UIT Act could be again issued. It has already been said earlier that the land which stood vested in the State Government by virtue of sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act the State Government cannot be divested moreso in view of sub-section(4) of Section 60A inserted in the UIT Act by Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1987. It has already been said earlier that the land which stood vested in the State Government by virtue of sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act the State Government cannot be divested moreso in view of sub-section(4) of Section 60A inserted in the UIT Act by Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1987. The further proceedings no doubt including taking of possession have to be in accordance with provisions of the Central Act including sub-section(3A) of Section 17 thereof, after tendering 80% of the estimated amount of compensation within a period of 6 months from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act: The Court at page 36 of that judgment further said- "We may state that it has already been said in the earlier part of this order that as the land vested in the State Government long back, in the year 1974 and vesting of land cannot be challenged now, not only because the earlier writ petitions challenging the same were dismissed, principles of res judicata are attracted, but also because of the provisions of sub-section(4) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted by Section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1987. As said earlier, now the possession of land vested in the State Government, if not taken shall be taken, and the compensation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Central Act and not in accordance with the provisions of UIT Act because the provisions of Section 53 of the UIT Act have been repealed and even otherwise the provisions of the Central Act cover the same field and are beneficial, shall govern the case." It will therefore be clear that a Division Bench of this Court has taken a categorical view that if the land had vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood, by virtue of that section there can be no divesting of the land. This Court even went to the extent in the aforesaid case to say that even if the conversion charges have been deposited or some constructions have been raised, this cannot be a ground to hold that the State Government can be divested of the land which vested in it under sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act and though this Court observed that it is for the Municipal Council or for the JDA to consider whether or not on the ground of deposit of conversion charges and construction if any on the land, the portion of the land should be left out or the plots should be allotted to such of the persons who have deposited the conversion charges and have raised construction. It will therefore be clear from the aforesaid case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) that this Court said that if possession had not been taken under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, after the extension of the Act to this State on September 24, 1984, the possession can be taken thereafter, but in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the amount of compensation can be determined. In view of the aforesaid case of Bishambhar Dayal which is a Division Bench judgment it cannot be said that in a case where the land has absolutely vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act after publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, if the amount of compensation has not been determined within two years of the extension of the Act to this State, the State Government will be divested of the land and possession has to be re-delivered to the owners of the land. 5. "Vesting" has not been defined anywhere in the Act but this word is of variable import and has not got a fixed connotation. The Apex Court in the case of the Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 in para 19 said that the word `vest' is a word of variable import. The court further said that its meaning will depend on the context where the word has been used. The Apex Court in the case of the Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 in para 19 said that the word `vest' is a word of variable import. The court further said that its meaning will depend on the context where the word has been used. The court further said : "On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894) provide that the property so acquired upon the happening of certain events, shall `vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances'. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word 'vest' has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation." A look at the provisions of sub-sections(1) and (2) of Section 17 of the Act will show that they are special provisions in a case of urgency and even if no award has been made under Section 11 of the Act in a case of urgency where even the appropriate Government directs the Collector after expiry of 15 days of the publication of the notice mentioned under Section 9(1) to take possession of the land needed for public purpose, such land thereupon vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Further under sub-section (2) of Section 17 the land shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3A) of Section 17 enjoins on the Collector that before taking possession of any land without prejudice to sub-section (3) thereof, he must tender payment of 80% of the amount of compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto and to pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31(2). Thus, in case of emergency as aforesaid the possession could be taken by the Collector even without making award, but 80% of the oompensation has to be paid' or tendered under sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act to the persons entitled to the compensation. A perusal of the awards in the present cases will show that payment of 80% of the estimated amount of compensation was tendered to the awardees within six months of the commencement of the Amendment Act in 1987. Some of the learned counsel for the parties referred to the case of C. Sargunam v. The State of 'Ihmilnadu, 1990 LACC 554. In that case the Madras High Court in para 14 said that : "One other contention put forth is that when vesting had taken place under Section 17(1), there could be no revesting of property. Here again, Mr. Govindarajan, learned counsel for the appellant, quite justifiably points out that there could be no legal impediment in revesting, because in such of those instances wherein the acquisition proceedings are declared illegal by courts, it would result in the title to the property reverting to the erstwhile owner. By operation of law, vesting takes place under Section 17(1), when there is a failure to adhere to the time-limit fixed therein, the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. The resultant effect will be the reverting takes place by operation of law." With due respect to the learned Judge who decided the case of C. Sargunam (supra), once the compensation is tendered, and it may not be accepted, the possession of the land may be delivered to the institution/department/company for which it has been acquired. Once there is vesting in the State Government of the land under the provisions of law free from all encumbrances the owner is deprived of the ownership and he can only be entitled to the amount of compensation and there can be no divesting as held in the aforesaid case of C. Sargunam (supra). Once there is vesting in the State Government of the land under the provisions of law free from all encumbrances the owner is deprived of the ownership and he can only be entitled to the amount of compensation and there can be no divesting as held in the aforesaid case of C. Sargunam (supra). The provisions of Section 17 of the Act are special provisions and whereas under Section 16 the possession of the Act can only be taken after an award has been made under Section 17 even if no award has been made after expiry of the 15 days of publication of notice mentioned in Section 9(1) if the State Government so directs, the Collector may take possession of any land needed for public purposes and such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and there is no question of reverting or revesting of the land in the owner thereof even if the award may not have been made within two years and all that the owner will be entitled in the determination of compensation. Though, Section 11-A of the Act was not on the statute book then, but a question had earlier arisen whether if the Collector refuses to make award under Section 11 under the special provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act what is the remedy to the party. In the case of Mantharvadi Venkayya v. The Secretary of State, 27 - ILR Madras 535 the court said that : "If, after having taken possession of the land under Section 17 before award, the Collector subsequently refuses to give an award on the ground that the land belonged to the Government, a suit would lie for a declaration that the land belonged to the plaintiff and for damages for breach of statutory duty on the Collector's part. The land having vested in the Government absolutley the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession but could only claim damages i.e. breach of statutory duty on the part of the Collector." On the analogy of the provisions of Section 17 which are special provisions under which possession having been taken the land absolutely vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances, it can be said that after notification having been issued under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood before its amendment under the Amendment Act of 1987 if the land had vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and/or possession having been taken, or even if it is not taken, all that the owner of the land can be entitled is for the determination of amount of compensation, but it cannot be said that the award could not be made. 6. So far as the ground taken in some of the cases by the JDA that some lands have been acquired under the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act all that may be stated is that this is a question in which this Court need not go and even the learned Land Acquisition Officer had refused to go into this question. I will therefore not discuss this question while dealing with the writ petitions in which any such question has been raised by the JDA. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that under Section 11 of the Act before an award could be made it was necessary under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of that section that the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer to obtain previous approval of the State Government and because no previous approval was taken as aforesaid the award is bad. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that under Section 11 of the Act before an award could be made it was necessary under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of that section that the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer to obtain previous approval of the State Government and because no previous approval was taken as aforesaid the award is bad. Though I have said above that what was required was the determination of compensation in such cases where the notifications under sub-section(2) of Section 52 and sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act had been issued and the land had been vested in the State Government absolutely free from all encumbrances, but even assuming for the sake of argument that under Section 11 of the Act the award should have been made, in my opinion so far as the aforesaid proviso is concerned, even if the award is made by the Collector without approval of appropriate Government in this case, the State Government, it will not be invalid muchless void. No such consequence has been provided anywhere in the Act. It is a matter in between the Collector and the State Government and no third person comes in between and he has no right to challenge the award on the ground that previous approval of the State Government has not been obtained. A similar question arose in the case of Ram Jiyawan v. State of UP and others, 1992 LACC 385 and the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid case in para 28 said : "Section 11 deals with enquiry into claims and making of awards. It lays down that on the date fixed in the notice under Section 9 or on any other day to which the enquiry may be adjourned the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the claims filed by interested persons. After holding this enquiry the Collector is required to make his Award containing (i) the true area of the land, (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be paid for the land and (iii) the apportionment of the compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, irrespective of the fact whether they have filed any claim or have appeared before him. Under sub-section (2) it is permissible for interested persons to compromise their inter se disputes. Under sub-section (2) it is permissible for interested persons to compromise their inter se disputes. The first proviso to sub-section (1) lays down that ''no award shall be made by the Collector under the sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf". The language of this proviso is apparently peremptory but its peremptor nature is diluted by the second proviso under which it is competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf'. From a combined reading of the two provisos it is apparent that the observance of breach of the mandate contained in the first proviso is a matter between the Collector and the State Government. The person interested does not come in the picture. Therefore, such a person cannot assail the validity of an award on the ground that previous approval of the Government or its appointed officer was not taken. In other words, despite this apparent peremptory language the first proviso is recommendatory. Accordingly failure to obtain approval of the Government will not invalidate the award." It will be clear from the aforesaid extracted decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that it has been held that the first proviso is only recommendatory and failure to obtain previous approval of the State Government will not invalidate the award. No doubt in Dr. No doubt in Dr. Angelo Fernandes v. Union of India and others, 1991 LACC 23 a contrary view has been taken by the Delhi High Court, but in my opinion the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid case of Ram Jiyawan (supra) .appears to be the correct view and therefore even if previous approval of the State Government is not taken, such of the persons cannot challenge the award who have right to claim compensation and they have no right to challenge the award on the ground that the same has been made without obtaining previous approval of the State Government.Though hereinafter I will deal with individual or batch of cases but I will like to make some observations in respect of the locus standi of the allottees of plots and/or the housing societies which had purchased the agricultural lands for building purposes under agreements to sell. These observations will apply to all such cases. I have already said that a notification under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was issued in 1979 and therefore, the acquisition proceedings were started in 1979 and even the agreement to sell are said to have been entered into after the aforesaid date by the Khatedars with the housing society/societies. The State Legislature enacted the Rajasthan Lands (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1976 (Act No. 37 of 1976) (for short, 1976 Act) and a perusal of the statement of objects and reasons will show that 1976 Act had to be made because unauthorised sales of plots of land by private colonisers and others to general public has assumed serious proportions. The 1976 Act was therefore made to put an end to this unscrupulous practice and to protect the general public from such illegal transactions by imposing restrictions to the transfers of land acquired or under acquisition for a public purpose. It will be seen from a perusal of Section 3 of 1976 Act that under it there is prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by the State Government and under Section 4 restriction has been imposed on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings have been intimated, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority appointed under notification No. F. 6(32) No. 34174 dated May 24, 1976. When transfer could not take place, even agreements to sell could not be executed as in all such cases they had to be followed by the execution of sale deeds. Therefore, also such transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings had been initiated by issuing notification under Section 52(2) of the UIT Act was not permissible as it was against the provisions of 1976 Act and agreement to sell will not confer any right on the purchasers. 8. I will now take up the cases or individual cases separately.Cases listed from S. No.12 to S. No. 24 SBCW No. 6709/91 Purshottam Kumar V. State and others , SBCW No. 6710/91 Shyamal Kumar Hazra v. State and Ors. , SBCW No. 6711/91 Sint. Manju Devi Agrawal v. State and Ors. , SBCW No. 6713/91 Rajendra Prasad Agrawal v. State and Ors. , SBCW No. 6714/91 Bimla Devi v. State and ors. , SBCW No. 6715/91 Keshav Dev Agrawal v. State and ors. SBCW No. 6716/91 Sint. Kiran Devi Agrawal v. State and Ors. SBCW No. 6718/91 Santosh Kumar Agrawal v. State and Ors ., SBCWP No. 6721/91 Smt. Kiran Devi Agrawal v. State and Ors. , SBCWP No. 6722/91 Ajay Kumar Bubna v. State and Ors. , SBCW No. 6723/91 Shiv Kumar Agrawal v. State and Ors. SBCW No. 6724/91 Amal Kumar Hazra v. State and Ors . and SBCW No. 6725/1991 Smt. Saroj Devi Agrawal v. State of Rajasthan and others. In this batch of writ petitions, the applications have been filed on behalf of some of the co-khatedars through their advocate Mr. A.L. Verma for impleading them as respondents and it has been stated that the agreement allegedly entered into with the respondent No. 4 for sale of khasra No. 201 and 202 is bogus and manipulated and the same did not confer any right on the society. It was on the application of the khatedars that they were arrayed as respondents Nos. 5 and 6. The khatedars have not challenged the awards and rather they have claimed compensation awarded. It may be stated that this Court had appointed Mr. K.N. Gupta Advocate as a Commissioner to go the spot and report in respect of actual physical possession/construction (pucca or kachcha) of any of the petitioners. 5 and 6. The khatedars have not challenged the awards and rather they have claimed compensation awarded. It may be stated that this Court had appointed Mr. K.N. Gupta Advocate as a Commissioner to go the spot and report in respect of actual physical possession/construction (pucca or kachcha) of any of the petitioners. Shri K.N. Gupta Commissioner in the presence of the representatives of the parties had inspected the site and submitted his report dated April 17, 1992 which is available in the file of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6709/91 Purshottam Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and others. A perusal of the report of the Commissioner will show that the Commissioner has made a report that as per Jamabandi (Khatauni) Shri Jodha s/o Sunderlal and Shri Ram Sukh s/o Jai Narain have been entered as khatedars in the land in dispute and a note has been given in red ink that vide mutation No. 121/30.7.1987 the name of Jaipur Development Authority has been recorded in place of above Shri Jodha s/o Sunderlal and Ramsukh s/o Jainarain. Dealing with the factual possession the Commissioner has said that not a single petitioner claimed to have construction on the disputed site and none was residing on the site. Even kachcha houses were not there except the house constructed by one co-khatedar Shri Sedu Ram (Real brother of Jodha Ram). One Vishnu Gopal had also constructed some pucca house. The Commission further reported that on some part of khasra No. 201 and 202 crop of wheat was seen. There was also pucca well having electricity pump fitted. As said earlier the khatedars have not come to this court and the allottees have come to this Court. A look at the agreement of sale will show that they do not appear to have been executed on any stamp paper and further only token amount appears to have been paid under it to the khatedars. It is disputed by the khatedars that they had entered into any agreement of sale with the aforesaid society or that they had delivered possession to it. It is disputed by the khatedars that they had entered into any agreement of sale with the aforesaid society or that they had delivered possession to it. As said earlier, the Commissioner appointed by this Court has made a categorical report that none of the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions was in possession of the land of which they claim to be in possession i.e. the plots said to have been demarcated by the society respondent No. 4 and that no construction was found on them. As per the report of the Commissioner some of the khatedars were in possession on some part of the land. The petitioners have not challenged the award and even the dates of award/awards have not been mentioned even assuming that the awards might have been made after outer limit of two years of the extension of the Act to this State, i.e. September 24, 1984. The khatedars have said that compensation may be paid under the award/awards, if any and have also said that the matter is pending consideration of the court under Section 18 of the Act. In Banwarilal v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1986 RLR 964 this Court has said that under Section 90A of the Land Revenue Act, 1953 no person holding any land for purpose of agriculture and no transferee of such land or any part thereof shall use the same or any part thereof for the construction of buildings thereon or otherwise for any other purpose except with the written permission of the State Government obtained in the manner laid down therein and otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of such permission. It was said by this Court that agricultural land cannot be used for non-agricultural purposes i.e. for construction of buildings etc. -without prior permission of the State Government or the competent authority. In the aforesaid case of Banwarilal (supra) referring to the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 the court said that the sale can only be of whole of survey number and if it is not so the sale is void. -without prior permission of the State Government or the competent authority. In the aforesaid case of Banwarilal (supra) referring to the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 the court said that the sale can only be of whole of survey number and if it is not so the sale is void. In Govind Murari v. State 1972 RLW 266 , agi J., as he then was, while upholding the validity of Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, further said that transfer of agricultural land for housing purpose is illegal unless same is first urbanised in accordance with law. In the case of Vijai Kumar Chadha v. The State of Rajasthan S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 374/1987 decided on March 27, 1990 this Court said : "Even the Society cannot claim any right or interest on the basis of the agreement to sell itself said to have been executed by the tenant. The agreement to sell does not create any right or interest, except the right of enforcement of the agreement within the stipulated time." A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Dhiraj Bhai Thakorbhai Patel v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 1989 LACC 591 , has held that a person having an agreement to purchase property to be acquired has only a right to claim his advance from the compensation amount, but he cannot be considered to have an interest in the land which is acquired as such by the State. The Court further said that a contract of sale of immovable property does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property. As said earlier, in the instant case the petitioners have come out with the case that the society had allotted the plots to them after taking possession of the agricultural land on the basis of alleged agreements of sale which as said earlier are disputed to have been entered into by the khatedars who have been arrayed as respondents to some of the writ petitions. Therefore, so far as the petitioners in these writ petitions are concerned, they cannot be said to have any locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings, moreso, having not challenged the award. Therefore, so far as the petitioners in these writ petitions are concerned, they cannot be said to have any locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings, moreso, having not challenged the award. In my opinion, looking to the aforesaid discussions and the stand having taken by the khatedars the petitioners cannot be said to be the persons interested in compensation and therefore have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Thus, this batch of writ petitions is liable to be dismissed. SBCW No. 6876/1991-Shri Krishan Somani v. State and others. 9. This writ petition is by the petitioners who claim to be the allottees of the plots by the respondent No. 4 Hathroi Garhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. and the plots have been allotted out of khasra No. 201 and 202 measuring 48 bighas 15 biswas situated in Gram Bir Khatipura Distt. Jaipur and the said having been purchased by the society from its khatedars. As in the earlier batch of writ petitions it will be seen that on the application of khatedars they were arrayed as respondents Nos. 5_ and 6 in those writ petitions and they wanted that the amount of compensation as awarded under the award may be paid to them. It will be seen from a perusal of the allotment letters to the petitioners, photostat copies of which have been marked as Amin 1/1 to Annr. 1/17 that the allotments have been made in between the period from February 17, 1990 to May 16, 1991. it will thus be seen that not only the allotments have been made after the notifications under sub-section (2) and (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood before 1987 were published in 1979 and on April 20, 1984, respectively but also after the passing of the award which award was made on June 20, 1989. It has already been said in the earlier part of this order while dealing with the question of law that by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood, the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances on and from the publication of the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act i.e. w.e.f. April 20, 1984 and there could be no reverting of the property. Thus, if the society allots the plots to its members, the petitioners herein, even after the award it cannot be said to have acted fairly and bonafide. As said earlier, the khatedars have not challenged the award and so far as the petitioners are concerned on the basis of the decision of this court in the case of Banwarilal (supra) it can be said that they are simply trespassers and have no interest in the land and compensation. Even they have not filed the agreement which is said to have been entered into in between the khatedars and the respondent No. 4 society and as said earlier, the khatedars have come out with the case that no agreement of sale was entered into and all that can be said is that a highly disputed question of fact whether or not any agreement of sale was entered into between the khatedars and the respondent No. 4 in respect of the land in dispute is involved in this case. The petitioners have no locus standi and they have no case for interference by this Court. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed. SBCW No. 6206/1991- Smt. Manju Srivastava and others v. State and others. 10. This writ petition is again by the persons who claim to be the allottees of the plots by the respondent No. 4 Hathroi Garhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (society) and the society is said to have entered into an agreement to sale with the khatedars of khasra No. 201 and 202 measuring 48 bighas 15 biswas situated in village Bir Khatipura, Distt. Jaipur. This fact has been contested by the khatedars and as said earlier they were arrayed as respondents Nos. 5 and 6 on their application. They have denied that any agreement was entered into by them in favour of the society, rather they have contested the writ petition and prayed that the writ petition may be dismissed and they may be awarded compensation in terms of the award. They have also come out with the case that the matter of compensation/apportionment of the same is pending for consideration of the court under Section 18 of the Act. The society had not filed any reply. They have also come out with the case that the matter of compensation/apportionment of the same is pending for consideration of the court under Section 18 of the Act. The society had not filed any reply. It will be seen from the award dated June 28, 1989 that the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood before August 1, 1987 and the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published on April 20, 1984 in the Rajasthan Gazette and after the publication of the aforesaid notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52(1) of the UIT Act the land vested free from all encumbrances in the State Government and the possession was also taken by the State Government and thereafter the possession of the land was also handed over to the JDA as far back as in the year 1984 itself. Not only this, after the UIT Act was amended as aforesaid by the Amendment Act as required by sub-section (4) of Section 60A of the UIT Act 80% of the estimated compensation amount was offered to the khatedars and a notice was issued on January 23, 1988. As said in the earlier cases the petitioners, the allottees are trespassers and even if the khatedars would not have contested the writ petition, the sale of plots of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes i.e. for building purposes is in contravention of the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and Section 90 A of the Land Revenue Act. As held by this Court in the case of Banwarilal (supra) the petitioners are trespassers even if they are in possession, which they do not appear looking to the report of the Commissioner the reference of which has already been made in the earlier part of this order in respect of a batch of the writ petitions in relation to khasra No. 201 and 202. Apart from this, there is delay in filing the writ petition inasmuch as the writ petition was filed on October 1, 1991 whereas the award was passed as early as on June 26, 1989 and the delay has not been explained. This writ petition, thus, has no force and deserves to be dismissed. SBCW No. 6973/91 Ghasi and ors. v. State and others. 11. The petitioners Nos. This writ petition, thus, has no force and deserves to be dismissed. SBCW No. 6973/91 Ghasi and ors. v. State and others. 11. The petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 are khatedars of khasra No. 44 and 100 measuring 3 bighas 7 biswas situated in village Hirapura, Tehsil and Distt. Jaipur and they are said to have sold the aforesaid land to Jai Chamunda Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Jaipur at the rate of Rs. 35,000/- per bigha on December 20, 1980 and the possession of the land is said to have been handed over to the said Society on December 20, 1980 and the society is said to have chalked out a scheme of residential houses and allotted land to its members. A plan known as `Bhura Patel Nagar B' Scheme' is said to have been chalked out and then the society is said to have applied for conversion of the land to the Collector and deposited Rs. 12,100/- as conversion charges on the self estimation of the conversion charges representing as 80% of the estimated amount of conversion charges. It was only thereafter that the plots are said to have been allotted to the members of the society and the total number of plots in the said scheme was 38. It is also the case of the petitioners that on more than half of the plots the constructions have been raised by the allottees and the allottees are said to have been residing there alongwith their families. The petitioners have demarcated the said plots where the constructions are said to have taken place in the map Annr. 3 by yellow colour and photographs have also been annexed showing construction. According to the petitioners various other khasra numbers i.e. No. 94, 95, 89 to 93 which are in the immediate vicinity of the land in dispute i.e. khasra No. 100 have been entered as Abadi land in the revenue record. Even khasra No. 101 which is adjoining to khasra No. 10 is said to be abadi land. Some agricultural lands are also said to be part of the scheme of the same housing society. The society is said to have paid full price of the land to the petitioners Nos. Even khasra No. 101 which is adjoining to khasra No. 10 is said to be abadi land. Some agricultural lands are also said to be part of the scheme of the same housing society. The society is said to have paid full price of the land to the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 and such of the persons who have constructed houses have even got electricity connection in their name and the bills of electricity charges have been filed by the petitioners. 12. So far as the society, namely, Jai Chamunda Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Jaipur, which is said to have purchased the land in dispute, not under any registered sale deed but under the agreement Annr. 1, is concerned, according to the petitioners it became defunct and it has not been arrayed as respondent to the present writ petition. Even the office bearers of the said society are not traceable and it was then that the allottees of the plots are said to have formed an association, namely Nagrik Vikas Samiti Bhura Patel Nagar `B' for looking after the interests of its members who are the allottees of the plots and the said samiti has been arrayed as respondent No. 4 to the writ petition. The afiresaid samiti is said to represent all the allottees of the plots. According to the petitioners, they came to know on November 18, 1991 when the officers of the JDA came to the spot and wanted to erect poles showing that khasra No. 100 was within the limits of the Chitrakoot Nagar Scheme of the JDA. On enquiry they came to know that the land stood acquired. In the earlier part of this order, this Court has already dealt with in detail the grounds of challenge before dealing with individual case/cases and it will not be proper to refer to the challenge to the acquisition proceedings and suffice it to say that as said earlier, notifications issued under sub-section (2) of Section 52 and sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act have not been challenged and could not be challenged in view of the provisions of Section 60A. Though, it is the case of the respondents that possession of the land had been taken but this fact has been contested by the petitioners. A reference to the award dated June 28, 1989 (Annr. Though, it is the case of the respondents that possession of the land had been taken but this fact has been contested by the petitioners. A reference to the award dated June 28, 1989 (Annr. 17) will show that it relates to khasra No. 100 measuring 3 bighas 17 biswas which is the disputed land. It will further be seen that the possession of this khasra number is also said to have been taken on October 31, 1984 through Tara Chand Jain and Jagdish and it was also handed over to Devkinandan Gupta, a representative of the JDA and it was only thereafter that the notification under sub-section (3) of Section 53 of the UIT Act was issued to the khatedars. It will be seen that after the Amendment Act of 1987 which had amended the UIT Act had come into force, as required under sub-section (4) of Section 60A, notice was given to the khatedars on January 23, 1988 to receive 80% of estimated compensation amount. This question being disputed whether the possession was or was not taken, I would not like to go into it moreso when it appears that there are some constructions of some persons on the land in dispute. But it is not the case of the petitioners or any of the holders of the plots whom the petitioner No. 4 claims to represent that there was any conversion of the land in dispute or in relation to the plots allotted to them by the society and thereafter any permission for construction was received or even the application for permission to construct was filed by any of the allottees of the plot to the JDA and thereafter constructions have been raised. So far asthe petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned, they have come out with the case that under agreement to sell not only they agreed to sell the land in dispute to the society, and as said earlier the society is not a party to the writ petition and even the whereabouts of its office bearers are also not known, but also are said to have received the entire consideration for which they are said to have agreed to sell the property. Even the agreement to sale is not on a stamp paper. Thus, firstly the petitioners Nos. Even the agreement to sale is not on a stamp paper. Thus, firstly the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 have ceased to have any interest in the land in dispute for the aforesaid reason and secondly as held by this Court in the case of Banwarilal (supra) sale/transfer being in contravention of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and against the provisions of Section 90A of the Land Revenue Act, no right can be said to have vested either in the society or in the allottees of the plots. In the aforesaid case of Banwarilal (supra) this Court was considering a case where the petitionerih that case after having purchased 3600 sq. feet of land i.e. a portion of survey and khasra No. 1937 measuring 14 bighas 17 biswas had deposited conversion charges and raised constructions and wanted to invoke the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This court in the aforesaid case said : "In my opinion, it is discretionary with the Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Before the Court can be asked to invoke the jurisdiction, the person must come with clean hands....... Under Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short, `the Tenancy Act') the sale, gift or bequest by a khatedar tenant of his interest in the whole or part of his holding shall be void, if it is not of a survey number except when the area of the survey number so sold, gifted or bequested is in excess of the minimum area prescribed for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 53 in which case also the area not transferred shall not be a fragment........Thus, the sale of 3600 sq. feet agricultural land of khasra No. 1937 measuring 17 biswas and 14 biswas is in contravention of Section 42(a) of the Tenancy Act and as such void. It is a case where no right or title or interest in the land vests in the petitioner. feet agricultural land of khasra No. 1937 measuring 17 biswas and 14 biswas is in contravention of Section 42(a) of the Tenancy Act and as such void. It is a case where no right or title or interest in the land vests in the petitioner. The court also said that if the construction had been made without permission of the Gram Panchayat or the Notified Area Committee, and thus the agricultural land having been used for non-agricultural purpose against the provisions of the Acts the petitioner has no case and the court declined to invoke its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court further said that in such cases where the agricultural land is used for non-agricultural purposes i.e. for construction of building against the provisions of the Land Revenue Act and Tenancy Act both transferee and transferor become trespasser and cannot be said to be the persons entitled to claim compensation. 13. In my opinion the aforesaid case is applicable on all fours to the present case. It will be seen from the grounds taken in the writ petition that the petitioners seek a direction from this Court that the scheme of Bhura Patel Nagar 'B' Scheme may be regularised as schemes of other housing societies have been regularised and instances have been given. It is not stated what were the circumstances in those cases and that apart as said earlier the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 having agreed to sell their land to the society having not sold through registered sale deed and having parted with the possession, the society having demarcated the plots in contravention of Section 42 of the Tenancy Act as well as Section 90A of the Land Revenue Act, the society even having become defunct, and not being party to the writ petition and the members having constructed houses without permission of the JDA thereby having taken the law in their own hands and having not come to this court with clean hands, the petitioners have no case for invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such persons do not deserve any interference in the equitable jurisdiction of this Court, the exercise of which jurisdiction in my opinion should be confined to honest, bonafide and law abiding citizens. Such persons do not deserve any interference in the equitable jurisdiction of this Court, the exercise of which jurisdiction in my opinion should be confined to honest, bonafide and law abiding citizens. They cannot be allowed to say that they are having constructions, which constructions are against the provisions of the Act as aforesaid, but because they have invested sufficient money in the construction of the buildings it should be taken by the court as a fact accomplished and the court should come to their rescue. 14. Thus, as said earlier the erstwhile khatedars of the land in dispute, they having even as per their own case taken full consideration, parted with the possession of the land to the society, no longer having any interest in the disputed land, the members of the petitioner No. 4, cannot be and should not be granted any relief by this Court. It may also be said that the award was made on June 26, 1989 and it will be seen from a perusal of the award as well as from the facts stated in the earlier part of this order that notification under sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the UIT Act was issued on October 10, 1979 in the Rajasthan Gazette and further the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on April 20, 1984. The writ petition was filed in this court on December 9, 1991 after the delay of more than two years of the passing of the award. It will further be seen that the personal notices were served on the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. Not only this, Ghasi petitioner No. 1 also filed objections in the year 1979. Thus even the alleged agreement of sale which as said earlier is not on stamp paper, was entered after the aforesaid the notification sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. Thus, on the ground of laches also, which have not been explained, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5427/1991 Mangala v. State of Rajasthan and others 15. The petitioner claims to be the khatedar of khasra No. 197 and 198 measuring 42 bighas 12 biswas situated in village Bir Khatipura Distt. Jaipur. Thus, on the ground of laches also, which have not been explained, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5427/1991 Mangala v. State of Rajasthan and others 15. The petitioner claims to be the khatedar of khasra No. 197 and 198 measuring 42 bighas 12 biswas situated in village Bir Khatipura Distt. Jaipur. There is no dispute and as said earlier in other cases the notifications under sub-section (2) and (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood before the amendment Act of 1987 saving come into force, have not been challenged and the award has been challenged. The award in this case was made on November 30, 1988 and the petitioner filed on September 19, 1991 almost after two years from the making of the award. In the earlier part of this order so far as legal question is concerned, it has already been dealt with and it has been held that once the land has been vested free from all encumbrances in the State Government, after notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on April 20, 1984, there could be no reverting of the land in the owner thereof even if the award is not made within two years. It will be seen in this case there was stay order and Mr. Garg Advocate for the petitioner appeared and intimated the Land Acquisition Officer that there is some stay order of the court and only after November 7, 1988 it was intimated to the Land Acquisition Officer that the stay order has been vacated and the Land Acquisition Officer made the award. No doubt, it appears that the stay order had been vacated on September 2, 1986, but so far as the Land Acquisition Officer is concerned, he was told even by the Advocate for the petitioner on November 7, 1988 that the stay order was vacated and thereafter therefore the award could not be made earlier and it was only made when the Land Acquisition Officer was informed that the stay order had been vacated on September 2, 1986. Thus, so far as this case is concerned, apart from other grounds to which reference has been made in the earlier part of this order it can be said that the petitioner cannot take the advantage of Section 11-A of the Act even if the same would have been attracted to this case. It will be seen from a persual of the award that the petitioner was represented by the counsel before the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore he must be deemed to have notice of the award and the delay has not been explained in filing the writ petition which has been filed after more than two years and 10 months from the date of award. Even in cases where by virtue of Section 11-A of the Act the award has to be passed within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act in my opinion if the award has been made after two years and the persons interested do not challenge the award for few years, so far as equitable jurisdiction of this court is concerned, if there is delay or there are laches in coming to this court, unless the same is reasonably explained, on the principle that delay defeats justice, the court may refuse to exercise its equitable jurisdiction because by reason of delay the possession having been taken long back and the scheme might have been implemented and the rights of third parties might have, intervened. The petitioner has not explained the delay and merely because he has come out with the case that he had no knowledge of the award because he was represented by a counsel, he shall be deemed to have the knowledge of the award. This is an additional reason for which the petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge the award. The case is almost identical to the case of Ghasi (SBCW No. 6973/1991) which has already been discussed in the earlier part of this order and for the reasons already stated in that case and for the reasons also stated above, I find no merit in this writ petition and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6933/1991 Banshi Ram and Others v. State and others. 16. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6933/1991 Banshi Ram and Others v. State and others. 16. The petitioners are co-khatedars of the lands measuring 33 bighas 10 biswas of various khasra numbers the details of which are given in para 1 of the writ petition. The land is situated in village Hirapura, Tehsil and Distt. Jaipur, It has already been said earlier that there is no challenge to the notifications under sub-section (2) and sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act and the only challenge is to the award which has been made on November 30, 1988 by the Land Acquisition Officer Jaipur not only in respect of the land in dispute but also in respect of other lands, and the grounds on which the award has been challenged are many but so far as the ground that after the extension of the Act to this State on September 24, 1984, the proceedings for acquisition taken under the provisions of the UIT Act became void is concerned, all that may be stated that this point is squarely covered by a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) which as said earlier was not interfered with by the Apex Court in so far as this Court held that sub-section (3) of Section 60A of the UIT Act as inserted by the Amendment Act of 1987 is ultravires but in the aforesaid case of Bishambhar Dayal, this Court upheld the validity of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of Section 60A. While dealing with the case of Ghasi (SBCW No. 6973/1991) in the earlier part of this order the reasons have been given in detail and for the aforesaid reasons which may not be repeated here it can be said that if the amount of compensation had been delivered after coming into force of the Act, may be that it was determined after more than 2 years of coming into force of the Act so far as vesting of the land in the State Government free from all encumbrances by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 1987 is concerned, it cannot be challenged on any ground whatever and the State Government cannot be divested of the possession if taken. In the instant case it will appear from a perusal of the award dated November 30, 1988 that the possession of the land in dispute is said to have been taken on November 16, 1984 at 3.25 p.m. by Shri Devkinandan Gupta, Tehsildar on behalf of the JDA except of Shiv Temple and the houses of khatedars and the possession of the land was also handed over to the representative of the JDA at the spot. Thus, the land vested absolutely free from all encumbrances in the State Government and as said earlier even after coming into force of the Act by virtue of Section 60A of the UIT Act revesting of the land could not have taken place, and the amount of compensation could have been determined under the provisions of the Act which was determined. 17. It will be seen from a perusal of the award that the petitioners were aware of the acquisition proceedings. They were intimated about the publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act in the year 1979 and the award having been made on November 30, 1988, it has been challenged by the petitioner in this court by filing the writ petition on November 18, 1991 almost about three years after the passing of the award. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that they came to know about the acquisition proceedings on November 14, 1991 when the representatives of the JDA came to the spot and started demolishing the houses and other constructions. The notification dated March 7, 1984 under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act had been published, as said earlier, in the Rajasthan Gazette on April 20, 1984. The petitioners shall be deemed to have notice of the notification and they cannot be allowed to say that they had no notice of the acquisition proceedings. That apart, it will further be seen that after extension of the Act on September 24, 1984 to this State and after coming into force the Amendment Act of 1987 as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 60A, the 80% of the estimated amount of compensation was offered to the petitioners as would be evident from the award. Therefore, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. SBCW No. 6049/91 Ganpat and another v. State of Rajasthan and others. 18. Therefore, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. SBCW No. 6049/91 Ganpat and another v. State of Rajasthan and others. 18. The petitioner No. 1 is khatedar of khasra No. 35 situated in village Hirapura Tehsil Jaipur and his share in the land is 1/2. There are other co-tenants, namely Sunderlal, Pratap, Chandra Ram, Mangal Ram, Banshi Ram, Sheonarain, Shanker sons of Gangaram and they are holders of the other half share of the land. As per the case of the petitioner No. 1 during the life time of his father, the land had been divided between the co-tenants and he was in possession of the half-share thereof. The father' of the petitioner No. 1 expired sometime in the year 1978 and the mutation of the land is said to have been recorded in favour of the petitioner on December 16, 1978. The petitioner No. 1 has come out with a case that in the year 1981 he had enterd into an agreement to sell with Mitra Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Jaipur and had also handed over the possession of the same to the said society But the society could not pay the total amount of sale consideration to him. The said society entered into an agreement with Patel Nagar Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., petitioner No. 2, and that society has paid the entire amount of consideration to him. But because no sale-deed was executed the petitioner No. 1 claims to be still khatedar of the land in dispute. According to the petitioner No. 1 no notice was ever given to him under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act and he had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings commenced under the UIT Act. 19. The petitioner No. 1 had further come out with the case that after the possession of the land was taken by the petitioner No. 2, Patel Nagar Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. from Mitra Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti in the year 1984 it chalked out plots in the land in dispute and also in the adjoining khasra No. 34 and he allotted plots to several persons who were in dire need of a roof under the sun. One Trilok Chaudhary Advocate had also fully constructed a residential house in his plot allotted to him after spending his whole life savings and has taken electric and water connections which facility has been provided by the Society and is living in his house. The petitioner No. 1 had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and came to know about the same on September 23rd, 1991 when the JDA officers alongwith their servants came there with bulldozers, then on enquiry he came to know that the notifications under sub-section (2) and sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act had been published respectively on October 10, 1979 and April 20, 1984, i.e. before the extension of the Act to this State on September, 24, 1984. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner No. 1 submitted that the proceedings under the UIT act were initiated against the father of the petitioner No. 1 who had died in the year 1978 and therefore against the dead person and therefore the proceedings against the dead person were void ab initio. The petitioner has challenged the award dated June 15, 1989 by filing. the writ petition in this court on October 21, 1991 interalia on the grounds which are common in other writ petitions and an additional ground has been raised as aforesaid that the proceedings were initiated against the dead person i.e. Chandra, father of the petitioner No. 1, who died in the year 1978 and therefore the proceedings were void. So far as other grounds on which the award has been challenged are concerned, they have already been discussed in the earlier part of this order while dealing with other writ petitions. So far as other grounds on which the award has been challenged are concerned, they have already been discussed in the earlier part of this order while dealing with other writ petitions. No doubt the proceedings could not have been initiated against the dead person and even in the case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra) a Division Bench of this Court, at page 45 of its judgment said that the proceedings for land acquisition against the dead persons are void, but in my opinion, that will not make much difference to the present case because even as per the case of the petitioner No. 1, he under an agreement to sell had transferred the land firstly to Mitra Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Jaipur, but because it could not pay the price, he transferred it to the petitioner No. 2, and so far as the petitioner No. 1 is concerned, he has taken the whole of the sale-consideration from the petitioner No. 2 and has parted with possession of the land to Mitra Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., who in turn handed over the possession of the land to the petitioner No. 2. It will be seen from a perusal of Jamabandi (Annr. 1) Khasra No. 35 is measuring 2 bighas 5 biswas and the petitioner No. 1 has only half share therein. The rest of the half share was with Sunderlal, Pratap, Chandaram, Mangal Ram, Banshiram, Sheonarain, Shanker sons of Gangaram. In other words the petitioner has only half share in the land in dispute. Admittedly, there was no division of holdings either through the decree of the court or under any other mode provided under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and the revenue record does not speak that there has been any division of holdings by meets and bound. Under Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the sale of a part of the survey number is void. Not only this, the use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose is not permissible under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act as said in the case of Ghasi (S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 6973/91) in which case a reference to the case of Banwarilal (supra) has already been made. Not only this, the use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose is not permissible under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act as said in the case of Ghasi (S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 6973/91) in which case a reference to the case of Banwarilal (supra) has already been made. It can be said that so far as members of the petitioner No. 2 are concerned, they have no interest and they have no locus standi as they are trespassers having purchased the plots of land i.e. part of the survey number of even half of the share of the petitioner No. 1 for non-agricultural purposes i.e. buildings purposes and no right is conferred in them. So far as the petitioner No. 1 is concerned, as per his own case he has taken the whole of the sale-consideration from the non-petitioner No. 2. He therefore ceases to have any interest in the land in dispute. He therefore, cannot challenge the award. 21. Apart from what has been said above, there is delay of about two years in challenging the award and in view of the notification under Sub-section(2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act it cannot be said that the petitioner had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. He shall be deemed to have the knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. This writ petition therefore deserves to be dismissed. Ganpat and another v. State of Rajasthan and other, S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6771/1991 22. The petitioner No. 1 is the same person who filed the S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6049/91 which has been dealt with just above. He is the khatedar of the lands bearing khasra numbers stated in para 2 of the writ petition. The dispute relates _to khasra No. 28 measuring 4 bighas 18 biswas situated in village Hirapura. As per the case of the petitioner No. 1 he sold the land of khasra No. 28 measuring 4 bighas 18 biswas to Mahaveer Swami Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Jaipur, petitioner No. 2. The said society is a registered co-operative society registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Society Act. He has received the total sale consideration from the petitioner No. 2 and handed over the possession of the land to the said society. The said society is a registered co-operative society registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Society Act. He has received the total sale consideration from the petitioner No. 2 and handed over the possession of the land to the said society. It is further the case of the petitioner No. 1 that though a registered sale-deed was not executed but it is the petitioner No. 2 who is the owner of the land in the eye of law and having all rights to file the writ petition, but in order to protect the fundamental rights of the society as well as of its members because the members have constructed houses over the said land and they are having their houses on the land which is subject of the acquisition proceedings and as such the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 stand on the same footing. Therefore, the petitioner No. 1 has also joined in this writ petition. It may be stated that under notification under Sub-section(2) of Section 52 of the UIT Act the land in dispute i.e. bearing khasra No. 28 measuring 4 bighas 18 biswas was also notified to be acquired for the then UIT Jaipur in the year 1979 and a notification cinder Sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was also published on April 20, 1984 and the land vested in the State Gover~iment free from all encumbrances by virtue of sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act as it then stood. The possession of the land is said to have been taken as will be evident from the award dated June 5, 1989 on October 31, 1984 and is said to have been given to the JDA. The fact that the possession was taken and delivered to the JDA is contested by the petitioners but at any rate it can be said that after publication of the notification on April 20, 1984 under Sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, as it then stood, the land in dispute stood vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and this court has already dealt with this aspect of the matter in detail while dealing with the position of law before dealing with the individual cases. It has already been held that as the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances under sub-section(4) of Section 52 after publication of notification under sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act, there can be no revesting of the same in its owner. It is not necessary to repeat the reasonings again and suffice it to say that the court has upheld the continuance of the proceedings after extension of the Act to this State. 23. So far as the contention of the petitioner that Chanda father of the petitioner died in the year 1978 and therefore the acquisition proceedings were initiated against the dead person and therefore the proceedings were void ab initio is concerned, this aspect of the matter has also been dealt with in the earlier writ petition (Ganpat v. State and others SBCW No. 6049/91) and for the reasons stated therein, which reason need not be repeated, it may be stated that even assuming that the proceedings were initiated against the dead person, the petitioner had no right and so far as the petitioner No. 1 is concerned, he has come out with the case that he has taken the whole of the sale consideration and had given possession of the land in dispute to the petitioner No. 2. 1 have already said in the earlier part of this order that the transfer or use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose is in contravention of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as well as the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and as such it is void and the person becomes trespasser. A reference to the decision in the case of Banwarilal, (supra) has already been made and the reasons have been given in detail in the case of Ghasi (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6973/1991) and the matter has been discussed as to what are the rights of the society or its members who got the possession of the land under the agreement of sale and the allottes constructed their houses without conversion and such like persons are trespassers and cannot be said to have come to this court with clean hands, they having contravened the provisions of the Act, raised constructions without permission from the competent authority, are not entitled to any relief. Therefore, so far as the present writ petition is concerned neither the petitioner No. 1 nor the petitioner No. 2 or its members, have right to challenge the acquisition proceedings and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 24. S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5723/1991 Pratap v. State of Rajasthan and others. The dispute relates to khasra Nos. 205, 206 and 207 measuring 10 bighas 11 biswas situated in village Bir Khatipur-Jaipur. The petitioner is said to have made improvements and developments over this land and invested his lifesavings in the development. The award in this case was made on June 28, 1989 and the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid award on the same ground that it was made after two years of the extension of the Act to this State on September 24, 1984. The petitioner has not challenged the notifications under sub-section(2) and (1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act. As said earlier in the other cases, there can be no dispute that after publication of the notification under sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act on April 20,1984, the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the reasons have already been stated and it can be said that even as a result of not passing the award within the stipulated time under Section 11-A, there can be no revesting of the land in the owners when 80% of the estimated amount of compensation was offered within 6 months as provided in sub-section(4) of Section 60A as inserted by the Amendment Act in the year 1987. Even if I do not enter into controversy that the possession was taken on October 30, 1984, by the Land Acquisition Officer and handed over to the State Government and then to JDA, as this fact is contested by the petitioner, this court has already taken a view that the possession can even be taken now but under the provisions of the Act. It will be seen that after coming into force of the Amendment Act as required under sub-section(4) of Section 60A 80% of the amount of estimated compensation was offered by notice dated January 23, 1988 to the petitioner, but the amount was not taken. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to say that he had no notice of the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to say that he had no notice of the acquisition proceedings. The award was made on June 28, 1989 and the writ petition was filed on September 26, 1991 i.e. more than two years after the passing of the award. The delay has not been reasonably explained. The writ petition therefore, is liable to be dismissed.S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5428/1991Bhura and others Y. State of Rajasthan and others. 25. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners who are khatedars of the land in dispute bearing khasra No. 204 measuring 65 bighas 1 biswa situated in village Bir Khatipura, Jaipur. There is no dispute that the land in dispute was subject or notification under Section 52(2) of the UIT Act in the year 1979 as well as notification under sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act for the reasons already stated so far as the acquisition proceedings are concerned, after the extension of the Act to this State on September 24, 1984, they were continued and the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances under sub-section(4) of Section 52 of the UIT Act after publication of the Notification under Sub-section(1) of the Section 52 on April 20, 1984 and it could not be reverted to its owners and the owners are only entitled to compensation. After coming into force of the Amendmend Act as required under sub-section(4) of Section 60A, 80% of the estimated amount of compensation was offered to the petitioners, but they did not accept it. The petitioners were represented by a counsel Shri Yash Pal Garg and this fact is not disputed by the petitioners and from a bare reading of averments of para 7(4) at page 9 of the writ petition it will be clear that the petitioners have admitted that after a notice under Section 9(1) was issued by the Land Acquisition Officer, he had fixed November 26, 1988 as the first date of hearing and Shri Garg advocate appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, it is a case where the petitioners had notice of the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer. It will further be seen that the petitioners did not dispute that on November 26, 1988 advocate Shri Garg had intimated the Land Acquisition Officer that there was stay from the court. Therefore, it is a case where the petitioners had notice of the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer. It will further be seen that the petitioners did not dispute that on November 26, 1988 advocate Shri Garg had intimated the Land Acquisition Officer that there was stay from the court. The petitioners have come out with a case that it was a wrong impression of the advocate and the stay order had been vacated long back. It was only on the next date that the Land Acquisition Officer was intimated that the stay order had been vacated and thereafter the award was made on November 30, 1988. 26. Undet the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act in the computing the period of two years referred to in that section the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursance of the declaration is stayed by an order of the court shall be included. There is no dispute and it has not been disputed by the petitioners that they have filed suit in the court of Munsif and the stay order obtained from there had been vacated on September 2, 1986. But it appears from the award dated November 30,1988 that even on November 7,1988 the advocate of the petitioners said that there was stay from the court. Therefore, if the advocate of the petitioner himself gave out that there was stay and the Land Acquisition Officer adjourned the case and only thereafter on being intimated that on September 2, 1986 the stay order was vacated, he made the award on November 30,1988, the petitioners are stopped from saying that in fact there was no stay and therefore the award could not be made in view of Section 11-A of the Act after two years from September 2, 1986 when the stay order in fact was vacated. The stay order having been vacated on September 2,1986, the award could have been made even if Section 11-A would have been applicable by September 1,1988, but was made on November 30,1988. But in view of the fact that the petitioner's advocate gave out that there was stay order, the petitioners cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong information furnished to the Land Acquisition Officer. This is an additional ground so far as this case is concerned. 27. But in view of the fact that the petitioner's advocate gave out that there was stay order, the petitioners cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong information furnished to the Land Acquisition Officer. This is an additional ground so far as this case is concerned. 27. As said earlier so far as the present case is concerned, the petitioners were represented by an advocate and the award was made on November 30,1988. The writ petition has been filed on September 19,1991, i.e. after about 2 years and 10 months and the delay has not been explained. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5414/1991 Sheo Narain and another v. State of Rajasthan and others. 28. The present writ petition is by the khatedars of khasra No. 196 measuring 34 bighas 12 biswas situated in village Bir Khatipur-Jaipur. This land too was acquired under the provisions of the UIT Act. As stated in other cases, the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 52 was issued on October 10,1979 and that the notification under sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act was published on April 20, 1984. As said earlier, the said notifications have not been challenged and the award has been challenged. The award in this case was made on November 30, 1988 and the writ petition has been filed on September 18, 1991 i.e. almost two years and ten months after the passing of the award. The petitioners filed civil suit in which the stay order made earlier was vacated in September, 1986 but the Land Acquisition Officer had no notice of the vacation of the stay order as will be seen from the award itself. After the UIT Act was amended as aforesaid and as required under Section 60A 80% amount of the estimated compensation was offered to the khatedars and the notification under Section 9 and 10 of the Act was issued as after the aforesaid amendment further proceedings were taken under the Act. Shri Garg, Advocate for the petitioner appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and he had given out that there was stay order by the court and the Land Acquisition Officer therefore did not pass the award and the same was passed only on November 30, 1988 by the Land Acquisition Officer when he was informed that the stay order was vacated on September 2, 1986. Thus, like the case of Ghasi and other cases the award was not immediately challenged, and this is an additional ground for dismissal of the writ petition i.e. the advocate of the petitioners himself gave out to the Land Acquisition Officer that there was stay and therefore, they cannot be allowed to take advantage of Section 11-A of the Act and because there is delay in challenging the award and the petitioner's counsel had taken part in the proceedings, therefore, the petitioners had knowdedge of the award. So far as the argument that the award is incomplete and no award has been given in respect of buildings extra.it will be seen that when notices were given to the khatedars under Section 9 and 10, who claim to have made construction, it cannot be said that the award is incomplete. A look at the award will show that it has not been stated that the buildings structures or houses are existing and all that has been stated is that in case any buildings are existing on the land of amount of compensation will be determined separately. There being no material that any such claim was filed under Section 9 of the Act, it cannot be say that the award is incomplete. S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5415/1991 Chanda v. State of Rajasthan and others. 29. This writ petition is by the khatedar who claims to be the khatedar of land bearing khasra No. 203 measuring 35 bighas situated in village Bir-Khatipura-Jaipur. As in other cases, there is no challenge in this case to the notification under sub-section(2) of Section 52 and sub-section(1) of Section 52 of the UIT Act published respectively on October 10, 1979 and April 20, 1984 and only challenge is to the award dated November 30, 1988 in the earlier part of this order, it has been said that because the land has vested free from all encumbrances in the State Government and handed over to the JDA there could be no revesting of the land and the only remedy with the petitioner is to claim compensation. For the reasons already stated in the earlier part of this order in respect of other cases, so far as the present case is concerned, it is also covered by the earlier reasonings given in various other cases. For the reasons already stated in the earlier part of this order in respect of other cases, so far as the present case is concerned, it is also covered by the earlier reasonings given in various other cases. In this case the award was made on November 30, 1988 and it will be seen that in this case also after insertion of Section 60A in the UIT Act by the Amendment Act of 1987 within 6 months 80% of the amount of estimated compensation was offered to the petitioner and notice was given. Not only this, Shri Garg Advocate for the petitioner appeared and he intimated the Land Acquisition Officer that there was stay from the Court and therefore the Land Acquisition Officer did not pass the award and the award could only be passed later on on November 30, 1988 when the Land Acquisition Officer came to know that the stay order had been vacated on September 2, 1986. This fact is not disputed by the petitioner rather the petitioner in para 6 has admitted this fact but has come out with a case that the order of civil court was for maintenance of status quo and it in fact did not operate in any way as a bar in land acquisition proceedings as regards the determination of market value was concerned. The Apex Court in the case of Usufbhai Noormohemad Nendoliya v. State of Gujrat and another, AIR 1991 SC 215 referring to be Explanation of Section 11-A said- "The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why the aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise......... In the first place, as held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why the aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise......... In order to get the-benefit of the said provision what is required is that the land-holder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any action or proceeding in pursuance of declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those land holders who do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired." It will therefore be clear that any person for whose benefit the Explanation to Section 11-A has been provided has obtained any order from a civil court including an order to maintain status-quo, he cannot be allowed to take the advantage of it and say that there was simply an order to maintain status-quo and passing of the award was not stayed. The said Explanation will not be attracted to this case. In my opinion, the expression `any action or proceedings ' will include even the order of status quo in which no further action can be taken. There is delay of about 2 years and 10 months in challenging the award and filing this writ petition which delay has not been explained. Therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 30. Section 60 of the UIT Act deals with the disposal of land by the Trust. Sub-section(2) of Section 60 is relevant for the present purpose and it reads as under:-60 Disposal of land by the 11rust. (1) .................... Therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 30. Section 60 of the UIT Act deals with the disposal of land by the Trust. Sub-section(2) of Section 60 is relevant for the present purpose and it reads as under:-60 Disposal of land by the 11rust. (1) .................... (2) The power of the Trust with respect to the disposal of land under sub-section(1) shall be so exercised as to secure, so far as practicable that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the trust and are willing to comply with any requirements of the Trust as to its improvement and use have an opportunity to obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them : Provided that where the Trust proposes to dispose of by sale any land without any improvement having been undertaken or carried out thereon, it shall offer the land in the first instance to the persons from whom it was acquired, if they desire to purchase it subject to such requirement and use as the Trust may think fit to impose. (3) .................." A perusal of the aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section 60 of the UIT Act will show that it is required of the Trust while exercising powers of disposal of the land acquired by it that as far as practicable if the persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the Trust and are willing to comply with any requirement of the Trust as to its improvement and use, then the Trust may consider giving accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirement on such terms and conditions as may be settled and in accordance with the scheme, if any, framed by the Trust for which the land was be acquired. But I have taken a view that the persons who are members of the society, the society having not purchased the land under any sale-deed, or the society having become defunct,- and the members having constructed the houses in contravention of the provisions of law and as such they being trespassers, they can have no right, but so far as other writ petitions by the khatedars are concerned, in their cases the 'Dust shall consider allotting suitable residential-accommodation of reasonable size in its Scheme to them as per the Scheme which it has framed or must have framed. 31. Consequently, I find no merit in any of the writ petitions and each of these writ petitions is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. But so far as the petitioners in S.B.Civil Petition No. 5427/91 Mangala v. State of Rajasthan and others , S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6933/91 Banshi Ram and others v. State of Rajasthan and others , S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5723/1991 Pratap v. State of Rajasthan and others , S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5428/91 Bhura and others v. State of Rajasthan and others , S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5414/1991 Sheo Narain and another v. State of Rajasthan and others , and S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 5415/1991 Chanda v. State of Rajasthan and others are concerned, they are khatedars or co-khatedars of the land and they have not transferred their lands to the societies and a reference to Section 60(2) of the UIT Act has already been made in the earlier part of this order and therefore, so far as they are concerned the Trust will consider to allot one residential plot to each of the petitioners of the reasonable size as per the scheme framed and on the terms and conditions as may be settled and on the reserve price. *******