JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the controversy relates to the suspension of the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Kekri. It is now well settled that an order of suspension by way of an interim measure pending an enquiry into the charge is not by way of penalty, but, it is equally important that an office of Chairman of a Municipality is an elective office and action of suspension against such person should not be lightly taken without some foundation. The courts should be zealous to see that an elected Member/Chairman is not lightly and arbitrarily suspended or removed from his office. But, still a temporary suspension of a delinquent elected member may be considered necessary or desirable under particular circumstance of a case to save the Municiplity and its funds from ruin. The State Government under its supervisory power, has been invested with the power to suspend a Member or Chairman of a Municipality under sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municiplities Act, 1959 (hereinafter, to be referred to 'as the Act'). While exercising this power, the State Government is not expected to act mala fide in passing the order of suspension. 2. In order to appreciate the contentions raised before me, the relevant and necessary facts are briefly stated: In August, 1990, the elections of the Members of Municipal Board, Kekri were held and the petitioner-was elected from Ward No. 7 and was subsequently elected as Chairman of the said Municipality. One Brij Kishore Sharma, Member of the Municipal Board, made a complaint on 1st May, 1991, to the Minister for Local Self-Government, Rajasthan, Jaipur, wherein, allegations were made against the petitioner for having committed various illegalities and irregularities in the discharge of his duties as Chairman. A copy of the complaint was also sent to the local MLA Shri Shambhu Dayal Badgujar, who in turn, referred the same to the Minister for Local Self Government. On these complaints, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Assistant-Director (Vigilance). From the reply of the State Government, it appears that the Inquiry Officer sought an explanation from the petitioner by sending to him a copy of the complaint. The petitioner submitted his explanation, a copy of which has been placed on the record as Ann.R/2. After completion of the preliminary enquiry, its result was forwarded to the State Government. From the reply of the State Government, it appears that the Inquiry Officer sought an explanation from the petitioner by sending to him a copy of the complaint. The petitioner submitted his explanation, a copy of which has been placed on the record as Ann.R/2. After completion of the preliminary enquiry, its result was forwarded to the State Government. The Inquiry Officer found the petitioner to have committed serious irregularities by misusing his position as Chairman and was guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties. He, therefore, suggested the action of removal of the petitioner under section 63 of the Act. The enquiry report was then processed by the Director, Local Bodies. The Minister for Local Self Government also considered the result of the inquiry, and a decision was taken to take action for his removal by initiating an enquiry under section 63 of the Act. While taking the above decision, the order of suspension with immediate effact was also passed. Consequently, the order of suspension was issued on 30.7.91 (Ann. 2), which reads as under : jktLFkku ljdkj Lok;r 'kklu foHkkx] jktLFkku] t;iqj dzekad ,Q fotk@Mh,yth@91@ fnukad vkns'k pwafd Jh Hkaojyky NkcM+k] v/;{k uxjikfydk dsdM+h ds fo:) jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1959 vf/kfu;e la[;k 38 lu~ 1959 dh /kkjk 63 esa tkap dk;Zokgh izkjEHk gks pqdh gSA vkSj pwafd Jh Hkaojyky NkcM+k] v/;{k ds fo:) izFken`"V;k vkjksi lgh ik;s x;s gSaA vkSj pwafd mDr Jh Hkaojyky NkcM+k ds uxjikfydk] v/;{k in ij jgus ls vc tkap esa izfrsdwy izHkko iMsxkA vr% Jh Hkaojyky NkcM+k v/;{k dh tkap fopkj/khu jgus vkSj mldk vafre vkns'k ikfjr gksus rd jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1959 vf/kfu;e la[;k 38 lu~ 1959 dh /kkjk 63 dh mi/kkjk 4 }kjk iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, jkT; ljdkj ,en~ }kjk Jh Hkaojyky NkcM+k] v/;{k uxjikfydk dsdM+h dks uxjikfydk v/;{k in ls rRdkyhu izHkko ls fuyfEcr djrh gSA jkT;iky dh vkKk ls g0 th0 ds0 xksLokeh mi'kk;u lfpo 3. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the order of his suspension on various grounds including that no enquiry has been commenced against him under section 65(10) read with section 63(2) of the Act, as such the order was illegal and without jurisdiction. 4. Mr. N.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the suspension of a Member/Chairman under sub-sec. 4. Mr. N.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the suspension of a Member/Chairman under sub-sec. (4) of section 63 of the Act can only be made by the State Government after the proceedings have been commenced against him under section 63 of the Act, Counsel argued that within the meaning of sub-sec. (4) of Section 63, an enquiry against a Member/Chairman can be said to have commenced on drawing up a statement of charges against him after having an explanation and sending the same for enquiry and finding of a Judicial-Officer of the rank of District Judge, or in any case, after consideration of the report of preliminary enquiry referred to in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 63, an explanation of the Member/Chairman concerned is sought and considered. He, therefore, urged that the order of suspension of the petitioner is premature and deserves to be quashed. Elaborating his argument, learned counsel contended that an office of a Chairman is an elective office and the legislature could not be taken to have laid down that he is liable for suspension before a statement of charges is drawn up and a judicial officer is appointed to inquire into the matter. It was pointed out that under sub-sec.(2) of Section 63, where it is proposed to remove a Member/Chariman on any of the grounds specified in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 63 as a result of an enquiry referred to in the proviso, the State Government, after having the explanation of the Member concerned, has to draw up a statement setting out distinctly the charges against hi and send the same for enquiry by a Judicial Officer of the rank of District Judge appointed by the State Government for that purpose. Till that stage is reached, the order of suspension is without jurisdiction. Strong reliance is placed in this connection on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ajmer Singh Yadav v. State of Rajasthan & others, 1986 RLR 16 . 5. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General, assisted by Addl. Advocate General, submitted that the word 'proceeding' in sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 should be given its natural and wider meaning. 5. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General, assisted by Addl. Advocate General, submitted that the word 'proceeding' in sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 should be given its natural and wider meaning. According to him, the proceedings against a delinquent Member/Chairman under section 63 of the Act are commenced from the stage of initiation of a preliminary enquiry, and the State Government is competent to suspend him, if the circumstances so warrant. It was also urged that in any case, a suspension order can be passed by the State Government after consideration of the result of the preliminary enquiry, if it makes up its mind to take action against him for the removal. This stage, according to the Advocate General, could be safely said when the proceedings for removal of a Member/Chairman have been commenced, and in such a case, a preliminary inquiry report is a safe-guard against any whimsical, capricious or mala fide exercise of power of suspension by the State Government. It was then contended that any narrow interpretation to the phrase 'commencement of the proceeding' contained in sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 would be contrary to the express provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (4) of Section 63. Strong reliance is placed on two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Ugamsee Modi v. State of Rajasthan 1962 RLW 184 and Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan 1963 RLW 209 . It was further contended that the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ajmer Singh Yadav's case (supra) runs counter to the above decisions, and hence is not a good law. 6. Before dealing with the above contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 65(1) lays down: "Every Chairman and every Vice-chairman shall be removable from his office as such chairman vice-chairman on any of the grounds specified in clause (d) of sub-sec. 6. Before dealing with the above contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 65(1) lays down: "Every Chairman and every Vice-chairman shall be removable from his office as such chairman vice-chairman on any of the grounds specified in clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of section 63, and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5) of that section shall apply." In Section 63(1)(d), the following grounds have been mentioned:"that he has (i) been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or (ii) been guilty of any disgraceful conduct, or (iii) become incapable in performing his duties as a member, or (iv) otherwise flagrantly abused in any manner his position as such member." A proviso appears after clause (d) in section 63(1) to the following effect: "Provided that an order of removal shall be passed by the State Government after such inquiry as it considers necesary to make either itself of through such officer or authority as it may direct and after the member concerned has been afforded an opportunity of explanation. Sub-Sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 63 are also relevant for the decision of the above controversy and they run as under: "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) where it is proposed to remove a Member on any of the grounds specified in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), as a result of the inquiry referred to in the proviso to the sub-section and after hearing the explanation of the member concerned, the State Government shall draw up a statement setting out distinctly the charge against the member and shall send and same for inquiry and findings by Judicial Officer of the rank of a District Judge to be appointed by the State Government for the purpose. (3) The Judicial Officer so appointed shall proceed to inquire into the charge in the prescribed manner, hear the member concerned, if he makes appearance, record his findings on each matter embodied in the statement as well as on every other matter he considers relevant to the charge and send the record alongwith such findings to the State Government, which shall thereupon pass orders in conformity with those findings. (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the State Government may place under suspension a member against whom proceedings have been commenced under this section until the conclusion of the inquiry and the passing of the final order and the member so suspended shall not be entitled to take part in any proceedings of the board or otherwise perform his duties of a member thereof. (5) Every order of the State Government passed under this section shall be published in the official Gazette and shall be final and no such order shall be liable to be called in question in any court." 7. A bare reading and scrutiny of sub-sec. (2) makes it evident that an enquiry under the proviso the sub-sec. (1) is contemplated under sub-sec. (2) of Section 63 which is applicable to the case of inquiry for removal of a Chairman under section 65(10). Sub-Sec. (2) expressly provides for an enquiry and further action to be taken in that behalf as a result of the preliminary inquiry referred to in the proviso to sub-sec.(1) of Section 63. The intention of the legislature is obvious that a preliminary inquiry under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) should be undertaken before any action under sub-sec. (2) is taken for removal of a member or a Chairman on the grounds specified in sub-section 0) (d) of section 63. In other words, a preliminary enquiry is not the stage when it can be said that an action for removal of a Member/Chairman under sub-sec.(2) is commenced. The words 'proposed to remove a member' in sub-sec.(2) make it clear that the action to remove a Member/Chairman under sub-sec.(2) starts only after the result of the preliminary inquiry the State Government decides to take action. At that stage, the State Government makes up its mind whether or not to take action for the removal of the Member/Chairman. The object of a preliminary inquiry is to verify whether there is any substance in the allegations made against a Member/Chairman. The argument of the learned Advocate General, therefore, has no merit that proceedings for removal against a Member/Chairman are commenced from the stage of initiation of a preliminary inquiry. The object of a preliminary inquiry is to verify whether there is any substance in the allegations made against a Member/Chairman. The argument of the learned Advocate General, therefore, has no merit that proceedings for removal against a Member/Chairman are commenced from the stage of initiation of a preliminary inquiry. My above views are fortified by the following observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal's case (supra): "After a complaint is received by the Government against a member or a Chairman, a preliminary inquiry has to be undertaken to verify whether there is any substance in the allegations made against such person and after holding that......inquiry as contemplated by provise to sub-section 0) of section 63, if the Government decides to take action against such person, it may issue show cause notice to him and also take further action for conduct of an inquiry in accordance with the provisions laid down under sections 63(2),(3),(4) and (5). Though for purposes of sub-sec.(7) of Section 63 a preliminary inquiry would be held to have commenced no sooner cognizance is taken of a complaint by the Government against such officer. Yet proceedings should be taken to commence in the meaning of the term under sub-sec.(4) to Section 63 only process is ordered to issue against such person, or when the authority makes up its mind to take action." Otherwise also, I am of the view that the office of a Chairman is an elective office and he should not be suspended in a routine manner without some foundation of misconduct /disgraceful conduct in the discharge of his duties etc. If the interpretation, as argued by the learned Advocate General is accepted, then, no Chairman would be in a position to function in a democratic set up of multi-party system prevailing in our country, as he would be suspended by mere initiating a preliminary inquiry even on a false complaint if the party in power is averse to him. 8. The matter does not end here. The issue still remains for decision, whether the petitioner was rightly suspended on the commencement of the proceedings. Sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 empowers the State Government to place a Member/Chairman under suspension against whom proceedings have been commenced. I have already said earlier that here proceeding means 'the proceeding to remove a Member/Chairman under sub-sec. The issue still remains for decision, whether the petitioner was rightly suspended on the commencement of the proceedings. Sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 empowers the State Government to place a Member/Chairman under suspension against whom proceedings have been commenced. I have already said earlier that here proceeding means 'the proceeding to remove a Member/Chairman under sub-sec. (2) of Section 63, after completion of the preliminary inquiry under proviso to sub-section 0), the State Government makes up its mind to take action for his removal on considering its result. Subsec. (2) of Section 63 states three different stages when the matter comes for consideration before the State Government in relation to removal of a Member/Chairman, viz; (i) The first stage is when the Government makes up its mind to initiate action to remove a Chairman on any of the grounds specified in clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) as a result of preliminary inquiry; (ii) The second stage comes when the State Government draws up a statement setting out the charge distinctly after having his explanation on a show cause notice; (iii) The third stage is when the statement of charges is sent for inquiry and finding by a judicial officer of a rank of a District Judge to be appointed by the State Government for the purpose. 9. The argument of Mr. Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the proceedings within the meaning of sub-sec. (4) of Section 69 can he said to have been commenced when the third stage is reached, i.e., statement of charges is sent for inquiry and finding by a judicial Officer.The expression 'proceeding' has been defined in the Random House Dictionary of English Language, as under: (i) a particular action or course of action; (ii) an action or a course of action, or conduct; (iii) the act of a person or thing that proceeds; (iv) proceedings, an activity continuing for some time; (v) the instituting or carrying on of an action at law-a legal step or measure. In Webstor's New International Dictioary, it has been defined as under: (i) progress or movement from one thing to another; (ii) the course of procedure in an action of law; and (iii) any step or action taken in conducting litigation. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined in legal sense as 'step taken in legal action'. In Webstor's New International Dictioary, it has been defined as under: (i) progress or movement from one thing to another; (ii) the course of procedure in an action of law; and (iii) any step or action taken in conducting litigation. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined in legal sense as 'step taken in legal action'. In Black's Law Dictionary, sixth edition, it has been defined: (i) an act which is done by the authority or direction of the Court, agency or tribunal, express or implied; (ii) an act necessary to be done in order to give and; (iii) a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right; (iv) all the steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or defence of an action. In Halsbury Laws of England, Vol.1, it has been laid down: "the term "proceeding" is frequently used to denote a step in an action and obviously it has that meaning in such phrases as 'proceeding in any cause or matter'. When used alone, however, it is in certain statutes to be construed as synonymous with or including an action." It has been also provided that the term 'proceeding' may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step, that is part of a larger action or special proceeding.If the expression 'proceeding' is considered in the light of above definition alongwith the provisions of sub-sec.(2) of section 63, then it would be clear that in the meaning sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 the proceeding' for removal of a Member/Chairman on any of the grounds in clause (d) of sub-sec.(1) can be said to have been commenced when the State Government makes up its mind to take action on_ considering the result of the preliminary inquiry. This is the first step under sub-sec.(2) when the State Government takes cognizance to take action for removal of a Member/Chairman. Thereafter, a show cause notice is given to him to take further action for the conduct of an inquiry as per provisions laid down in sub-secs. (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 63 of the Act. For taking cognizance at this stage on the report of the preliminary enquiry, the delinquent Member is not required to be heard. Thereafter, a show cause notice is given to him to take further action for the conduct of an inquiry as per provisions laid down in sub-secs. (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 63 of the Act. For taking cognizance at this stage on the report of the preliminary enquiry, the delinquent Member is not required to be heard. At this stage, the State Government has to be satisfied on the results of the preliminary enquiry that there is a prima facie case to takes further action for the removal of the Member/Chairman. At this stage the State Government may also come to a prima facie conclusion that further continuance of the Member/Chairman in office may not be in the public interest or in thee interest of the Municipality, and it can exercise its power under sub-sec. (4) and place him under suspension. Such a protective measure like suspension may, become necessary to prevent the person concerned from misusing his office to) cause further harm to the public interest or the interests of the Municipality.It may be stated that in sub-sec.(2) of Section 63 itself sufficient provision has been made to safeguard the interest of the delinquent elected office holder so that he may not be lightly suspended by the State Government. The holding of a preliminary inquiry into the charges covered by clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) as provided in its proviso and consideration of the said report by the State Government so as to find out as to whether a prima facie case has been made out against the delinquent elected office holder or not have been made condition precedent before an order of suspension is passed. It may be observed that a preliminary inquiry is undoubtedly a safeguard against whimsical, capricious or mala fide exercise of the power of suspension by the State Government. Then, further safeguard is provided when a post-decisional hearing is given to the delinquent) Member at the stage of drawing up a statement of charges. After hearing the explanation of the member concerned, the State Government is required to draw up a statement of charges as provided in sub-sec. (2). At this stage, the Govern-I ment can drop the proceedings if it is satisfied with the explanation. 10. The alternative argument of Mr. After hearing the explanation of the member concerned, the State Government is required to draw up a statement of charges as provided in sub-sec. (2). At this stage, the Govern-I ment can drop the proceedings if it is satisfied with the explanation. 10. The alternative argument of Mr. Jain is also not acceptable that issuance of a show cause notice and hearing the explanation of the member concerned are necessary when it can be proposed under sub-sec. (2) of section 63 of the Act to remove from his office on any ground contained in clause (d) of Section 63 (1) of the Act. Though this aspect of the matter has been dealt at length by me in the preceding paragraphs, yet at the cost of the repetition it may be observed that there is no such statutory requirement for the State Government while taking cognizance and making up its mind, on considering the report of preliminary enquiry, to take further action for the removal of the delinquent Member/Chairman. The hearing of the explanation of the member concerned, as provided in sub-sec. (2) of Section 63, is at the subsequent stage when a statement of charges is drawn by the State Government. At this stage, the State Government may also drop the proceedings if it is satisfied from the explanation. The argument of Mr. Jain, if accepted, would be unnecassary stretching the language of sub-sec. (2) of Section 63.After considering the provisions contained in section 63 of the Act and all the facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that if the State Government comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out against a Member/Chairman on consideating result of the preliminary inquiry, and it is further of the view that the charges are serious enough that the Member/Chairman should be temporarily removed from holding the elective office to prevent him from further acting prejudicially, it should be free to pass an order of suspension in exercise of its supervisory authority at this stage. There is no scope for the applicability of the principle of audi alteram partem at the stage of passing an order of suspension during the pendency of an inquiry and such requirement cannot be read into the provisions contained in sub-sec. There is no scope for the applicability of the principle of audi alteram partem at the stage of passing an order of suspension during the pendency of an inquiry and such requirement cannot be read into the provisions contained in sub-sec. (2) or (4) of Section 63.A Full Bench of this Court in Bhura Lal v. State of Rajasthan & ors 1988 (1) RLR 945 has considered this aspect while dealing with the suspension of a Sarpanch under the Panchayat Act. In para No. 20 of the judgment, it was observed as under: "Coming to the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that if a Panch or Sarpanch or Upsarpanch is not afforded on opportunity of hearing before an order of suspension is passed, the principles of natural Justice would be violated, it may be pointed out that the order of suspension resulting in the temporary removal of the Panch or Sarpanch is only an interim measure pending an enquiry into the charge drawn against the delinquent holder of the public office and at that stage it is not necessary to afford an opportunity of hearing to the person sought to be suspended. It may be pointed out that suspension may be by way of punishment or by way of an interim measure. When it is by way of punishment, the principles of audi alteram partem must be complied with. When it is only by way of temporary deprivation of office or as an interim measure, it should not be insisted upon that an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the person concerned before passing an order of suspension. Lord Denning M.R. in (4) Lewis v. Helfer (1978) 3 All. E.R. 354) , pointed out the distinction between the two types of suspension orders:- "These words apply, no doubt, to the suspensions which are inflicted by way of punishment, as for instance when a member of the Bar is suspended from practice for six months, or when a solicitor is suspended from practice. But they do not apply to suspension which are made, as a holding operation, pending enquiries. Very often irregularities are disclosed in a Government department or in a business house; and a man may be suspended on full pay pending enquiries. Suspension may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is cleared of it. But they do not apply to suspension which are made, as a holding operation, pending enquiries. Very often irregularities are disclosed in a Government department or in a business house; and a man may be suspended on full pay pending enquiries. Suspension may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No one, so far as I know, has ever questioned such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself, and so forth. The suspension in such a case is merely done by way of good administration. A situation has arisen in which something must be done at once. The work of the department of the office is being affected by rumours and suspicions. The other will not trust the man. In order to get back proper work the man is suspended. At that stage, the rules of natural Justice do not apply." The Full Bench also considered the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, 1984 SC 1271 , and after citing the decisions of two Full Bench Judgments of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Kashmiri Lal v. The Dy. Commissioner, Sonepat & ors., AIR 1980 P & H 209 , and Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana & ors., AIR 1979 P & H 61 , it was observed in paras 25 & 26 as under: "25.-Similar is the situation when the suspension of a Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch is necessary to be brought about in order to prevent him from continuing to commit serious acts of misconduct, misappropriation of funds, position and the like. In such case a pre-decisional hearing can be dispensed with particularly when ample opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the delinquent holder of public office during the statutory enquiry under section 17(1) of the Act read with rule 21 of the Rules." "26.-As pointed out by us above, the order of suspension under section 17(4A) is an order of interim nature, and it could be passed only after an active application of mind by the State Government to the question as to whether an emergent or immediate action is called for on the basis of the preliminary enquiry report and its decision to send a charge sheet and show cause notice to the Panch or Sarpanch concerned. Moreover, it is envisaged in rule 21(3) that an opportunity of hearing shall be afforded to the person concerned in the sense that after a show cause notice alongwith a statement of charges is served upon him, he will have an opportunity to submit his representation in answer to the charges. At that stage he could also seek a review of the order and ask the authority to rescind or modify the same. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Liberty Oil Mills Case (8) the principles of natural Justice would be satisfied if a post-decisional hearing is given in such matters and the aggrieved party is afforded an opportunity at his request. If an urgent or emergent action is required to be taken as a result of the consideration of the preliminary enquiry report made by the Collector to the State Government, then there could be no doubt that the order of suspension of the Panch or Sarpanch could be passed at the stage of giving the show cause notice along with a copy of the order sheet as a review or reconsideration of the order of suspension is naturally envisaged after the Panch or Sarpanch submits his representation in reply to the show use notice, as on consideration of the same, the State Government may drop the charges or proceed to appoint an Enquiry Officer to hold the enquiry into the charges. It needs to be emphasised that an order of suspension of an elected office holder should only be passed by the State Government when the charges levelled against him involve misconduct of serious magnitude and are of such a nature as to warrant immediate or emergent action". The Full Bench also approved the view expressed in Radhey Shyam Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & ors., 1985 RLR 920 , wherein it was held that before suspension of Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch under the Panchayat Act, during pendency of an inquiry, a pre-decisional opportunity to be heard cannot be afforded and that the principles of natural Justice are attracted to an order of suspension passed by way of punishment, but, if the order of suspension is by way of an interim measure pending an inquiry into the charge, it is not necessary to afford an opportunity of hearing to the person sought to be suspended before passing the order of suspension. 11. Now, I proceed to consider the two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Ugamsee Modi's case (supra), and Mohan Lal's case (supra), and also the decision of the learned Single Judge in Ajmer Singh Yadav's case (supra), which have been referred by the learned counsel for the parties and which relate to the question of suspension of a Member/Chairman of a Municipal Board.In Ugamsee Modi's case (supra), the petitioner was the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Jalore, and he was suspended by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 of the Act. Before passing the said order, a preliminary enquiry was held by the Collector, Jalore, who submitted a report against the Chairman alleging flag rent abuse of his position in the discharge of duties. A criminal case was also registered on the allegations, which was inquired by the Inspector General of Police, who applied for sanction to prosecute the Chairman. The State Government on being satisfied prima facie that the Chairman was guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, issued a notice under section 63(2) of the Act on Jan. 17, 1961, a show cause notice why action be not taken. In spite of the reminders, the Chairman did not submit his explanation and on 14th Feb., 61, the suspension order was passed. 17, 1961, a show cause notice why action be not taken. In spite of the reminders, the Chairman did not submit his explanation and on 14th Feb., 61, the suspension order was passed. The notice that was issued to the Chairman in that case was under section 63(2) of the Act, and in that context the learned Judges of this Court observed as under: "If these facts are correct that there were certain allegations of misconduct against that petitioner of his having abused his powers as a Chairman of the Municipality, that on those allegations there was some inquiry by certain officers and that on the report submitted by those officers the Government called upon the petitioner to explain the allegations made against him, it can hardly be contended that proceedings cannot be taken to have commenced against the petitioner within the meaning of sub-sec. (2) of Section 63 of the Municipalities Act. It may be that the framing of the actual charges and the reference to the judicial officer concerned may take place later; but there was nothing to prevent the State Government from taking action to suspend him on those allegations under sub-sec.(4) of Section 63 of the Act. The Judicial Officer concerned, in case a reference is made in respect of certain charges which are already the subject matter of inquiry in the criminal court, may stay his hands and then take up his investigation, if at all necessary, at a later stage after the termination of the criminal proceedings and submit his report to the Government; but these are subsequent stages of the proceedings relating to the pendency or conclusion of the inquiry. There can be no doubt that on the facts stated here, proceedings under sub-sec. (2) of section 63 of the Act, must be taken to have commenced against the petitioner when on these allegations he was called upon to show cause and to explain his conduct. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the contention of the petitioner that the order of suspension is without jurisdiction." It was then held as under: "It is well settled that an order of suspension is not by way of penalty. All that it does is to make the person affected refrain from discharging his functions in a particular office for a certain penod. All that it does is to make the person affected refrain from discharging his functions in a particular office for a certain penod. If the order had been malicious, of course, this Court would be entitled to interfere; but on the facts, as they appear to be, it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the Government in making that order was unjustified or malicious". The the above judgment, some observations which create an impression that after the report of the preliminary enquiry is considered by the State Government and a show cause notice is given to the delinquent Member/Chairman is the stage when the proceeding can be said to have been commenced. The observations with regard to notice to the Member/Chairman appear to have been made keeping in view the facts of that particular case and not for the purpose of laying down general preposition of law. The necessity of giving notice to the delinquent representative seeking his explanation arises after the State Government has make up its mind to take action against him for removal on considering the results of the preliminary inquiry making a prima facie case under clause (d) sub-sec. (1) of Section 63 of the Act. Ugamsee Modi's case (supra) came for consideration by another Division Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal's case (supra), wherein the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Ranawat, C.J. and Hon'ble Tyagi, J. addressed itself to the stage when it can be held that the proceedings have been commenced for the removal of a member/Chairman. In that case, certain complaints were received by the State Government against the Chairman which were inquired into by the Dy. Director of Local Bodies and Assistant Director of Local Bodies after the Post of Dy. Director was abolished. An interim report was, submitted to the Government on 22.10.62. The Government, after considering the report of the preliminary inquiry, while issuing an order for further inquiry under section 63(2) of the Act, simultaneously, passed an order of suspension of the petitioner on Oct.24,1992. A similar argument was raised before the Division Bench that the proceedings could not be said to have been commenced, and therefore, the suspension order was illegal and without jurisdiction. The Division Bench,after considering Ugamsee Modi's case (supra) and the various provisions of section 63, held that for the purposes of sub-sec. A similar argument was raised before the Division Bench that the proceedings could not be said to have been commenced, and therefore, the suspension order was illegal and without jurisdiction. The Division Bench,after considering Ugamsee Modi's case (supra) and the various provisions of section 63, held that for the purposes of sub-sec. (1) of section 63, a preliminary inquiry is commenced no sooner cognizance is taken of a complaint by the State Government, against such officer, yet proceeding should be taken to commence in the meaning of the term under sub-sec. (4) of section 63 only when process is ordered to issue against such person or when the authority makes up its mind to take action. In the words of the Division Bench:- "the issue therefore in short is whether the petitioner was suspended on commencement of the proceedings against him under section 63. If so, the order of suspension cannot be held to be invalid. In Ugamsee Modi v. State of Rajasthan, 1986 RLR 16 a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Singhal held, "proceedings under sub-sec. (2) of Section 63 of the Act, must be taken to have commenced against the petitioner when on those allegations he was called upon to show cause and to explain his conduct." We are in agreement with the law laid down in that decision. After a complaint is received by the Government against a Member or a Chairman, a preliminary inquiry has to be undertaken to verify whether there is any substance in the allegations made against such person and after holding that inquiry as contemplated by proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 63, if the Government decides to take action against such person, it may issue show cause notice to him and also take further action for conduct of an inquiry in accordance with the provision laid down under sections 63(2), (3), (4) and (5). Though for purposes of sub-sec. (1) of Section 63 a preliminary inquiry should be held to have commenced so sooner congnisance is taken of a complaint by the Government against such officer, yet proceedings should be taken to coommence in the meaning of the term under sub-sec. (4) to Section 63 only when process is ordered to issue against such person, or when the authority makes up its mind to take action. (4) to Section 63 only when process is ordered to issue against such person, or when the authority makes up its mind to take action. At that stage the Government makes up its mind whether or not to take action and that, in our opinion, is the stage of commencement of proceedings for purposes of Section 63(4)." In Mohan Lal's case (supra), an interim report of the preliminary inquiry was submitted to the Government on Oct. 22 and on Oct. 24. The Government applies its mind and took a decision to take action against the Chairman under section 63 and the order of suspension was passed on the interim report itself. No show cause notice was given before passing the suspension order and no charge-sheet was drawn uptill a final report was received and the Government issued show cause notice to the petitioner after receipt of the final report. On these facts, the Division Bench observed as under : "In fact, no charge sheet appears to have been drawn uptill a final report was received against the petitioner from the Asstt. Director of Local Bodies for although sonic facts were found established others still required further inquiry. After receipt of that final report, the Government issued show cause notice to the petitioner although it had decided to take action already on the interim report. Thus even though show cause notice was in fact issued on the 1st of December, proceedings commenced against the petitioner on the 24th of October, 1962 when the Government took a decision to take action against him. The order of suspension in this case was made simultaneously with the order of inquiry. The crux of the matter is not the service of the show cause notice or the date on which it is issued, but the date of determination of the competent authority that there was material for taking action for issuing process. In this view of the matter, the order of suspension of the petitioner cannot be held to be invalid having been made simultaneously with the order of institution of inquiry against him." Thus, the view which I have taken stands fully fortified by the above judgment of the Division Bench. In this view of the matter, the order of suspension of the petitioner cannot be held to be invalid having been made simultaneously with the order of institution of inquiry against him." Thus, the view which I have taken stands fully fortified by the above judgment of the Division Bench. The stage when the State Government considers the report of the preliminary inquiry and makes up its mind to take action for removal against the erring Member/Chairman of the Board under section 63(2) of the Act, is the stage of commencement of proceedings for purposes of section 63(4) and the State Government is competent to pass an order of suspension in exercise of powers contained in sub-sec. (4).The Division Bench has not held that obtaining of the explanation and its consideration is a condition precedant for suspending a Member/Chairman of the Municipal Board/Council.In Ajmer Singh Yadav's case (supra), it is no doubt true that the learned Single Judge has observed as under : "In my opinion, as far as a Chairman /member of the Municipal Board/Council is concerned, in case he is sought to be removed from the office on the ground Contained in clause (d) (i) of sub-sec. (1) of section 63 of the Act, that he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, the proceedings for removal can be said to have been commenced against him only after the report of inquiry under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of section 63 of the Act is received, he has been afforded opportunity of explanation and the State Govt. has applied its mind and has decided to proceed under sub-sec. (2) of section 63 of the Act against him. It is not necessary that for commencement of the proceedings, as aforesaid, the statement of charges which as per the notification referred to earlier is to be treated as complaint must have been drawn." The above observations, no doubt, support the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings can be said to have been commenced under sub-sec. (4) of Section 63 of the Act only after the delinquent representative had been afforded opportunity of explanation and the State Government applied its mind and decided to proceed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 63 of the Act. (4) of Section 63 of the Act only after the delinquent representative had been afforded opportunity of explanation and the State Government applied its mind and decided to proceed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 63 of the Act. But, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the views expressed by him run counter to the decisions in Mohan Lal's case (supra) and Ugamsee Modi's case (supra), as stated earlier. 12. This question may be judged from another angle also. If the argument of Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, is accepted that a pre-decisional hearing is a condition precedent to the delinquent Member/Chairman before his suspension, it would result in duplicacy and in Justice. From sub-sec. (2) of Section 63, it is clear that an opportunity of hearing has to be granted to the delinquent holder of a public office before definite charges are framed and referred to the judicial officer. If an opportunity of hearing is read into the provisions of section 63(4) of the Act, it would mean that two opportunities should be provided, one before passing the order of suspension and another before framing of the charges. It has never been the intention of the legislature that two such opportunities should be provided and I agree with the submissions of the learned Advocate General that it is not the intention of the legislature to grant any pre-decisional hearing before a Member/Chairman is suspended by the State Government in exercise of powers under section 63(4) of the Act. What is required is that before he is suspended, a preliminary enquiry should be held by a responsible officer and after the report is received and the State Government applies its mind and comes to the conclusion that a further probe is essential for the removal of the Member/Chairman, then, it has to issue a notice under section 63(2) of the Act to show cause why definite charges be not framed and referred to a judicial officer. At the stage of application of mind by the State Government to proceed or not to proceed against the delinquent representative, he can be suspended and it is not at all essential that a pre-decisional hearing should be granted to him to show cause why he may not be suspended before the proposed inquiry. Such view may also result in grave harm or in Justice to the institution and the public. Such view may also result in grave harm or in Justice to the institution and the public. Therefore, I have no hesitation in rejecting the first and the foremost contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings against the petitioner have not commenced in the present case. 13. I may now pass to consider the next contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of suspension is vitiated on the ground of mala fides. The averments in this connection in the writ petition are that the petitioner opposed the election of respondent-2 Shambhu Dayal Badgujar (MLA) in the last Assembly election which took place in the year 1990, and that he (respondent 2) belongs to Janta Dal (Digvijay Singh Group), which is attached to Bhartiya Janta Party in running the Government in the State of Rajasthan. In other words, the respondent-2 used his influence on respondent-3 Shri Bhanwarlal Sharma, Minister for Local Self Government, Rajasthan, to pass the order of suspension, Another ground has been stated that the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality is Shri Kishan Lal, who also belongs to Janta Dal and the petitioner is a member of Congress (I) party. Then, it was stated that respondent-3 Shri Bhanwarlal Sharma was not happy with the petitioner on several grounds other than the political anmity, while in ground No. (F) he has stated that he has given his personal consent on asking of respondent-3 to allot some piece of land to M/s Kekri Press Company Ltd., all these averments have been expressly denied by the respondents. Further details were given about the allotment of the land to M/s Kekri Press Company Ltd. in para No. 6 of the reply. It was also denied that respondent-2 had influenced respondent-3 or the State Government in passing impugned order. Simply because the elections are contested on different political platforms can hardly be a ground of enmity. It was also denied that respondent-2 made any complaint against the petitioner.In S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is for the person seeking to invalidate an order to establish the charge of bad faith. It was also denied that respondent-2 made any complaint against the petitioner.In S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is for the person seeking to invalidate an order to establish the charge of bad faith. It has been remembered that such a charge may be made easily and without a sense of responsibility, and that is why, it is necessary for courts to examine it with care and attention.The allegations of mala fides made in the writ petition are quite vague containing the necessary particulars for the allegation. Such type of allegation can be made by any petitioner who is suspended by the State Government. For such a charge, the petitioner was required to prove malus animus indicating that the State Government was actuated either by spite or ill-will against him, but, no such particulars were furnished by him. No material has been placed on the record to prove the allegation of mala fides also. Simply because the State Government belongs to a political party to which the petitioner does not belong can hardly be a ground to infer the mala fides. Ours democracy is based on multiparty system, and in such system, the State Government may be of a different party than the party to which a Sarpanch or Chairman may claim to belong and such averments can always be made to challenge the order of suspension. In the instant case, the suspension of the petitioner has been made on consideration of the result of the preliminary enquiry, and as such it cannot be said to be without foundation. The preliminary inquiry is a safeguard against an arbitrary or whimsical exercise of powers. The second contention has also no force and the same is hereby rejected. 14. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the allegations which are the basis of the suspension of the petitioner were against all the members of the Municipality and not against the petitioner alone as Chairman and that the accusation against the petitioner is not of serious nature. This argument can be summarily rejected as the same has not been taken in the writ petition. In the absence of any averment in the writ petition, the respondents are unable to give any reply. This argument can be summarily rejected as the same has not been taken in the writ petition. In the absence of any averment in the writ petition, the respondents are unable to give any reply. I have also perused the report of the preliminary enquiry Ann. R/3, which has been placed on the record by the respondents. A perusal of the said report shows that there are serious allegations of flagrant abuse of powers by the petitioner as Chairman of the Municipal Board as well as misconduct in the discharge of his duties. Those allegations have been found to be prima facie true on the preliminary inquiry. As such, it cannot be said that the suspension of the petitioner is without any foundation. Otherwise also, it is the subjective satisfaction of the State Government on a preliminary inquiry whether to proceed or not against the delinquent Member/Chairman for his removal and this Court cannot substitute its own wisdom for that order. It is no doubt true that a party challenging the order of suspension can show that the satisfaction of the concerned authority was an extraneous or irrelevant circumstance or that there was a total lack of application of mind. The facts and circumstances to be considered must be those which existed on the date of the conclusion of the opinion or arriving at the satisfaction and actually weighed with the authority while passing the impugned order. While the court can examine as to whether the opinion or satisfaction for that. Though, the materials placed may not satisfy the court, the task of the court is only limited to an investigation as to whether there was any intention (sic) of Act at all or whether irrelevant or extraneous circumstances have weighed with the authority while passing the impugned order. The fact that different formation of opinion or satisfaction is possible for the court on the very same facts and circumstances is not a ground to quash the order of suspension. Then, the petitioner is to be afforded an opportunity of hearing by the State Government before drawing up a statement stating out distinctly the charges and sending the same for inquiry and finding by a judicial officer. At that stage, the petitioner can point out that there is no foundation to frame any charge against him and that the proceedings should be dropped. At that stage, the petitioner can point out that there is no foundation to frame any charge against him and that the proceedings should be dropped. Presently, it cannot be said that the order of suspension is without any foundation or that it was passed in irrelevant and extraneous circumstances. No other point has been pressed before me. 15. Before parting with it, I would like to say that the suspension of an elected representative cannot be equated with the suspension of a Government servant. As elected representative is elected by the electorates for a fixed term and the term and the consequences of suspension of an elected representative may be evil. Ours is a multi-party system of democracy, and politically this possibility cannot be ruled out that the delinquent representative may belong to different political party than the party in power, who is empowered to pass an order of suspension under the provisions of the Act. In spite of the safeguards provided under the provisions of section 63, for a healthy democratic set-up, and in the interest of all it is desired that such elected representative should not be kept under suspension for an uncertain period in the garb of an inquiry. Though, it is true that the final inquiry is made by a judicial-officer of the rank of District & Sessions Judge, but, still it is necessary that the matter should be decided as early as possible. It is also necessary that no undue delay should be made by the State Government on its part either in framing the charges after hearing the delinquent representative or in prosecuting the inquiry before the judicial officer. If at any subsequent stage, it is found that the State Government was unnecessarily consuming time by adopting dialatory tactics, it shall always be open to the delinquent representative to approach this court seeking to quash the proceedings and in a given case, this court should not hesitate in quashing the proceedings on being satisfied that the inquiry was unnecessarily being delayed for ulterior object to keep the delinquent representative under suspension. An expeditious inquiry in such matters is essential for a healthy democratic set-up and also for the electorates as well as for the delinquent Member/Chairman who deisres to vindicate his honour to save future political career.The net result of the above discussions is that the writ petition has no merit and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******