ORDER V.S. Kokje, J. 1. This is a case filed by a Judicial Officer posted as Civil Judge Class II and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ujjain against one Shivmohan Singh Parihar and his Advocate Shri Babulal Pandya. The application is for quashment of Proceedings initiated by Shivmohan Singh Parihar through Shri Babulal Pandya, Advocate against the applicant Judicial Officer, Shri Liladhar Baurasi, when this matter came up on 10-10-1991 in motion hearing, the Court was shocked to find that it was not a lone case but it was stated at the bar that several cases against Judicial Officers of Ujjain Sessions Division were Pending in the Courts of Ujjain in almost all of which Shivmohan Singh Parihar was the complainant and Shri Babulal Pandya was his lawyer. While admitting this case for hearing it was directed that a report be called from Sessions Judge, Ujjain about all the pending cases against Judicial Officers in his Judicial District along with record of the cases. In compliance, the Sessions Judge sent the records and report about the pending cases. It transpired that as many as 12 criminal complaints involving Judicial Officers in one way or the other were pending in the various Criminal Courts of Ujjain Sessions Division. There were 9 Transfer Applications also filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate in respect of these cases. After perusal of the records it was thought fit to take suo motu cognizance of the matters and to issue notices to show cause against quashing of the proceedings and or taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act against the complainant and his lawyer. These cases were registered as M. Cr. Cs. No. 2590/91, 2584-91, 2588/91, 2593/91., 2579/91, 2581/91, 2577,91, 2585/91, 2586/91, 2578/91, and the cases relating to transfer Applications are M.Cr. Cs. No. 2596/91, 2594/91, 2592/91, 2591/91, 2589/91, 2587/91, 2583/91, 2582/92, and 2580/91. 2. All these cases were heard together after service of notice on the non-applicant. In some cases the reply has also been filed. 3. A perusal of the record of all these cases show that vague, general and baseless allegations have been made in the complaints and scandalous allegations have been made against the Presiding Judges of the Courts below. 2. All these cases were heard together after service of notice on the non-applicant. In some cases the reply has also been filed. 3. A perusal of the record of all these cases show that vague, general and baseless allegations have been made in the complaints and scandalous allegations have been made against the Presiding Judges of the Courts below. The question for consideration in all these cases is as to whether the proceedings deserve to be quashed, whether action under Contempt of Courts Act be taken against the Non-applicants and as to what action be taken against Shri Babulal Pandya Advocate appearing in these cases. 4. So far as the quashing of the proceedings is concerned it is settled law that the inharent powers of the Court can be used to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court as also to ethers wise secure the ends of justice: (a) In Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. U.O.I. 1986 (1) SCC 259 . it was observed by the Supreme Court that addressing letters to the Advocate General and Passing them to persons not concerned amounted to abuse of the process of Court. (b) In Vijay Pal Reddy v. State AIR 1278 SC 1590, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the inherent powers could be involved only when the facts alleged in the complaint, if they are accepted to the correct on their face value, do not make out an offence with which the accused is charged. (c) In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre AIR 1988 SC 709 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that the legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed the test to be applied by the cases is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations made, prima-facie established the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration special features which appear in a Particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest or justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the Court to take into consideration special features which appear in a Particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest or justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is to on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage. 5. So far as the Contempt of Courts Act is concerned the settled law is as follows: (a) In National Textile Workers Union v. P. B. Ram Krishnan AIR 1983 SC 759 , the conduct of the contemner in writing against High Court Judges was considered to be a serious interference with the administration of Justice. (b) In Rachapudi Subbarao v. Advocate General Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 755 , a notice imputing malice, partiality and dishonesty to the Court in the Judicial adjudication of the suits against the parties was held to amount to criminal contempt. (c) In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries AIR 1980 SC 946 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that every abuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to contempt of Court. Abuse of process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceeding Or the orderly administration of justice is a contempt of Court. It was further observed that it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its perpicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. (d) In State of Orisa v. Bardakant Misra AIR 1974 SC 710 , it was observed that it is the expectation and coptilance of all those who have or likely to have business therein this the Courts perform all their functions on a high level of rectitude, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. (d) In State of Orisa v. Bardakant Misra AIR 1974 SC 710 , it was observed that it is the expectation and coptilance of all those who have or likely to have business therein this the Courts perform all their functions on a high level of rectitude, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. It was further observed that where a memo of appeal to the Supreme Court against certain contempt proceedings, the contemner, a Judicial Officer alleged that he fears bias of the High Court, that he entertained apprehension that the High Court may impose substantive punishment and may refuse bail or time for getting redress from the Supreme Court, if the proceedings were to go on before the same High Court, the aspersions amounted to gross scandalisation of the High Court. It was further observed in this case that there is no warrant for the narrow view that the offence of scandalisation of Court takes place only when the imputation has reference to the adjudicatory functions of the judge in the seat of Justice. The right of appeal does not give right to commit contempt of Court. It was also held in this case that allegations of malafides, bias, improper motive and procedure against High Court Judges in ground of appeal to Government amounted to gross Contempt of Courts. (e) In Asharam M. Jain v. C. T. Gupta AIR 1983 SC 1151 , the Supreme Court refused to accept unqualified apology tendered by a contemner who had made serious allegations against Chief Justice of High Court showing contemptuous disregard of all decencies. The contemner was sentenced to simple imprisonment for 2 months. (f) In Ramdayal Markara v. State of M.P. AIR 1978 SC 921 , it was held that allegation that a Judge has a predisposition to convict was not a fair criticism of judicial act and amounted to contempt. In that case a senior lawyer of a Court in rural area attacked a judgment given by the Court on the ground that had a wayward bend of mind and wielded a wayward pen and that he took a deliberate turn in the discussion of evidence because he had resolved to convict the accused. This was taken to be contemptuous behaviour. This was taken to be contemptuous behaviour. (g) In S. K. Sarkar, Member of Board of Revenue v, Vinay Chandra Misra AIR 1981 SC 723 , the Supreme Court held that High Court may take cognizance on its own motion of a contempt of subordinate Court on the basis of information received by it. 6. There is yet another aspect of the case which concerns the Counsel, Shri Babulal Pandya, Counsel for the complainant in the lower Courts and for the non-applicant No. 1 in this case. Section 35 of the Advocate's Act, 1961 provides for punishment for Advocate's misconduct. The disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council is invested with the power to action against an Advocate for mis-conduct : (a) In the matter of D, an Advocate of Supreme Court AIR 1956 SC 102 , the conduct of an Advocate in the criminal trial against him disclosed the continuous and persistent attempt on the part of the Advocate to be rude to and contemptuous of the Magistrate, to hold up the trial and to do everything in his power to bring the administration of justice into contempt, such a conduct was severally condemned and the Advocate by reason of his having indulged in conduct unworthy of the honorable profession suspended from practise for one year. (b) In Lalit Mohan v. Advocate General AIR 1957 SC 250 , a legal practitioner imputed partiality and unfairness against the Munsif in open Court. He suggested that the Munsif following no principle in his order. It was held in these circumstances that the legal practitioner was guilty of grave professional mis-conduct. (c) In Registrar, High Court Bombay v. S. K, Irani AIR 1963 Bom 254 , it was held that a letter by the counsel written under instructions of his client does not absolve him of his responsibility in scandalising the Court. (d) In re Provash Chandra (F. B.) AIR 1961 Cal. 459 calling Magistrate 'Spitful' and admonishing him for disobliging lawyers was held to be a misconduct. (e) In B. S. Pleader. Samastipur, In the matter of S.B. AIR 1935 Pat 249, statements gratuitously and unnecessarily made in open Court which contained inputation against the fairness and impartiality of the Court without any foundation were held to amount to professional misconduct. (f) In re Tulsidas Amanmal Karani AIR 1941 Bom 228, it was observed that misconduct is a sufficiently wide expression. Samastipur, In the matter of S.B. AIR 1935 Pat 249, statements gratuitously and unnecessarily made in open Court which contained inputation against the fairness and impartiality of the Court without any foundation were held to amount to professional misconduct. (f) In re Tulsidas Amanmal Karani AIR 1941 Bom 228, it was observed that misconduct is a sufficiently wide expression. It is not necessary that it should involve moral turpitude. Any conduct which in any way render a man unfit for exercise of his profession or is likely to tamper or embarres the administration of justice by High Court or any of the Court subordinate there to may be considered to be a misconduct. (g) On re 'P' An Advocate AIR 1963 SC 1313 , it was held that the term infamous conduct in ax a professional respect means that in the pursuit of his profession the lawyer or the medical man or the Chartered Accountant has done something which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by his professional brethern of good repute and competancy. It was also observed that Advocate or pleader is punishable in his professional capacity for misconduct other than professional mis-conduct. 7. After having surveyed the case law on the points, let us now examine the facts of this case in the light of the aforesaid legal position. On 3-9-1991 the Non-applicant No. 1 Shivmohansingh Parihar filed a criminal complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain against the applicant Shri Liladhar Baurasi, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ujjain. Shri Babulal Pandya was his counsel in this case also. Offences u/s. 217, 218 and 219 of I.P.C. are mentioned to have been committed by the Judicial Magistrate as per the heading of the complaint. The case was filed at 11.45 p.m. The Court again took it up at 3.20 p.m. when Shri Pandya, Counsel for the complainant asked for time. The case was then posted for 9-9-91 for statement of the complainant u/s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short 'the Code"). On that date and on 10-9-91 time was sought by Shri Babulal Pandya, on 28-9-91 statements u/s 200 of the Code were recorded. Complainant's witness Shri Issaque Mohd. was present but his statements were not recorded as the Court wanted to be satisfied that sanction u/s. 197 of the Code was not necessary. On that date and on 10-9-91 time was sought by Shri Babulal Pandya, on 28-9-91 statements u/s 200 of the Code were recorded. Complainant's witness Shri Issaque Mohd. was present but his statements were not recorded as the Court wanted to be satisfied that sanction u/s. 197 of the Code was not necessary. Shri Pandya insisted that even before the question of sanction u/s. 197 of the Code was considered. Statements u/s. 202 of the Code be taken and for arguing the point, sought adjournment. The case was fixed then for 11-10-91. On that date lengthy arguments were heared on the point of necessity of sanction u/s. 197 of the Code for prosecution the case was posted for order on 14-10-93 on 12-10-1991 Shri Pandya moved an application praying for stay of further proceedings on the ground that the complainant proposed to file a Criminal Case against the Presiding Officer Shri Subhash Kakade, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain. 8. So far as the question of the proceedings is concerned a bare perusal of the complaint and the statement u/s. 200 of the Code show that the allegations clearly relate to the action of Shri Liladhar Baurasi, in discharge of his duties as Judicial Magistrate First Class. Ujjain. What has been complained of is that in five cases the Judicial Magistrate First Class had passed orders which were wholly illegal, against legal procedure, against precedent. The case clearly falls under the protection of Sec. 3 of Judges (Protection) Act. 1985. There is clearly a bar against entertainment of such a complaint and the chief Judicial Magistrate clearly erred in entertaining the complaint itself. Section 3 (1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads as under: Section 3. Additional Protection to Judges : (1) notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed done spoken by him when, in the of, acting or in the of, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. It would be obvious from the plain language of the provision that there is a clear bar against entertainment or continuance of any civil or criminal proceedings against a Judge for whatever he does as a Judge, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his judicial duty. In such cases the Magistrate is not bound to record the statement of the complainant u/s. 200 of the Code also. On seeing that a Judge is being souhgt to be prosecuted on charges which relate to the discharge of duty as a Judge, it is the duty of any Magistrate before whom such a complaint comes to immediately test the case on the anvil of S. 3 (1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and or finding that the bar under that section is attracted to dismiss the complaint there and then. It is unfortunate that several Magistrates of Ujjain Sessions division entertained cases against magistrates without even caring to see whether such complaints were entertainable. It is not to suggest that cases against Judicial Officers deserve a different treatment, but it would be a legitimate expectation that a Judge sitting in judgment over the actions of another Judge, especially when the acts are alleged to be done or purported to be done in discharge of judicial duty, would seriously apply his mind to the case to eliminate the possibility of a Judge being harassed on false, frivolous and vexatious allegations. The minimum, which is required of a Judge in such a situation is to first see whether the case was barred by the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. In the bunch of cases which came before me, I found to my great dissatisfaction that the cases dragged on for an unreasonably long period and even transfer applications moved on the ground that the complaint was against the same Presiding Officer were also not attended to expedititously. I sincerely hope that the Magistracy in general will learn a lesson from the present case and would do all that which is necessary to be done in law, for putting down with heavy hand, such a blatant abuse of the process of their Court for pressurising blackmailling or embarrassing Judges ? On a bare reading of the complaint in the present case it should have been thrown out as not entertainable in view of S. 3 (1) of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. On a bare reading of the complaint in the present case it should have been thrown out as not entertainable in view of S. 3 (1) of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Moreover, the allegations in the complaint are all vague, and general and infact scandalous. They make out no oddence under any Act much less offences u/s. 217, 218 and 219 of I.P.C. mentioned in the complaint. The complaint and all the proceedings based on it, therefore, amount to a clear abuse of process of law and deserve to be quashed in the interest of justice. 9. The lodging of such a complaint containing virulous attack on a Judge for whatever he had done in discharge of his duties is clearly contumacious. The complaint has attributed motives to the Magistrate. It reads as under: Ors. Lang Hindi Page-344 10. Similarly in his own statement u/s. 200 of the Code he made disparaging remarks about the judicial conduct of the Judicial Magistrate. The documents filed alongwith complaint also contained several allegations as regards the conduct of the Judicial Magistrate as a Judge. The application dated 12-10-91 also contains allegations not only against the Judicial Magistrate Liladhar Baurasi but against the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain in whose Court the case was pending. In the light of the case law cited herein above there is a clear case for taking action against the non-applicant Shri Shivmohansingh Parihar as also against Shri Babulal Pandya. Under the rule for proceedings under contempt of Courts Act framed by High Court cases involving contempt of Court are laid before the Division, Bench and are registered as Misc. Cr. Cases. Let a M. Cr. C. under Contempt of Courts Act be registered against the Non-applicants and placed before the Division Bench for further orders. The lower Court's record as also the record of this M. Cr. C. along with this judgment be also placed before the Division Bench for reference. The non-applicants are directed to remain present before the Division Beach for further proceedings on 5-3-1992. 11. The conduct of Shri Babulal Pandya Advocate in the cases is to say the least extremely reprehensible. In the light of the case law discussed above his actions prima-facie amount to professional mis-conduct. It would not be enough to send a copy of this judgment to the State Bar Council for appropriate action. 11. The conduct of Shri Babulal Pandya Advocate in the cases is to say the least extremely reprehensible. In the light of the case law discussed above his actions prima-facie amount to professional mis-conduct. It would not be enough to send a copy of this judgment to the State Bar Council for appropriate action. It is the duty of this Court to see that such conduct on the part if an advocate is not taken lightly. The Additional Registrar is, therefore, directed to file a complaint against Shri Babulal Pandya, Advocate, Ujjain before the State Bar Council for professional mis-conduct committed by him by moving several applications containing scandalising matter as also by filing several untenable complaints against Judicial Officers of Ujjain. The Additional Registrar shall pursue the matter with the State Bar Council and do all that is necessary to prosecute such proceedings till the end. 12. It appears that there are no effective provisions enabling the Judicial officer to control abuse of the process their Court by lawyers appearing before them. Contempt Proceedings have also become lesser effective because of the lengthy procedure involved in making a referance etc. Filing complaints before the disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council is also not feasible for every Court because even if such a direction is given there is no machinary to prosecute the complaint further on behalf of the Court. In these circumstances, it appears that time has come for the High Court to think of making appropriate rules in exercise of powers granted to it by Sec. 34 or the Advocates Act, 1961 laying down the conditions subject to which an Advocate shall Be permitted to practise in the High Court and the Courts subordinate there to. Effective control ever erring advocate who abuse the license to practise as a licence to abuse the process of Court and to pressurise and blackmail the Judge, can be exercised by all Courts, if by a rule it is provided that if an Advocate abuses the process of a Court and does not conduct himself properly, while conducting a case, his vakalatnama in that particular case can be cancelled by the Judge and he may not be allowed to conduct that particular case. The matter deserves consideration of High Court and the Additional Registrar is directed to bring this to the notice of Rule Making Committee (Civil) of the High Court. 13. The matter deserves consideration of High Court and the Additional Registrar is directed to bring this to the notice of Rule Making Committee (Civil) of the High Court. 13. In the result, the proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain against Liladhar Baurasi, J.M.F.C., Ujjain, initiated by Shri Shivmohansingh Parihar are hereby quashed, the action under the Contempt of Courts Act is directed to be taken against the non-applicants and a complaint against Shri Babulal Pandya, Advocate non-applicant No. 2 is directed to be (filed by the Addl. Ragistrar before the State Bar Council of M. P. Council of M.P. Normally in a criminal case costs are not awarded to the applicant. However, this is an exceptional case in which a Judicial Magistrate was driven to rush to this Court to avoid the harasment and embarrassment, he was made to face by the Non-applicants. He deserves to be compensated and, therefore, in the interest of justice, I direct the non-applicants to pay Rs. 1,000/- each to the applicant as costs of these proceedings. This amount of Rs. 2000/-shall be recoverable in the same manner in which a fine is recovered by virtue of S. 431 of the Code. C.J.M. Ujjain to recover the amount of costs and pay it to applicant with these directions this case is disposed of.