Birla Jute & Industries v. Civil Judge, Chittorgarh (44)
1992-11-05
K.C.AGRAWAL
body1992
DigiLaw.ai
Honble K.C. AGRAWAL, C.J. — This petition, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, has been filed by the Birla Jute and Industries Ltd., for quashing of the order of the Civil Judge, Chittorgarh, dated 15.4.89 in Civil Misc. Case No. 1/88, and the award given by the Collector. The prayer made is further that the Collector be directed to determine the amount of compensation afresh. 2. Birla Cement Works is a Unit of Birla Jute & Industries Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Calcutta. 3. The petitioner company required material for the manufacture of cement which is excavated from the land which is taken over by the Company u/s 89(4) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The petitioner company, made an application to the Collector, for handing over possession of the land by dispossessing respondents No. 3 and 4, to whom the same belonged. The application was contested by respondent No. 3, protesting against the acquisition. The application made by the petitioner was finally transferred to the Addl. Collector. On 15.12.87, he determined the compensation to the tune of Rs. 2, 38, 110, 45. The petitioner-company, did not accept the award and sub tutted an application u/s 89(4), read with Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, before the Addl. Collector No. II, Chittorgarh, for making reference to the Civil Judge. The Additional Collector, accepted the reference of the petitioner, and consequently, made the reference to the Civil Judge, for determination of the amount of compensation. 4. Before the Civil Judge, the respondent-claimant, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the reference, contending that the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, having been repealed by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, of 1987, the reference application, was not maintainable. 5. The Civil Judge, upheld the objection of respondent No. 3. holding that S. 89(4), providing for reference being made to the Civil Judge, did not apply.
5. The Civil Judge, upheld the objection of respondent No. 3. holding that S. 89(4), providing for reference being made to the Civil Judge, did not apply. S. 89 (4) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, with which we are concerned, is quoted below :- "89 (4)-If, in the exercise of the right herein referred to over any land, the rights of any persons are infringed by the occupation or disturbance of the surface of such land, the State Government or its assignee shall pay to such persons compensation for such infringement and the amount of such compensation shall be calculated by the Collector, or if his award is not accepted by the civil court. as may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act XXIV of 1953)." 6. Contending that the view taken by the Civil Judge, was erroneous, the present writ petition has been filed by the Birla Jute and Industries Ltd. 7. I have heard counsel for the parties. In my view, the Civil Judge, was right in holding that the reference application was not maintainable, Apart from the reason given by him, another ground which strikes is that us 89 (4), if the rights of any person are infringed by occupation or disturbance of the surface of such land, the State Government or its assignee has been directed to pay compensation for such infringement, the amount calculated by the Collector may be increased by the Civil Judge, on a reference being made to him. 8. A reading of the whole provision would indicate that it is the person whose right has been infringed, he alone has been given the right in this provision for enhancement of compensation, by making a reference to the Civil Court. 9. Although counsel for the petitioner contended (hat the language of sub-section (4) of S. 89 is capable of being interpreted, it also has conferred right to the person who suffers on account of excessive compensation having been awarded to the other side.
9. Although counsel for the petitioner contended (hat the language of sub-section (4) of S. 89 is capable of being interpreted, it also has conferred right to the person who suffers on account of excessive compensation having been awarded to the other side. In other words, what was contended by the petitioners counsel, was that sub-section (4) of S. 89, does not confer right only on the person who claims that he has been awarded less than what he should have been, but also to the person who is aggrieved by the excessive awarding of compensation, whose rights have been infringed u/s 89 (4). 10. The aforesaid provision does not support the submission of the petitioners counsel. His contention was that since compensation has been determined in accordance with the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 both the parties have been given right to apply for making of a reference for enhancement or decreasing the compensation. In the present case also, its applicability cannot be confined for enhancement. The provision, sub-section (4) of S. 89 should be widely construed and that as the legislature has not made any distinction between the two categories of persons, the court should not, by artificial interpretation, restrict its scope only to cases of infringement. 11. I am unable to accept the argument. The rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only it would not be open to the courts to adopt and other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the object and policy of the Act. Kanailal Sur. V. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan (1). 12. While holding that sub-section (4) of S.89 applies only to a case where a person whose right is infringed, 1 have applied the rule of plain grammatical meaning. It is only where the two constructions are possible and one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy, while the other construction likely to assist the object of such policy, the court should prefer to adopt the later construction. 13. In the instant case, keeping the object of S. 89 (4), the only conclusion that is derived is that the legislature thought of conferring rights to those persons whose rights have been infringed.
13. In the instant case, keeping the object of S. 89 (4), the only conclusion that is derived is that the legislature thought of conferring rights to those persons whose rights have been infringed. If the word infringe, is not taken into account while interpreting sub-section (4) of S. 89, the whole object would be defeated. The legislature has not made any provision for conferring right to a person for whose benefit the rights have been extinguished, to file a reference, if he feels it to be erring the sum on the side of excessiveness. 14. In Blacks Law Dictionary, the meaning given of word infringement is as under: "Infringement Abreaking into, a trespass or encroachment upon; a violation of a law, regulation, contract, or right. Used especially of invasions of the rights secured by patents, copyrights, and trademarks." 15. From the meaning, the only conclusion possible is us 89 (4), A reference application can be made by the person who suffers on account of acquisition having been deprived of the right, title or interest, which he had before acquisition. 16. Mr. Joshi was not right in contending that as the Land Acquisition (Rajasihan Amendment) Act, 1987 applied, the principles laid down under the Land Acquisition Act, upholding the right, even of a person who is made to pay compensation, can be used. 17. Section 18 has been the subject matter of interpretation by various courts. It has never been accepted by any court that a person who thinks that an award is of the amount more than what it should have been, he can also make a reference. U/s 3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act. a person interested can be made a party, if he claims an interest in compensation and if he comes within S. 20(b) and S. 21 of the Act. A person who thinks that the compensation has been awarded in excess than what should it have been, has no right to move an application for reference. S. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act supports this conclusion. It reads: S. 25-Amount of compensation by Court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector. The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11." 18.
S. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act supports this conclusion. It reads: S. 25-Amount of compensation by Court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector. The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11." 18. Consequently, when the compensation cannot be less in the reference proceedings, than what had been awarded by the Collector, the necessary result is that no reference can be made at his instance. 19. Maxwell, in his Book of Interpretation of Statutes has said— "The rule of construction is "to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed" The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used" for it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament, cannot make the law." 20. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The duty of the court is to explain and not to expound its meaning. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions, which may be entertained by the court, as to what is just and expedient. 21. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed, with costs.