JUDGMENT : G.P. Mathur, J. This petition has been filed for quashing of the orders dated 21-3-1991 passed by the City Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar (Annexure 12 to the writ petition) and the order dated 27-11-1991 passed by the 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar, (Annexure 13 to the writ petition) in proceedings u/s 133 Code of Civil Procedure. The parties have exchanged affidavits and, therefore, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage in accordance with the Rules of Court 2. The present petition was filed before the Joint Registrar on 18-12-1991 and on 20-12-1991 an order was passed for issuing notice to the opposite parties to show cause why the petition be not admitted. The contesting opposite party No. 23 has filed counter affidavit and the main plea taken therein is that the Petitioner had filed another writ petition No. 35505 of 1991 challenging the same orders in this Court which was dismissed as not pressed on the application of the Petitioner and in these circumstances the present petition is not maintainable. I have, therefore, summoned the record of the aforesaid writ petition which reveals the following facts: 3. The present Petitioner Daya Shanker filed Writ Petition No. 35505 of 1991 challenging the same orders dated 21-3-1991 of the City Magistrate Kanpur Nagar, and 27-11-1991 of the 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar, in this Court on 5-12-1991. The petition was heard by me on 6-12-91 when the following order was passed; As prayed put up on 9-12-1991 as part heard. It appears that the writ petition was not taken up for hearing on 9-12-1991. Subsequently the Petitioner Daya Shanker moved an application which bears the date 13/17 December, 1991, for dismissing the writ petition as not pressed. The application was filed in Court on 17-12-1991 and on 19-12-1991 the following order was passed: An application has been moved by Shri A.C. Tewari praying that the writ petition be dismissed as not pressed. Along with the application a Vakalatnama of the Petitioner Daya Shanker has been filed. In these circumstances this petition is dismissed as not pressed. The affidavit filed in support of the present writ petition No. 37641 of 1991 was sworn on 16-12-1991 and it was got reported from the office of the Stamp Reporter on 18-12-1991 and was filed in the office of the same day. In these circumstances this petition is dismissed as not pressed. The affidavit filed in support of the present writ petition No. 37641 of 1991 was sworn on 16-12-1991 and it was got reported from the office of the Stamp Reporter on 18-12-1991 and was filed in the office of the same day. It was heard on 20-12-1991 when notice was directed to be issued. 4. Learned Counsel for the contesting Respondent has submitted that as the Petitioner had filed another writ ^petition in this Court challenging the same orders which was dismissed as 'not pressed' the present writ petition challenging the same orders is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has however submitted that since the earlier writ petition was dismissed as 'not pressed' and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case the second petition is not barred and the same is maintainable. In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon several decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely Daryao and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1457 , Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Limited Vs. The Government of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1196 . P.D. Sharma Vs. State Bank of India, AIR 1968 SC 985 , Tilokchand and Motichand and Others Vs. H.B. Munshi and Another, (1969) 1 SCC 110 , Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 1328 and Direct Recruit Engineering Officers v. State of Maharashtra 1990 (2) UP LB EC 833. 5. In the case of Daryao (supra) the Petitioners challenged the order passed by the Board of Revenue by filing a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution which was dismissed. Instead of filing an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of the High Court the Petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The main argument of the Petitioners was that the principle of res-judicata, which is no more than a technical rule, could not be pleaded against a petition which seeks to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was, therefore, required to consider as to whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution would be barred if a writ petition had been dismissed earlier. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was, therefore, required to consider as to whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution would be barred if a writ petition had been dismissed earlier. It is evident from the following observation made in para 7 of the report: ...That is why we must proceed to deal with the question of res-judicata on the basis that a fundamental right has been guaranteed to the citizen to move this Court by a original petition wherever his grievance is that his fundamental rights have been illegally contravened. Again in para 8 of the report it was observed as follows: ....This Court would naturally refuse to circumscribe them or to curtail them except as provided by the Constitution itself....Thus the right given to the citizen to move this Court by a petition under Article 32 and claim an appropriate writ against the unconstitutional infringement of his fundamental rights itself is a matter of fundamental right, and dealing with the objection based on the application of the rule of res-judicata this aspect of the matter has no doubt to be borne in mind. After considering the matter in detail the Court recorded its conclusion in following words in para 19 of the report: We hold that if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is other wise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and move this Court under Article 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and move this Court under Article 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. If the petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the larches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Article 32, If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the Petitioner was guility of laches or that he had an alternative remedy it would not be a bar, except in cases which we have already indicated. If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res-judicata. 6. In Birudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills case (supra) it was held by a Constitution Bench that if a writ petition under Article 226 is disposed of on merits with a speaking order a writ petition under Article 32 on same facts would be barred irrespective of whether the notice was issued to the other side or not before such decision was given. 7. In Trilok Chand v. H.B. Munshi (supra) a Constitution Bench reiterated that the Supreme Court would refrain from acting under Article 32 if the party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 with a similar complaint and for the same relief and failed. In Devilal Modi, Proprietor, M/s. Daluram Pannalal Modi Vs. 7. In Trilok Chand v. H.B. Munshi (supra) a Constitution Bench reiterated that the Supreme Court would refrain from acting under Article 32 if the party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 with a similar complaint and for the same relief and failed. In Devilal Modi, Proprietor, M/s. Daluram Pannalal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and Others, AIR 1965 SC 1150 , it was held by a Constitution Bench that it would not be right to ignore the principle of res-judicata altogether in dealing with writ petitions filed by citizens alleging the contravention of their fundamental rights In this case after dismissal of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the Appellants filed an appeal in the Supreme Court but the SLP was dismissed. Thereafter the Appellant filed a second writ petition in the High Court raising some new grounds which was dismissed and then appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The Court observed as follows in para 12 of the reports: If constructive res-judicata were not applied to such proceedings a party could file as many writ petitions as he liked and take one or two points every time. That clearly was opposed to considerations of public policy on which res-judicata was based and would mean harassment end hardship to the opponent. Besides if such a course is allowed to be adopted, the doctrine of finality of judgments pronounced by this Court would also be materially affected. We are, therefore, satisfied that the second writ petition filed by the Appellant in the present case is barred by constructive res-judicata. 8. In Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India (supra) the Appellant challenged the order dated 17th March, 1961, passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was dismissed in limine on 22nd March, 1961. Thereafter the Appellant approached the Financial Commissioner and filed a petition u/s 33 of the 1954 Act which was rejected by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India. Thereafter he filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of res-judicata in view of the dismissal of the earlier writ petition. Thereafter the Appellant approached the Financial Commissioner and filed a petition u/s 33 of the 1954 Act which was rejected by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India. Thereafter he filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of res-judicata in view of the dismissal of the earlier writ petition. It was on these facts that a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges made the following observation in para 10 of the report: It is, therefore, incontrovertible that where a petition under Article 226 is dismissed in limine without a speaking order such a dismissal would not constitute a bar of res-judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, more so, when on the facts in this case it appears that the petition was dismissed presumably because the Petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of a revision petition u/s 33 of the 1954 Act which remedy he availed of and failure to get the relief he moved the High Court again for the relief. 9. A close scrutiny of the decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court would show that a second petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be put at the same pedestal as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution as in the latter case the Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to a citizen to move the Hon'ble Supreme Court and claim an appropriate writ against the unconstitutional infringement of his fundamental right. Secondly, if the writ petition is dismissed in limine without any speaking order it would not be possible to find out whether the same was dismissed on the ground that there was an alternative remedy or the Petitioner was guilty of laches. Therefore, it has been held that such a dismissal cannot create a bar of res-judicata. The nature of the order passed while dismissing the writ petition would, therefore, determine whether the second petition is barred or not. 10. The earlier petition filed by the Petitioner has not been dismissed without passing any speaking order but has been dismissed as not pressed. The nature of the order passed while dismissing the writ petition would, therefore, determine whether the second petition is barred or not. 10. The earlier petition filed by the Petitioner has not been dismissed without passing any speaking order but has been dismissed as not pressed. In the case of Daryao (supra) under identical situation it was held that such a dismissal of the writ petition created a bar of res-judicata which would be evident from para 20 of the report wherein it was observed as follows: The Petitioners had moved the High Court to obtain a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Revenue Board against them, and when the matter was argued before the High Court in view of the previous decisions of the High Court their learned Counsel did not press the petition. In other words the points of law raised by the petition was dismissed on the merits. That being so, it is a clear case where the writ petition has been dismissed on the merits, and so the dismissal of the writ petition creates a bar against the competence of the present petition under Article 32. 11. In Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 5 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question whether a second writ petition would be maintainable if the earlier writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn It was held that Order 23 Rule 1 CPC should be extended to the cases of with drawl of writ petition also on the ground of public policy. The Court observed as follows m para 9 of the report; While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution since such withdrawal does not amount to re-judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the Petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. Since the earlier writ petition was dismissed on the application moved by the Petitioner himself, in my opinion the second petition for quashing the same order is not maintainable. 12. Since the earlier writ petition was dismissed on the application moved by the Petitioner himself, in my opinion the second petition for quashing the same order is not maintainable. 12. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has also placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Munna Lal Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1986 ACJ 92, In this case a S.I. was placed under suspension. He filed a writ petition challenging the suspension order which was summarily dismissed on 9-11-1982. Thereafter he filed another writ petition in 1985 and it was held that the subsequent petition can be entertained if it is covered by the principles laid down in Daryao's case (supra). In para 12 of the report it was observed as follows: In the instant case the earlier petition was dismissed in limine by a non-speaking order. Suspension is a continuing cause of action and it is open to an employee to challenge the order of suspension at any time on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings.... In this case the suspension order was quashed on the ground that though it was passed in 1982 but the disciplinary proceedings had not started and even the charge-sheet had not been issued till 11-3-1965 when the writ petition was decided. Therefore, this case can be of no assistance to the Petitioner. 13. There is another reason for not entertaining the second petition Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court is headed as follows: Direction, Order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution other than a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus. Rule 1 of Chapter XXII provides that an application for a direction or order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution other than a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus shall be made to the Division Bench except in cases covered by the proviso where it shall be presented to a single Judge. Rule 7 provides that where an application had been rejected it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts. In my opinion Rule 7 of Chapter XXII also bars the second writ petition filed by the Petitioner. Rule 7 provides that where an application had been rejected it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts. In my opinion Rule 7 of Chapter XXII also bars the second writ petition filed by the Petitioner. The argument of the learned Counsel that the word "application" used in Rule 7 refers to an application for interim relief cannot be accepted as such an application is separately dealt with in third paragraph to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 which provides that where an ad interim order is sought, a separate application after furnishing its copies and copies of all documents in support of the plea for such interim order to the other side against whom the order is sought, shall be made for the purpose. 14. The conduct of the Petitioner also disentitles him to get any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution as it an equitable relief. The earlier writ petition was heard by me on 6-12-1991 and as I was not satisfied it was ordered to be put on 9-12-1991 on the request of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The affidavit filed in support of the second writ petition was sworn on 16-2-1991. The application for withdrawing the earlier writ petition was filed on 17-12-1991 and thereafter the second writ petition was got reported front the office of the Stamp Reporter and was filed before the Joint Registrar. It is obvious that the Petitioner did not want his case to be heard by the Court which had heard the earlier writ petition and the device of getting the earlier writ petition dismissed as not pressed and filing a second writ petition was adopted so that the case be heard by another court. In my opinion if such a course is permitted to be adopted by a litigant it will lead to a serious mal-practice of "indulging in Bench hunting tactics." as observed by the Supreme Court in Sargooja Transport case (supra). The second petition had been filed even when the first petition was still pending in this Court and at a point of time there were two petitions seeking the same relief. A litigant should not be permitted to adopt such a course in administration of justice. 15. The second petition had been filed even when the first petition was still pending in this Court and at a point of time there were two petitions seeking the same relief. A litigant should not be permitted to adopt such a course in administration of justice. 15. Having given my anxious consideration to the entire matter I am of opinion that the second petition seeking the same relief is not maintainable. This petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order is vacated.