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1992 DIGILAW 846 (ALL)

BADRI NATH v. IX ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE

1992-06-18

G.P.MATHUR

body1992
JUDGMENT G.P. Mathur, J. - The landlord has filed this petition for quashing of the appellate order, dated 31-10-1989 by which his release application, which had been allowed by the Prescribed Authority, has been dismissed in appeal. Parties have exchanged affidavits and therefore, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage in accordance with the Rule of Court. 2. Landlord-petitioner Badri Nath filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against Krishna Lal (Predecessor-in-interest of respondent Nos. 2 to 9) for release of a shop situate in house No. J. 19/22 Mohalla Jamaluddinpura in the city of Varanasi on 16-9-1985. The case of the landlord in brief was that he is the owner of house No. J. 19/22 situate in Mohalla Jamaluddin para which was purchased by him in 1969. The house had seven rooms of very small dimension in the ground floor which were in occupation of petty shop keepers. When the house was purchased his family consisted of 12 members but there were only four residential rooms in the house. The petitioner carries on the business of 'Zari' in a shop in the same house. He was facing acute hardship on account of paucity of residential accommodation and, therefore, he got the seven rooms on the ground floor vacated and after remodelling he started using them for residential purpose. The petitioner had five sons, namely, Ram Babu aged 35 years, Ramesh Kumar aged 28 years, Suresh Kumar aged 26 years, Dinesh Kumar aged 23 years and Pradeep Kumar aged 21 years, all of whom had finished their education and as they were not interested in service they all wanted to carry on independent business. The eldest son Ram Babu alone had set up his 'Zari' Business in a shop situated in house No. J-19/61 Jamaluddinpura. The remaining four sons of the petitioner were unemployed and, therefore, four separate shops were required for setting them in business. Ramesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar wanted to set up a business of general store for which the shop in the tenancy of Krishna Lal was ideally suited. They had also made arrangement of necessary finances. Dinesh Kumar and Pradeep Kumar were, for the time being working with the petitioner in the Zari shop in order to gain necessary experience. Ramesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar wanted to set up a business of general store for which the shop in the tenancy of Krishna Lal was ideally suited. They had also made arrangement of necessary finances. Dinesh Kumar and Pradeep Kumar were, for the time being working with the petitioner in the Zari shop in order to gain necessary experience. The case of the landlord further was that the tenant Krishna Lal owned a house bearing No. J/63-A in Mohalla Jaitpura and he was carrying on a big business of cloth and card-board in the said house. He was also carrying on business of card-board in house No. 29/32 Mohalla Baluabir which is owned by Rudra Pratap alias Bachcha Babu and his eldest son was looking after the said business. That apart the tenant was also carrying on hosiery business in a shop in house No. K55/11 Mohalla Ausanganj. It was thus pleaded that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine and in view of large and several business being carried on by the tenant and he being in possession of several other shops he would not suffer any hardship if the release application was allowed. 3. Tenant Krishna Lal contested the release application on the ground inter alia that he was in occupation of the shop for the last 30 years; that the petitioner had got vacated shops on the ground floor of the house and had thereafter converted the same into residential portion and thus the need of the landlord was not bona fide that the landlord had earlier filed a release application which was registered as P.A. Case No. 12 of 1975, which was dismissed on 16-3-1979 and the appeal was dismissed on 30-1-1980 and, therefore, the present application was not maintainable; that Ram Babu and his two brothers were carrying on separate business; that the landlord was in fact carrying on money lending business and that Ramesh and Suresh do not want to carry on business of general store but they would carry on the ancestral business of Zari. 4. The parties filed affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their case. After examining the evidence in great detail the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine and that he would suffer hardship in the event of the refusal of the release application. 4. The parties filed affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their case. After examining the evidence in great detail the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine and that he would suffer hardship in the event of the refusal of the release application. On these findings the release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by order, dated 10-2-1988. Tenant Krishna Lal filed an appeal which was allowed by the 9th Addl. District Judge on 20-10-1989 and the release application was dismissed. Aggrieved the landlord has filed the present writ petition. 5. I have heard Shri Sudhir Jaiswal for the petitioner and Shri R.N. Singh and Shri S.N. Singh for the contesting respondent at length and have examined the record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Additional District Judge has taken into consideration irrelevant facts and the findings recorded by him are based upon conjectures and surmises. He has also submitted that the relevant provision of law not considered by the Additional District Judge while deciding the appeal and, therefore, judgment suffers from manifest error of law. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, submitted that the learned Addl. Distt. Judge has after considering the material on record recorded a finding of fact that the need of the landlord is not bona fide and, therefore, the release application was rightly dismissed and as such there is ground for interfering with the impugned order. 6. It is not disputed that the shop was let out to Krishna Lal and the release application was filed impleading him as opposite party and same was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 10-2-1988. Krishna Lal fied an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority and during the pendency of the appeal he died, and thereafter respondents Nos. 2 to 9 to the present writ petition, were substituted as parties to the appeal. After the death of Krishna Lal the landlord moved an amendment application for amending the release application and para 8-A was added therein. In this paragraph it was stated that Krishna Lal has died and the shop in dispute which remained frequently closed was no longer required by his sons and, therefore, the same should be released in favour of the landlord. In this paragraph it was stated that Krishna Lal has died and the shop in dispute which remained frequently closed was no longer required by his sons and, therefore, the same should be released in favour of the landlord. It is stated in para 2 of the writ petition that Krishna Lal died during the pendency of the appeal which fact is not disputed in the counter-affidavit. The judgment of the learned Additional Judge shows that he did not at all take into consideration this development which took place during the pendency of the appeal, namely, that the original tenant Krishna Lal had died. Once this fact was brought on order that the original tenant had died and the landlord had pleaded the fact that the shop remained closed as the same was not required by the sons of the erstwhile tenant the learned Addl. District Judge ought to have examined it. He has, however, completely ignored to consider this important fact. In my opinion it was a very important circumstance which had considerable bearing on the fate of the case and on account of its non-consideration the judgment of the appellate authority is vitiated. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the learned Additional District Judge has been completely swayed by two earlier litigations between the parties which were wholly irrelevant for the decision of the present case and due to this reason the findings recorded by him are completely vitiated. In the earlier part of the judgment while discussing the case of the parties the learned Additional District Judge has mentioned that Krishna Lal had filed an injunction suit against the landlord being suit No. 244 of 1971 which was decreed. Copy of the judgment in the aforesaid suit has not been brought on the record of the case. In para 35 of his affidavit (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) the petitioner has stated that he got the knowledge of suit No. 244 of 1971 and that the tenant by playing fraud obtained an ex-party decree against him. Even assuming that an injunction suit was filed by the tenant against the landlord in 1971 and the same was decried it can have no bearing at all on the present proceedings for release under Section 21 of the Act. It was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present case. Even assuming that an injunction suit was filed by the tenant against the landlord in 1971 and the same was decried it can have no bearing at all on the present proceedings for release under Section 21 of the Act. It was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present case. The learned Additional District Judge has however drawn an inference against the bona fide need of the landlord on the basis of the aforesaid injunction suit which is legally unjustified. 8. Another ground which has weighed heavily with the learned Additional District Judge in holding that the need of the landlord is not bona fide is that the petitioners filed a release application earlier which was registered as P.A. Case No. 12 of 1975. This release application was dismissed on 16-3-1979 and the appeal was also dismissed on 30-1-1980. Learned Additional District Judge has observed in the impugned order that the landlord has concealed this material fact and further that he had not shown any new or changed circumstances which entitled him to file a fresh release application. In this connection it may be noticed that in para 10 of his affidavit (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) the landlord has stated that he had filed P.A. Case No. 12 of 1975 but the same was dismissed on account of some technical mistake. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the landlord has concealed the fact of filing an earlier released application. Regarding filing of a second release application it may be mentioned that the legislature has made a specific provision in that regard. Rule 18 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, reads as follows :- "(2) Where an application of a landlord against a tenant under Section 21 for the release of any building or any specified part thereof or any surplus land appurtenant to such building is rejected on merits and a fresh application on the same ground is made within a period of one year from that decision, the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive." A perusal of the rule will indicate that if a release application had been dismissed on merits a fresh application on same grounds cannot be made within a period of one year. It is not disputed that the earlier release application was filed in 1975 which was dismissed on 16-3-1979 and the appeal was dismissed on 30-1-1980. The present release application has been filed on 16-9-1985 i.e. nearly ten years after the filing of the earlier release application and nearly six years after the final rejection thereof. Thus the second release application was fully maintainable in law and had to be judged on merits. The learned Additional District Judge has also erred in observing that the landlord had not indicated the change in circumstances and, therefore, his need did not appear to be bona fide. Regarding change of circumstances it is obvious that when the earlier release application was filed in 1975 the age of the sons of the landlord was much less. The age of Ramesh and Suresh would have been only 18 and 16 while that of Dinesh and Pradeep would have been 13 and 11 years. At that time it could not be legitimately said that Ramesh, Suresh, Dinesh and Pradeep had to be set up in some independent business. Since the present release application has been filed ten years after the earlier release application, the family circumstances of the landlord have completely changed. Even his youngest son is 21 years of age. According to the case of the landlord and the material on the record they have completed their education and as they are not interested in service they want to set up independent business. In the present release application it is specifically pleaded that Ramesh and Suresh who are aged 28 and 26 years want to set up a general store in the shop in dispute. If a landlord comes out with a case that his sons are 28 and 26 years of age and they want to set up independent business such plea cannot be said to be absolutely bogus and cannot be thrown out straight away without examining the same on merits. Therefore, it is wholly incorrect that the landlord had not shown any change in the circumstances since the filing of the earlier release application. This reason given by the Additional District Judge for rejecting the release application is, therefore, wholly illegal and contrary to law. 9. Therefore, it is wholly incorrect that the landlord had not shown any change in the circumstances since the filing of the earlier release application. This reason given by the Additional District Judge for rejecting the release application is, therefore, wholly illegal and contrary to law. 9. The Additional District Judge has also observed that in case the landlord wanted to set up Ramesh and Suresh in independent business and if a shop was required for them he should not have got the seven shops in the ground floor converted in residential portion and could have utilised the same as shop for them. It appears that the learned Additional District Judge has not looked into the release application and the affidavit filed by the petitioner carefully. It is stated in paras 3-A to 3-E and 4 and 5 of the release application that the house was purchased in 1969 and at that time there were seven small rooms in the ground floor which were occupied by the petty shop-keepers and, therefore, he was facing considerable difficulty. It is obvious that in 1969 Ramesh and Suresh were only 12 and 10 years of age. The other two younger brothers were only 7 and 5 years of age. It is obvious that at that time the landlord could have visualised that Ramesh and Suresh would carry on some independent business after completing their education. In view of the shortage of residential accommodation he converted the shops for residential purpose. Therefore, the mere fact that in 1909 the landlord converted small shops into residential portion can be ground for rejecting the release application which had been filed in 1985 on the ground that the sons had grown up and wanted to start independent business. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the finding of the Additional District Judge that the two sons of the landlord are sitting with the eldest son Ram Babu and are carrying on business in a shop is not based upon any evidence on record. This contention appears to be correct as there is no evidence on record to show that the two sons of the landlord are carrying on joint business with Ram Babu. Even the names of the aforesaid two sons has not been mentioned. This contention appears to be correct as there is no evidence on record to show that the two sons of the landlord are carrying on joint business with Ram Babu. Even the names of the aforesaid two sons has not been mentioned. That apart unless it was established that Ramesh and Suresh, for whose need the release of the shop in dispute was sought for, were the persons carrying on business with Ram Babu the present application could not be rejected. 11. The Learned Additional District Judge seems to be greatly influenced by the fact that the landlord was in possession of several other shops and on this ground he has held that his need is not bona fide. The landlord has stated in his affidavit that his family owned two houses and in these two houses his sons were owner of only th share. He has further stated that amongst the collaterals no partition had taken petition place. He has further stated that in house No. 116/119 several tenants were in occupation. He has thus pleaded that until the property was partitioned and he got a specific share and then got it vacated from the tenants the same could not be used by Ramesh and Suresh. Learned Additional District Judge did not at all examine the affidavit I of landlord and wrongly observed that he was in possession of several shops and, therefore, his need was not bona fide. 12. So far as the tenant is concerned it is not disputed that he owns a house where he is carrying on a wholesale business of cloth and card-board. Material on record also shows that one son of the tenant was carrying on business of card-board in Mohalla Balmabir and another son was carrying on business of hosiery. It is not a case where the tenant is not possessed of any other shop or that in case the release application was allowed his business would be completely stopped However, I am not expressing any final opinion on this aspect of the case in view of the order which I propose to pass. 13. In view of the discussions made above I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Additional District Judge are completely vitiated as they are based upon irrelevant circumstances and the relevant provisions of the rules have not been considered by him. 13. In view of the discussions made above I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Additional District Judge are completely vitiated as they are based upon irrelevant circumstances and the relevant provisions of the rules have not been considered by him. He has also not considered properly the evidence adduced by the landlord and his judgment is also based upon misreading of evidence. In these circumstances the appeal requires rehearing. In the result the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 25-10-1989 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge, Varanasi, is quashed. The learned District Judge, Varanasi, is directed to rehear the appeal himself or assign it to some other Additional District Judge for the purpose. Since the release application was filed in 1985 and considerable time has elapsed it will be proper if the appeal is heard and decided expeditiously preferably within three months of the filing of a certified copy of this order before him. Parties will bear their own costs.