JUDGMENT BHARUCHA, J.:—This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Additional Judge, Rohtak, being the Designated Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short T.A.D.A. Act, 1987) whereby the appellant was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 5 thereof and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months. 2. The appellant was apprehended by Sub-Inspector Rohtas Singh and Head Constable Ram Krishan near the Hilton factory on. G.T. Road in the State of Haryana on 7th April, 1988 on suspicion. In the envelope of wax paper that the appellant was carrying was found a .12 bore country-made pistol for which he had no licence or permit. After the necessary formalities, sanction was issued on 26th April, 1988 by the District Magistrate, Sonepat, for prosecuting the appellant for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. On 7th December, 1989, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sonepat, before whom the appellant was being prosecuted for the said offence, passed the following order: "Present A.P.P for the State. Accused on bail. At this stage it has come to my notice that this case should have been tried by the learned Designated Court under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Consequently this case is sent to learned Designated Court (Shri B. R. Gupta, learned Addl. Sessions Judge), Sonepat. Accused is directed to appear in that court at 12.00 noon today itself. File completed in all respects be sent immediately. Sd/- J. M. I. C., Sonepat Announced 7-12-1989." 3. The appellant was then tried by the said Additional Judge under Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987. The judgment under appeal noted that the appellant was charged on 18th December, 1989 by the said Additional Judge for the offence punishable under Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. Upon the evidence led, the said Additional Judge found that the prosecution had brought home the offence to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 4. Upon the evidence led, the said Additional Judge found that the prosecution had brought home the offence to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 4. The appellant has in his grounds of appeal taken, inter alia, the plea that the prosecution itself had not considered the case against him to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and that it was, therefore, not proper that he should have been tried and convicted thereunder. In the counter filed by Khajan Singh, Sub-Inspector, Police Station, Rai, it is submitted in reply that the prosecution had considered this to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed against the appellant under Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and had requested the learned Magistrate to transfer the case to the Designated Court for trial. 5. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the T. A.D.A. Act, 1987 had been extended to cover the whole of the State of Haryana by a notification dated 18th November, 1987. 6. This Court in the judgment in Jaloba v. State of Haryana, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 197 considered the submission that the Designated Court had no jurisdiction to try the appellant Jaloba because he had not been charged with having committed any offence under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985. He had been charged under Section 25 of the Arms Act. This Court rejected the submission noting Sections 6 and 9 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985 (equivalent to Sections 5 and 11 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987). Section 6 laid down that if in any area notified by the State Government under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985, a person contravened any provision or rule made, inter alia, under the Arms Act, then he was liable to the enhanced punishment provided for in the section. Section 9 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985 laid down that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, every offence punishable under that Act or a rule made thereunder was triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 9 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985 laid down that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, every offence punishable under that Act or a rule made thereunder was triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It, therefore, followed that though the offence committed by the appellant was in contravention of Section 25 of the Arms Act, it became exclusively triable by the Designated Court because of the notification made by the State Government and the operation of Section 6 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985. It was, therefore, futile for the appellant to contend that the Designated Court did not have jurisdiction to try him for the offence for which he stood charged. 7. Upon the authority of the judgment in Jalobas case (1989 Supp (2) SCC 197) it must be held that the appellant before us was rightly tried by the Designated Court under the provisions of the T. A. D. A. Act, 1987. 8. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that, in any event, the provisions of Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act did not apply to the appellant. These provisions applied where "any person is in possession of any arms and ammunition specified in ........ Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, unauthorisedly in a notified area". Category III(a) of Schedule 1 to the Arms Rules reads thus:- "III Firearms other than those in categories I, II and IV, namely Ammunition for firearms other than those in categories I, II & IV, namely : (a) Revolvers and pistols Ammunition for firearms of category III(a)." 9. It was pointed out that the appellant was found to be carrying a country-made pistol and submitted that a country-made pistol fell outside the ambit of the said Category III(a). That category speaks in broad terms of "revolvers- and pistols" and there is no reason to exclude a country-made revolver or pistol therefrom. 10. It was then argued, and, we think, with substance, that Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 applied only when a person was in possession of "arms and ammunition" and that the appellant, while he had been found in possession of a country- made pistol, had not. been found in possession of any ammunition. We think that the words "arms and ammunition" in Section 5 should be read conjuctively. been found in possession of any ammunition. We think that the words "arms and ammunition" in Section 5 should be read conjuctively. This is not merely a matter of correct grammar but also subserves the object of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987. A person in possession of both a firearm and the ammunition therefor is capable of terrorist and disruptive activities but not one who has a firearm but not the ammunition for it or vice versa. It is, therefore, our view that the provisions of Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act 1987 could not have been applied to the appellant. 11. This is not to say that the appellant should necessarily have been acquitted. Section 12 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 empowers the Designated Court to convict a person of any offence under any other law if he is found to have been guilty of the same during the course of a trial under that Act and to punish appropriately. 12. It was submitted that the evidence against the appellant did not establish that he was guilty of an offence under Section 25(1 B)(a) of the Arms Act, namely, of having in his possession an unlicensed firearm. We have examined the evidence and found no reason to question the conclusion of the Designated Court that the appellant was so guilty. That the evidence relied upon was of two police officials does not ipso facto give rise to doubt about its credibility. There is nothing on record to show that these police officials were hostile to the appellant and their evidence was not shaken in cross-examination. That the private party who was called as a witness by the prosecution did not support it does not, in the circumstances, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was innocent. 13. The appellant being guilty of an offence under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and he is also liable to fine. In the circumstances of the case, we think that the appellant must undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and pay a fine of Rs. 200/-. 14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. The appellant has already paid the fine of Rs. In the circumstances of the case, we think that the appellant must undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and pay a fine of Rs. 200/-. 14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. The appellant has already paid the fine of Rs. 200/- and has served a part of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him. He is presently on bail. The bail now stands cancelled and the appellant shall surrender to serve the balance of the sentence of imprisonment. Appeal allowed. For citation: AIR 1993 SC 1212 N.M. KASLIWAL AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ. Dr. Indu Kant Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and others, Respondents. Writ Petns. (C) Nos. 493, 456, 381,547,564 and 565 of 1992 with SLP (C) Nos. 9155-56, 9110 & 8528-29 of 1992 with C.A. No. 2950 of 1992 and with SLP (C) Nos. 5621 and 6343 of 1992 Decided on 11-8-1992. WITH Dr. Dhirendra Kumar Saxena, Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and others, Respondents. WITH Dr. Renu Raheja and others, Petitioners Versus Secretary, Medical Health, Lucknow and others, Respondents. WITH Dr. Neelima Mittal, Petitioner Versus Secretary, Medical Health, Lucknow and others, Respondents. WITH Dr. Daya Nand Prasad and another, Petitioners Versus State of U.P. and another, Respondents. WITH Dr. Rajeev Kishore Saxena, Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and another, Respondents. WITH Dr. R.K. Saxena and another, etc etc., Petitioners Versus State of U.P. and others, etc. etc., Respondents. WITH State of U.P. and others, Appellants Versus Dr. Vijay Tilak, Respondent. WITH State of U.P. and others, etc. etc., Petitioners Versus Dr. Yogendra Singh, etc. etc., Respondents. 1216 AND WITH Principal, S.N. Medical College, Agra and another, etc. etc., Petitioners Versus Dr. Kavita Shankar Garh and another, etc. etc., Respondents. Constitution of India, Art.32 - Education -Admission to post graduate medical course - Entrance exam. - Candidates securing less than minimum marks - Recommendation by SC in earlier petition to Govt. for consideration of such candidates against vacant seats - Same recommendation cannot be made in respect of candidates of earlier years. Where the SC in an earlier petitioner had made a recommendation to the Govt, for consideration of candidates of year 1992 securing less than minimum marks in an entrance examination for post graduate medical course, the same recommendation cannot be given in respect of candidates of earlier viz. 1990 or 1991. Where the SC in an earlier petitioner had made a recommendation to the Govt, for consideration of candidates of year 1992 securing less than minimum marks in an entrance examination for post graduate medical course, the same recommendation cannot be given in respect of candidates of earlier viz. 1990 or 1991. The candidates who had secured the minimum qualifying marks in the year 1990 or 1991 had an opportunity to appear in the entrance examination of 1992 and to make up the deficiency. Further granting admission to the candidates of 1990 and 1991 batch and to allow them to join with the batch of 1992 was bound to increase the total strength of Post-graduate students in 1992 which would not only be in violation of the directions of the Medical Council of India, but would also put an additional financial burden on the State Government (Para 5) Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, Dr. N.M. Ghatate and Mr.S.M. Jain, Sr. Advocates, Mr. Prashant Kumar, Mr. Pradeep Mishra, Mrs.Rachna Gupta, Mr. R.B. Mishra, Mr.Vimal Roy, Mr.Vikrant Singh, Mr. Ajay Agrawal, Mr. Vishwajeet Singh, Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Mr.R.D. Upadhyay, Mr. R.P.Gupta, Mr.E.C. Agarwala and Mr. S.K. Mehta, Advocates with them, for the appearing Parties. JUDGMENT KASLIWAL, J.:— All the above cases relate to the Doctors who had appeared in the entrance examination of 1990-91 for admission to Post-Graduate Medical Courses of seven medical colleges in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In some of these cases the candidates have filed Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution directly in this Court while in some cases the candidates first approached the High Court and being unsuccessful in the High Court have filed Special Leave Petitions against the orders of the High Court and there are some Special Leave Petitions filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh or by the Principal of the Medical Colleges against the orders of the High Court where the High Court had passed the orders in favour of the candidates. Though the points raised in all these cases are identical but in some cases, the notice has not been served on the respondent candidates and in some Special Leave Petitions the defects pointed out by the office have not been removed by the petitioners. Though the points raised in all these cases are identical but in some cases, the notice has not been served on the respondent candidates and in some Special Leave Petitions the defects pointed out by the office have not been removed by the petitioners. In view of the circumstances mentioned above we are stating the facts of the Writ Petitions filed by the Doctors under Article 32 of the Constitution and decision in these cases would cover the controversy in all these cases. 2. All the above writ Petitions have been filed by the doctors who had appeared in the entrance examination of 1990 and 1991 for admission to Post-Graduate Medical Courses of Medical Colleges in the State of Uttar Pradesh. All the petitioners secured less than 50% marks in the general category and less than 40% marks in the SC/ ST category necessary to qualify for admission to the Post-Graduate Course. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid rules by which the minimum percentage of marks has been kept as 50% for general category and 40% for SC/ ST category. This Court in a recent decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, AIR 1992 SC 932 had already held that the prescription of 50% cut off marks for the students of general category and 40% for SC/ STs was valid. The aforesaid decision was affirmed in Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 451, 454, 525, 545 of 1992, Ombir Singh v. State of U. P. decided on July 30,1992 (reported in 1992 AIR SCW 3218) 1217 and it was held that any challenge to the above rule laying down minimum percentage of marks for eligibility for admission to Post-Graduate Courses was no longer res integra. 3. It was, however, contended on behalf of the petitioners that while deciding the case Ombir Singh v. State of U. P., (1992 AIR SCW 3218) (supra) relating to the entrance examination for the year 1992, this Honble Court had made a recommendation that the State Government may take suitable steps for redressing the long felt grievance of the doctors to fill up all the seats which remained vacant after the admission of those candidates who had secured the minimum qualifying marks in such entrance examination. It has been submitted that a similar direction may be given in respect of seats which remained vacant in the years 1990 and 1991 also. It has been submitted that a similar direction may be given in respect of seats which remained vacant in the years 1990 and 1991 also. In this regard it was submitted that the State Government itself in a chart submitted before this Court has admitted that 256 seats remained Vacant in 1990 and 180 seats in 1991. It was further submitted that such direction be given in respect of all those petitioners who have approached this Court or the High Court in this regard. 4. The above prayer has been opposed on behalf of the State Government. It has been submitted on behalf of the State that there is no provision for carrying forward the vacant seats of any particular year to the subsequent years. It has been submitted that if the candidates of 1990 and 1991 batch are admitted now, they will have to join along with 1992 batch and this would increase the total strength of Post-Graduate students for the year 1992. It has been pointed out that the maximum number of seats for Post-Graduate Courses in 1992 is 535 out of which 318 have been filled by the candidates securing more than 50% marks and for the remaining vacancies the Government is trying to adjust the candidates of the year 1992 in terms of the recommendation made by this Honble Court in Ombir Singhs case (1992 AIR SCW 3218). It has also been submitted that it would not be just and proper to grant admission to such candidates only who have filed the petitions before this Honble Court under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court and to deny such right to other candidates who have secured much higher marks in merit in the entrance examination of 1990 and 1991, but did not approach the Court. It was submitted that such action would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. We have, given our thoughtful consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the case. We have already held that the rule laying down the minimum percentage of marks in the entrance examination is valid and no direction can be given to the State Government to fill up any vacant seats by the candidates securing less than the minimum qualifying marks. We have already held that the rule laying down the minimum percentage of marks in the entrance examination is valid and no direction can be given to the State Government to fill up any vacant seats by the candidates securing less than the minimum qualifying marks. We had of course, made a recommendation to the State Government in respect of the vacant seats of Post-Graduate Course for 1992 but we find no valid justification to make such recommendation in respect of the candidates of the earlier years of 1990 or 1991. The candidates who had not secured the minimum qualifying marks in the years 1990 or 1991 had an opportunity to appear in the entrance examination of 1992 and to make up the deficiency. We find justification in the difficulties pointed out by the State Government in doing so. Granting admission to the candidates of 1990 and 1991 batch now and to allow them to join with the batch of 1992 is bound to increase the total strength of Post-Graduate students in 1992. This would not only be in violation of the directions of the Medical Council of India, but would also put an additional financial burden on the State Government. In any case, the State Government itself is vehemently opposing such request made on behalf of the candidates of 1990 and 1991 and we cannot give any direction to the State Government in this regard. 6. In the result, we find no force in these writ petitions Nos. 493,456, 381,547,564,565 of 1992 and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs. 1218 S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9155-56/92, 9110/92 & - 8528-29/92 7. These Special Leave Petitions are dismissed in terms of the Judgment passed in W. P. Nos.493, 456, 381, 547, 564, 565 of 1992. Civil Appeal No. of 1992 (In S.L.P. (Civil) No. 20164 of 1991) 8. Special Leave granted. 9. This appeal by the State of U. P. is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 22-10-1991. It is allowed in terms of the judgment passed in W.P. Nos.493, 456, 381, 547, 564, 565 of 1992 and the order of the High Court dated 22-10-1991 is set aside. 10. I.A. No. 3 filed by Dr. Neena Raizada in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 451 of 1992 was directed to be tagged along with Special Leave Petition No. 6343 of 1992. 10. I.A. No. 3 filed by Dr. Neena Raizada in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 451 of 1992 was directed to be tagged along with Special Leave Petition No. 6343 of 1992. This application for intervention filed by Dr. Neena Raizada is now dismissed as we have already dismissed the Writ Petitions of the Doctors of 1990-91 Batch. S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 5621 & 6343 of 1992 and with S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. of 1992 11. The Court while delivering judgment in W.P. Nos. 493, 456, 381, 547, 564, 565 of 1992 delink above Special Leave Petitions heard with these writ petitions and direct issue of notice in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 5621 & 6343 of 1992 returnable within six weeks and mentioning in the notice that these Special Leave Petitions may be disposed of at the notice stage itself. Pending notice, there shall be interim stay of the operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court. The other remaining Special Leave Petition Nos. (sic) of 1992 are defective. Two weeks time is allowed to cure the defects and such cases be listed after removal of the defects. Order accordingly. For Citation: AIR 1993 SC 1215 Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.