Govind Narain v. Mohan Singh — 1992 DIGILAW 88 (RAJ)

JUDGMENT 1. 1. This second appeal was earlier dismissed by this Court on the premises that the provisions of Section-14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, are not attracted in this case. The appellant then approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. Leave was granted by the Supreme Court on 17th July, 1990 and the appeal was disposed of with the following order:- 1. "That the judgment and order dated, 3rd November, 1989 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 156 of 1988 be and is hereby set aside and the matter be and is hereby remanded to the said High Court for fresh consideration with the directions that the High Court Do restore to its file S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 156/88 and Do dispose of the same after affording the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings and to adduce further evidence, if so advised taking into account the principle stated in A.I.R. 1940 PC 17 and other cases. 2. That there shall be no order as to costs of this Appeal in this Court ; 3. That the Order of this Court dated, 11th April 1990 passed in Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 1990 in this Appeal granting stay of dispossession of the petitioner herein from the shop in dispute situated at Tonk Road, Jaipur shall continue until any such further order as the High Court may make in that behalf." 2. Originally, the second appeal was admitted and following substantial questions of law were framed:- 1. Whether with effect from August 1, 1979, a fresh tenancy of the suit shop was created by the plaintiff, Mohan Singh in favour of the appellant and if so, did the suit for eviction instituted by the respondent from the said premises which had been let out for commercial business purpose could not lie as against the appellant on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, before the expiry of five years, with effect from the said date ? 2. Whether the application under Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C. was wrongly rejected by the first appellate Court ? 3. 2. Whether the application under Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C. was wrongly rejected by the first appellate Court ? 3. After the case was remanded by the Supreme Court for fresh decision of the Second Appeal, an application for amendment of the written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant- appellant. This application was allowed on 13.3.91 and an additional issue was framed in the following terms:- "Whether the execution of rent note dated 13.8.79 (Ex.1) created a fresh tenancy to attract the bar of sub-section(3) of Section-14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950"? 4. Brief facts giving rise to this second appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for rent and eviction on the ground of default and on the ground of personal bona fide necessity. The case set up by the respondent before the trial court was that he had let out a shop to the defendant-appellant on 24.5.68. The last rent note was executed on 3.8.79. The defendant-appellant agreed to take the shop on rent at the rate of Rs. 100/- w.e.f. 1.8.79 and also agreed to make payment of house tax, water and electricity bills. He paid rent and electricity charges upto 30th June, 1980 and thereafter no payment has been made. The tenant had neither paid nor tendered the rent of the suit premises for the period of six months and had thus, defaulted in payment of rent. The respondent-plaintiff also claimed that the disputed premises were required by him for himself and his son and that there was a reasonable and benafide necessity. The respondent had retired from service on 1.2.70 and was interested in doing some business due to financial difficulty. The second son of the respondent, Shri Jai Singh, was weak in studies and the respondent was interested that he may do business of general merchandise with his cooperation and supervision. Jai Singh could not be married because he was not having any business. The appellant-defendant contested the suit by asserting that the premises had not been taken on rent of Rs. 100/- per month. The rent note dated 3.8.79 had not been executed. The premises were taken on rent of Rs. 50/- per month on 24.5.68. The appellant had paid rent to the respondent regularly. He was doing the business of Tailoring. The appellant-defendant contested the suit by asserting that the premises had not been taken on rent of Rs. 100/- per month. The rent note dated 3.8.79 had not been executed. The premises were taken on rent of Rs. 50/- per month on 24.5.68. The appellant had paid rent to the respondent regularly. He was doing the business of Tailoring. The respondents used to get his cloths stitched from the appellant and a sum of Rs. 700/- was due to the appellant from the respondent. Respondent agreed to adjust this amount towards the rent. He had sent Rs. 300/- for the period between 1.7.80 to 30.9.80, but, the respondent refused to accept the same. Therefore, the appellant deposited the amount of rent on 6.1.81 under section 19-A of 1250 Act. The appellant denied the assertion of the respondent about his reasonable and bona fide necessity of the suit premises. He asserted that the plaintiff-respondent had another shop available with him, where he could do his business and the he would suffer greater hardship if the decree for eviction was passed against him. He also stated that the landlord had filed the suit with the object of getting higher rent. The plaintiff-respondent filed a rejoinder in which he reiterated that the suit premises were earlier given on rent of Rs. 50/- but, thereafter he constructed the cement floor, provided an Almirah and made other improvements. Thereafter, higher rent was agreed to be paid. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed six issues. Issue No. 2 related to the question of default and issue No. 3 related to the question of reasonable bona fide necessity. Issue No. 4 related to the question of comparative hardship. 6. Trial Court held that the plea of default raised by the landlord was not tenable, because, the tenant had deposited the rent under section 19-A on 6.1.81. On the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity the trial court held that the landlord required the suit premises for reasonable and bona fide necessity and also that the comparative hardship will be caused to the landlord if the decree for eviction is not passed. In conclusion, the trial court decreed the suit of the landlord. 7. The appeal filed by the tenant against the judgment and decree of the trial court has been dismissed by the lower appellate court. In conclusion, the trial court decreed the suit of the landlord. 7. The appeal filed by the tenant against the judgment and decree of the trial court has been dismissed by the lower appellate court. Lower appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court about the reasonable and bona fide necessity and comparative hardship of the landlord. 8. In this appeal, the appellant has challenged the findings recorded by the trial court as well as the judgment of the lower appellate court on the ground that the same are perverse. 9. When the appeal was argued earlier, learned counsel for the appellant raised the plea that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 14(3) of 1950 Act. This plea was rejected by this Court by holding that the possession of the property was not taken by the plaintiff-landlord from the tenant-appellant after 1968, when admittedly, the tenancy had initially commenced and created. The tenant continued to hold the premises during the period as tenant. More increase or reduction of rent does not necessarily import a surrender of existing lease and the grant of new tenancy. A bare surrender does not follow from mere agreement or unless there is some special reason to infer a new tenancy and the courts below have come to the conclusion that the increase of rent did not import a new demise. Such a finding of fact did not warrant interference in second appeal. As already mentioned hereinabove, the Supreme Court has allowed the appeal of the appellant against the judgment dated November 3, 1986 and the case has been remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration after affording opportunity to the parties to amend their pleadings and adduce further evidence, if so advised, taking into account the principle stated in AIR 1940 P.C. 17 and other cases. 10. Shri Alok Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, has strenuously argued that from the rent note Ex. 1, dated 3.8.79, it is clearly borne out that a new tenancy had come into existence. This tenancy commenced from 1.8.79. Various conditions of lease were incorporated in the rent note, Ex. 1. Shri Alok Sharma submitted that the plaintiff himself came forward with the case that the disputed shop had been taken on rent of Rs. 1, dated 3.8.79, it is clearly borne out that a new tenancy had come into existence. This tenancy commenced from 1.8.79. Various conditions of lease were incorporated in the rent note, Ex. 1. Shri Alok Sharma submitted that the plaintiff himself came forward with the case that the disputed shop had been taken on rent of Rs. 100/- P.M. on the basis of oral tenancy dated 1.8.79 and it was agreed that house-tax, water and electricity charges are not included in the amount of rent and the tenant will not sublet the shop to anybody and he will be responsible for house tax and other municipal taxes. He referred to Para-33 of the plaint and argued that as per the case of the plaintiff himself the tenancy commenced from 1.8.79. He submitted that the suit premises were let out for commercial and business purposes and, therefore, the suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in Clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Section-13 of 1950 Act was not maintainable for a period of five years from the date of tenancy, i.e. 1.8.79. Shri Sharma invited the Court's attention to the cases of A. Ranganatham Chetti and others v. M. Ethirajula Nayudu, AIR 1940 P.C. 17 Gurtcharan Singh v. Kamla Singh and others, AIR 1977 S.C. 5 Abdul Gafoor v. Kunj Bihari Lal, AIR 1957 All. 346 , N.M. Ponniah Nadar v. Kamalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1989 S.C. 467 . 11. Shri M. M. Ranjan, learned counsel for the landlord- respondent, on the other hand, argued that although, the landlord had come out with the plea of tenancy w.e.f. 1.8.79, defendant-tenant had categorically denied the commencement of tenancy from 1.8.79 and had also denied the execution of rent note dated 3.8.79. His case has been that the tenancy commenced on 24.5.68 and the suit had been filed by the landlord only for the purpose of enhancement of rent. Shri Ranjan argued that it was merely a case of enhancement of existing rent from Rs. 50/- to 100/-; there was no surrender of the possession of the suit premises by the tenant in favour of the landlord, after the expiry of earlier tenancy. In the absence of such surrender, there can be no question of creation of a new tenancy. 50/- to 100/-; there was no surrender of the possession of the suit premises by the tenant in favour of the landlord, after the expiry of earlier tenancy. In the absence of such surrender, there can be no question of creation of a new tenancy. Shri Ranjan further argued that once the premises are let out, the period of five years must be counted from that date and not from the date of fresh tenancy. Therefore, if the tenancy commenced on 24.5.68, the period of five years came to an end on 23.5.73, and, therefore the bar imposed by Section 14(3) of 1950 Act was inapplicable. Shri Ranjan placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gappu Lal v. Sri Ji Dwarka Dhish Ji, AIR 1969 SC 1291 Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh, 1987 (2) RLR 890 : 1987 R.L.W. 701. Shri Ranjan also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in N.M. Ponniah Nadar's case (supra). 12. Section 14 of the 1950 Act reads as under:- "14. Restriction on eviction : (1) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (b) of sub-section 13 shall be passed unless the Court is satisfied, after taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, that it is reasonable to allow such eviction. (2). No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall be passed if the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing he decree than by refusing to pass it. Whether the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant." 13. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant." 13. A perusal of Section 14(1) and (2) shows that these provisions impose a restriction on the court in passing a decree of eviction on the basis of the ground specified in Section 13(1) (b) and 13(1) (h) unless the Court is satisfied that it is reasonable to allow eviction on the ground specified in Section 13(1) (b) or where the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. The Court can also pass decree for partial eviction if it is satisfied that no hardship would be caused to either of the parties. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 however, imposes a bar against the filing of suit by the landlord for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purpose on the basis of the grounds specified in Section-13(1)(h) before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant. Thus, section 14(3) imposes a complete embargo on the entertainability of the suit filed by the landlord in case, the conditions specified in section 14(3) are present in a given case. 14. Therefore, the crucial and important question of law which is required to be determined is as to what is the point of time when the premises can be said to have been let out. The crux of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the words used in Section 14(3) are "from the date the premises were let out to the tenant" and not "from the first date the premises were let out to the tenant", or "from the date the premises were first let out to the tenant". His submission is that the word 'first' cannot be read as implicit in the language of Section 14(3). His submission is that the word 'first' cannot be read as implicit in the language of Section 14(3). This is not a case of omission and, in any case, the Court cannot supply the causes omissus. His further submission is that the suit for eviction had been filed in respect of the premises for which tenancy commenced from 1.8.79 and since the premises were let out for commercial or business purposes, no suit could be filed upto 31.7.84. These submissions have been countered by the respondent's counsel who has vehemently argued that no new tenancy had come into existence and, therefore, the suit was clearly out of the purview of Section 14(3) of 1950 Act. 15. In Ranganatham Chetti and others v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (supra), to which reference has also been made in the order of the Supreme Court dated, 17th July, 1990, on the basis of which this appeal is being considered afresh, it was noticed that a tenant whose lease expired on September 30, 1992, continued to remain in possession. There were negotiations which resulted in an agreement by the landlord to give a fresh lease on increased rent. Formally, the lease was executed on 1st Feb., 1923 for a period of ten years from the time the old lease came to an end, i.e. on October 1, 1922. The argument raised on behalf of the tenant in the context of the provisions of Madras City Tenant's Protection Act, 1921, was that the old tenancy was continuing and since the old tenancy commenced before the commencement of 1921 Act the tenant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of 1921 Act. Repelling this argument the Privy Council held that, "though the physical possession was continuous, the possession from 1st October, 1922 was attributable to a new tenancy, which was formally embodied in the lease dated 1.2.1923, the increased rent thereby provided having been paid by the tenant from 1st October, 1922 in terms of the verbal agreement for a lease". 16. In Abdul Gafoor v. Kunj Bihari Lal (supra), Allahabad High Court held that a permanent tenancy right must be deemed to have been waived by acceptance of a new agreement by the tenant. It amounts the waiver of the old terms and their substitution by a new terms. 16. In Abdul Gafoor v. Kunj Bihari Lal (supra), Allahabad High Court held that a permanent tenancy right must be deemed to have been waived by acceptance of a new agreement by the tenant. It amounts the waiver of the old terms and their substitution by a new terms. The permanent tenancy must also be deemed to have been impliedly surrendered with the execution of the new agreement. In doing so, the Allahabad High Court referred to some passages from Rehman's Law of Landlord and Tenants (8th Edition 562), where it has been stated : "There cannot be two concurrent tenancies of the same premises, and therefore, if during the continuance of a lease the landlord with the assent of the tenant, grant a new lease the previous lease is surrendered by operation of law or in other words, the tenant having assented is estopped from afterwards denying the landlord a power to grant the new lease which he could only do, assuming the old lease to be surrendered.......And this is so, whether the new lease is to the tenant himself, or to himself jointly with a third person....... It is immaterial that the new lease is for a less term than the unexpired residue of the old one, for a term of hundred years would be surrendered if there was new demise for a week." 17. Reliance was also placed on Foa on Landlord and Tenant, Edn. 6, at p. 695, where it has been stated : "The reason why this operates as a surrender is that the lessee, by accepting the new lease has been party to an act the validity of which he is by law afterwards, estopped from disposing, and which would not be valid if the first lease continued to exist and as the lessor could not grant the new lease until the prior one had been surrendered, the acceptance "of such new lease is of itself a surrender of the former." 18. In Pandit Kishan Lal v. Ganpat Lal Khosla, AIR 1961 S.C. 1554 , while interpreting the provisions of Section 105 and Section 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Their Lordships observed as under:- "It is one of the obligations of the contract of tenancy that the tenant will, on determination of tenancy, put the landlord in possession of the property demise. Their Lordships observed as under:- "It is one of the obligations of the contract of tenancy that the tenant will, on determination of tenancy, put the landlord in possession of the property demise. Unless the possession is delivered to the landlord before expiry of the period of requisite notice, the tenant continues to hold the premises during the period as tenant". 19. That was a case in which the Singer Sewing Machine Co. was a tenant of the appellant in respect of a shop at Gurgaon since 1934. On August 30, 1954 the Company addressed a letter to the landlord intimating its desire to close down its office from 1.9.54. In that letter it intimated to the landlord that lest there may be any misunderstanding about the payment of rent in future; Mr. Khosla who will be carrying on the business in the shop will be personally responsible for the payments of the rent of the shop. The landlord demanded vacant possession of the shop and stated that till possession was given the tenancy could not be validly determined and the Company will be responsible for payment of rent till the delivery of possession. Their Lordships held that merely, because the Company had written letter to the landlord, the landlord cannot be forced to accept the new tenant as an assignee of the Company's tenancy. 20. In Gappu Lal v. Dwarkadhish Ji (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that mere increase or reduction of rent does not necessarily import the surrender of the existing lease in the grant of a new tenancy". 21. That was a case in which four shops were let to the defendant in 1944 for Rs. 150/- per month and other two shops were let out in 1945 on a rent of Rs. 65/- per month. In 1953, the tenant agreed to pay a consolidated rent of Rs. 215/8 per month for all the six shops and to vacate them by 31st July, 1957. The plaintiff landlord contended that by the reason of change in the quantum of rent a new tenancy had come into existence. The defendant denied the contract and alleged that in 1953 there was only an enhancement of rent. The lower courts held that it was a case of enhancement of rent only. The plaintiff landlord contended that by the reason of change in the quantum of rent a new tenancy had come into existence. The defendant denied the contract and alleged that in 1953 there was only an enhancement of rent. The lower courts held that it was a case of enhancement of rent only. The High Court reversed this conclusion and held that, enhancement of rent would mean that a tenancy would come into existence. This decision of the High Court was reversed by the Supreme Court on the question of coming into existence of a new tenancy and the observations quoted hereinabove were made in that context. 22. In Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh (1987 RLW 701) , an objection was raised about the maintainability of the suit for the first time in Second Appeal. On the basis of Section 14(3) of 1950 Act, learned Single Judge allowed the objection to be raised, but, on merits held that, from mere enhancement of rent alone it cannot be inferred that new tenancy came into existence. The facts of that case are that in the written statement, defendant-tenant pleaded that the plaintiff previously filed a suit for ejectment against him and other three tenants and compromise was effected on 7.1.74 amongst all the four tenants and the plaintiff. One shop was vacated and its possession was given to the plaintiffs and rent of his shop was enhanced from Rs. 40/- to 80/- and thus, a new tenancy in respect of the disputed shop came into existence w.e.f. 7.1.74. Landlord disputed this plea on the ground that the tenant was in occupation and possession of the suit shop for the last 15 years and no change took place in the demise premises by virtue of the compromise dated, 7.1.74. In this case Milip Chandra J. held that, mere enhancement of rent does not result in creation of new tenancy. 23. In N.M. Ponniah Nadar's case (supra), in a suit for eviction filed by the landlord, the tenant claimed the benefit of Madras City Tenants Protection Act and claimed that he was entitled to ask for a sale of the property in his possession because the tenancy was continuing at the commencement of applicability of the provisions of the Act to Shivkashi Municipality. The landlord came with the case that when the terms of tenancy were revised pursuant to the proceedings of the Rent Controller wherein the rent was changed on the basis of settlement and a new tenancy had come into existence between the parties. The trial court and the lower appellate court extended the benefit of Madras City Tenants Protection Act to the defendant, but the High Court reversed the finding and conclusions of the courts below by taking the view that when the parties had increased the rent in 1965 by mutual agreement, it was not a continuance of old lease on payment of higher rent but it was a case of conversion of annual lease into the monthly tenancy and consequently, a new tenancy had come into existence. While examining the issue their Lordships took notice of the fact that original lease was oral one and no written lease was executed in terms of the compromise resulting in increase of rent. If, in fact, new tenancy in supersession of old lease had been created with drastic changes In terms one would legitimately accept the parties to have entered into written contract instead of contenting themselves to be bound by oral agreement. After quoting passage from Gappulal's case (supra), their Lordships further observed : "We may add that if on account of the variation in the quantum of rent any consequential change is made regarding the time and manner of the payment of rent it cannot have the effect of graver consequences being imported into the change of rent than what the parties had intended and warrant a finding by the Court, that the parties had intended to create a new tenancy in supersession of the earlier one or that the operation of law a new tenancy had come into existence". 24. In M. Devasakayam v. Thiruveedi Amman Koli Devastanam, 1968 (2) Mad. L.J. (NRC) 57, a trustee of a temple had obtained a lease of temple property for himself from all the trustees of the temple, which itself was not lawful and in addition he had entered into a fresh lease deed whereunder there was not only an increase of the rent but there was also a limitation of the period of lease to one year. The High Court of Madras held that the lease deed subsequently entered into created a new tenancy because, there was not only an enhancement of rent, but also the imposition of other conditions such as the period of lease etc. 25. In Natesa v. Arumugha, ILR (1968) 3 Mad 776, there was an oral tenancy between the parties. Subsequently, the tenant had entered into a new agreement under a registered instrument fixing the period of tenancy to a period of three years and containing prohibitive clauses forbidding the tenant from subletting or assigning his tenancy etc. The High Court held that there were substantial alterations in the terms of the tenancy and hence, there was adequate justification to hold that the parties had entered into a new tenancy. 26. The principle of law which emerges from the above referred decisions is that mere increase or reduction in the rent by itself is not sufficient to imply the surrender of the existing lease and the grant of new tenancy and even if the mode and time of payment is changed, the supersession of existing tenancy cannot be inferred ordinarily. However, if the terms of the tenancy have changed and a new tenancy agreement is entered into or a new lease is executed by the tenant, the existing tenancy will be deemed to have been surrendered and the fact that the tenant continued to remain in possession will be of no consequence. 27. In the light of the above two principles if the facts of this case are examined, it is clear that in the plaint the plaintiff- respondent himself had come with a specific case that the last rent note of the shop in dispute was executed on 3.8.79 and that the tenant had taken the shop on rent of Rs. 100/- per month w.e.f. 1.8.79 by oral tenancy, the terms of which were reduced in writing on 3.8.79. Paras 2 and 3 of the plaint which are relevant, read as under:- HINDI MATTER 364317 A 28. In Ex. A-4, rent note which was executed on 24.5.68 the period of lease was for one year. Ex.1 is the rent note dated 3.8.79. The period of tenancy is from 1.8.79 to 31.7.80 i.e. for 11 months. The tenancy commenced from 1.8.79 at the rent of Rs. 100/- per month. In Ex. A-4, rent note which was executed on 24.5.68 the period of lease was for one year. Ex.1 is the rent note dated 3.8.79. The period of tenancy is from 1.8.79 to 31.7.80 i.e. for 11 months. The tenancy commenced from 1.8.79 at the rent of Rs. 100/- per month. In his statement before the trial court, the respondent-landlord has stated that the rent deed is Ex.1. In cross-examination he has stated that the rent was charged from Rs. 50/- to 100/-, because, he had got done floor and electric fitting in the shop and also made provision for keeping the goods. It is thus, clear that the original tenancy agreement came to an end in 1969 itself and the tenant continued to be a statutory tenant and a new tenancy commenced from 1.8.79 after the landlord had made improvements in the tenanted premises. The terms were reduced in writing, the period of tenancy was also fixed as 11 months. At the same time, the rent was changed from 50 to 100 per month. While deciding issue No. 5, the learned trial court also took notice of this fact when he observed : HINDI MATTER B 29. On the basis of the above discussion, it has to be held that the new tenancy had come into existence w.e.f. 1.8.79. The two decisions of the Supreme Court in Gappulal v. Dwarkadhish Ji (supra) and N.M. Ponniah Nadar v. Kamalakshmi Ammal (supra) as also the decision of this Court in Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh (supra), are of no help to the respondent landlord. In all the three cases, the parties had merely agreed to enhance the rent. In the case of N.M. Ponniah Nadar (supra), the only additional fact was that the mode of payment was changed from annual to monthly rent. There had been no change in the terms of tenancy. Fresh rent note had not been executed on the basis of improvements made by the landlord in the tenanted premises. The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that since the possession continued to remain with the tenant, therefore, the old tenancy must be treated as continuing, cannot be accepted in the face of the clear decision in A. Ranganatham Chetti and others v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (supra). The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that since the possession continued to remain with the tenant, therefore, the old tenancy must be treated as continuing, cannot be accepted in the face of the clear decision in A. Ranganatham Chetti and others v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (supra). I am also of the opinion that for the purpose of Section 14(3), the period of five years cannot be counted with reference to first tenancy or old tenancy even though a new tenancy comes into existence. The premises will be deemed to have been let out to the tenant from the date of commencement of the new tenancy and not from the date of original tenancy. In the face of this conclusion it must be held that the landlord was not entitled to file a suit for eviction of the tenant upto 31.7.84 and the suit filed by him on 16.8.80 was not maintainable in the face of Section 14(3) of 1950 Act. 30. Consequently, this second appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside and the suit of the respondent is dismissed. 31. Parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.Appeal allowed. *******