JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - These two appeals raise the question of jurisdiction of the Family Court at Lucknow to entertain the petition for maintenance filed by Smt. Archana Misra and Archan Pratap alias Achintya minor under Sections 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act No. 78 of 1956). The maintenance was claimed from Pratap Chandra Misra who is the husband of Smt. Archana Misra and father of Archan Pratap minor. 2. Before the learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow, it was pleaded on behalf of Pratap Chandra Misra that the Court at Lucknow had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition as no part of the cause of action accrued at Lucknow. The learned Judge held that the petition was maintainable at Lucknow on behalf of the minor, but it was not maintainable on behalf of the wife. Thus the husband has partly succeeded and partly lost before the Family Court Against the order of the Family Court one appeal has been preferred by the wife and the other appeal has been preferred by the husband. The wife naturally claims that her plea is also maintainable at Lucknow and the husband claims that the plea of neither his wife nor his son is maintainable at Lucknow. 3. Jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a proceeding is to be seen with reference to the allegations made in the plaint or application. On material facts there is no dispute between the parties. These facts are that the marriage took place at Hardoi and thereafter the husband and wife stayed at Hardoi and various other places including Secunderabad where the husband who is a member of the Indian Railway Service, was posted. The son was born at Secunderabad. The first attempt to desert the wife was made by the husband on 611989 when she was turned out of the house at Hardoi whereafter she came to Lucknow and started living there with her parents along with the minor son. Thereafter efforts were made by the wife to patch up in which connection she went to Hardoi and lastly to Secunderabad. At Secunderabad also she was not welcomed by the husband and she left that place on 3031990 and came to Lucknow. Since then she and her minor son are living at Lucknow with the wife's brother. Thereafter efforts were made by the wife to patch up in which connection she went to Hardoi and lastly to Secunderabad. At Secunderabad also she was not welcomed by the husband and she left that place on 3031990 and came to Lucknow. Since then she and her minor son are living at Lucknow with the wife's brother. On these facts Lucknow is neither the place of marriage nor of last residence of husband and wife. On these undisputed facts it has to be determined whether the Family Court at Lucknow had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 4. Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act. Under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for short, Code, a suit or proceeding can be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. In view of this clause it has to be determined whether any part of the cause of action has accrued at Lucknow. 5. Learned counsel for the husband has cited AIR 1978 Allahabad 234 Subhash Chandra Jain v. Smt. Vidyut Jain and AIR 1984 Calcutta 49 Arun Kumar Bedi v. Anjana Bedi for claiming that Lucknow Court cannot have jurisdiction in the matter. 6. As already noticed the petition was filed under Sections 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, for short Maintenance Act. Section 18 reads as follows: 18(1). Subject to the provisions of this section a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time. (2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance (a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her: (b) ........................................... This section creates two statutory rights in favour of a Hindu wife. The first is entitlement to be maintained by the husband and the second is her entitlement to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance if the husband is guilty of desertion. This section creates two statutory rights in favour of a Hindu wife. The first is entitlement to be maintained by the husband and the second is her entitlement to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance if the husband is guilty of desertion. The term desertion has been explained as including abandonment of the wife without reasonable cause and without her consent and against her wish. 7. In the present case the plea of the wife is that she has been abandoned by her husband without reasonable cause and without her consent. This according to the above section amounts to desertion. Thus under the above section the wife is entitled to live separately if the allegations made by her in her petition are found to be correct. At this stage those allegations have to be assumed to be correct. Once it is held that she is entitled to live separately it will also have to be held that she is entitled to live separately at the place of her choice. This carries with it an obligation on the part of the husband to maintain her at the place she is residing in accordance with her choice. In the present case the wife is admittedly residing at Lucknow ever since the husband deserted her. On the view taken by us of Section 18 we are of the opinion that cause of action for a suit for maintenance would arise also at the place where the wife resides on account of desertion by her husband. Lucknow in the present ease being such place, we are of opinion that the Family Court at Lucknow had jurisdiction to entertain the petition in question. Accordingly the finding of learned Judge. Family Court holding that the wife was not entitled to maintain petition at Lucknow cannot be sustained. 8. The reasoning adopted by us in respect of wife applies with equal force to the minor child. Under Section 20(1) a Hindu is bound to maintain his children. This is the statutory obligation of the husband in the present case towards his minor son and correspondingly it is the statutory right of the minor son to claim maintenance from his father. Under subsection (2) a legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor. This is the statutory obligation of the husband in the present case towards his minor son and correspondingly it is the statutory right of the minor son to claim maintenance from his father. Under subsection (2) a legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor. This is also a statutory right available to Archan Pratap, the minor in the present case. We are accordingly of the opinion that the learned Judge, Family Court was correct in holding that application for maintenance at the instance of minor was maintainable at Lucknow. 9. In Subhash Chandra Jain (Supra) the wife had filed suit for maintenance at the place where marriage had taken place. It was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that the Court at Etah had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for maintenance. This judgment is authority only for the proposition that the Court at the place where marriage has taken place has jurisdiction to entertain suit for maintenance. This judgment is not authority for the proposition that the Court at the place where the wife is residing as a result of desertion by the husband does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The aspect involved in the present case was not before this Court in that case. The place where marriage takes place also furnishes part of the cause of action for a suit for maintenance, 10. The facts of Arun Kumar Bedi's case (Supra) are very much akin to the facts of the present case. In that case the marriage had taken place at Delhi and the parties thereafter lived together in United kingdom where the husband was settled and the desertion of the wife also took place there. After desertion the wife returned to India and started living at Calcutta where she filed suit for maintenance. Jurisdiction of the Court at Calcutta to entertain the suit was challenged by the husband on whose behalf it was urged that nonpayment of maintenance allowance did not constitute cause of action for a suit for maintenance within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code. Jurisdiction of the Court at Calcutta to entertain the suit was challenged by the husband on whose behalf it was urged that nonpayment of maintenance allowance did not constitute cause of action for a suit for maintenance within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code. On behalf of the wife it was urged that Section 18 of the Maintenance Act imposed a statutory obligation on the husband to maintain a separated wife and nonfulfilment of the obligation constituted part of cause of action within the meaning of Section 20(c) of the Code. The trial court accepted the wife's plea but the High Court negatived it. In paragraph4 of the Report it is observed: ....... It is settled now that cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support Tier right to the judgment of the Court. Admittedly in the present case the plaintiff has riled the suit claiming the right for a judgment awarding her separate maintenance. The right to claim maintenance necessarily arises on her marriage to the defendant/husband. Her further right to claim such maintenance by way of a separate maintenance arises as and when she proves desertion by the husband as one of the grounds specified in Section 18(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. Therefore, in order to be entitled to a judgment of the Court on her claim she has to establish her marriage with the defendant husband and desertion by the defendant. Nonpayment of the maintenance itself need not be proved in order to get a judgment because that may be the defence to her suit by the husband. In the opening sentence of the quoted passage the learned Judges elaborate what constitutes cause of action. According to them cause of action means every fact which would be necessary to prove in order to get relief. Thereafter they confine the facts required to be proved in a suit for maintenance to factum of marriage and factum of desertion. In view of the observations contained in the extracted passage if the husband denies marriage and desertion the wife will have to prove these facts in order to get maintenance. Thereafter they confine the facts required to be proved in a suit for maintenance to factum of marriage and factum of desertion. In view of the observations contained in the extracted passage if the husband denies marriage and desertion the wife will have to prove these facts in order to get maintenance. In our opinion, on the same analogy it can be said that if the husband denies neglect to maintain the wife, the wife will have to prove nonpayment of maintenance allowance also. Therefore, on the reasoning contained in the judgment itself, nonpayment of maintenance allowance would also constitute part of the cause of action. Accordingly, with utmost respect to the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that nonpayment of maintenance allowance does not constitute part of cause of action in a suit for maintenance, 11. There is another way of looking at the question. Despite service of summons the husband does not put in appearance and the Court calls upon the wife to prove her case ex parte. In order to succeed on the basis of ex parte evidence the wife apart from stating about marriage and desertion will also have to state that since desertion the husband has not paid her any money to maintain herself. For this reason also we are of the opinion that nonpayment of maintenance allowance also constitutes part of cause of action in a suit for maintenance. 12. In view of the above, First Appeal No. 68 of 1991 filed by Pratap Chandra Misra against Archan Pratap minor is hereby dismissed while First Appeal No. 86 of 1991 filed by Smt. Archana Misra is allowed and the judgment and order of the learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow, to the extent it holds that the petition at the instance of Smt. Archana Misra is not maintainable at Lucknow is hereby set aside and it is held that the said petition is maintainable at Lucknow at the instance of Smt. Archana Misra as well as at the instance of Archan Pratap minor. In First Appeal No. 68 of 1991 Archan Pratap will get costs from Pratap Chandra Misra and in First Appeal No. 86 of 1991 Smt. Archana Misra will get costs from Pratap Chandra Misra. Stay order, if any operating shall stand discharged. (Order accordingly.)