JUDGMENT 1. - The non-petitioner plaintiff filed a suit for rent and eviction against the petitioner who was the defendant in the suit. The suit was on the ground of default in payment of rent and some more grounds. The defendant petitioner appeared and contested the suit. An exparte decree was passed on 16th March, 1991 by which the suit was decreed and before passing the exparte decree the rent payable under section 13 (3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was determined on 22.9.1990 and rent was not deposited. The defence against eviction was struck off. Subsequently according to the petitioner he came to know about the exparte decree in March, 1992 and he moved an application for setting aside the exparte decree. Along with this an application for condonation of delay was filed but the trial court rejected this application. He preferred an appeal before the District Judge but the same was also rejected. Then he preferred a revision petition before this court which was allowed and the matter was remanded to the District Judge, who ultimately dismissed the appeal. Meanwhile execution proceedings were pending and in those proceedings the petitioner preferred objections under Section 47 of the CPC and the same have been dismissed by the Civil Judge Kota by his order dated 16.7.1992. It is against this order dismissing the objections under section 47 CPC that the petitioner has preferred this revision petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity and as such it cannot be executed. This contention is based on the ground that at the time suit was filed in November, 1989 rent for five months only was due, hence ground of default was not available to the non-petitioner. It is contended that there is no finding of the trial court about the existence of personal necessity of the plaintiff landlord or on the other grounds on which the eviction was claimed and when basis for default goes away and the decree has been passed on grounds of default in payment of rent then such a decree cannot be executed being a nullity. According to him ordinarily the executing court cannot go beyond the decree, but when the very basis of the decree is missing and the decree is nullity then it is open to the executing court to refuse execution of the decree. A number of decisions have been relied upon by him, which are as under. 2. In Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and others, AIR 1978 SC 22 , a compromise decree for eviction suit under the Rent Act was passed and the decree was to be executed after five years. The compromise decree was challenged as a nullity on the ground that the decree incorporated a lease of five years and in absence of registration it was invalid. It was observed that a decree for eviction of a tenant cannot be passed solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties and the court has to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant had admitted by the compromise. When a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution the executing court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. In this case after considering the terms of the compromise and whole tenor of the compromise petition it was held that the decree was a lawful decree of eviction founded on statutory ground and there was sufficient material to show that the trial court applied its mind and was satisfied that a valid decree under the M.P. Act could be passed. 3. In Nandi Bala Dassi v. Bibhupi Bhushan Mukhjerjee,1987 (1) R.C.J. 521 , the objection under section 47 CPC was raised in execution and it was held that the executing court can go behind the decree in deciding the executability of the decree while deciding an objection under section 47 CPC and if the court was not satisfied about the existence of any ground under section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act then the decree could be held to be nullity. In this case the court passing the decree had not come to any finding at all as to whether any of the alleged grounds for eviction as made in the plaint had been proved. 4. In V.S. Alwar Ayyangar v. Guruswamy Thevar, AIR 1981 Mad. In this case the court passing the decree had not come to any finding at all as to whether any of the alleged grounds for eviction as made in the plaint had been proved. 4. In V.S. Alwar Ayyangar v. Guruswamy Thevar, AIR 1981 Mad. 354 , it was held that the fundamental rule is that the executing court cannot go behind the decree. It is also fundamental that it is open to a judgment debtor to resist execution on the ground that the judgment against him is a nullity. The executing court can very well decline to execute a decree if it is satisfied that it is a nullity and when it does so, it is not to be regarded as going behind the decree, for the simple reason that there is no decree at all to go behind. In this case the decree holder had obtained a declaration that he was in possession of the suit land and the judgment debtor was restrained from interfering with his possession. In the execution the decree holder complained that the judgment debtor wilfully disobeyed the court's injunction but the judgment debtor objected the execution on the ground that he was entitled for the possession of the land and he obtained a declaration from a Record Officer that he was cultivating tenant of the land. Considering all the circumstances the plea of the judgment debtor was not accepted and the decree was allowed to be executed by sending the judgment debtor to civil prison. 5. In Sunder Das v. Ram Prakash, AIR 1977 SC 1201 , a decree for eviction was passed and in execution an objection was raised that the decree was rendered null and void by virtue of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was held that an executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule which is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Referring to section 50 of the Act which had been introduced with retrospective effect it was held that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit and therefore the decree for eviction was a nullity. 6. In Haji Sk. Referring to section 50 of the Act which had been introduced with retrospective effect it was held that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit and therefore the decree for eviction was a nullity. 6. In Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao, AIR 1962 SC 1230 , the suit for possession was based on proprietary rights, but the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950 came into force before the decree was passed. As the decree was passed in ignorance of the Act, it was held that the executing court can refuse to execute it. 7. In Krusha Chandra Sahood v. Indramani Sahu, AIR 1984 Orissa 49 , the judgment debtor was allowed to raise the plea during execution proceedings that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit for eviction when Rent Control Act was in force. It was a case of complete lack of jurisdiction. 8. In Sushil Chandra Sur and others v. Smt. Sadhana Bakobi and another, AIR 1982 Cal. 417 , compromise decree for eviction was passed and there was no indication that the court while passing decree applied its mind as to existence of statutory ground of eviction. In the circumstances the decree was held to be a nullity. It could not be executed and the executing court could go behind decree. This view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Lal and another, AIR 1970 SC 790 . It was held that the jurisdiction of the court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 13 (1) have been proved. Where the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between parties, the court was not competent to pass the decree under execution and same must be held to be a nullity. 9. In B.V. Patnakar and others v. C.G. Sastry, AIR 1961 SC 272 , the matter related to interpretation of Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order of 1948. In this order the restriction was placed on the power of the court to execute the decree and when this prohibition was not considered the delivery of possession was set aside and the judgment debtor was put back in possession. 10. In this order the restriction was placed on the power of the court to execute the decree and when this prohibition was not considered the delivery of possession was set aside and the judgment debtor was put back in possession. 10. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others, AIR 1974 SC 471 , it was held that the mere fact that Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the Bombay Rent Act, does not remove that prohibition on the Rent Court or empower it to make a decree for eviction de hors the statute. Considering the material it was held that the courts satisfaction about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction can be presumed from the compromise incorporated in the decree. 11. In Narsaram v. Smt. Babli Bai, 1983 RLR 499 : AIR 1983 Raj. 208 , it was held that the court passing a decree for eviction must satisfy itself that one of the grounds contained in section 13 (1) exists. In this case an objection was raised in the execution and considering the material it was held that the pleading about the non payment of rent were not very clear. But taking over all view of the averments of the plaint it was held that the grounds contained in section 13 (1) was sought to be alleged by the plaintiff and the defendant also fully well understood the fact that the suit was based on the ground of default. In the circumstances the decree was not held to be a nullity. 12. In K.C. Manchanda v. Murree Brewery Co., AIR 1968 Del. 167 , it has been held that while executing the decree or order made by a Tribunal, the Tribunal functions as a Civil Court and it can consider the decree passed by the Tribunal. If the decree is made by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction, then it is a nullity because the court cannot have seizin of the case and if the decree is-a nullity then it would be non-est and the executing court could decline to execute the decree. 13. If the decree is made by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction, then it is a nullity because the court cannot have seizin of the case and if the decree is-a nullity then it would be non-est and the executing court could decline to execute the decree. 13. In Yumnam Amudombi Singh v. Chabungbam Maipak Singh, AIR 1970 Manipur 87 , it was held that the question of validity of a decree can be raised only on the ground that the court passing a decree lacked inherent jurisdiction as to the subject matter or over parties arrayed before it. The question was whether Registrar of Cooperative Societies had jurisdiction to decide a particular dispute or it was to be taken to a civil court. 14. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 , the compromise decree for ejectment without satisfying about the grounds of eviction as provided under the Act was held to be a nullity and it could not be executed. 15. Another argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when a suit for eviction is not based on the ground of default then the rent is not to be determined and the ground of section 13 (5) for striking out defence is not available and the court should not proceed under section 13 (5) of the Act. In support of this contention he placed reliance on Rajendra Kumar v. Jamnadass, 1975 WLN 15 . 16. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner has strongly contested the matter and claimed that the executing court cannot go behind the corectness of the decree. According to him only in case of inherent lack of jurisdiction it is open to the executing court to look into the decree but the correctness or otherwise cannot be looked into by the executing court. 17. In Chhutan Lal v. The Punjab National Bank, AIR 1972 Raj. 159 , a decree made on the basis of an unregistered award, though passed in contravention of law was held to be binding and conclusive and could not be said to be a nullity to be questioned in execution. 18. In V. Ramaswami Aiyengar v. T.N.V. Kailasa Thevar, AIR 1951 SC 189 , it was held that the duty of an executing court is to give effect to the terms of the decree. 18. In V. Ramaswami Aiyengar v. T.N.V. Kailasa Thevar, AIR 1951 SC 189 , it was held that the duty of an executing court is to give effect to the terms of the decree. It has no power to go beyond its terms, though it has power to interpret the decree and it cannot make a new decree for the parties under the guise of interpretation. 19. In Hiralal Patni v. Kalinath, AIR 1962 SC 199 , an objection was taken in the execution proceedings regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the court which passed the decree. It was held that the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction does not go to the root of the jurisdiction and the validity of the decree cannot be challenged on that ground in execution proceedings. 20. In was observed that objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case, because the objection regarding competence goes to the very root of jurisdiction and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. 21. In view of the case law cited on behalf of both the sides, it has to be seen whether in the present case the objection of the petitioner that the decree is a nullity and therefore unexecutable can be accepted or not. The decisions which have been cited can be said to lay down the principle that normally the executing court cannot go beyond the decree. The executing court has to execute the decree as placed before it and it is only if the decree is a nullity that it can be said to be unexecutable and in this circumstance the executing court can look into the objections. The validity of the decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that in could not have seizin of the case because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction. Section 13 (1) of the Rent Control Act says that notwithstanding anything contained in the law of contract no court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of a land lord whether in execution of a decree or otherwise unless it is satisfied ...... Section 13 (1) of the Rent Control Act says that notwithstanding anything contained in the law of contract no court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of a land lord whether in execution of a decree or otherwise unless it is satisfied ...... As the words used in this section include the execution of a decree, hence it is open to the executing court to see whether the court passing a decree has satisfied itself about the existence of the grounds enumerated in section 13 (1) of the Act or not. The executing court does not sit as an appellate court going into the correctness of the finding arrived at by the trial court. If the trial court has given a finding about the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in section 13 (1) then the decree cannot be said to be a nullity so as to persuade the executing court to decline to execute the same. It may be stated here that the decree would be invalid or a nullity if the court passing the same had inherent lack of jurisdiction. When the court could not have exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of dispute or the parties then the decree would be a nullity but the same cannot be said about the correctness of a finding arrived at by the trial judge. The trial court may pass a decree for eviction on the ground that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months or on personal necessity or any of the grounds contained in sub-section (a) to (1) of section 13 (1) of the Act. The executing court cannot look into the correctness of this finding. This correctness of the finding can be challenged only in appeal. 22. In the present case there is no controversy that the court which passed the decree was competent to pass the same and there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in it. The only ground urged is that at the time the suit was filed the rent for five months only was due and as such clause (a) of section 13 (1) was not applicable and the decree could not be passed on this ground. The objection taken by the petitioner is one which can be canvassed in appeal from the decree but not in execution proceedings. The objection taken by the petitioner is one which can be canvassed in appeal from the decree but not in execution proceedings. Here the trial court has considered the material on record and arrived at a finding that the tenant petitioner is a defaulter in the payment of rent and as such liable to be evicted. The existence of this finding is itself sufficient to proceed with the execution of the decree and the executing court cannot go beyond this finding in order to ascertain its correctness. The decree has been passed after being satisfied about the existence of a ground for eviction and as such is a valid decree and therefore can be executed. The executing court cannot go beyond the decree in order to ascertain whether the decree passed has been passed correctly or not. The executing court namely, the Civil Judge Kota has rightly dismissed the objections under section 47 CPC and this revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.Revision dismissed. *******